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GREAT  
WAR

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# THE GREAT WAR

FOURTH VOLUME  
THE WAVERING  
BALANCE OF FORCES





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RAYMOND POINCARÉ

President of the French Republic.



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President of the French Republic

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FOURTH VOLUME  
THE WAVERING  
BALANCE OF FORCES

BY

GEORGE H. ALLEN, PH. D., FORMERLY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, HISTORY DEPARTMENT; NOW IN THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OF THE GENERAL STAFF AT WASHINGTON; FELLOW IN CLASSICAL ARCHÆOLOGY, AMERICAN SCHOOL OF CLASSICAL STUDIES, ROME, ETC.,  
AND OTHERS



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## PREFACE

Throughout the ages life has been a struggle. From the time when primitive man beset by constant peril sought with grovelling rites to propitiate grotesque creations of his own imagination, the human race has groped its way, blindly but instinctively, through violence and ignorance, towards light and freedom. But whenever man, escaping the malignant spell of superstition, has thrown off the crushing load of fear and has at last dared to stand erect and look Nature in the face, assurance flourished, pride usurped the place of fear, and nations, drunk with greed, arrogance, and lust of power, were borne by their own madness down the path of ruin. The present cataclysm seemed but the culminating disaster of this process.

The world war continually expanded since its scope first created amazement; it has been prolonged beyond all serious expectation. To and fro across the tortured soil of Europe rolled the fiery tide of battle. The headlong fury of the first German onslaught into France was intercepted on the eve of victory. The German hosts marshalled anew poured across Flanders towards the English Channel, but their momentum was blocked at the last moment. The Allies in their turn assailed the vital region of the Dardanelles, where success would have opened immeasurable possibilities. Twice they wavered on the very threshold of victory and fell back. With accumulated strength the Teutonic armies burst the Russian lines along the Dunajec

and Biala, disrupting the entire Galician front. The Austro-German offensive, developing to unprecedented magnitude and directed with masterly coördination, crushed the Polish salient and pressed far back the western front of Russia, but at every critical juncture it fell just short of a decision. The prize pursued with such relentless energy slipped from the hands outstretched to grasp it. The forces of the Central Powers swept over Serbia, levelling the main obstacle to the establishment of their dominion from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf; but their triumphant march was broken off before the final fruits of victory were gleaned. The Allies organized for common action fell upon their antagonists on all fronts at once. The Central Empires quivered beneath the awful strain, but escaped,—though by the narrowest margin. Again and again the fortunes of war turned upon the slenderest chances, while the world hung in agonized suspense on each succeeding crisis, until the very sense of consternation had been blunted.

Meanwhile, millions perished, desolation spread, and from the depths of their despair the peoples cried to Heaven. The ways of Destiny are inscrutable but from the soul's passionate yearning springs the conviction that they are not aimless, that in all the harrowing vicissitudes Destiny with unflinching method elaborates her mysterious design. Salvation depends on the moral fortitude which accepts facts with candor and the confident discernment which interprets them constructively. Faith sees beyond the misery and anguish and in the process detects the nature of the accomplishment.

The imagination falters at the vision of flaming passions and frenzied efforts; heroism and depravity, exultation and despair, tenacity and vacillation, magnanimity and ruthlessness. The judgment of the moment defines the conflict

in precise, exclusive terms as the collision of right and wickedness. The heart bestows its devotion. The soul is stirred to its depths by hope and fear for the party of its choice. But Destiny with cool, inhuman composure, unswervingly pursues her task. Her concern is for the human race as one. She knows no favorites, recognizes no distinctions. Armies, states, and empires are but her means and implements. Perfection is her aim.

Ever fiercer rage the fires of battle. The hour of judgment has sounded and with the roaring of a thousand mouths of flame and the convulsion of earth and sky Nemesis executes the grim sentences of doom. Man and his works are tested. Incompetence and corruption, injustice and dishonesty are consumed by the devouring element. With special zest the flames attack the decadent fabric of pious fictions, sentimental heirlooms, and unreasonable conventions by which the peoples were entangled and repressed. Loyalty quavers. Thrones totter. Means and resources fail. The souls of men are bared. They survive or perish by reason of their inherent worth alone. Unconquerable perseverance, self-control, clearness of vision, constant determination, tireless faith,—these are the crucial attributes. Humanity, bruised and chastened, is exalted through fortitude compounded of these qualities.

Praise be to those who in whatever post cherished the lamp of faith through the hours of deepest gloom! Glory to those who with conscious purpose and unshaken resolution labored to the end, becoming free and willing agents in the consummation of the transcendent plan!

No great earnest effort can be entirely lost, and in this sense there is victory without defeat. Behind and above all broods the spirit of the divine Sculptor under whose action humanity is plastic.

Threatening shadows still hover above the gloomy waste of misery and desolation, but the horizon is now bright with the coming dawn. Slowly from the mists the shadowy outlines of the new age appear. A time will surely come when the destruction of the great conflict will seem small in comparison with the results obtained, and future generations, inspired by a higher conception of life and new principles of justice and reason, shall learn to bless these days of suffering and terror.

GEORGE H. ALLEN, PH. D.

Washington, D. C.

## CHAPTER I

### TENTATIVE OFFENSIVE EFFORTS OF THE WESTERN ALLIES

General character of the campaign of 1915. Probable numerical strength of the chief combatants at the beginning of the year. The situation in the West. The French offensive near Soissons, January 8-14. French offensive in Champagne, February 16-March 11. Battle of Neuve Chapelle, March 11-12. The contest for Les Eparges, April 5-11. Hill 60. The second Battle of Ypres, April 22-May 27. The poisonous gas. Gallantry of the Canadians. Restoration of the Allied front and readjustment of the positions on the Ypres salient. The British offensive near Festubert and the French offensive west of Lens.

In former times the ordinary cessation of warlike operations during the winter months led to the disconnected, annalistic plan for military history. But to-day the development of the physical appliances of war and the increased intensity of military effort tend to eliminate all periodic interruption in the progress of hostilities and to destroy, therefore, the cause for such a formal scheme of composition. The casual relationship of material and space makes the commencement of the present volume coincide with the beginning of the new year, rather than with the waning of the great westward offensive of the Germans in the autumn or with the commencement of their new, imposing undertaking in the spring, or with any particular occurrence in the months that intervened between these two most prominent events. The first winter of the Great War presents no striking turning point nor any interruption in the contracted course of operations, and, conformably, it is our purpose to present a continuous narrative as of an organic fabric of events.

The declining measure of results obtained by the tremendous efforts of the Central Powers during the autumn, and the wavering issue of the subsequent isolated encounters in the West led many observers to believe that a turning point had been reached and that with the progressive marshalling of Allied resources the limit of Teutonic strength must have been surpassed. The vanity of such an assumption was soon to be exposed by the gigantic development of Teutonic energy and strength, far exceeding all prevision.

In general, the initiative grasped by the Central Powers at the beginning was retained by them almost to the close of the second year of the war. With them rested the choice of means, time, and place for dealing with their enemies. Postponing the fulfilment of their original purpose in the West under pressure of an urgent situation on the eastern front, the Germans devoted their attention as preëminently to Russia during 1915 as they had to France in 1914.

The eastern theater now presents a stupendous spectacle of mammoth preparations, bewildering maneuvers, the execution of a colossal plan with boldness and precision, dramatic vicissitudes, the frightful collision of immense contending forces.

The less sensational course of operations in the West is marked by no events of preëminent significance. The situation in the early months of 1915 preserved the general features of the closing weeks of 1914.

By the end of 1914 the Germans had probably added, altogether, thirty-three Reserve and fifteen Landwehr corps to the original twenty-five and one-half corps of the active army. Four of the active corps, the First, Eleventh, Seventeenth, and Twentieth, together with ten and one-half Reserve and seven Landwehr corps appear to have held the eastern front, while the remaining active, twenty-two

Reserve and seven Landwehr corps were probably stationed in the West. The aggregate strength of all the German forces at both fronts may be reckoned as about 3,000,000 men. The Austro-Hungarians could scarcely have mustered more than 1,500,000. Russia may have had as many soldiers under arms as Germany. But a portion of her strength had already been drawn away to face the Turks upon the frontier of the Caucasus and the efficiency of all her armies, in consequence of faulty means of transportation and organization, was obviously far below the standard of the opponents on her western borders.

We may assume that since the completion of their original concentration the French had maintained their forces in the field at about 2,000,000 men. Despite assiduous recruiting and the large numbers already concentrated in the training camps in England, the complement of British forces on the continent fell far below the goal of popular expectation. Including the Indian army they did not yet exceed 220,000 men.


During the first half of 1915 in the West interest centers on certain periods of intenser conflict: the struggle near Soissons, January 8-14; the French offensive in Champagne, February 16-March 11, and, contemporary with its final stage, the Battle of Neuve Chapelle; the contests for Les Éparges, April 5-11; and the second Battle of Ypres, April 22-May 27, with the Allied offensive in Artois and near Festubert which coincided with a part of it.

In the last volume it was pointed out that certain conditions had created a condition of relative stagnation on all the fronts; but these conditions were far more effective on the western front where a state of almost complete immobility prevailed.

The chief aggressive activity of the Germans was naturally transferred to other fields. Except in isolated instances

the essential function of their forces in the West was, for the time, to hold what had been already gained. There the aggressive rôle was undertaken by the Allies, who haltingly essayed the gigantic task of ejecting the enemy from his positions in Northern France and Belgium, while at the same time aiming to distract the prosecution of the German offensive movements against Russia and prevent the shifting of German forces from the western to the eastern front. Consequently a relationship exists between the efforts of the Allies in the West and the periods of greatest tension in the conflict on the eastern front.

The first of the aggressive operations takes us back to the sector of the Aisne, where, on January 8th, the French successfully attacked the German outposts on a prominent eminence known from its altitude in meters as Hill 132. East of this height the railway from Soissons to Laon ascends to the higher level through a long defile. After organizing the new position, the French resumed their attack in the face of desperate resistance, and gained possession of the whole of Hill 132 and of the foremost line of German trenches on the plateau of Perrière, beyond the railway, on the 10th. But in consequence, probably, of insufficient artillery preparation and support, and of delay in the transport of ammunition and supplies, the French suffered a fatal loss of time and did not push the onslaught home at the critical moment of surprise and confusion. The Germans quickly recovered their equilibrium, brought together reinforcements, and counter-attacked with great violence on the 12th, driving the French from all their positions on the higher ground and eventually compelling them to withdraw entirely from the north bank of the Aisne throughout the contested section on the night of the 13th-14th. The presence of the Kaiser lent a specious impressiveness to the final stage of this series of encounters.



German troops surrendering. They have thrown down their rifles, are holding up their hands and are running forward, crying, *Comrades! Comrades!* to the French soldiers shown in their trench to the right. This is from an enlargement of an actual photograph made on the battlefield of *Noire-Dame-de-Lorette*.



A spirited controversy regarding these events grew out of the comments of the press in the two countries. The French admitted a local success of the enemy and the withdrawal of their own forces to the south bank of the Aisne, but they ascribed the misfortune to the flooded condition of the river, which swept away most of the available bridges and hindered the transport of munitions and supplies to the forces on the north bank. They represented the consequences of the episode as inconsiderable.

In Germany, however, these occurrences were treated with the effusive exultation of a conspicuous victory. It was reported that the Germans had taken 5,200 prisoners and that the bodies of 4,000 to 5,000 French soldiers were found upon the field, which seemed to indicate that the futile operation could scarcely have cost the French an aggregate loss of much less than 20,000 men. Recalling General Joffre's order of the day of December 17th, already alluded to in the last volume, to indicate the comprehensive nature of the French intentions, the Germans complacently observed that they had not only frustrated the enemy's great offensive, but had gained a position which would open the way for the decisive resumption of their own offensive towards Paris, when the proper moment came. A dispatch from Berlin declared that the French wall of iron had given way at a point where the French had believed, and had seemed justified in believing, in its solidity, and that von Kluck had again given brilliant proof of his genius as a commander, appearing more and more as "the von Hindenburg of the West."

It was natural that after the radiant dawn of early triumphant expectations had faded into a gloomy noonday of wearisome trench-warfare, such a seemingly auspicious incident should have been seized upon with eagerness in

Germany as a means to counteract impatience and reinforce the sense of confidence.

We should observe, however, that the Germans made no serious effort to cross the Aisne in this region and never employed their new position as a base from which to renew the attack towards Paris. The advantage gained was purely local.

The winter of 1914-1915 in France and Belgium was unusually mild, and at the same time exceptionally rainy. The plains of Flanders, Picardy, and Champagne became veritable marshes, as the saturated earth was unable to absorb the superfluous moisture. The trenches were frequently converted into ditches or canals. Offensive operations were seriously embarrassed. Often batteries moving in accordance with the plans for offensive operations were imprisoned in the soft, adhesive clay, so that the artillery support, upon which the infantry attacks depended for success, was fatally impaired.

In December, as was noted in the last volume, the French made a slight advance during a brief offensive in Champagne, where their front between Reims and the Meuse formed a concave depression towards the south. The operations took place at that time on the sector Perthes-Le Mesnil-Massiges.

The French profited by an interval of clear weather on February 16th to renew their attack with much greater energy in this same region, on a sector extending from a point 500 yards northwest of Perthes eastward to the farm of Beauséjour, a distance of about four miles, and were successful in capturing German trenches along a front of about two miles on the same day, and about 800 yards in addition on the 17th.

They added to their successes on the 20th after many counter-attacks, until by March 3d they were in possession

of all the first line trenches of the Germans from a point northwest of Perthes to one northeast of Beauséjour, had secured with them an important ridge running parallel with the original front of attack, and had even penetrated into places beyond the summit of this ridge.

The seriousness of the situation for the Germans is now indicated by the presence of two regiments of the Guard, transferred from Flanders, where a British offensive was generally expected. But not even this reinforcement could check the ardor or advance of the French, who did not discontinue their offensive in this section until the 11th.


The official communiqués were once more contradictory. The German press weakly sought to indicate a disastrous repulse of the enemy; thus the Press Bureau issued a commentary on the entire operations in Champagne in which it was claimed that the French purpose had been to advance with Vouziers as the objective, to break the German lines, and by creating a diversion in the West, relieve the pressure on the Russians at the time of their defeat at the Masurian Lakes in February. It was insisted that the Russian disaster and the integrity of the German lines proved the French offensive to have been a complete and disappointing failure. Extolling German skill and heroism it was said that the great effort of the French, with six army corps, had been unable to make any impression on a front of eight kilometers held by two feeble divisions of Rhenish troops, which with the support of the battalions of the Guard and those of other formations had repelled the assaults of six times their own number. While it was admitted that the German losses were heavier than in the victorious operations at the Masurian Lakes, those of the French were represented as three times as great as those of the Germans.


The French response, two days later, claimed a gain of from two to three kilometers in depth on a front of seven kilometers, and notably the capture of an important series of ridges, and the infliction of heavy losses on the enemy, and asserted that in consequence the German army in Champagne had been immobilized. It further pointed out that the operations had largely contributed to the brilliant Russian victory in Northern Poland on February 25-March 3, which offset the Russian discomfiture near the Masurian Lakes. It also refuted the German boast of the two Rhenish divisions having repulsed the repeated attacks of six French army corps by recalling the German statement that two corps of General von Einem's army and some battalions of the Guard and of other formations had been summoned as reinforcements.

It would probably be approximately correct to estimate the forces engaged in this French offensive as six army corps for the French and five for the Germans.

The apparent exactitude in detail and relatively moderate tone of the French communiqués as compared with the vagueness and uniformly dogmatic assurance of the German convey an impression of trustworthiness respecting the indications of local gains. But even so, the visible results would seem to have been insignificant in comparison with the greatness of the effort and the heavy losses undoubtedly sustained by the French. As regards the supposed chief purpose of relieving the pressure upon the Russians at a critical moment by creating a diversion in the West, the French authorities may very likely have been justified in the belief that their offensive was a complete success.

If all the French attacks during three weeks had terminated as disastrously as was claimed, the apathy of the Germans in confining themselves to a passive offensive and





French map showing the German advance before the Battle of the Marne and the line of the front during the winter of 1915.

not seizing the opportunity of their opponents' discomfiture to assail the opposing lines with crushing violence, in accordance with the fundamental principle of their doctrine of strategy, would be incomprehensible.

To the observers in the western Allied countries it seemed that with the advent of March a new and decisive stage of the war would be entered on, possibly a protracted one, but certainly to end in the victory they steadfastly held to be inevitable. They noted the increasing frequency and greater vigor of Allied attacks in the western theater and they confidently expected the speedy coming of the new British hosts as the overwhelming factor in the final period of the conflict.

Already in November the Eighth British Division had arrived upon the continent completing the Fourth Corps. In January the Fifth British Corps had been constituted under the command of Major-general Sir Herbert Plumer. The Canadian Division under Major-general Alderson, destined soon to win splendid fame, arrived in Flanders in February, and in the same month two complete divisions of British Territorials were conveyed across the Channel. The total British forces were approaching the half million mark. The disposition of British forces had been somewhat altered since the furious contests which raged around the Ypres salient in the autumn. The length of the British front, now extending from the crest of the salient east of Ypres to the vicinity of La Bassée, was still the same as then. The southern reëntrant of the salient was held by the new Fifth Corps. On their right followed the Second Corps along the sector facing Wytschaete and Messines. General Pulteney's Third Corps still lay astride the Lys. Sir Henry Rawlinson's Fourth Corps stretched from Estaires to west of Neuve Chapelle, the Indians continuing the line to Givenchy, whence the First Corps extended

across the canal and were linked with the left wing of the Tenth French Army of General Maud'huy.

The British forces were now grouped in two armies to the command of which the original corps commanders of the Expeditionary Force had been promoted. The First Army under Sir Douglas Haig comprised the First, Indian, and Fourth Corps, the Second under Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, the Third, Second, and Fifth.

The isolated offensive efforts of the French thus far recorded served chiefly as experiments to test the nature of the problem of breaking the elaborate system of hostile intrenchments, of blasting an opening in the adamantine barrier which faced the Allies in the West. They demonstrated that success could be attained with adequate means and management, a heavy cost in men and ammunition; by the concentration, in fact, of overwhelming forces of men and material upon the section proposed for the attack and absolute secrecy as to the preparations.

The attack must be so coördinated in the staff-work, maintenance of gun control communications and every other detail, that immediately the first-line trenches had been destroyed, and while the crushing effect of the bombardment remained, the artillery should advance its curtain of fire to intercept the enemy's reinforcements. Above all, to overwhelm his successive lines of trenches, an abundant and uninterrupted stream of ammunition was necessary, and the most careful provision had to be made against all contingencies.

Among the considerations that led Field-marshal Sir John French, about the end of February, to decide upon a vigorous aggressive movement on the British front may be assumed the need of fostering the offensive spirit of his troops. The section chosen for the enterprise lay opposite the village of Neuve Chapelle, northwest

of La Bassée, where there was a slight depression in the British front.

East of the German lines and parallel with the opposing fronts there stretched a range of hills which commanded the approaches to Lille and the industrial region in the valley of the Scheldt. Between the British lines and these important heights lay Neuve Chapelle, covered in front by the German first-line trenches, supported in the rear by the defenses of the second line, which in this section followed the course of the Des Lays River. The German Second Corps held this part of the front.

The long period of scarcely interrupted quiet in this region and the tactical superiority of the British aerial service favored the concealment of all the preparations. A powerful mass of artillery was collected on March 8-9, the field-pieces congregated about a mile and a half behind the British front, the heavy guns at Lacouture and Vielle Chapelle, about twice as far away.

The assault of Neuve Chapelle was entrusted to the Fourth and Indian Corps, operating on the north and south respectively. The infantry was concentrated on the evening of the 9th under cover of the darkness, and on the morning of the 10th the British first-line trenches were crowded with troops in tense expectancy, awaiting with eagerness the signal which should terminate the irksome months of monotony and delay.

Suddenly at 7.30 the air was rent by the deafening roar of the British artillery and the earth trembled beneath the terrible concussion. Clouds of smoke arose from the German trenches and great masses of earth were hurled into the air. Four shells to the yard was the rule for the British gunners. Barbed-wire entanglements were torn to bits and parapets were pounded into a chaos of hollows and furrows.

Thirty-five minutes later the gunners lengthened their range so as to interpose an impassable barrier of fire behind the welter of carnage and devastation which had been the German first-line defenses. Instantly the stream of bursting shells, levelling every obstacle, tearing up great trees, began to blow the houses of Neuve Chapelle into bits as readily as a child's destructive whim disperses the toy village in a nursery.

Whistles sounded along the British front. It was a solemn, thrilling moment. The soldiers leaped from the trenches and dashed forward with reckless, headlong vehemence. The 23d and 25th brigades of the Eighth Division advanced towards the northeastern corner and the center of the village respectively, and the Garhwal brigade of the Meerut Division towards the southeastern corner. Then, half an hour later, the curtain fire was lengthened so that Neuve Chapelle was completely shut off from German reinforcements, and the 25th brigade swept into the streets of the demolished village, where most of the Germans had either been killed or wounded or were overcome with terror. The Indian brigade had easily carried the first-line trenches opposite the British right. But on the left the artillery preparation had been deficient and the 23d brigade was held up in front of some remaining wire-entanglements, suffering heavy loss, and was forced to submit to a serious delay before resistance could be overcome.

Thus the British by lack of precision in executing the plan of action were deprived of the unique but transitory chance of pressing forward to the complete realization of their hopes while they themselves were flushed with the enthusiasm of success and the Germans were still demoralized.

Considerable time was now required to reform the British front before a further advance could be undertaken. The





Photograph made under exceptional conditions showing a bayonet charge in the region of the Heights of the Meuse.



View showing the plateau of Les Eparges

remaining brigades of the two corps which were to take part in the further attack did not arrive until 3.30 P. M.

Finally the attack was resumed on lines converging towards the important elevations east of Neuve Chapelle. But here again the artillery preparation had not been thorough. The Germans resisted stubbornly in a large number of houses which had been converted into little fortresses and other intrenched redoubts and at the fortified bridge-heads along the river, supported by a great quantity of machine-guns, until the British attack was discontinued at nightfall.

The Germans, who had now completely rallied, held their ground on the 11th, and, after receiving reinforcements during the night, counter-attacked the next morning with great violence. The struggle continued furiously throughout the 12th without appreciable gains for either side. But by evening Sir John French directed Sir Douglas Haig, the commanding general of the First Army, to hold and consolidate the ground already won and to suspend further offensive operations for the present. The British accordingly intrenched themselves along the River Des Lays.

The ground gained by the British in the three days' Battle of Neuve Chapelle was somewhat more than a mile in depth on a front of three miles, converting a depression into a rounding projection in the contour of their lines. The cost of this advance had been heavy: 190 officers and 2,337 men killed, 359 officers and 8,174 men wounded, and 23 officers and 1,728 men missing; but the British were convinced that the losses of the enemy had been heavier,—they themselves had taken 1,687 prisoners. In his subsequent report Sir John French declared that the principal aim of the British attack had been attained. Yet it is probable that the intended goal had not been defined in precise terms, that the British leaders had really contemplated

much more extensive results, and that the outcome of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle was a disappointment, though a salutary lesson.

Early in April the French brought to a successful conclusion the gradual operation of ejecting their opponents from a prominent position in the broken, wooded country between the Moselle and the Meuse, where the Germans had pushed forward their narrow wedge until it penetrated at St. Mihiel the great fortified barrier that ran from Toul to Verdun. The French plan was not to attack directly the apex of this salient, where the Germans had repaired the captured fort of Camp des Romains, installing guns which commanded the whole region within a radius of many miles, but step by step to crush in its sides so as eventually to throttle the position at the extremity.

The eastern bank of the Meuse is here confined by an extensive hilly zone, known as the Heights of the Meuse, which form the western border of the undulating plain of the Woëvre; and near the eastern margin of this elevated belt rises the isolated plateau of Les Épargés, about 1,000 feet above the sea, or about 250 feet above the adjacent valleys. This was a place of great importance in the German salient and served as a bulwark for the Germans in warding off French operations in the southwestern section of the Woëvre. In the hands of the French it would dominate a large portion of the interior of the enemy salient. The village of Les Épargés northwest of the plateau was held by the French. The plateau was strongly fortified, especially on the northern and western slopes. Two bastions occupied the western and eastern extremities of the hill, connected by double lines of trenches.

The first objective of the French was the western bastion, which they began to attack on February 17th by exploding several mines; then they fought their way up

the acclivity, and gained their initial goal. But the attempt to storm the eastern bastion on the 20th was unsuccessful. For weeks the opposing forces eyed each other with the closest vigilance across a narrow interval on these heights. A fresh attempt made by three French battalions to take the eastern bastion on March 18-21 produced no important change in the situation.

A violent tempest raged throughout the decisive operations which were begun on April 5th at 4 P.M. by two regiments. Torrents of rain covered the heights with a thick layer of mud through which the French soldiers had to struggle for a precarious foothold while exposed to the pitiless rain of shells and sweeping blasts from the German machine-guns.


At first the French made scarcely any permanent progress; but in a struggle lasting all night on the 6th-7th, they captured 500 yards of German trenches. The curtain fire of the artillery on both sides prevented for a time the arrival of reinforcements for either party and the battle waned throughout the day. On the morning of the 8th, however, two French regiments and a battalion of chasseurs by a determined effort won the summit after an hour's struggle and forced the Germans to retire to the section of the ridge lying further east. The conflict was continued with great violence all day and by midnight nearly the whole of the elevation was in the hands of the French, who had captured 1,500 yards of trenches, including the bastion at the summit, the key to the whole position. The Germans were now reduced to a small triangle at the eastern extremity.

A fresh regiment was added to the French forces on the 9th and at 3 P.M. began the final attack by which the Germans were driven from the eastern triangle. They counter-attacked under cover of a fog and for a moment

the French fell back. But as soon as the fog lifted, the fire of the French artillery was resumed, the fresh regiment charged with the bayonet, and by 10 P. M. the French were finally in complete possession of the heights of Les Épargés. The Germans still held the lesser spur of Combrès next to the south.

The capture of the elaborately fortified position of Les Épargés in the face of almost insurmountable obstacles was a remarkable achievement. The extensive works on this eminence were a striking illustration of German thoroughness and of the absolute confidence of the defenders in their ability to hold the place. Under the surface of the plateau there was a system of subterranean galleries traversed by a narrow-gauge railway, with chambers where the reserves could repose in safety while the French were constantly exposed to the fire of the German guns.

The possession of Hill 60, opposite the northern extremity of the line held by the Second British Corps, less than three miles southwest of Ypres, was stubbornly contested because of its importance as an observation point for artillery operations over the low plains north and northwest. On the evening of April 17th the British successfully exploded seven mines, blowing up the German trench and 150 soldiers, and thus opening the way for the infantry attack that quickly secured possession of the entire hill, in spite of fierce hand-to-hand fighting. The next morning a German attack forced the British to the reverse slope of the hill until with the arrival of reinforcements they succeeded in driving the Germans once more from the summit at the point of the bayonet. Nor could formidable artillery fire and repeated infantry charges loosen the British hold until on May 15th the Germans, using poisonous gases, regained possession.



Map showing the Heights of the Meuse and the position of Les Eparges.



All the appearances about the middle of April seemed to indicate a situation distinctly auspicious for the cause of the Allies. The Russian Colossus was believed to be advancing, slowly but inevitably, towards the plains of Hungary and the vital parts of the Dual Monarchy. Conspicuous local successes had animated the enthusiasm and confirmed the confidence of the French, who were now completing preparations for a new offensive on an unprecedented scale; while with deliberate and systematic energy the British were collecting their resources for the final, overwhelming effort. At the same time the fortunes of the expedition at the Dardanelles did not exclude the hope that results of stupendous importance might at any moment be obtained. The attitude of Italy, Greece, and Roumania swayed in the balance, likely to be influenced decisively by a victory of the Allies at any time.

A sudden shift of fortune changed these radiant expectations to bitter disappointment and anxiety. The Germans forestalled the British in a vigorous onslaught in the West, and less than two weeks later punctured the vast but inflated surface of the Russian leviathan, razing at once the shining fabric of enticing hopes that had been reared upon it. With the impressive candor that bespeaks deep-seated confidence, Earl Kitchener is said to have declared that he did not know when the war would end, but that it would begin in May. There was some truth in this remark, but the beginning made in May was chiefly a German one. May found the British in the throes of a Cabinet crisis and in a bitter controversy over lack of ammunition, while the British army, despite the most intense exertion, scarcely held its own against the formidable assaults of the enemy.

The salient covering Ypres again became the theater for a furious contest in which the German offensive was

supported by a mass of heavy guns probably superior in caliber and number to any that had yet been concentrated on that section of the front. A violent bombardment of Ypres at long range continuing several days preceded the attack. This radiating point on the base of the salient projecting eastward from the Ypres-Yser Canal was less than three miles from the nearest section of the German front. The destructive bombardment of Ypres, facilitated by this proximity, had the effect of a curtain fire in impeding the movement of supplies to the Allied troops in position on the margin of the salient.

The Allied forces holding this salient comprised the Forty-fifth Division of the Ninth French Army Corps and on its right the Canadian Division, followed by the two divisions of the British Fifth Army Corps whose position extended to the point where the Second British Corps took up the line. On the left of the French was the Belgian Army, stretching out northward to Nieuport and the North Sea.

Opposite this part of the Allied front there was ranged the left flank of the Duke of Württemberg's army, in particular the Twenty-sixth and Twenty-seventh Reserve Corps and the right wing of the Fifteenth Corps from Alsace.

The Germans chose to direct their attack against a section of the hostile front where the conjunction of forces of the three Allies supposedly impaired coherence, one from which men and guns had been recently withdrawn for the proposed offensive effort in another quarter, and where success would straightway endanger all the Allied forces on the salient.

About 5 P. M. on April 22d, after a violent cannonading of the Allied front, a dense cloud of yellow vapor issued from the German trenches between Bixschoote and Lange-marck and was wafted by a gentle wind across the space

between the hostile lines. This was a terrible device of German science, a poisonous vapor composed of chlorine gas, by means of which the Germans almost succeeded in inflicting a disastrous defeat upon their enemies. Projectiles charged with the identical destructive element were employed at the same time, but their effect has been obscured by the sweeping excution wrought by the gently-moving venomous clouds.

Preparations had been carefully perfected in advance for this baneful attack. Special receptacles of metal in the form of tubes with faucets had been distributed along the German front. From these the malignant gases were to be released when the direction of the wind was favorable. As protection against a reverse effect the Germans wore masks or rubber muzzles, covering the nose and mouth, which enabled the wearer to inhale the air through a perforated plate covering a pad which was saturated with a liquid that neutralized the effect of the deadly emanations.

The gases were released along a front of about five miles. The dense cloud enveloped the French division, pouring over the parapets and penetrating the trenches, hiding everything from sight. The soldiers were seized with violent suffocation and excruciating pains in throat and lungs. Some were blinded. Some fell into a deathlike stupor. The greater number, dazed and gasping, their faces blue and swollen, struggled to escape. A lingering, agonizing death from acute bronchitis awaited many who survived the first encounter.

With poisoned atmosphere added to the no less terrible, though more familiar, bursting of the high-explosive shells and cutting blasts of fire from the machine-guns, the French troops found themselves engulfed in an inferno which surpassed the most hideous creations of poetic fancy. Man's demoniacal fury had enlisted the very elements to

serve his murderous purposes. The battle-lines which had stood firm against the most furious attacks so many months withered at once under the venomous breath of the strange and awful monster.

The whole line of the French division was immediately rendered incapable of action. The Germans, following close behind the fatal fumes, quickly occupied several lines of trenches, seized the villages of Langemarck, Pilkem, Het Sas, and Steenstraate, advancing about two miles on a front of at least four, and captured 1,600 prisoners and about thirty-five guns, including a British battery of four heavy pieces. The French were, for the most part, rolled back upon the section of the canal near Boesinghe. On their own right the Germans seized the bridge at Steenstraate and captured some works upon the west side of the canal south of Lizerne.

There was now the obvious danger that the Germans would drive a wedge between the French and Belgians west of the canal and make the entire line in Flanders untenable. The left wing of the Canadian Division was uncovered and exposed to a flank attack in consequence of the dispersal of the French. The Germans were pouring through a four-mile crevice in the Allied dike, threatening to cut off all the British forces eastward on the salient.

A catastrophe was averted only by the most strenuous exertion, and mainly through the splendid tenacity and courage of the Canadians, whose left wing was bent but did not break before the surging torrent. All night the conflict raged while the very existence of the Allied forces was in peril. Reserve units were hurried forward with frenzied haste and flung into the fiery breach as soon as they arrived without regard to their customary relationship. Unflinchingly the Canadians, assailed by poisonous gases, torn by a fearful cannonading, unsupported by heavy

guns, struggled on against appalling odds. By the morning of the 23d a precarious line of mixed detachments had been thrown across the opening, about two miles behind the original position, and connection between the French and British had been reestablished about 800 yards east of the canal.

But the situation was still very serious for the Allies. The position of the 3d brigade, which formed the left wing of the Canadians, was especially trying. The troops of this brigade were assailed from three directions at the same time and almost cut off from their supplies. Forced to yield ground upon their left they swung back gradually, pivoting on the left flank of the 2d brigade, until their front passed through the village of St. Julien.

Another great gas attack began at 3.30 A. M. on the 24th. The Canadian 3d brigade, assailed with great violence, was compelled to relinquish St. Julien and the 2d was forced to swing back also in order to conform with the new line of the 3d, its extreme right remaining stationary at Grafenstafel. The Germans, extending eastward the range of their offensive, attacked heavily the protruding angle of the Allied line near Grafenstafel. But the Canadians held their ground at this critical point, where they were responsible for the safety of the Twenty-eighth British Division, which stood next on the right and was facing eastward.

Substantial reinforcements were now arriving for the British, principally the Northumbrian Territorial Division, which had crossed from England only three days before, the Lahore Division of Indians, and parts of the Fourth Division. These formations gradually took over the most exposed sections of the front between the canal and Grafenstafel.

After performing miracles of heroism and maintaining a defense which was vital to the safety of the Allies, the

Canadians received a well-earned and needed respite, the 3d brigade being withdrawn on the 24th and the 2d on the 25th. But it became necessary for the 2d, although reduced to less than 1,000 effectives, to return temporarily to the battle-front on the 26th, traversing a shell-swept zone by daylight.

The Germans had been unable to make any further progress west of the canal. During a general counter-attack delivered by the Allies on the 26th the French retook Lizerne and some trenches near Het Sas. But the British failed in their attempt to recover St. Julien or to make any appreciable progress in that quarter.

On May 1st the British general began to withdraw his forces from the front which they were then holding in consequence of its exposed situation. This movement was in accordance with an earlier agreement between Generals Foch and French by which the latter promised to maintain the outer line only on condition that the French should by reinforcements reestablish their original position. The new British position was a much reduced one forming a semicircle on a radius of about three miles from Ypres.

This withdrawal was effected systematically and with great success, the units being in their new positions by the morning of May 4th, without the Germans knowing that the British had evacuated their trenches. On discovering this the enemy occupied Zonnebeke and other places that had been bitterly contested for months and began to entrench and move forward his guns.

This contracted section of the British front, stretching southward from the Ninth French Army Corps, was held from left to right by the Fourth, Twenty-eighth, and Twenty-seventh British Divisions, the Lahore Division having been withdrawn. Under the ceaseless fire of the superior German artillery the work of fortifying the new

British line was found very difficult. After a general bombardment on the morning of the 8th, the section of British trenches east of Frezenberg, on which the German fire was gradually concentrated, was soon completely obliterated and heavy loss was suffered by the defenders. After desperate efforts the front was reestablished further west on a line running through Verlorenhoek.

But no rest was given by the Germans. The heaviest bombardment yet experienced was sustained by the new British line on the 13th; in some places trenches were again destroyed and the front was broken; but the heroic efforts of the British limited the results of the day's terrific attacks to a very slight displacement of the battle-lines toward Ypres.

Meanwhile the Belgians and French were striving to eject the Germans from the vicinity of Steenstraate and Het Sas, where they still held the bridge-heads on the west side of the canal. After repeated efforts the Allies regained Steenstraate and the trenches near Het Sas on the 15th and compelled the Germans to evacuate all their remaining positions west of the canal during the night of the 17th-18th.

After desultory and not remarkable operations, the Germans again attacked the British on the 24th, at 2.45 A. M., with heavy shell-fire and poisonous vapor, so suddenly that their opponents, many of whom were asleep, had not time to put on the masks with which by this time they were provided. The British were forced to yield some ground on their left wing, where they only reestablished connection with the French on the former line on the 26th.

Although the Germans had gained a conspicuous tactical success and had overrun most of the Ypres salient, their efforts fell short of the great strategic victory that seemed almost within their reach, and after five weeks' continuous

fighting they did not even retain the entire area seized in the fiery onrush of their first attacks. Tremendous as was the impression at first made by the use of poisonous gases they gradually lost importance as counteracting devices were introduced.

To characteristic German vigilance and foresight should be accredited this aggressive movement, which was intended to forestall and foil the long predicted British offensive rather than to wrest a decisive victory. No important drafts were made from other sections for the attack in Flanders, for at the very moment there was a gigantic concentration of Teutonic forces in Galicia. The action was a local application of the offensive-defensive principle, resistance through aggression. Probably the Germans did not expect to gain more than the salient and some permanent crossing points upon the canal for future use, though even in these modest aims they failed. But they doubtless hoped that the forcible attack in Flanders would divert attention from Galicia, put the Russians off their guard, and help to conceal the shifting of forces from the western to the eastern front, and that a sensational demonstration of Germany's vitality might influence at a critical juncture the doubtful course of Italian deliberations.

The contemplated offensive of the Allies in the West, rendered doubly urgent by the rout of the Russian Armies in Galicia, was not deterred by the fierce onslaught in Flanders. To divert the Teutonic forces from the pursuit of their amazing advantages in the East demanded a very formidable menace on the West, but it was not yet evident that the Allies possessed the resourcefulness and strength needed to jeopardize a truly vital interest of their enemy.

The French and British launched their offensive simultaneously on a combined front of about twenty-five miles





Map showing the territory west of Lens where the French offensive was made in May, 1915.

between Arras and Armentières, the former in the direction of Douai and Valenciennes, the latter in that of Lille. There they expected to drive their fangs deep into the most sensitive portions of the German front.

In particular it was hoped that the advance of General d'Urbal's Tenth French Army across the plains of the Scheldt would destroy communications along the German front from Lille to Soissons and imperil the lines of supply of three different German armies. The French attack was chiefly concentrated against the German salient north of Arras and its immediate objective was Lens, situated directly behind this section of the German front, the leading coal-producing center of France.

An undulating plateau of chalky formation lies between Arras and the valley of the Lys and extends westward from the flat country east of Lens. Its highest part is formed by the crest of Notre Dame de Lorette, running east and west. From this central elevation a number of very rugged spurs project towards the south, while less precipitous ridges descending gradually on the north sink into the valley of the Lys. On the solitary eastern extremity of the crest stood the Chapel of Notre Dame de Lorette. In the valley southward lay the village of Ablain-St. Nazaire and, beyond the next parallel ridge, Carency. The main highway from Arras to Béthune passed through Souchez and traversed the more elevated region of Notre Dame de Lorette by a depression east of the chapel.

The German lines formed a prominent salient westward embracing Ablain-St. Nazaire and Carency on the higher ground, so as to insure possession of Lens, the important center of communications. The positions had been carefully fortified with elaborate trench systems, powerful defensive works, such as the "Labyrinth," which have become famous, and many isolated posts and redoubts commanding

the approaches with innumerable machine-guns. The Germans showed their appreciation of the importance of the ridge of Notre Dame de Lorette by their multiplied trench system running across it protected by wire-entanglements, the numerous machine-gun emplacements, and the many hidden batteries. The whole district, ravines and villages, was fully utilized for defensive purposes, while artillery covered the eastern extremity of the ridge from strong positions at Angres, Souchez, Ablain-St. Nazaire, and several other nearby places.

General Foch personally directed the French offensive operations in this section. The French army, comprising probably seven army corps, with 1,100 pieces of artillery of varying calibers, surpassed in men and guns the opposing army of von Bülow. But the Germans held stronger positions and apparently were not ignorant of the proposed attack against them.

The French operations ranged on a front of about fifteen miles, but the chief action centered at a point about two miles north of Arras, opposite the so-called Labyrinth, and at the plateau of Notre Dame de Lorette. A furious bombardment was opened on May 9th at 6 A. M. against the German position, and during the day 300,000 shells were fired.

By ten o'clock the German trenches had been sufficiently pulverized and the ground prepared for the attack. The infantry sprang forward in a delirium of excitement, their spirits attuned to the roar of the heavy guns and the screeching of the shrapnel. Their fury bore them through clouds of suffocating vapors, where the high-explosive shells had burst at close intervals, and over ground that had been pitted, scarred, and furrowed in the most bewildering manner. The German shells tearing ugly gaps in the advancing lines served only to spur the French to more impetuous momentum as the surest means of safety.

On the extreme right the attack encountered the almost inexpugnable "Labyrinth" and made but little progress. In the next section towards the northwest the French troops gained the foremost hostile trenches, threw themselves upon the Germans in La Targette, situated on the Arras-Béthune highway, which they quickly mastered, and pushed on into Neuville-St. Vaast. Further to the left the French poured over the remains of the famous intrenchments known from the appearance of the soil as the White Works and penetrated beyond the Arras-Béthune highway.

The attack on Carency was the beginning of an operation of intense exertion which lasted several days. The village itself was riddled by 20,000 shells, and during the artillery preparation the French exploded simultaneously seventeen mines beneath the German positions, destroying almost completely the entanglements and abattis and long sections of the trenches, and making unavailable the mines which the Germans themselves had planted. The French infantry advanced with reckless vehemence in spite of the broken character of the ground and pushed northward on the eastern side of Carency.

On the front between the Labyrinth and Carency the first attack had resulted in the capture of two, and in places three, lines of German trenches, and in an extreme advance of about two miles and a half. This was the beginning of a period of unusual warfare in the Labyrinth. In the dark subterranean passages with which the chalky ground was honeycombed, in some places fifty feet below the surface, men fought with knives and picks, or bayonets, or teeth and hands. Every yard was contested with the most stubborn determination, and the French advanced by almost imperceptible degrees, but by the middle of June the Labyrinth was almost entirely in their hands. At Neuville-St. Vaast the opening onslaught was the prelude to a tedious


struggle in which the French had to fight their way from house to house,—each a little fortress bristling with machine-guns,—and street to street, gaining almost complete possession of the town after a week of incessant conflict. But the Germans were not entirely expelled until the night of June 8-9.

Carency, still a strong position, was taken by an enveloping movement on the east and west. On May 11th the French on the eastern side cut the communications with Souchez, but were halted in their advance at a strongly fortified hill. The force on the western side was checked by a defensive position in a quarry. The next day a very energetic attack carried the town on both sides. Over a thousand Germans threw down their weapons, advanced from the trenches crying, "*Kamerade, Kamerade* (Comrade, Comrade)" and surrendered. The French pressed on and during the ensuing night captured most of Ablain-St. Nazaire, the Germans retaining a foothold only on the eastern side of the place.

The struggle for the heights of Notre Dame de Lorette is a striking example of the character and tremendous difficulty of an attack on positions patiently and ingeniously fortified in the most approved and latest methods. But it is equally impressive by reason of the heroism, determination, and inconceivable endurance exhibited in the attacks. The defense was made by Bavarian troops. In previous attacks, on March 15th and April 15th, the French had already gained a foothold on this ridge by capturing the Grand Éperon and other spurs debouching from the western part of the plateau and overlooking Ablain-St. Nazaire. On the present occasion the French, taught by experience, gathered vast quantities of ammunition and provisions nearby, they even laid a narrow-gauge railway to distribute material and supplies. Three regiments of infantry and



Plan showing the German fortification of Ablain-Saint-Nazaire. After a German document.



Plan of the Labyrinth, showing the German trenches. After a photograph from an aeroplane, May 27, 1915.



three battalions of chasseurs chosen for the enterprise launched on the 9th awaited the termination of the indispensable artillery preparation to dash forward with all the force of their repressed ardor in an impetuous charge. Within two hours three lines of defense were carried, although at heavy loss, and the French were checked at the fourth only by the formidable fort erected by the Germans at the chapel.

Unsupported by the French artillery, whose fire could not now be directed, owing to the severance of the telephone wires to the rear by the enemy's shells, the attacking troops threw themselves upon the ground or sought shelter in the pits formed by the exploding shells, and passed the night in improvised intrenchments on the field of battle, constantly bombarded by the enemy's artillery. For more than three days they remained in the same precarious position, merely marking time, holding the ground already gained, but subjected to the concentrated fire of hostile guns from several points. The unusual heat accelerated the decomposition of the corpses lying all about, contaminating the air with the repulsive odor, and bodies were even torn from the shallow graves by the exploding shells.

The decisive assault on the German fort was executed on the night of the 12th-13th. The chasseurs crawled forward on all-fours, while deadly gusts of fire from the enemy's machine-guns swept the field a few inches above their heads. Reaching the foot of the hostile parapet, the foremost soldiers grasped the sandbags and actually stuffed them into the embrasures, stopping for a moment the continuous streams of lead that poured from the mouths of the machine-guns. In an instant the French were over the parapet and engaged in a death-grapple with their adversaries in the dark interior of the fort. Nothing could

resist the desperate fury of the French, who were quickly masters of the situation.

The Germans still retained possession of their foothold in the eastern part of Ablain-St. Nazaire and held an important position on one of the southern spurs of the heights of Notre Dame de Lorette, known as the "White Way (la Blanche Voie)." The French attacked this spur on the afternoon of the 21st and cleared the German trenches in the ensuing night. During the struggle lasting thirteen days for possession of the heights of Notre Dame de Lorette, the French had counted more than 3,000 German corpses and taken more than 1,000 prisoners on the ridge and its immediate offshoots. But their own losses had been heavy.

The German position at Ablain-St. Nazaire was now most precarious. The line of communication from Souchez was everywhere exposed to the French artillery, so that it was perilous to relieve the detachments or even to bring up supplies. Superhuman demands upon the German troops had reduced them to a state verging on complete exhaustion. Subjected to fire from nearly every direction, they could scarcely expose themselves a moment from behind their cover, while the great projectiles threatened to bury them alive beneath the fragments of their own defenses. During a vigorous French attack on the night of the 28th-29th the Germans, yielding to the inevitable, relinquished their hold on Ablain-St. Nazaire. The French were now in possession of the entire front of the German salient.

The Germans had strongly intrenched themselves in the ruins of an extensive sugar-refinery a short distance west of Souchez on the road to Ablain-St. Nazaire. The French attacked this position both from the west and south, hurling hand-grenades into the enemy's trenches and dispersing the Germans at the point of the bayonet. These were the

same French troops who had stormed Carency and reduced Ablain-St. Nazaire, and it was reported that during the course of their offensive, from the initial onslaught on May 9th to the capture of the sugar-refinery on May 31st, they had buried nearly 3,000 German slain and taken more than 3,000 prisoners.

The French offensive now gradually waned. Either its accumulated energy had been spent, or the concentration of men and guns on the German side had restored the equilibrium. On the night of June 12-13 the French captured the railway station of Souchez; but this achievement practically marks the limit to which they succeeded in hacking off the protruding angle in the German front. Persistent efforts failed to drive the Germans from Souchez where they blocked the Arras-Béthune highway. The exertions of the French were chiefly confined henceforth to the lesser tasks of consolidating and organizing their new front in the conquered positions.

The British had meanwhile coöperated with the French, in accordance with the common plan, by taking up the offensive north of La Bassée. On the same day that the French onslaught burst with such overwhelming fury on the foremost German trenches in front of La Targette, Carency, Ablain-St. Nazaire, and Notre Dame de Lorette, May 9th, the British assailed the German lines at different places between Festubert and Armentières for the purpose of detaining the forces posted opposite them, chiefly the Seventh Corps, and of winning, if possible, the ridge which had been their ultimate objective in the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March.

The Eighth Division (of the British Fourth Corps) attacked the German trenches about three miles northeast of Neuve Chapelle, but could make no permanent progress against the enemy's strong position and the violent


enfilading fire of the machine-guns. The First and Indian Divisions attacking south of Neuve Chapelle met with no greater success, so that Sir John French sanctioned the proposal of Sir Douglas Haig to concentrate their effort at the most southern point. But unfavorable weather delayed the resumption of aggressive operations until the night of May 15-16.

Then the Indian Division, the Second Division (of the First Corps), and the Seventh Division (of the Fourth Corps), which had been transferred to the First Corps area for this particular purpose, attacked the slightly rounding section of the German front which extended from the vicinity of Richebourg-l'Avoué southwestwards in the direction of Festubert. The ensuing battle took its name from Festubert.


The Indian Corps on the left was unable to advance, but the Second quickly captured two lines of trenches, and the Seventh on the right made still greater progress. The British experienced considerable difficulty in consolidating their attacking front by uniting the inner flanks of the Second and Seventh Divisions; but even after this had been accomplished, about noon on the 17th, progress was very difficult and slow, because the country swarmed with the enemy's isolated fortified posts which were abundantly supplied with machine-guns. The Fifty-first (Highland) and Canadian Divisions took the place of the Second and Seventh on the 19th, and gradual progress continued until the 25th when the British offensive was discontinued.

The British had driven the Germans from strongly entrenched positions, winning ground along a front of about four miles, but had only penetrated to an average depth of 600 yards. The chief service rendered by the British in this Battle of Festubert was the support lent to the French during the great offensive of the latter in Artois.





French soldiers on their way to the trenches.



Commandant's post of observation in the Les Éparges ravine.

## CHAPTER II

### THE WINTER OPERATIONS IN THE EAST *(January-March, 1915)*

The situation in the East at the commencement of 1915. Motives and plans of the contestants. Movements in Bukovina. The renewed effort to capture Warsaw from the west, von Mackensen's attack and failure on the front in central Poland, February 1-8. The plan for simultaneous action on the wings of the Teutonic front in north and south. The situation in East Prussia and the German concentration there. The German plan of battle; a compound double enveloping maneuver. The particular concentric movement of each wing, in the south on Lyck, in the north on Wirballen. East Prussia completely cleared of the invaders about February 15th. The general converging movement of the entire army and its results. The Russian counter-offensive. The German offensive on the Narev and its failure. The Teutonic offensive in the south, the battles for possession of the Carpathian passes. The importance of Peremyśl and nature of its defense. Its fall on March 22d and the results.

After the rapid vicissitudes that marked the earlier operations in the East, the oscillating line of hostile contact reduced its speed and range of fluctuation and finally rested for a time upon a winding course that kept the distinctive westward swelling of the Russian front, though shorn of its vertex, broadened at the base, and thereby made much less conspicuous. Starting on the Russo-German boundary near the Baltic Sea, the line of the opposing fronts swung southward, lopping off an eastern slice of Prussian territory, regained the Russian frontier north of the Narev, veered to the southwest and crossed the Vistula at Vysogrod, then bearing southward followed the Bzura, the Ravka, and the Nida, traversed the Vistula a second time, ascended the valleys of the Dunajec and the Biala to the Carpathian range, passed south of the

summits in the region of the Dukla Pass, then swerving to the left, kept to the northeastern slopes as far as the Roumanian border.

The Russian armies were now associated in two groups, a northern under General Russky and a southern under General Ivanoff. The former embraced an army on the East Prussian border, another on the Narev, the forces defending Warsaw along the Bzura and the Ravka, and the army operating in the region of the Pilica. The latter group comprised the army of the Nida under General Ewarts, the army of the Dunajec under General Dmitrieff, the forces investing Peremysl under General Selivanoff, General Brussiloff's army of the Carpathians, and the small Ninth Army of General Alexeieff, in Bukovina. The Grand-duke Nicholas with mobile chief headquarters flitted back and forth as occasion demanded at a convenient distance behind the lines.

A portion of the German forces was deployed along the bending front of East Prussia, but the main part with von Mackensen was stationed on the Bzura and the Ravka facing Warsaw. A German element, probably four corps, was present with the Austro-Hungarian forces. Five armies of the latter faced the Russians. General Dankl's army on the Nida, now reduced to only a corps and a half, formed the contact with the German right. Ranged against Dmitrieff along the Dunajec and the Biala lay General Woyrsch's army. The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Armies were operating in the zone of the Carpathians, under the general command of the Archduke Eugene, who had come to this section with the Fifth Army from the southern frontier after the abandonment of the disastrous Serbian campaign.

The Russians had held all the important Carpathian passes in October, when a serious invasion of the Hungarian plains

was imminent. Later the Austro-Hungarian armies took the offensive, with the assistance of the Germans, and drove the Russians from the passes. But just before the close of the year there was another turning of the tide and by the first of January the Russians had carried the watershed west of the Uszok Pass while their cavalry ranged the valleys leading down to Hungary.

Partly to distract the Central Powers, and to prevent the removal of German forces to the West, where the new resources of France and Great Britain were not yet available, the Russians took the offensive on an extensive scale in the latter part of January. In Bukovina, the principal part of which had been in their hands since September, the comparatively small Russian forces pressed forwards towards the divide and took the Kirlibaba Pass, leading into Hungary, on the 17th. There was a simultaneous movement along the right bank of the Vistula towards Thorn, and a general forward movement in East Prussia, with which we shall soon have occasion to deal more fully.

In the meantime von Hindenburg resolved to attempt once more the capture of Warsaw by a frontal attack. Von Mackensen assembled powerful masses of artillery along the Ravka and down the Bzura as far as Sochaczef; but concentrated his attacking columns, no less than seven divisions, within the narrow space of seven miles in which the Germans controlled both banks of the Ravka. The German artillery commenced a terrific bombardment of the Russian position on the eastern side of the Ravka from the slopes west of that river on the night of February 1-2. Under cover of the guns and of a heavy snowstorm the German infantry advanced in deep formation up the opposite slopes. Their initial fervor and the impetus of numbers quickly bore them across the first line of Russian trenches, and by the close of the following day the second

and third lines were also captured and the Russians had been driven back to the crest of the hills three miles from the river, and in some places beyond the ridge. The battle continued with great violence throughout the 3d while the Germans gradually neared their goal. But the vigor of the German onslaught waned, while reinforcements stiffened the resistance of the Russian lines, and a Russian counter-attack was made on the 4th. The Germans were slowly pushed back into the valley and by the 8th the Russians were even attempting a thrust beyond the Bzura.

This failure in a frontal attack on Warsaw was added proof that offensive operations against the Russian front could only be successful where the forces of the Central Powers would be directly based upon their incomparable systems of strategic railways.

When von Hindenburg saw that the Russian counter-attack might succeed he adopted the plan of simultaneous action in smiting the Russian front on both its wings, by following up with vigor the offensive already started in the south and launching a new and overpowering onslaught in the north.


The efforts of the Teutonic Allies to cut the essential arteries of Russian communications in Poland had thus far been frustrated. General Dankl's sudden incursion into Poland in August, 1914, which aimed to intercept the Kieff-Warsaw railway near Lublin had been speedily repelled, while von Hindenburg had been thwarted in his probable expectation of severing the Petrograd-Warsaw line after the Russian catastrophe in East Prussia. The latter line ran parallel to the German boundary in the region of Grodno and Bialystok and hardly forty miles distant; here a German menace was especially serious, hence the Russians' anxiety to press the Germans westward in East Prussia. The obvious highway for the penetration



General Kusmanek, commander of the Austrian forces defending Peremysl.



General von Mackensen, commander of the German forces operating against Warsaw.



General Selivanoff, commander of the Russian forces besieging Peremysl.



of this vital region by a German army is the railway from Königsberg through Lyck to Bialystok and Brest-Litovsk, but von Hindenburg had vainly attempted this route. The operations of Germany in East Prussia were quite insignificant from September, 1914, till February, the greater part of the forces there having been transferred to central Poland, and the troops remaining under General von Below withdrawn some distance west of the boundary to naturally protected positions, thus leaving a considerable segment of the province to the Russians.

Weighty considerations disposed the Russians to undertake another considerable effort in East Prussia. Advancing mainly along the communicating lines of railway, the one running from Kovno westward through Eydtkuhnen and Gumbinnen, the other from Bialystok and Osovietz north-westward through Lyck and Lötzen, the Tenth Russian Army, probably eleven infantry and several cavalry divisions, about 200,000 men, under General Sievers, had overrun East Prussia almost to the line of the Angerapp River and the principal chain of the Masurian Lakes. The new invasion was pushed forward more vigorously in the north with the evident intention of outflanking the Germans and rolling back their front. By February 6th the right wing of the Russians had reached the Inster, while the left rested on Johannsburg, and the center threatened Darkehmen and Lötzen.

But suddenly, after so many months of quiet the Germans took the offensive on the old battle-ground of the Masurian Lakes with overwhelming force, and dealt their antagonists a staggering blow that proved to be the most sensational occurrence of the winter.

The violence of the struggle in central Poland had helped to screen an enormous concentration of German forces behind the front in East Prussia, performed with

the usual unobtrusive swiftness of the Prussian railways. The total forces available on the eastern frontier of East Prussia numbered about 400,000 men.

Field-marshal von Hindenburg going to Insterburg assumed general supervision of the ensuing operations. Once more a Russian army had exposed itself in the fateful zone of the Masurian Lakes and with acute discernment von Hindenburg dashed upon the prospective prey.

A repetition of the famous double enveloping maneuver of Tannenberg was planned upon a vastly more extensive scale, covering a front of about 125 miles. The German forces were divided into two general groups, one extending from Tilsit to Lötzen, the other from Lötzen to the vicinity of Johannsburg. The first was commanded by Colonel-general von Eichhorn, who had been inspector of the Sixteenth, Eighteenth, and Twenty-first Army Corps in time of peace, the second by General of the Infantry von Below, who had been commander of the Twenty-first Corps at Saarburg before the war.

The German offensive might appropriately be called a compound double enveloping movement. For each wing of the German army, advancing with concave front, converged upon its own immediate objective before the two parts drew together to crush the foe entrapped between them, so that in each case a lesser Cannæ was enacted within the framework of the greater one, and the entire maneuver was not unlike the onset of the lobster with its enveloping claws, each operating with incisive nippers. The units in the south converged on Lyck, those in the north on the district of Wirballen.

The forward movement was inaugurated by the forces at the extremities of the German front. On the extreme right General of the Infantry von Litzmann, on February 7th, marched the Fortieth Reserve Corps twenty-five miles

through forests choked with snow, and surprised the Russians, forcing at Wrobeln the passage of the Pisseck River, the outlet of Lake Spirding. Repulsing the flank attack of a Russian column, which had come up from the fortress of Kolno, on the 8th, he swept along the curve of the international border, captured Biälla and Grajevo, and severed the railway line between Lyck and Bialystok.

General von Falck, leading the next corps to the north, advanced on a line parallel with the route of von Litzmann, took Johannsburg by storm on the 8th, and later coöperated in driving the enemy from the defiles commanding Lyck.

General von Lauenstein's forces on the extreme left near Tilsit advanced on the 8th through Spullen, Pilkallen, and Schirvindt. They outflanked the Russians, compelling them to evacuate each successive position, and finally cut off their natural line of retreat by the railway eastward to Kovno. Other German forces to the right of these advanced from the vicinity of Insterburg along the main railway line directly eastward towards Gumbinnen and Stallupönen, attacking the Russians in front. The promptness and vigor of the German forces, exceeding every expectation, surprised and disconcerted their opponents. In their flight a division and a half, reaching the vicinity of Eydtkuhnen and Wirballen, late in the afternoon of the 10th, sought respite for the night, but neglected the most necessary precautions. Suddenly in the evening the Germans burst upon them and after sharp street-fighting captured these towns together with extensive booty and 10,000 prisoners, whose very number embarrassed their captors.

But in spite of the brilliance of this partial success, the larger part of the forces which composed the Russian right wing seem to have effected their escape towards Kovno before the railway was intercepted by the Germans.

The conflict in the right center did not become intense until the 12th, when the Russians yielded their foremost lines. The Kaiser arrived in Lötzen on the 13th so as to be present at the culminating action. The Russians had in their turn intrenched the defiles between the Masurian Lakes and had posted their staunchest troops, Siberians, in this section. The road from Lötzen to Lyck passed between Lakes Laszmiaden and Lyck. Here the Russians fought with desperate courage; but the vastly superior number of the Germans and the issue of the conflict on the wings had already made a general retreat inevitable. The battle in the narrows was merely a delaying action to secure for the Russian forces an opportunity for retirement eastward.

Finally, on the 14th, the First German Army Corps, commanded by General Kosch, with the Eleventh Landwehr Division, overcame the resistance of the Russians in a violent contest at the defile, under the eyes of the Kaiser, while the converging corps of General von Butlar and General von Falck coöperated further south, and on the same afternoon the Germans entered Lyck in triumph.

The capture of this town had practically completed the redemption of the sacred soil of this very loyal province so long polluted by the presence of the enemy, and the troops were thrilled with the consciousness of having accomplished a difficult and memorable achievement. Suddenly the Kaiser appeared in his motor-car upon the market-place, where the victorious columns and the dejected throngs of prisoners, moving in opposite directions, offered a curious contrast. Frenzied acclamations burst from the throats of the delighted soldiers and were merged in the swelling notes of the national anthems, and the Kaiser before a background of grim, blackened ruins, addressed the multitude in a few short, stirring sentences.

The right and left wings of the German army now sought to approach and entrap a large part of the Russian army by converging respectively on Augustof and Suwalki. The Twentieth Russian Corps, under General Bulgakoff, was thereby threatened with annihilation and sought refuge in flight towards the Russian frontier railway which passes through Augustof and Suwalki. After over a week of heroic struggling, it became disorganized. Nevertheless, two regiments cut through the hostile ring on the 22d and joined the Russian counter-attack then beginning northwest of Grodno.

The Germans claim to have taken more than 100,000 prisoners, including General Bulgakoff and six other generals, and to have captured about 300 guns during the winter conflict of the Masurian Lakes and the ensuing pursuit of the Russians. The practical destruction of the Russian Tenth Army was exultantly proclaimed in Germany, but it soon became evident that this announcement was an exaggeration. The Third Russian Corps suffered heavy losses around Wirballen and most of the Twentieth Corps was wiped out, but the forces in the region of Lyck retreated in good order, contesting almost every foot of the way. In fact, the escape of so large a portion of General Sievers's army with scarcely any help from the railways, through forests choked with snowdrifts, before an enemy greatly superior in numbers and equipment, was a very remarkable performance.

The principal part of the German forces pressed forward towards the Niemen. General von Eichhorn gained a foothold beyond that river near Sventoyansk, a short distance below Grodno, but was unable to crown this achievement by cutting the Warsaw-Petrograd railway, only about ten miles away.

German forces advanced on the right from Grajevo along the railway against Osovietz on the Bobr. The

heavy German siege artillery was installed within range of the fortress on the 25th, and an artillery combat was carried on intermittently for several weeks, until finally the Germans abandoned their attempt to break through the line of the Bobr.

The Russian counter-offensive based upon Grodno and the other Niemen fortresses was already making progress by the 23d, and on the 26th the Germans were forced to evacuate their position on the right, or eastern, bank of the Niemen.

In retreating the wings of the German army drew apart again like jaws warily distended to snap their victim in an unguarded moment. Scarcely had the Germans reached the front Simno-Augustof on March 8th when they suddenly turned upon the Russians. While the German right wing held the enemy, the left attempted to outflank them by a rapid maneuver towards Sejny. The Russians eluded the trap and after violent combats for three days withdrew. The battle was in effect a delaying action. Before the end of the month the Germans had installed themselves upon Russian territory passing just east of Pilviszki, Marjampol, Suwalki, and Augustof.

Von Hindenburg's great effort on the East Prussian front was probably regarded as the necessary prelude to a decisive thrust at Warsaw from the north. With this purpose was connected the simultaneous desultory conflicts along the line from Johannisburg to the Vistula, to which section the center of gravity of the German forces was to be shifted on completion of the operation further east. Before undertaking the project indicated it was necessary to secure the German left wing on the Niemen from attack on flank and rear and also to enfeeble the Russian Narev line by cutting the Warsaw-Petrograd railway at some point east of it. After this the Polish capital could be attacked

by columns converging from various points along the German front from the west around to the northeast.

A misapprehension of his ultimate aims by the Russians led von Hindenburg to plan the swift and secret transportation of his army by the Prussian railways to the frontier north of Warsaw whence he would strike southwards with sudden energy before the enemy could readjust his forces. Although the full realization of the first part of the plan proved impracticable, the second phase was, nevertheless, undertaken.

The Narev was the chief Russian defensive barrier in northern Poland. It empties into the Bug about fifteen miles northeast of Novo Georgievsk. Fortified towns command its chief crossing points, one of which, Ostroleka, is a convenient base of reinforcement for threatened points in this section, as three branch railways from the Warsaw-Petrograd line there converge. Przasnysz, midway between Ostroleka and Mlava, and about fifty or sixty miles north of Warsaw, lies between the Narev and the Prussian frontier and is an important strategical point, mainly because from it radiate eight important highways.

The line of the Narev was held by the Twelfth Russian Army, commanded by General Plehve, stretched along an extended front. Przasnysz was covered by a single brigade and a division was stationed on elevated ground westward, between the town and the railway that runs from Warsaw through Mlava and Soldau to Danzig.

On the 20th two German corps that had been concentrated two days earlier between Mlava and Chorzele, with their right wing resting on the railway, began operations to encircle the opposing Russian forces. Przasnysz was captured on the 24th from the east and encircled on the south and the Russians were attacked on their right flank and rear. The division thus menaced fought with stubborn

heroism for thirty-six hours and resisted the fiery tempest of assault by a vastly superior force until the pressure was removed on the 26th by a counter-attack.

Strong Russian columns converged upon the disputed area from the fortresses along the Narev. The Thirty-sixth German Reserve Division was overpowered and roughly handled at the crossings of the Orzec. The Russians reëntered Przasnysz on the evening of the 26th but did not secure definite possession until the next night. By the 28th the wavering tide of battle turned decidedly against the Germans, who sustained heavy losses and were compelled to retreat in haste to the prepared positions from which they had set out.

The Germans did not at once relinquish a project upon which such far-reaching hopes had undoubtedly been based. Fresh troops were brought up and there were violent conflicts on the four days, March 8-11, when the Germans gained some advantage and pushed their front almost to Przasnysz. But the general thawing of the streams about the 15th interrupted all further operations on an extensive scale.

The situation on the Carpathian front profoundly concerned the Teutonic leaders. Hungary was becoming restive under the prolonged menace of the invasion of her rich plains, the harvests of which were counted upon by Germany to replenish her own insufficient food supply. A hostile blow for Hungary would certainly decide wavering Roumania, which coveted Bukovina and Transylvania, to throw in her lot with the Entente Allies. Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, had been replaced on January 13th by Count Stephen Burian, a Hungarian nobleman and friend of Count Tisza, and it appeared manifest that the claims of Hungary were not to be ignored.





Prussian town after its occupation by the Russian forces.



Russian troops with their transport wagons marching through a frontier town.

After the failure of von Mackensen's frontal drive on Warsaw early in February, the vigorous offensive in the Carpathians then already under way became the counterpart of the furious German onslaught on the East Prussian border in the common Austro-German plan for operations on the eastern front.

The natural barrier of Hungary protecting her plains are the vast mountain masses on the north and east. The High Tátra range in the northern region has a diameter of more than a hundred miles and its bare summits have an altitude of 9,000 feet. On the east the elevated tract of Bukovina and Transylvania is even broader, but its highest crests do not exceed an altitude of 6,000 feet. Between these bastion-like masses stretches the central chain of the Carpathians for a distance of about 200 miles around the northeastern border and is pierced by the principal passes connecting Hungary and Galicia. The entire system is heavily wooded.

The lowest passes are in the northwest. In general they become gradually higher and longer towards the southeast. The summit of the Dukla Pass in the extreme northwestern section is hardly more than 1,500 feet above the level of the sea and 500 feet above the plains which it connects. The Lupkow Pass, a little to the east, is somewhat higher. Through it runs the railway from Buda-Pesth to Peremyśl. Beyond the Rostoki, a highway pass, opens the Użok, considerably higher and longer than the preceding, which is traversed by a light railway. Another road pass, variously called the Vereczke and the Tucholka, flanks on the west the important Beskid or Volocz Pass, still longer and more difficult, by which the main railway from Buda-Pesth to Stryj and Lemberg reaches the Galician plain. Some distance further east the Wyskow, another road pass, became prominent in the Austro-German operations. Near the

southeastern extremity of the common boundary of Hungary and Galicia the Jablonica Pass gives access to the upper valley of the Pruth for the main railway from Buda-Pesth to Stanislaw, Kolomea, and Czernowitz.

Besides the railway lines which crossed the central Carpathian chain, there were useful lines of lateral communication connecting the mouths of the different valleys on both sides of the mountains, the railway from Neu Sandez through Stryj to Stanislaw in Galicia, and the main line from Pressburg through Buda-Pesth to Miskolcz and Munkacs in Hungary.

The topography of the region was more favorable to a descent of the Russians into Hungary than to an advance of the Austro-Hungarian armies from Hungary into Galicia. The reason is that the glens descending on the Hungarian side converge upon the valley of the Theiss, so that an invader from the northeast reaching the junction-point by any one of them would cut off the defenders in all the others, while on the Galician side the valleys for the most part either run parallel for a considerable distance or bear apart, and are flanked by strong positions in the outlying spurs, so that the success of an invading force in any one defile would not necessarily imperil the defenders in the others, while on the other hand the junction of columns descending by several routes could easily be impeded.

About the end of the third week in January, Brussiloff held the summits of the Carpathians at the Dukla Pass and practically at the Lupkow, while further east the Russian line followed the Galician slope along the foothills. The Russians had reached the crests at Kirlibaba and occupied all of Bukovina except a small corner covering the approaches to the Borgo Pass in the extreme southwest.

After the abandonment of the disastrous offensive against Serbia in December the greater part of the Austro-Hungarian forces on the southern frontier had been transferred to the northeastern border.

Within the bending contour of the Russian front the Austro-Hungarian army shut up in Peremyshl still held out. Peremyshl was too far from the Carpathian range to actually command the northern outlet from any of the passes. But its position in the rear of an operative section of the Russian front was a constantly disturbing factor which undoubtedly delayed the Russian offensive in the western section of the Carpathian line, precisely where the conditions were otherwise most auspicious.

The movement of powerful German forces in anticipation of a gigantic undertaking on the front in northeastern Hungary was cleverly disguised. Rumors were set afloat that the offensive against Serbia would straightway be resumed and that as reinforcement for this enterprise four German army corps were being transported southward, and to add to the effect of this deception a few rounds of shell were fired at Belgrade. But in reality these German troops, upon reaching the junction at Miskolcz, were hastily conveyed northeastward towards the approaches of the Carpathian passes. A new army, with German units as the essential elements, was thus constituted in the latter part of January on a central section of the Austro-Hungarian front and placed under the command of General of the Infantry von Linsingen, himself a German.

Three armies of the Central Powers under the general supervision of Archduke Eugene now confronted the Russians on the Carpathian front. Probably as many as 600,000 men in all were deployed from the Dukla to the Kirlibaba Pass along the Austro-Hungarian front.


The efforts of the Germanic Allies were focussed primarily upon two objectives, the recovery of Lemberg, with the consequent isolation of the Russian forces in western Galicia, and the relief of Peremyśl. The first of these two tasks was committed to the coöperative efforts of the armies of Generals von Pflanzer and von Linsingen, the second to that of General von Boehm-Ermolli. The first two were to drive into the Russian front, closing like tongs upon the vital spot.

The offensive on the right, where von Pflanzer's army advanced by two general routes, progressed at first with gratifying expedition. Entering Bukovina by the Jakobeny and Kirlibaba Passes in the extreme southeast, the right wing of this eastern army drove the Russians from the town of Kirlibaba on January 22d, concentrated in the upper valley of the Moldava, where they recaptured Kimpolung on February 7th, and, debouching into the plain, advanced northeastward on a sweeping front.

The Russians, greatly outnumbered and threatened with envelopment, retreated systematically, turning wherever a good chance was offered to engage in a delaying action. By the 16th the Austro-Hungarian forces in Bukovina were crossing the Sereth. Late in the afternoon of the same day the left wing of von Pflanzer's army, which had gone through the Jablonica Pass, put the Russians to flight in a two days' battle before Kolomea and entered the town on the heels of the fugitives in time to prevent the destruction of the bridge spanning the Pruth. Czernowitz was taken on the 17th and on the next day the Russians withdrew entirely from the right bank of the Pruth. Von Pflanzer's columns turning northwestward now converged on Stanislaw, which the Russians were compelled to evacuate on March 3d.

The Austro-German army of General von Linsingen was confronted by a much more arduous task. For the Russians





German Emperor arriving in Lyck. The Kaiser is the figure denoted by a cross just to the right of the front of the motor-car.

had gained a far stronger foothold in the higher regions of the central Carpathians, where the rugged character of the country and the harshness of the winter climate made the difficulties of dislodging them almost insurmountable.

General von Linsingen's right wing advanced by the Wyskow Pass; his main attack was directed through the Beskid and Vereczke Passes. One German division, starting from the Uszok Pass behind the right wing of the Austro-Hungarian army on the west, struck eastward below the main crest of the Carpathians on the Galician side, attacked the flank of the Russian forces opposite the Vereczke and Beskid Passes threatening their communications, and forced them to retreat.

The main forces of von Linsingen's army advanced in parallel columns through the Beskid and Vereczke Passes. The road descending from the latter towards Galicia crosses a minor ridge and follows the tributary glen of the Arava to its junction with the Opor, where both routes unite. Between these two defiles rises a steep and deeply-wooded ridge, which takes its name from the village of Koziowa. Here the Russians were entrenched in a strong position known from its altitude in meters as Hill 992. The ridge of Koziowa turned out to be the main strategic point of the whole central Carpathian range. The stubborn resistance of the Russians at this point prevented the coöperation of von Linsingen's main columns and their debouchment into the plain, destroyed the hope of reaching Stryj and Lemberg, and left von Pflanzer isolated in an exposed position without support.

The Austro-German army began to attack Koziowa on February 8th and during the following two days no less than twenty-two assaults were launched in vain against the Russian trenches. Week after week the repeated attacks were drowned in blood and the greater part of

von Linsingen's army was hopelessly locked in the foothills on the northern side of the Carpathians.

Von Pflanzer's advance reached highwater mark at Stanislaw, which he was compelled to evacuate on March 4th, withdrawing hastily to a line resting on Kolomea and Czernowitz.

It had been planned that General von Boehm-Ermolli with the western army should drive a wedge straight through the Russian front to Peremyśl. A union with the liberated garrison of the great fortress would have meant disaster for the Russian army westwards on the Dunajec.

The Austro-Hungarian forces advanced from the Lupkow and Uszok Passes towards the upper valley of the San. Violent conflicts occurred between the Ondava and the San, but in spite of desperate efforts the Austro-Hungarian army was unable to dislodge the Russians from the Dukla Pass or push their own advance very far beyond the summit of the Lupkow Pass.

While from without the efforts to relieve Peremyśl thus failed completely, the situation within the fortress was daily becoming more serious from the depletion of provisions.

Peremyśl is situated on both sides of the River San which flows down in a wide circuit westward from the region of the Uszok Pass. The railway running south from Peremyśl branches to connect with the lines that cross the Lupkow and the Uszok Passes. The city itself lies at the center of a low rim of hills. Like Antwerp, its defenses formed a series of concentric rings. The fortress had been rebuilt in 1896 and thoroughly modernized in 1909 and it was regarded as one of the strongest in Europe.

There was an interior fortified girdle close to the city. Beyond this stretched an intermediate line of forts, mostly rather small. But upon the outer circle, consisting of nine powerful works and many smaller redoubts, about six miles





Russian transport steamer on the River Vistula.



Russian town set on fire by the Russians as they retreated. *Many square miles of territory were devastated by the Russians as they retreated in efforts to increase the difficulties of the invading German army.*

from the city, the reliance of the defenders was chiefly placed. The line of the outer forts had been covered and consolidated by intricate wire entanglements and a network of trenches.

Peremyśl was first invested by the Russians on September 27th, after a considerable remnant of the Austro-Hungarian army defeated on the Rawaruska-Grodek line had taken refuge within its walls. General von Kusmanek, the commander of the fortress, disposed of more than 100,000 men and 1,000 guns including two batteries of the big Austrian Skoda howitzers.

The retirement of the Russian forces during October enabled the defenders to replenish the supply of food and ammunition, but a portion of the civil population was still permitted to remain as a useless tax upon the common stores. After the collapse of von Hindenburg's first attack on Warsaw and the hasty retreat of the Austro-German armies, the hostile ring closed again around Peremyśl and the second and longer investment began on November 12th.

At one time the relief of the fortress seemed imminent. During the Teutonic offensive in December an Austro-Hungarian army crossed the Dukla and Lupkow Passes and advanced as far as Sanok and their efforts were supported by a vigorous sortie of the besieged. Five regiments broke through the lines of contravallation and forced their way as far as Bircza on the road to Sanok. For four days the issue was doubtful; then General Selivanoff, commander of the army of investment, concentrated reinforcements at the critical point and drove back the Austro-Hungarian forces with heavy loss.

Soon after this the danger from the south was removed and the Russian front in the Carpathians was restored by General Brussiloff. The shortage of provisions in Peremyśl and the arrival of additional heavy artillery for the Russians

hastened the termination of the siege. By March the cavalry mounts were slaughtered for meat and dogs were sold for about twelve dollars apiece. On the night of March 13th the Russians carried by storm the village of Mal-kovice northeast of Peremysl, opening thereby a breach in the outer line of defenses. Fortifying the ground thus gained, the Russians commenced the bombardment of the second line.

The fortress was now in desperate straits and another sortie was undertaken as a final effort on the 18th. Thirty thousand troops struck out eastward along the Lemberg railway towards Mosciska, where it was believed that the Russians had extensive stores of provisions, since it was imperative to capture fresh supplies before the besieged tried to cut their way to the Austro-Hungarian positions in the Carpathians. But an overwhelming force of artillery was brought to bear against them and after fighting with desperate determination for seven hours they were compelled to retreat with severe losses to the cover of the forts.

Early on the morning of the 22d innumerable heavy detonations heard within the Russian lines told of the feverish destruction of munitions preparatory to the surrender of the fortress. Vast quantities of explosives were sunk in the river, guns were systematically destroyed, and the bridges over the San were blown up. About nine, the chief-of-staff of the besieged forces appeared in the Russian headquarters bearing General von Kusmanek's tender of capitulation.

Nine Austro-Hungarian generals, ninety-three superior officers, about 2,500 subalterns and functionaries, and 117,000 soldiers became prisoners of war and were sent as rapidly as possible to internment camps in the interior of Russia. The fall of Peremysl freed the Russians from a standing menace and removed the great obstruction from



Ruins of Fort Hurko.



Showing the state of destruction of the forts of Peremysl after the surrender of the Austrians.



their lines of communication. Its surrender released a veteran Russian army which was now available for active operations at the front. A portion were retained in reserve and the remainder strengthened the forces on the western section of the Carpathian front. In a vigorous offensive between Bartfeld and the Uszok Pass, the Russians captured strongly fortified points around the Lupkow Pass, swarmed into the valleys of the Ondava and Laborc, and by April 25th had almost reached Homonna near the border of the plain. This counter-blow completely arrested the offensive of the Germanic Allies further east.

To clear the crest of the Carpathians was the necessary preliminary for a resumption of the Russian attack on Cracow as well as for a Russian invasion of the plains of Hungary. As long as the Austro-German forces held their positions in Poland and along the western summits of the Carpathians, the approach to Cracow was like a funnel and Russia would have exposed her army corps to certain ruin if she had driven them westward into the narrowing space between the mountains and the Vistula. The prospective significance of the action of the Russians in the Carpathians remains, therefore, uncertain; whether, in other words, these operations were regarded as the beginning of a decisive invasion of Hungary, and therefore as an integral part of a major enterprise, or as an effort to secure the position of the left flank preparatory to a supreme offensive westward, and therefore only a subsidiary undertaking.

Perhaps the high command of the Russian armies reserved its decision as to the ultimate direction of the offensive. A grand attack on Cracow might not preclude incursions into Hungary for the purpose of scattering terror and creating a spirit of disloyalty. Important as such lesser aims might be, Cracow remained the really vital spot. With Cracow in Russian hands the whole

Austro-German front in Poland would collapse. Cracow was still the gateway to Vienna and Berlin. Only complete success in a crushing onslaught westward would lead with certainty to a decisive issue.

After the failure of von Mackensen's great effort the Germans had seized the apparent opportunity to carry on in the Carpathians a warfare of rapid maneuvers with the promise of tangible and far-reaching consequences. The people of the Central Empires had cherished the expectation that their armies would forthwith roll together from the Carpathian summits and the forests of East Prussia, like the fabled cliffs of the Symplegades, crushing the Russian hosts between them.

But this attractive vision faded with the failure of the German efforts north of Warsaw, the plan of retaking Lemberg sank before the stubborn resistance at the ridge of Koziowa, Peremyśl surrendered after fruitless efforts to relieve it, and the offensive campaign of the Germanic armies in the Carpathians lapsed by gradual degrees from a major enterprise to a mere ruse to cover the stupendous preparations for the really crucial operations elsewhere.

## CHAPTER III

### THE GREAT TEUTONIC DRIVE IN GALICIA

A retrospect. Misleading convictions of the Entente Allies. The plight of Austria-Hungary and the progress of German control over the armies of the Dual Monarchy. The Teutonic leaders. The Central Empires rise to the situation and design an offensive on an unprecedented scale, profiting by the experience already gained in the course of the war. Position of the armies. Prodigious preparations on von Mackensen's front. His preliminary attack on April 28th. The tempest breaks, May 2d; the Russian Third Army staggers backwards. Rapid advance of von Mackensen's right wing and perilous situation of the Russians south of the Dukla and Lupkow Passes. Resistance of the Russians on the Besko-Szczucin line, May 9-12. Arrival of the Austro-German operative front on the San and the cooperation of von Boehm-Ermolli and von Linsingen. Von Pflanzer repulsed. Retreat and sudden counter-attack of Ewarts's Russian army north of the Vistula. The conflict on the San; fall of Jaroslaw, May 15th, and of Peremysl, June 2d. The German advance east of the San. Von Linsingen's attempts to cross the Dniester and his final success. The combats on June 12th and 13th. Second battle at Rawaruska, June 20th, and fall of Lemberg, June 22d. The situation at the end of June.

On the eve of the most sensational revolution in the whole course of the war a rapid recapitulation of the actual situation may not be out of place. We shall have occasion several times to note the rivalry of two antagonistic policies in German military circles, one looking for expansion in the West, the other in the East. But at the beginning of the war the western policy seems to have held undisputed supremacy. Von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff supported it; von Falkenhayn, his successor, was its determined advocate; and Germany was committed to the plan of quickly crushing France while Russia was held at bay within her own boundaries. The civil authorities acquiesced in the fateful program that involved the violation of

Belgium. A sudden stroke was levelled with tremendous fury at Germany's most persistent enemy. Belgium was overrun, the French recoiled before the shock. But at length the deluge rushed in vain against the human rampart reared by the steady self-possession of the French commanders and the unwavering courage of the opposing troops. The desperate efforts to retrieve the failure on the Marne were powerless to break the determination of the British and their allies on the fields of Flanders. The Germans raised a barrier in the West which in general held the tide of warfare far from their own borders. But the invaders of Belgium and France gained no decisive advantage and for more than a year they made no paramount effort on this front.

Russia's unexpected promptness had meanwhile created a dangerous situation for the Central Empires in the East. Von Hindenburg's sweeping campaign in East Prussia removed the incubus of immediate peril from Germany herself, but there remained the incompetence of Austria-Hungary to support alone the weight of Russia's onslaught as the chief disquieting factor. Beginning in September, 1914, German troops were repeatedly transferred from the western to the eastern front, until finally the center of gravity itself was shifted, and this inaugurated the second phase of the great struggle. The general purpose of the Central Powers remained the same, to beat down one of their opponents, but the direction of the principal effort was reversed.

The Russians had overrun most of Galicia, widening their western salient. The German attacks in Poland and the northeast had in most cases failed in their objects, and the offensive in the central Carpathians was brought to an ignominious deadlock in the northern foothills. East Prussia had been delivered from her invaders, Bukovina

had been reconquered, the apprehensions regarding Roumania's conduct had for the time subsided, and Hungary and Cracow were not immediately threatened. But the conquest of the greater part of Galicia by the Russians more than outweighed in strategical importance the subjugation of western Poland by the Austro-Germans. The balance of results at the conclusion of the winter's operations could scarcely be regarded as favorable to the Central Powers.

The surrender of Peremyśl brought deep humiliation to the Dual Monarchy. The German shoring-props, which had helped to stay the structure for a time, were quivering beneath the unequal strain and Austria-Hungary seemed once again to be verging on prostration. Flushed with success the Russian forces were pouring over the crest of the Carpathians into the valleys that lead from the Dukla and Lupkow Passes down into the Hungarian plain, while Italy and Roumania voraciously surveyed their eventual portions of the spoil.

The situation at the close of April called for immediate and strenuous action by the Central Empires. It was necessary by a supreme exertion to rescue the Dual Monarchy once for all from the agony of its recurrent crises. The Central Empires rose to the emergency and by application of their extraordinary powers of organization made preparations commensurate with the magnitude of the task. Germany responded to the heaviest demands made upon any belligerent without displaying any symptom of exhaustion.

Opinion in the West still clung to the fatuous assumption that Germany had entered the conflict with all her forces at the highest point and that she therefore had no means for replenishing the steady drain of time. But in reality no error could have been more fundamental. All through

the autumn and winter the level of her effective energy had been rising. She even seems to have increased considerably her initial lead in equipment and preparedness during the first nine months of the great struggle.

Only the leaders of Germany had appreciated from the first the nature of the elements and means upon which victory depended. Germany alone was abundantly equipped for the kind of warfare in which preponderance of shell-fire was destined to be the most decisive factor of success. And yet Germany's original superior preparation for the prevailing kind of fighting was partly accidental, since her mobile high-powered artillery had been prepared for the prompt reduction of fortresses, and not for trench-warfare, in which she had not expected to be compelled to engage.

Under the gruelling preceptorship of Mars the French had been reluctantly disabused of their inordinate faith in shrapnel and light field-artillery and were striving manfully to redress their original lack of heavy ordnance. But their manufacturing capacity, especially after the loss of leading industrial sections, was limited. The British had made relatively great progress, if we consider their very meager state of preparation at the beginning of the war, and yet, untouched as they were by the sharper spur of instant peril, only a few of the most discerning minds among them grasped the true measure of the vital problems, while Russia had scarcely begun to rectify her serious technical deficiencies.

Under the relentless exigencies of the war it was inevitable that the superior talent and efficiency and the overwhelming prestige of the German General Staff should give this body superior authority in the league of the Central Powers. As was to be expected, German control followed German reinforcements, for the German authorities

would not expose the safety of their own troops to comparatively indifferent Austro-Hungarian management.

With the consolidation of German influence in the Austro-Hungarian armies, rivalry and intrigue were effectively repressed, sanitary and medical shortcomings were corrected, incompetence was replaced by efficiency, and the higher aims of strategy were no longer sacrificed to intrigue or selfish egotism. The conspicuous martial qualities of many of the races comprised in the Dual Monarchy now found untrammelled scope.

The Austro-Hungarian generals appear for the most part as rather shadowy characters. They do not stand out in the imagination with the sharp, incisive features of the more prominent German leaders. We have even overlooked thus far the Austro-Hungarian generalissimo, the Archduke Frederick, who was born in 1856, the son of the Archduke Charles Ferdinand and brother of the Dowager Queen Maria Christina, widow of Alfonso XII and mother of Alfonso XIII, the present King of Spain. He had received an essentially military training and was regarded as a conscientious officer, became general of the infantry and army inspector in 1905 and commander of the Landwehr in 1907, and was the natural successor of the murdered Archduke Francis Ferdinand as chief commander. We shall soon record his presence at the operative front.

General von Mackensen was appointed as group commander of all the Teutonic armies from the Nida to Bukovina, and now for the first time a comprehensive operation carried on by armies of both the Central Powers was placed under the direction of a single chief. In this way nearly all the Austro-Hungarian field-forces now passed under the superior command of a German general.

General von Mackensen sprang from a family of the merchant class. The Kaiser's friendship for him went back


to the time when as crown prince the former served in the same regiment. It is reported that the subsequent appointment of this plebeian officer as the Kaiser's aide-de-camp produced a scandal, which resulted in the conferment of nobility upon him. He was colonel in 1901 and commanded an army corps in 1913. As general of infantry and commander of the Ninth German Army he played the chief part in pushing the German front to the line of the Bzura and the Ravka in the autumn of 1914, and his brilliant leadership in Poland won for him the much-coveted distinction of the Order *pour le mérite* and promotion to the rank of colonel-general. The quality of von Mackensen's talent seems subtler, more flexible, than that of von Hindenburg, although the latter was now more than ever idolized by the German people.

Von Hindenburg's titles to the possession of genius have already been discussed. He was the masterly exponent of a system. The brilliant improvisations of a Napoleon were absolutely foreign to his nature. His reputation still rested mainly on his two spectacular victories in East Prussia, which in reality were only the execution of long and laboriously meditated plans. Separated from the setting of his lifelong preparation, von Hindenburg's combinations did not work out with quite the marvellous precision of his maneuvers in the region of the Masurian Lakes. Only the wonderful superiority of the German military machine saved the armies from disaster after the first attack on Warsaw and made it possible for the retreat to become the prelude of a renewed offensive. But von Hindenburg's character and appearance satisfied the popular craving for a hero. In him the German nation saw the embodiment of its favorite and most effective traits. It instinctively exalted its own ideals and predilections in adoring his personality and achievements.






General Russky, commander of the Russian  
northern forces.



General Dmitrieff, commander of the Russian  
Third Army in Galicia.



General Lechitsky, commander of the  
Russian forces in Bukovina.

Von Hindenburg's merit is scarcely distinguishable from that of his counterpart and chief of staff, von Ludendorff, who, by his principal's own assertion at least, deserves to be regarded as a genius. The contrast between the two men could scarcely have been greater. The former was abrupt, obstinate, and often tactless; the latter was polished, affable, and deferential.

Erich von Ludendorff was born into the middle class. He entered the army from the cadet school at Gross-Lichterfelde in 1881. At the War College, to which he went in 1890, his attention was mainly devoted to Russian studies, and the completion of his course was followed by a visit of a year in Russia. He was appointed to the Great General Staff in 1895 as captain. Advanced to the rank of major in 1902, and to the colonelcy in 1911, he was summoned just before the war to the 85th brigade, and led these troops across the Belgian frontier on August 4, 1914, and three days later, after hand-to-hand engagements, into Liége. Von Ludendorff remained with the army in Belgium until called with von Hindenburg on August 22d to face the great crisis in the northeast.

General Erich von Falkenhayn, as Chief of the General Staff,—having succeeded von Moltke in name as well as fact in December, 1914,—was probably the chief designer of the plan for the gigantic offensive movement which swept away the Polish salient and carried the Austro-German eastern front from the Dunajec and the Bzura to the Pripet Marshes. Born in 1861, he was at one time military instructor of the Crown Prince, whose favor he enjoyed. He served as major in the East Asiatic occupation brigade and took part in the expedition against the Boxers. Later he was at different times chief of staff of the Sixteenth and the Fourth Army Corps. As Prussian Minister of War in 1914 he earned the antipathy of the more democratic

nations by his support of the German officers whose arrogant behavior in Alsace resulted in the unfortunate affair at Zabern. He was raised to the rank of general of infantry upon being relieved, at his own request, of the duties of minister of war on January 20, 1915. Major-general Wild von Hohenborn was appointed as his successor in the latter office and was at the same time made lieutenant-general.

During the last week in April some fundamental changes were made in the command of the Russian forces. General Alexeieff succeeded General Russky as commander of the northern Russian army group and General Lechitsky took Alexeieff's place as head of the Russian forces in Bukovina.

The southern Russian army group under General Ivanoff, comprising the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Armies, contained fourteen army corps with a total effective strength of about 600,000 men. The forces concentrated on the corresponding section of the Austro-German front, from the Vistula to the border of Roumania, numbered about 1,000,000 men.

In planning the gigantic operation which will presently be described, the leaders of the Teutonic alliance were guided by their own experience and especially by attentive observation of the mistakes made by their opponents in the West. In general the attacks of the western Allies penetrated the foremost German trench or line of trenches only to bring up before a second, third, or remoter line with forces too far spent for further effort. The problem of sustaining the attack until complete success had been achieved demanded the absolute concealment of the preparations and rapidity of execution, so as to forestall the concentration of reinforcements for the enemy, the previous accumulation of abundant stores of ammunition, the accurate coöperation of the artillery with the attacking



Austrian soldiers in camp during the offensive against the Russians.



Russian prisoners taken by the Germans waiting in line at Augustovo to receive rations.



masses of infantry, especially in the matter of adjusting the range of gunfire to the progress of the battle, and the intervention of the reserves at the right moment.

The western Allies had made all their attacks upon comparatively short sections of the front, and consequently, when they pushed back a corresponding section of the German lines and advanced into the breach, they were enfiladed from the sides. The remedy was to choose a section of attack confined by impenetrable barriers on both sides, or else to make the operative front so broad that an effective nucleus would be sufficiently covered until decisive results had been obtained.

With the proper dispositions and the harmonious action of all the forces success was simply a question of intensity of fire. A sufficient weight of shell would pulverize the strongest intrenchments and render any position untenable.

The German leaders chose as operative sector the front in western Galicia between the Vistula and the mountains, where the line passed up the left or western bank of the Dunajec to its junction with the Biala and then along the left bank of the latter to the region of the foothills, where it crossed to the right bank and bore off eastward. This sector offered the essential conditions which have been described. It happened, moreover, to be the only section of the eastern front where the Teutonic Allies had made no considerable effort since the beginning of the year.


Two main railways afforded communication with the Austro-German bases of supplies and in their further course eastward corresponded with the future lines of operations.

Within this space of about fifty miles were drawn up the Austro-Hungarian army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand on the left and von Mackensen's own army on the right. North of the operative center thus formed

stretched the Austro-Hungarian army of four corps under von Woyrsch along the Nida in southern Poland. On the right the armies of Boroëvic von Bojna, von Boehm-Ermolli, von Linsingen, and von Pflanzer extended along the Carpathians and the Pruth down to the Roumanian frontier, in the order mentioned. Except in Bukovina these had scarcely accomplished any tangible results, but now the stupendous Austro-German victory in western Galicia was about to bestow upon them a sort of unearned increment of effectiveness.

The chief dynamic force resided in von Mackensen's army, and preparations for the most intense aggressive operations were made on the section of about twenty-five miles along the Biala which corresponded with his front. The lower Dunajec was a less suitable theater for a forcible attack on account of the extensive marshes bordering the stream. The mountains covered von Mackensen's right flank, while the extent of the Austro-German operative front towards the north would have secured his left against attack by even a much more numerous enemy.

The Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and the Eleventh German Army of von Mackensen formed together a striking force of about 500,000 along the Dunajec and the Biala. The Third Russian Army under General Dmitrieff faced them with only 200,000 men. The Teutonic leaders had realized the most fundamental condition of success, a decisive numerical superiority at the crucial point. Nor was this all. The development of Russian industry was far from adequate to replenish by current production the constant wastage of munitions in a great war. Thanks to the accumulations made in recent years, the Russians had taken the offensive with an unexpected energy which had disconcerted the plans of their opponents and aroused exaggerated hopes



Russian retreat in Galicia. *German forces in pursuit advancing on one of the especially constructed military roads.*



German troops in Gorlice.



among their friends. But the accumulated stores were now exhausted and the hostility of Turkey had months before closed the only convenient route for the importation of supplies from western Europe. At the most critical moment Russia faced a munition famine. Soon there were accounts of batteries calling in vain for shell, units going into battle without rifles, armies subjected to the most terrible bombardments without any support from their own artillery.

The nucleus of von Mackensen's army of six corps had been brought from central Poland where he had conducted the frontal attacks on Warsaw. A large contingent from the western front included the Tenth Army Corps which had shared in the operations against Liége and had formed part of von Bülow's army in the Battle of the Marne. Added to these were other detachments from various sections of the eastern front as well as units newly-formed. Most of the forces transferred at this time to the theater of the impending action were brought up in the night preceding the commencement of the attack and distributed along the front under cover of the darkness. A division of the Guards was first shifted from its position on the western front to Alsace and then, a little later, appeared at Neusandez, just behind the battle-line on the Biala.

About 2,000 pieces of artillery, a half at least of heavy caliber, had been concentrated on the principal operative section of the front and vast magazines of ammunition and supplies were formed at convenient intervals at the rear. Three-fourths of the entire winter's accumulation of shell are said to have been brought to Cracow and from there distributed along the western Galician front by night. A vast number of motor-vehicles was collected. Taken as a whole the aggregation of men and material for the great offensive in Galicia was without a parallel

in history and no great movement of this kind had ever been so swiftly and silently accomplished.

Two successive objectives were envisaged from the first in the Teutonic plan for offensive operations in the East, the expulsion of the Russians from the greater part of Galicia and the destruction of the Russian salient in Poland. The attainment of the first of these will be the subject of the present chapter.

Renewed activity on the part of the Austro-German forces from Koziowa to the Jablonica Pass for about a week beginning April 25th and a sudden German inroad into Courland about the same time engaged the attention of the Russians and attracted reinforcements which might otherwise have been available where the greatest danger really threatened. Furthermore, the great assault itself was preceded by minor attacks near the Biala so that its real character was not immediately recognized.

The execution of the great plan began on April 28th with an attack from Ropa on the upper Biala in the direction of Gorlice. This was carried on for three days as an isolated operation. Besides disturbing Dmitrieff's left wing and drawing reinforcements thither from the Russian center, where the chief attack impended, this operation threatened the communications of the Russian forces which had penetrated into the region south of the Dukla Pass.

German aircraft had already thoroughly investigated the Russian position and discovered the most available approaches.

The inauguration of the grand attack, in the presence of the Austro-Hungarian Generalissimo and Field-marshal, Archduke Frederick, and of Colonel-general von Mackensen, was a solemn moment. There were involved the existence of the Dual Monarchy, the survival of the Teutonic Alliance, and the safety of Germany herself.

The preliminary bombardment lasting about three days reached its final stage with a fire of unprecedented violence during four hours on the morning of May 2d. The crashing reverberations seemed to rend the firmament, shake the earth, and pound human consciousness into a delirious madness or stunned and helpless lethargy. In words of thunder launched from tongues of flame a terrible Nemesis summoned Russia to justify her conduct under suspension of the sentence for sloth, incompetence, and corruption pronounced against her ten years before.

More than 700,000 shells were hurled into the Russian positions during the last stage of the bombardment. The Russian intrenchments were obliterated and at once the Austro-German infantry sprang to the attack. A large number of pontoons had been brought to the left bank of the river on the offensive front and concealed behind a dyke, where they were in readiness to be drawn, at the proper moment, through openings, temporarily concealed by sand-bags and grass, down to the water's edge on rails. Thus pontoon-bridges were quickly pushed across the Biala.

While the Russian line was pierced at several points, the chief attack was made against the village of Ciezkowice. The columns moving forward by this route, coöperating with those which were already advancing from Ropa further up, captured Gorlice and turned Dmitrieff's whole front.

On the next day, while the right wing of the Russian army still held out against the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand's Austrian army, the left fled precipitately towards the Visloka. Confident in the ability of his army to defend its strong intrenchments on the western line, Dmitrieff had prepared no alternative positions in the rear to serve as a refuge in adversity. His lack of foresight all but involved the total destruction of the Russian forces in the Carpathians

as well his own Third Army. If the Russians had been able to hold out on the line of the Visloka, they might have saved the positions already conquered in the region of the Carpathians, because this line covers on the west the entrance to the Dukla Pass.

But von Mackensen pushed forward von Emmich's Tenth Corps as rapidly as possible on his right so as to bar the outlets of the passes and entrap Brussiloff's right wing. The forward movement of the main forces was retarded by the difficulty of transporting the heavy artillery.

On the 5th the advanced column, moving along the railway, effected the passage of the Visloka and commanded with its artillery the highway descending from the Dukla Pass. The Russian forces that had been successfully resisting the attacks of von Boehm-Ermolli's army in the Ondava and Laborcz valleys south of the Dukla and Lupkow Passes, realizing the menace to their communications in Galicia, sought safety by sudden flight. General of Cavalry von Marwitz led the right wing of the Austro-Hungarian army over the Lupkow Pass. By the 9th Hungary was completely cleared of the invaders. Although a great many prisoners fell into the hands of the German forces in Galicia during the struggles of the Russian forces in extricating themselves, Brussiloff's right wing was not destroyed. The exploit of the Forty-eighth Division, which, finding its retreat completely intercepted, cut a way through to contact with the main part of the army, is similar to that of the Twentieth Corps in the retreat from East Prussia which escaped from the iron jaws of the German army in the forests near Suwalki.

The Austro-Hungarian army did not overcome the resistance of its opponents on the lower Dunajec until the 6th, when Tarnow was taken and the Russians retreated towards the east and northeast.





Austrians in Peremysl after the evacuation of the city by the Russians.



Austrian troops crossing the River San. As the Russians retreated they of course destroyed the bridges. Above is shown two types of military bridges, one of pontoons on the right background, and one of driven piles in the foreground.

The Germans won crossing points on the Vislok near Rymonof and at Fryztak on the 8th, and by the 9th the Russian battle-front was stretched along the line from the outlet of the Uszok Pass northwestward through Besko and Debica to Szczucin on the Vistula. A range of hills prolonging in a general sense the line of the upper San as far as the Vislok and even beyond it formed a natural support for this position.

Here the Russians made a stand for a few days until their opponents' heavy field-artillery and von Mackensen's principal masses of infantry, his redoubtable "phalanx," had arrived. Then, after shattering the enemy's power of resistance by a furious bombardment, von Mackensen delivered his sledge-hammer blows with seven picked divisions drawn up in compact formation on a front of about twelve miles, backed by six other divisions in reserve.

The Russians were again in retreat on the 12th, the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had reached the lower Visloka, and on the right the vanguard of the Austro-German host was crossing the San between Sanok and Dynof. Two days later von Mackensen's advanced guard appeared before the fortress of Peremyśl. The Austro-German forces throughout the Carpathians were actively coöperating. Pouring down from the Lupkow Pass in the direction of Sanok, advancing from the Uszok towards Sambor, and from the Beskid towards Stryj, they combined with the armies of the archduke and von Mackensen on a common front, extending the battle-line towards the southeast, while Brussiloff slowly withdrew before them. Most of the Austro-German forces engaged in the Galician campaign were now advancing on converging lines in the general direction of Lemberg, so that every step tended to consolidate their common front.

The only exception was in the extreme southeast. There early in May von Pflanzer advanced northward on

a front of about a hundred miles. By the 9th his left wing rested on the railway about midway between Nadvorna and Stanislaw, when the Russians attacked in superior force and in a five days' engagement drove his army back to the Pruth. This reverse was quickly followed by another blow launched at the opposite extremity of the Austro-German operative line, in southern Poland.

There the Russian army commanded by General Ewarts was retreating in conformity with the movement of the battle-front in Galicia, its left wing keeping in contact with the right wing of the Russian army south of the Vistula. But on the 15th General Ewarts suddenly turned against his pursuers, the Austro-Hungarian army under General von Woysch. Punctuating the attack with stinging emphasis by sending the Cossacks around his adversary's flank to strike at the line of communications, Ewarts defeated the Austro-Hungarian army in a three days' combat, inflicting heavy losses upon it, and resumed his gradual retrograde movement, free for a time from molestation.

The conflict on the San had meanwhile begun. The Russian front now swerved from the Carpathian foothills near the outlet of the Beskid Pass and bore northward, crossing the Stryj and Dniester Rivers, swinging round the fortress of Peremysl in a loop, keeping west of the lower San, and gradually diverging from it to reach the Vistula at Tarnobrzeg. The staggering effect of the Austro-German onslaught may be appreciated by the number of 174,000 Russians taken prisoner in the course of the operations in this quarter during the first two weeks of May. The Russian Third Army had retreated eighty-five miles before overwhelming forces, exposed to a merciless shower of steel. In spite of terrible losses and contrary to all reasonable expectations, it had preserved its cohesion as a fighting force.

The Teutonic hosts paused longer at the San than at any other stage of their course across Galicia, in consequence of the need felt for collecting their energy after the tremendous exertions of the preceding fortnight, the greater compactness of the Russian front resulting from the concentric retreat, and the support afforded the defensive by the stronghold of Peremysl.

The army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand gained the left bank of the San on the section Jaroslaw-Sieniava. After holding out two days against the Austro-Hungarian assaults, the fortress of Jaroslaw, which guarded the bridge-head, fell on the night of the 15th-16th, but not before most of the Russian forces had passed the river. All through the 16th the Austro-Hungarian army struggled for the crossing-points and by the 17th 160,000 had gained the eastern bank and driven the Russians back to a considerable distance. But the latter, launching a vigorous counter-attack, held their assailants at bay for more than a fortnight and all but deprived them of their foothold on the right bank of the San. The bridge-head at Sieniava, lost by the Austro-Hungarians as late as the 27th-28th, was not regained until June 12th. Probably lack of troops properly armed and equipped and of sufficient ammunition prevented Ivanoff from paralyzing the Austro-German offensive by a turning movement against von Mackensen's left wing.

Whatever the effect, if any, on the Austro-Hungarian councils of Italy's entrance into the war about this time, it was hardly shared by the less susceptible allies.

Von Mackensen's phalanx on May 24th forced the passage of the San at Radymno. Von Boehm-Ermolli was threatening the Peremysl-Lemberg railway from the south. The intention was evidently to isolate Peremysl and join forces on a new front east of the San in preparation for the next great forward thrust.

The Russians, menaced from all sides at Peremyśl, strove to hold that stronghold only till they could remove the war-material and supplies.

The first rounds were fired at Peremyśl on May 16th. The Germans concentrated their chief efforts against the northern section of the outer girdle, where some of the forts were almost completely demolished by the terrific bombardment. On the 31st Bavarian troops captured several of the Russian positions. Already von Boehm-Ermolli had brought a section of the Peremyśl-Lemberg railway within range of his heavy artillery. The southern forts of Peremyśl were abandoned on June 1st. The final assault was made on the night of the 1st-2d. About 3.30 A. M. the German troops forced their way into the city from the north and there met the Tenth Austro-Hungarian Corps which had been advancing from the west. Altogether the Teutonic Allies garnered 269,732 prisoners, including 873 officers, 251 cannon, and 576 machine-guns in the Galician offensive during May.

Toward the east, von Marwitz advanced in the general direction of Lemberg and entered Sambor on June 15th. Von Linsingen's army advanced to the Dniester, bearing to the right so as to threaten the flank and rear of the forces opposed to von Pflanzer near Stanislaw and Halicz. The situation seemed to favor the execution of the original plan for these two eastern armies on the Austro-German front, that of bagging a considerable number of their adversaries by a combined enveloping maneuver.

Returning to the offensive, von Pflanzer captured Stanislaw on June 9th and crossed the Dniester at Zaleszczyki on the 11th, while von Linsingen forced a passage of the same river on his own front at Zurawno on the 6th.

Perceiving the dangerous position of their forces between these two points, the Russian commanders despatched reinforcements to the point menaced by von Linsingen

and after a conflict of three days forced the Austro-German forces to the south bank of the river. This momentary success insured the safe withdrawal of the remaining Russian forces on the south side of the stream.

But all other operations were subordinate to the outcome of the crucial struggle in the central positions near the San. With strict attention to the ultimate aims of the campaign, von Mackensen conducted his operations from this time on with reference to the anticipated struggle in Poland. He turned his own front quite sharply to the left, into a position facing the Wisznia and in general alignment with the archduke's forces on the left along the San and those of von Boehm-Ermolli on the right stretching across to the Dniester marshes. Continuing to swerve gradually to the left, his army was headed straight for the vulnerable section of the Russian lines in Poland, the railway between Lublin and Chelm.

The Austro-German forces now attacked the Russians on a front extending about forty miles, from Piskorovice on the San to the vicinity of Mosciska. In a desperate conflict on the 12th and 13th the Russian front was broken southeast of Jaroslaw and a large number of captives fell into the hands of the victorious Teutonic Allies.

The Russians retired to a line which ran eastward along the Tanef from its confluence with the San, then swung round to the south, and skirted the Grodek lakes and marshes down to the Dniester. The line of the Grodek lakes was in itself almost impregnable to frontal attacks, but it could be turned by assailants strong enough in number, just as the Russians had outflanked it in 1914, and the execution of this crucial maneuver accorded well with von Mackensen's general line of operations. Whilst von Boehm-Ermolli approached the Grodek position in front on his way to Lemberg, the redoubtable German phalanx

rolled irresistibly northeastward towards Rawaruska, the scene of Russia's earlier hard-earned victory, the real key to the Galician capital. Here the Russians were overpowered in a fierce battle on the 20th and the defensive line covering Lemberg was turned. The Russians abandoned the north bank of the Dniester above Halicz. Their forces deployed along the Grodek line fell back in good order before von Boehm-Ermolli, whose entrance into Lemberg on the afternoon of the 22d afforded a very welcome tonic to the spirit of the Dual Monarchy.

After attaining the chief immediate goals of the offensive in Galicia, the Austro-German armies, which had thus far tended to converge, now spread out like an open fan. The Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, after finally getting the better of the resistance on the lower San, advanced into Poland. Von Mackensen swept northward towards Tomasof and Zamosk in Polish territory, while the armies of von Boehm-Ermolli and von Linsingen spread out towards the northeast and east to face the Russians who in these directions had retired to a line extending along the upper course of the Bug and down the Gnila Lipa to its confluence with the Dniester.

Germany's policy towards Turkey had borne fruit in the vassalage of that country. Through Turkey Germany might hope to dominate Asiatic Turkey. Russia's disasters were largely attributable to her isolation because of the closing of the Dardanelles, the mastery over which involved the control of Russia's vast grain exports. Most potent considerations, therefore, demanded that the Western Powers should shatter the obstruction that barred direct coöperation with their ally in the East, and we shall turn to the consideration of a naval operation for that purpose, followed by a land offensive conducted under unusual difficulties.

## CHAPTER IV

### NAVAL OPERATIONS AT THE DARDANELLES

British naval protection. Consideration of the tactics of the Dardanelles operations. Bombardment of Dardanelles forts, November 3, 1914. Motives for the Dardanelles expedition. Admiral Carden's plan. Divergence of naval opinions. Mr. Churchill's expectations. Earlier British passages of the Dardanelles. Physical characteristics of the Strait and Gallipoli Peninsula; its forts. Bases seized by the British: Imbros and Lemnos islands; Port Mudros. A British submarine enters the Strait. Operations of February 19, 1915: Allied ships; the objectives; the day's action; renewed operations, February 25th, the entrance forced; operations within the Strait and in the Gulf of Saros. Bombardment of Gallipoli. Vice-admiral de Robeck in command. The disastrous operations of March 18th. The Allied fleet out of the Dardanelles. A joint military and naval attack ordered. Losses.

Simultaneously with the first really important naval battle of the war, that of January 24, 1915, in the North Sea, the Allies were considering a serious naval attack on the Dardanelles, which was soon to be carried out in force. The dispatch of a fleet to force the Dardanelles constitutes one of the spectacular operations of the British navy, nor was it undertaken without grave anxiety as to its success. Political and economic reasons swayed the decision, perhaps chiefly. It presented unusual problems, and the relative values of land defences and the most modern naval armaments were to be put to a new test.

As this campaign of ships against forts is one of the most striking in history, some discussion of the tactics is of interest, if not necessity.

Admiral Carden, in a telegram of January 5, 1915, in reply to one from the Admiralty of January 3d, asking his

opinion as to the practicability of forcing the Dardanelles by the use of ships alone, said: "I do not think that the Dardanelles can be rushed, but they might be forced by extended operations with a large number of ships." Admiral Carden's successor, De Robeck, seems to have concurred entirely with this view. Whatever views are here advanced, they are given with every reserve. It is wholly a moot question, not a strong possibility: "a might have been." On January 3, 1915, the Admiralty (in the person of the First Lord) telegraphed Admiral Carden: "The importance of the results would justify severe loss."

In the end, six battleships and many thousand officers and men of the Allied fleet were lost, and still many more thousands of the army.

It would appear at least not unreasonable that had the Strait been "rushed" in the first instance, instead of bombarding and silencing the outer forts on February 19th, and a swift run for the Sea of Marmora been made, the fleet would have got through with less loss than six battleships. The crux of the situation was in the mine, stationary or drifting with the current. It was an immense danger of course, but was it a sufficient one to cause a probable loss, in such an advance, of more than six battleships? Lord Fisher's calculation of probable loss in extended operations was twelve.

Let us say twelve, with the loss of every soul aboard, some twelve thousand officers and men. The ships were, with few exceptions, old and could have been spared; and such loss in officers and men would have been but a fraction of that which was to come through use of the army, though the loss in the trained officer or man of the navy was a far more serious matter to that service than an equal loss is to an army.

There are many points of similarity to Farragut's famous passing of the forts of the Mississippi, a feat which stands

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OF KULJEVSTOJE

ТОНА АВВ. ЛНЗОД, ГОВД ЕРНФК

Село на река Висока на река Висока

АДПРКАТ СИБ ТОНА ВЛРНИ ОВЛТН ТРИ ПСОЕ

JOHN ARBUTHNOT, LORD FISHER  
OF KILVERSTONE

Admiral and first sea lord of the British admiralty.

ADMIRAL SIR JOHN RUSHWORTH JELlicoe

Commander-in-chief of the home fleet of the British navy.





in the front rank in naval annals, and in the writer's opinion places Farragut as the greatest of naval leaders in daring resource and conduct. His orders were to "*reduce the defences* which guard the approaches to New Orleans, *when* you will appear off that city and take possession of it." The British Admiral's orders, substituting the Dardanelles and Constantinople for the Mississippi and New Orleans, were practically the same. The bend of the Mississippi commanded by Fort Jackson on the right bank and Fort St. Philip on the left was very similar to the bend of the Dardanelles at Chanak; the breadth of the channel and the swiftness of the current were about the same; the relative armaments of forts and fleet in each instance were much alike; a chain barrier supported by hulks was across the river in the one case, and mines, floating and stationary, obstructed the river in the other; the ships in the one case were of unprotected wood and slow; in the other heavily armored and fast. As to mines, Farragut's phrase later at Mobile was applicable.

It is difficult to see that there was any insuperable difficulty in rushing the forts and entering the Sea of Marmora and appearing off Constantinople, which would have been at its mercy. Just as Farragut felt, despite his orders, that the possession of New Orleans would involve the surrender of the forts, so "Lord Kitchener was of opinion that directly the passage had been forced the Gallipoli garrison would evacuate the peninsula, inasmuch as their communications with Constantinople would be cut off." In a memorandum dated March 23, 1915, he wrote: "Once the ships are through, the position of the Gallipoli peninsula ceases to be of any military importance." Moreover, as it appears from the Dardanelles Commission Report, he and others, including Earl Grey, "confidently looked forward to a revolution taking place

in Constantinople if once the British fleet appeared in the Sea of Marmora."

The belief as to the peninsula was justified; it would have been impossible to pass supplies by the narrow isthmus of Bulair, but three miles across and thus fully commanded from the sea, even had there been a base from which supplies could be furnished. Both the north and south sides of the Sea of Marmora were destitute of railways, and transportation of supplies, particularly of heavy ammunition, was almost impossible. Once the fleet or even a very moderate portion of it, was at Constantinople, the way would, almost surely, be open to the Black Sea. Even if not, for a time, the Sea of Marmora would be held, and the communications by way of the Dardanelles would soon be established. The worst that could happen would be to return by the Strait as did Admiral Duckworth in 1807. It would seem clear that there would be little danger from mines in such a return. And if entrance to the Black Sea should be effected through the surrender of Constantinople, the entire littoral of both seas would be under Entente control. The dockyard of Sevastopol would be at the command of the Entente Powers for repairs, with all Russia as a base of supplies.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the political effect. Bulgaria would have joined the Entente instead of the Central Powers; Serbia would not have been invaded. Greece, of necessity, would have been friendly and the struggle for Mesopotamia could have had but one outcome. The "Rush" would have been well worth the loss of even the twelve battleships estimated by Lord Fisher. Most of the ships were old and ineffective for the battle-line and in any case no such loss would have occurred. What was needed was a Farragut, with a free foot, who when he saw the *Tecumseh* go down, in the narrow channel

at Mobile Bay, and the leader of his line stop and back, with a warning cry from her of torpedoes ahead, and his line thrown into confusion by the *Brooklyn's* action, could, from the main shrouds where he had been lashed by his flag-lieutenant, shout out, "Damn the torpedoes! Four bells. Captain Drayton, go ahead."

Had the British authorities but read the wonderful story of Mobile Bay, a different story would have been told of the Dardanelles, for the "Rush" in all probability, would have been made.

Turkey entered the war by a declaration on October 29, 1914. Her action, in August, in giving refuge to the German battle-cruiser *Goeben* and the cruiser *Breslau*, to which was added later a ship of the East Africa line with a cargo of mines, heavy guns, and ammunition, had practically assured the Entente Powers of what her coming action was to be. On November 3d the first act of war came in the bombardment by four battleships, two British and two French, of the forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles. The attack was at a range of seven to eight miles, was at high speed, and lasted but eight to ten minutes. It was stated as a reconnaissance only and as meant to test the range of the Turkish guns.

On November 25th, Mr. Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the British Admiralty, brought before the newly organized War Council, the question of an attack upon the Dardanelles, as the "ideal method" of defending Egypt.

It should be stated that from the beginning of the war (August 3, 1914), until November 25th, a period of nearly four months, the conduct of affairs had been in the hands of the Cabinet, of which there were twenty-two members, assisted in some degree by the Committee of Imperial Defence, a committee established many years before the

war. Of the twenty-two members of the Cabinet, but one, Lord Kitchener, the Secretary for War, was in any wise an expert. On November 25th a new committee, known as the War Council, met. In this Council there was again but the one of military training and experience, Lord Kitchener. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Churchill, himself in nowise an expert in naval matters, represented the Navy.

The question of attacking the Dardanelles was brought up by Mr. Churchill at the first meeting of the War Council as the "ideal method of defending Egypt."

But there was much more in the question of the Dardanelles than the safety of Egypt and aid to the Russians. The main dominating thought of British policy had been the control of all highways to India. The Dardanelles forced, the forts in the Allies hands, and the fleet before Constantinople would have made such a control a surety and would have saved the serious struggle in Mesopotamia. Hence, not only the safety of Egypt would have been assured but also the possession of the great railway connecting Constantinople, and thus all Europe, with Bagdad, of which all but 498 miles of the total 1,654 were reported in 1916, by a German authority, as completed. The largest gap, 415 miles, is from Ras-el-Ain to Samara, sixty miles from Bagdad. There would still remain to be built, to reach Koweit on the Persian Gulf, about 500 miles additional.

This undertaking was of significant importance to Great Britain and if it did not specifically appear among the reasons for the Dardanelles venture, it was necessarily always a matter of preoccupation.

On December 28, 1914, the Secretary of the War Council, Sir Maurice Hankey, called the attention of that body by a memorandum to the "remarkable deadlock" in the western theater of war and invited consideration of the possibility of





Vice-admiral John Michael Robeck, successor to Vice-admiral Carden as commander-in-chief of the Allied squadron at the Dardanelles.



Rear-admiral Guépratte, commander of the French squadron at the Dardanelles.



Vice-admiral Sackville S. Carden, commander-in-chief of the Allied squadron attacking the Dardanelles.

striking the most effective blow against Germany "through her allies, and particularly Turkey."

On January 2, 1915, a telegram was received by the Foreign Office from the British Ambassador at Petrograd conveying a request from the military authorities of Russia that "a naval or military demonstration against the Turks should be arranged in order to relieve the pressure felt by the Russian troops at the Caucasus." To this communication a reply was sent on the following day to the British ambassador authorizing him "to assure the Russian government that a demonstration would be made against the Turks." It was added, however, that such action would not be likely to effect any serious withdrawal of enemy troops in the Caucasus.

The discussion of the demonstration continued till January 13th. The views of Lord Kitchener, Lord Fisher, and others showed considerable divergence. On January 11th Admiral Carden's requested suggestions for operations had been received. As has been stated, his first telegram dated 5th January, addressed to Mr. Churchill said: "I do not think that the Dardanelles can be rushed, but they might be forced by extended operations with a large number of ships."

Admiral Carden's plan suggested four successive operations as possible:

- "(a) The destruction of the defences at the entrance of the Dardanelles.
- "(b) Action inside the Straits so as to clear the defences up to and including Cephez [Kephez] Point, Battery No. 8.
- "(c) The destruction of the defences of the Narrows.
- "(d) Sweeping of a clear channel through the mine field and advance through the Narrows followed by a reduction of the forts further up and advance into the Sea of Marmora."

A month was estimated as necessary to do this.

The decision of the Council on January 13th was in the following terms: "The Admiralty should prepare for a

naval expedition in February, to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as an objective." The plan was submitted to France and the coöperation of a French squadron was asked, which the French Admiralty promised. Final action was taken by the War Council on January 28th.

The Report of the Dardanelles Commission, after setting forth the advantages claimed for the proposed naval operation, continues:

"The decision of the War Council [January 28th] was then translated into action. The plan of operations was finally approved by M. Augagneur (the French Minister of Marine), who pronounced them to be 'prudent et prévoyant.' The final arrangements . . . were completed and a detailed staff paper on the proposed operation were [Sic] sent by the Admiralty to Admiral Carden on the 5th February. On the 17th or 18th February the Prime Minister conveyed to the Cabinet the unanimous decision of the War Council. It was accepted by them without question, criticism, or discussion of any kind.

"The bombardment opened on the 19th February."

A main argument leading to the decision of the War Council was the experience of the Belgian fortresses. The swift fall of these had "led to the belief that permanent works were easily dealt with by modern long-range artillery. . . ."

"The utilization of air craft had led to the hope that in a comparatively confined space like the Gallipoli Peninsula, the value of naval bombardment, particularly by indirect-laying would be enormously increased."

"We have received," says the Report of the Dardanelles Commission, "abundant evidence to show that these arguments weighed strongly both in the minds of ministers and experts."

In the very beginning (November 25th) Mr. Churchill insisted that the experience of the past was no longer admissible by reason of the "marvellous potentialities of the

*Queen Elizabeth*” which, brand-new and carrying eight 15-inch guns, was being hastened into commission. His arguments concerning her had much effect in bringing Lord Kitchener to favor the effort. By the middle of January, she was ready for her gun trials which were to take place off Gibraltar, but Lord Fisher suggested that such ammunition might as well be expended against the forts of the Dardanelles instead of firing uselessly into the sea. “If this is practicable she could go straight there, hoist Carden’s flag and go on with her exercises. . . .” The range of her 15-inch guns was such that she could keep out of range of the Turkish forts and fire with the effect in some degree of a howitzer, the great advantage of the use of which is in the large angle of fall (which may be almost vertical) and the consequent inability to protect guns or the interior of the fort, if accuracy be assured. The highest elevation of the *Queen Elizabeth’s* guns was, however, but 20 degrees, and this was not sufficient for really high-angle fire: “lying 15,000 yards from Gabe Tepe and firing with reduced three-quarter charge at Kilid Bahr, the angle of descent would be 17 degrees, 18 minutes; firing at Chanak the angle of descent would be 20 degrees, 20 minutes. At 24,000 yards (twelve sea miles) the range used later against the Chanak forts across the Isthmus of Gallipoli, the angle of fall was probably as much as 26 degrees, but even this bears no relation to the practically vertical fall of the shot from a howitzer.

“Looking to all the facts of the case,” says the Report, “we are disposed to think that undue importance was attached to the ease with which the Belgian forts were destroyed,” and the analogy between these and the forts at the Dardanelles was overrated.


But the experience of the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882 was not favorable to great expectations based on

the long-range fire of the *Queen Elizabeth*. "The natural deduction from the Alexandria bombardment [which took place under the most favorable conditions for the ships] was that a naval attack on modern forts, well-armed and adequately manned, would be a highly critical operation, would most probably end in failure, and could only succeed at the cost of serious loss," says a British writer.

The experience of the past had not been of a character to encourage the effort, though, of course, it must be said that the instruments to be employed were ships of strength and gun power then unimagined. But defence likewise had been busy. Mines, automobile torpedoes which could be discharged from the shore, guns of heaviest caliber, and works much more resistant to gunfire were now available and all these were prepared under the able surveillance of the German Staff, instead of by the somewhat casual administration of the old time Turk. The Isthmus of Gallipoli and its opposite shore were now a great fortress.

Admiral Duckworth had passed the forts in 1807 against guns firing stone balls twenty inches in diameter and immovable as to mountings. He had arrived before Constantinople, but had to retire from before batteries which were built during prolonged negotiations, but what was more serious, through having behind him forts which he had been unable to garrison and which thus cut off all supplies. Sir Geoffrey Hornby on February 12, 1878, in command of the Mediterranean Fleet of Great Britain, passed the Strait, unopposed, and anchored in the Sea of Marmora. He had already declared (10th August, 1877), that the possession by the Russians of the Peninsula of Gallipoli and the erection of batteries "could not fail to stop transports and colliers, and would be most difficult for men of war to silence."





The periscope of *E-7* hit by a Turkish projectile.



The British submarine *E-7* returning from the Sea of Marmora after sinking Turkish vessels and passing the mine-fields twice.

The Strait of Dardanelles, known to the ancients as the Hellespont, famous in story for the tragedy of Hero and Leander, and in history as the point where Xerxes crossed for the invasion of Greece, is thirty-eight statute miles long from Cape Helles, which marks the westerly entrance on the north side, to the town of Gallipoli where it broadens into the Sea of Marmora. From Gallipoli to Constantinople is 125 miles. The breadth, at the westerly entrance, is about 4,200 yards. Leaving the Aegean, the southern point is known as Kum Kalé. Just east of this the river, anciently known as the Simois, enters the Strait. About four miles S. S. E. is Novum Ilium, the site of ancient Troy. Between these two points are marshes and salt lagoons making an extremely difficult terrain for attack by troops. East of this marshy land, and bordering the Strait, are hills rising to 1,100 feet, similar in roughness to those of the north shore.

Having passed the entrance, the Strait expands at its broadest; nearly double the width at the entrance, but at ten miles within it contracts to one and three-quarter miles. Four miles further on after passing another broad pocket, we come to Chanak (known officially as Sultanieh), the narrowest part, where it is but 1,400 yards across. Here, it turns due north for three miles, expanding to two miles and then narrowing suddenly, when it turns N. E., to 2,000 yards. It thence continues N. E. with a breadth varying from two to three and one-half miles to the Sea of Marmora, where, on the north shore as mentioned, a mile within the exit, lies the sleepy town of Gallipoli of some 20,000 inhabitants whence the peninsula takes its name. This peninsula, lying on the north side of the Strait and connected by a narrow isthmus but three miles across in its narrowest part, is some fifty miles long. The part of the Aegean on the N. W. coast is known as the Gulf of

Xeros, usually anglicized into Saros. The peninsula is a series of rough ridges, the highest of which is on the north shore, rising at one point to 1,471 feet. The army operations which were finally to come, were to be at the S. W. end, in the roughest and most difficult part, where the land has the profile of a human foot thirteen miles long from toe to heel. The elevations here are from 600 to 700 feet. A more rugged, difficult mass would be hard to find. "The hills are so deeply, sharply cut that to reach their tops in many places is a matter of sheer climbing. There is little cultivation, few villages and no properly engineered roads. Most of the land is covered with a dense scrub from three to six feet high, with stunted forests in the hollows. Communications are so bad that the usual way from village is not by land but by boat along the inner or outer coast." The scrub mentioned was to cause the death of many soldiers from its catching fire through bombardment during the assaults by the army.

A mile and a half from the village of Bulair, at the narrowest part of the peninsula and six miles N. E. of Gallipoli, is a strong line of earth works thrown up in 1853, during the Crimean War, by the French and English. There were to be feints of landing in this region, but feints only, as occupancy, even if a foothold could have been gained in so rough a region, could serve no good purpose so long as the Turks controlled the water way.

Taken from the Aegean to the Sea of Marmora the principal points are at the entrance; Cape Helles and (just within Cape Helles) Sedd-ul-Bahr on the north. On the south side Kum Kalé and two miles S. W. of Kum Kalé the village of Yeni Sehr with Fort Orkanieh. All these four points were armed with batteries of 10.2-inch and 9.2-inch guns. Then eleven miles within, on the south side, came Kephez Point with Fort Dardanos, and opposite

to these, two miles across the Strait, Fort Soghandere. Four miles above Kephez Point are the Narrows with Chanak on the south side and Kilid Bahr on the north, three-quarters of a mile apart, both sides powerfully armed with guns, including many 14-inch. Nagara Point, another constriction of the Strait, was again four miles beyond Chanak. It and its opposite point, on the north shore, were also heavily armed. The fleet, however, never extended its attack beyond Chanak.

The Turks who, as mentioned, from their reception of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* were clearly going to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers, had under German advice and leadership altered the whole character of the defence. A naval attack early in the war, before the defences could be so perfected, might have succeeded, but later the forts were heavily armed; though the number of guns is not accurately known, it is certain that there were many of 14-inch and 11-inch, besides large numbers of less caliber. Large stores of ammunition had been accumulated during the winter and an army, probably less than 400,000, besides one of never less than 180,000 at Constantinople, was available at the Dardanelles. It was but 130 miles from the capital to the Strait and communication by water was uninterrupted.

Finally, and far from least, the narrowness of the Strait enabled a perfect use of automobile torpedoes, launched from batteries ashore. These now have ranges up to 10,000 yards (over eleven land miles), but a much shorter range is sufficient for ordinary use, and particularly for the Dardanelles, which, at the broadest part, is but four miles across, and at Chanak but three-quarters, and at Nagara but one mile. There are long stretches with a breadth of but 4,000 yards, which is the range of the ordinary torpedo carried in battleships. In addition to such an advantage,


there was the constant current out of the Sea of Marmora, with a velocity of from one to four knots, the latter a strength twice that of the Mississippi at high water. This gave an unsurpassed opportunity for the use of floating mines, of which the Turks were to take full advantage.

As preparatory to the operations against the Dardanelles, the island of Imbros, thirteen land miles from the entrance to the Strait, with an anchorage in a bay open to the north and thus of small value, and Lemnos, with an admirably protected anchorage of great extent, both belonging to Greece, were occupied as "a military necessity." It was vital to the Allies to have such a base as the latter, and, much as we may decry such ethics, military necessity governed, as it always will and must. While certain rules are laid down for the governance of warlike operations, we must remember that war is, itself, an absolute negation of law, and when necessity comes, all rules must, by the very nature of war, take second place. In saying this we are dealing with a fact and not a theory.

Lemnos is about fifteen miles in extreme length and breadth. The island is nearly divided by two deep indentations opposite and separated from one another by only two miles: Burnea Bay to the north and Mudros to the south. The former is an open roadstead; the latter in all its parts affords good anchorage, and the upper end a particularly secure one.

Port Mudros is described by Masefield, who took part in the later expedition of the army (though he is much amiss as to the number of ships which can be provided for in the upper bay), as "a great natural harbor, measuring some two or three miles across, (which) provides good holding ground in from five to seven fathoms of water for half the ships in the world. Two islands in the fairway divide the entrance into three passages, and make it more





easy for the naval officers to defend the approaches. It is a safe harbor for ocean-going ships in all weathers; but with northerly or southerly gales, such as spring up very rapidly there in the changeable seasons of the year, and blow with great violence for some hours at a time, the port is much wind-swept, and the sea makes it dangerous for boats to lie alongside ships. Mudros itself . . . could not even supply the ships with fresh water, let alone meat, bread, and vegetables. The island produces little for its few inhabitants; its wealth of a few goats, fish, olives, and currants could be bought up in a week by the crew of one battleship. Everything necessary for the operations had therefore to be brought by sea and stored in Mudros till wanted. When this is grasped the difficulty of the undertaking will be understood. There was no dock, wharf, nor crane in Mudros, nor any place in the harbor where a dock or wharf could be built without immense labor of dredging. Ships could not be repaired, nor dry-docked there, nor could they discharge nor receive heavy stores save by their own winches and derricks. Throughout the operations ships had to serve as wharves, and ships' derricks as cranes, and goods were shipped, reshipped, and transhipped by that incessant manual labor which is the larger half of war."

Alexandria and Port Said are 600 miles away; Malta 800, and Gibraltar, where are the largest docks, 1,000 miles beyond Malta.

On November 3, 1914, as has been stated, there had been a tentative bombardment of the forts at the entrance by four battleships, two British and two French. This fact is important only because it followed immediately on the statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty, on November 2d.

On November 18th a British submarine entered the Strait and torpedoed the old (though refurbished) Turkish

battleship *Messudieh*, which was guarding the mine fields. It was a brave and gallant feat for which the young commander very properly received the Victoria Cross.

It was not until February 19, 1915 (which fell on Friday, the Mohammedan Sunday), that Vice-admiral Sackville S. Carden, who was in chief command, and Rear-admiral Guépratte, commanding the French, made the first real attack.

The British ships engaged in the siege of the Strait were the *Queen Elizabeth*, 27,500 tons, eight 15-inch guns; *Agamemnon*, 16,500 tons, four 12-inch and ten 9.2-inch; *Lord Nelson*, a sister ship; *Irresistible*, 15,000 tons, four 12-inch; *Implacable*, a sister ship; *Cornwallis*, 14,000 tons, four 10-inch and fourteen 7.5-inch; *London*, 15,000 tons, four 12-inch; *Prince of Wales*, a sister ship; *Vengeance*, 12,950 tons, four 12-inch; *Albion*, a sister ship; *Majestic*, 14,950 tons, four 12-inch; *Prince George*, a sister ship; *Triumph*, 11,980 tons, four 10-inch and fourteen 7.5-inch; *Swiftsure*, a sister ship; *Inflexible*, battle-cruiser, 17,250 tons, eight 12-inch; a total of fifteen battleships carrying eight 15-inch guns, forty-eight 12-inch, twelve 10-inch, twenty 9.2-inch, and forty-two 7.5-inch, a total of one hundred and thirty heavy guns (all 6-inch and lower calibers are omitted). The 15-inch guns fired a shell of 1,950 pounds, the 12-inch, one of 850, and the 10-inch, one of 500 to 600 pounds. There were also seven British cruisers: the *Bacchante*, *Euryalus*, *Dartmouth*, *Dublin*, *Talbot*, *Doris*, and *Minerva*. The mother ship for seaplanes, the *Ark Royal*, was fitted with all appliances for what has become a terrible weapon of war. The *Queen Elizabeth* was one of a class of five, the most powerful ships of their period. The general data concerning them is as follows: displacement, 27,500 tons; length, 600 feet; beam, 90½ feet; draft, 28¾ feet; horse-power, 60,000; machinery, Parsons turbines; armor belt thirteen inches; protection to heavy guns, 10-inch; main armament, eight 15-inch;

secondary armament, twelve 6-inch; torpedo tubes, four 21-inch; speed, 25 knots; fuel, oil only. The *Queen Elizabeth* and *Irresistible*, being the most valuable ships, were generally employed at long range; notwithstanding the former was severely injured and had to be sent to Gibraltar for repairs, being towed stern foremost.

The French fleet comprised five battleships: the *Charlemagne*, *Jaurequiberry*, *Gaulois*, *Suffren*, and *Henri IV*, all of an older type, varying from about 11,000 to about 12,000 tons, and all with 12-inch or lesser caliber battery.

To these must be added one Russian cruiser, the *Askold*.

The attack was made with the *Inflexible*, *Agamemnon*, *Cornwallis*, *Vengeance*, and *Triumph*, and the French, the *Gaulois* and *Suffren*; all covered by a flotilla of destroyers, with the *Ark Royal*, the mother ship of the seaplanes outside. From this last were sent up aircraft as observers.

The objectives were the four forts at the entrance, Cape Helles and Sedd-ul-Bahr on the north and Kum Kalé and Orkhanieh on the south or Asiatic side. The fort at Cape Helles mounted two 9.2-inch guns; Sedd-ul-Bahr, six 10.2-inch; Kum Kalé, four 10.2-inch and two 5.9-inch; Orkhanieh (two miles S. W. of Kum Kalé), two 9.2-inch. Used against these were twenty guns heavier than any of the Turkish, and eight of which were four times as powerful as any of the latter. The ranges used by the *Inflexible* were about nine land miles; those of the other ships as low as six.

“The action began at 8 A. M.,” says a British writer. “It was clear that the forts at Cape Helles on the point of the peninsula, and at Kum Kalé, on the opposite shore, were frequently hit, and at times seemed to be smothered in bursting shells. It was harder to make out what was happening to the low earthworks of the batteries about Sedd-ul-Bahr. All the morning the bombardment continued; it was like target practice, for not a single shot was fired in reply. Admiral Carden came to the conclusion that the forts had been seriously damaged and at a quarter to three


in the afternoon gave the orders to close in. What follows shows that aërial observation at long range is no easy matter. As the ships steamed nearer, the hitherto silent and apparently destroyed forts began to shoot. They made bad practice, for not one of the six ships that had shortened range was hit. By sundown the European batteries were quiet again, but Kum Kalé was still firing, when, on account of the failing light, Admiral Carden withdrew the fleet."

Bad weather came on, which, while not particularly detrimental to the use of the ships, was so to the use of airplanes for observation. It was not until nearly a week later, February 25th, that operations began anew, when, at 10 A. M., the *Irresistible* and *Queen Elizabeth* took position nine miles from their respective targets, the *Irresistible* firing at Fort Orkhanieh on the Asiatic shore, and the *Queen Elizabeth* against Sedd-ul-Bahr and Cape Helles; both ships were out of range of any of the enemy's guns. The *Gaulois*, *Agamemnon*, *Vengeance*, *Cornwallis*, *Suffren*, *Charlemagne*, *Triumph*, and *Albion* were later to take position further inshore in the order named, from south to north. About 11 o'clock the *Agamemnon* was struck at a range of six miles by a shell from Cape Helles, which killed three and seriously wounded five of her crew. By 11.30 the guns there had been silenced by the long range fire of the *Queen Elizabeth*. The other ships stood in to closer range, some 2,000 yards.

"It says much of the courage and discipline of the Turkish artillerymen," continues the writer, "that though they had to face overwhelming odds, their last gun was not silenced till after 5 P. M. Little daylight remained, but covered by the battleships and destroyers, a number of North Sea trawlers at once set to work to sweep for mines in the entrance. The work was resumed next morning at sunrise and the mine field was cleared for a distance of four miles up the Strait. Then the *Albion*, *Vengeance*, and *Majestic* steamed in between the headlands and opened a long range fire on Fort Dardanos, a work on the Asiatic side some distance below the Narrows (four and a half miles below Chanak). It was not heavily armed, its best guns being four 5.9 Krupps. As the



The bow of the *Majestic* as she lay bottom upwards.



The *Majestic* heeling over one minute after the explosion of the torpedo, from the effects of which she sank on May 27th in the Dardanelles.



battleships opened fire, a reply came not only from Dardanos but from several unlocated batteries at various points along the shore. (The Strait is here two and a quarter miles broad.) The Turkish fire, however, did little harm, and we were able to attack the rear of the entrance forts (which were but about six miles in the other direction with low level ground in their rear), and drive off several bodies of Turkish troops. One party near Kum Kalé was driven across the bridge near the mouth of the river Mendere (the ancient Simois), and the bridge itself destroyed by shell fire."

Believing that these forts had been abandoned, marines were sent ashore with explosives to destroy the guns. This was accomplished, a detachment of Turks was encountered, a hot skirmish ensued and the marines had to retire with some casualties.

The entrance to the Strait was cleared, but, continues the same writer:

"This was only the easiest part of the problem, and only the beginning of the formidable task assigned to the Allied fleets. The real defence of the Dardanelles—the forts at the Narrows—had not been touched. Nevertheless, with that misleading optimism which has done so much to paralyze national effort, the Press of France and Britain wrote as if the fall of the outer forts had decided the fate of Constantinople . . . Enver (Pacha) . . . was for once in a way correct when he told a correspondent: 'The real defence of the Straits is to come. That lies where the difficult waterway deprives ships of their power to maneuver freely and obliges them to move in a narrow defile commanded by artillery and mines.'"

Attacks were continued from day to day. On March 1st the *Triumph*, *Ocean*, and *Albion* bombarded the batteries on the low-lying Kephez Point on the Asiatic side four miles below Chanak, with casualties of six wounded, and four French battleships operated against the lines of Bulair from the Gulf of Saros; the next day the *Canopus*, *Swiftsure*, and *Cornwallis* repeated the operations of the first day in the Strait against Point Kephez and the positions opposite. The mine-layers, covered by destroyers, were active within a mile and a half of Point Kephez,

with some half dozen of their crew wounded. The Russian cruiser *Askold* now joined, but from what point is not mentioned.

On March 5th, attack was begun from the Gulf of Saros by the *Queen Elizabeth*, against the forts of Chanak, firing over the land at a range of 21,000 yards, or about twelve miles. The angle of fall at such a range would be about twenty-five degrees and thus bore some resemblance to the fire of howitzers, but far less in effect, as mentioned, through the reduced angle of fall. The forts thus fired against were Rumilieh Medjidieh Tabia, Hamadieh II Tabia, and Nazamieh, which by Admiralty account were armed as follows: the first, with two 11-inch, four 9.4-inch, and 3.4-inch guns; the second, with two 14-inch; the third, with one 11-inch, one 10.3-inch, eleven 9.4-inch, three 8.2-inch, and three 5.9-inch. The *Inflexible* and *Prince George* were present to deal with the neighboring howitzer and field artillery fire. The fire was observed in the Strait and reported by the *Irresistible*, *Canopus*, *Cornwallis*, and *Albion*. This fire directed and spotted by aëroplanes, required extreme accuracy in range, as at such a distance the angle of fall was about forty-five degrees, so great that such firing was akin to howitzer practice. The *Queen Elizabeth* fired twenty-nine rounds "with satisfactory results," it being stated that the magazine of Fort Hamadieh II Tabia (which, as mentioned, was armed with two 14-inch guns), was blown up. Action next day was favored by fine weather. The *Queen Elizabeth*, supported by the *Agamemnon* and *Ocean*, again fired, with a like range of 21,000 yards across the peninsula against Forts Hamadieh I Tabia and Hamadieh III. The former, half a mile below Chanak, was armed with two 14-inch and seven 9.4-inch guns; the latter, at Chanak, with two 14-inch, one 9.4-inch, one 8.2-inch, and four 5.9-inch. The *Queen Elizabeth* was replied to by howitzers

and field guns; three shells from field guns struck her without causing any damage.

Meanwhile, inside the Strait, the *Vengeance*, *Albion*, *Majestic*, *Prince George*, and the French battleship, *Suffren*, fired on Soghandere, Mount Dardanos, and were fired at by a number of concealed guns.

Fort Rumilieh Medjidieh Tabia, which had been attacked on the previous day, opened fire, and was engaged and hit by 12-inch shells. The majority of the ships inside were struck by shells, but there was no serious damage and no casualties.

“On March 7th (the Admiralty reports continue), the weather continuing calm and fine, four French battleships (the *Gaulois*, *Charlemagne*, *Bouvet*, and *Suffren*) entered the Strait to cover the direct bombardment of the defences of the Narrows by the *Agamemnon* and *Lord Nelson*. The French ships engaged the Mount Dardanos battery and various concealed guns, silencing the former. The *Agamemnon* and *Lord Nelson* then advanced and engaged the forts at the Narrows at 14,000 yards to 12,000 yards by direct fire [a distance equivalent to about eight and seven land miles; the angle of fire of a 12-inch shell at this range would be from sixteen degrees to eighteen degrees]. Forts Rumilieh Medjidieh Tabia (J) and Hamadieh I Tabia (U) replied. Both were silenced after heavy bombardment. Explosions occurred in both forts. Fort I (on the European shore, opposite Kephez Point) had not fired since the explosion on the 5th. The *Gaulois*, *Agamemnon*, and *Lord Nelson* were struck three times, but not seriously damaged. The *Lord Nelson* had three men slightly wounded.”

While these operations were in progress the *Dublin* continued to watch the Bulair Isthmus. She was fired at by 4-inch guns and struck three or four times.

Speaking of the operations of this day, a British writer says:


“We believed that we had put the Chanak forts, the strongest of the Narrows, out of action. Subsequent experience showed that it was a difficult matter permanently to silence the forts. Reports of German officers made it clear that under the heavy fire of the ships it was hard to keep the guns constantly in action, not so much on account of any serious

damage, but because the batteries were flooded with stifling vapors from the shells, and it was necessary to withdraw the men until the air cleared. Further, the defenders had been ordered to economize ammunition, and to reserve their fire for the closer attack which they believed would follow. The fact, therefore, that a fort ceased firing was no proof that it had been really silenced. Again and again during these operations we heard of forts being silenced, which next day, or a few days after, could bring most of their guns into action."


The Admiralty reports of operations of March 7th (such were given out to the press as they occurred), says: "Owing to the importance of locating the concealed guns the seaplanes have had to fly very low on occasions. On the 4th instant, a seaplane . . . became unstable and nose-dived into the sea, both officers (pilot and observer) being injured." Another officer reconnoitering at close quarters was wounded but managed to return safely. On the 5th a seaplane was hit no less than twenty-eight times, and another eight times in locating concealed positions. "The *Ark Royal* is equipped with every appliance necessary for the repair and maintenance of the numerous aircraft she carries."

Desultory attacks continued, both in the Strait and against the Bulair lines at long range, but with nothing of decisive character, the main event of interest being the venture too far of the cruiser *Amethyst* while covering the mine-sweepers. Quoting once more from a British writer's account:

"She was suddenly fired upon by a concealed Turkish battery and suffered terrible loss in a few minutes. As the result of a dozen hits by the Turkish guns, one-fifth of her crew were put out of action. No detailed account of this unhappy affair, in which her crew displayed the utmost gallantry, was published by the Admiralty, and this [says the British narrator] led to the absurdest legends obtaining credence. Thus it was said that she had run through the Narrows, and entered the Sea of Marmora. The Nation was thus allowed to rest under a complete misconception of the tremendous difficulty of the task before its Navy."



Camouflaged British cruiser in the Dardanelles.



The British and French squadrons off the Dardanelles.



Admiral Carden was obliged, through illness, to give up the command, on March 16th, to Vice-admiral John M. de Robeck. Two days later, on March 18th, the great and serious effort of the ships was made.

“It was a bright, clear day with a light wind and calm sea. At a quarter to eleven in the forenoon, the *Queen Elizabeth*, *Agamemnon*, *Lord Nelson*, *Triumph*, and *Prince George* steamed up the Straits towards the Narrows. The first four ships engaged the forts of Chanak and the battery on the point opposite, while the *Triumph* and *Prince George* kept the batteries lower down occupied by firing at Soghandere and Kephez Point. After the bombardment had lasted for an hour and a half during which the ships were fired upon not only by the forts but by howitzers and field guns on the heights, the French squadron, *Bouvet*, *Charlemagne*, *Gaulois*, and *Suffren* came into action, steaming in to attack the forts at short range [a mile from Kephez Point; four from the forts of Chanak; the British ships were, in this phase, seven miles from Chanak; later six of the eleven engaged were to take position off Kephez Point which is three miles from Chanak]. Under the combined fire of the ten [nine at the moment] ships the forts once more ceased firing. A third squadron then entered the Straits to push the attack further. This was made up of six British battleships, the *Albion*, *Irresistible*, *Ocean*, *Majestic*, *Swiftsure*, and *Vengeance*. As they steered toward Chanak, the four French ships were withdrawn in order to make room for them in the narrow waters [the channel is three and a half nautical miles (four land miles) broad at Kephez Point], but in the process of this change all the forts suddenly began to fire again, which showed that none of them were seriously damaged. According to Turkish accounts, only one big gun had been dismounted.

“Then came the first disaster of the day,” continues Mr. Buchan, “the French squadron was moving down to the open water inside the Straits being still under fire from the inner forts [at Chanak]. An officer on a British destroyer who was watching its movements reported that he saw three large shells strike the *Bouvet* almost simultaneously, and that immediately after there was a loud explosion and she was hidden in a cloud of smoke. The first impression was that she had been seriously damaged by shell fire, but her real wound was from one of the mines which the Turks were now sending down with the current. They had waited to begin this new attack till the narrow waterway was full of ships. As the smoke cleared the *Bouvet* was seen to be heeling over. She sank in three minutes, carrying with her most of her crew.

“The attack on the forts continued as long as the light lasted. The mine-sweepers had been brought up the Straits in order to clear the pas-

sage in front, and to look out for drift mines. An hour and a half after the *Bouvet* sank, the *Irresistible* turned out of the fighting line with a heavy list. She also had been struck by a mine, but she floated for more than an hour, and the destroyers took off nearly all her crew—a dangerous task, for they were a target all the time for Turkish fire. She sank at ten minutes to six, and a quarter of an hour later another drift mine struck the *Ocean*. The latter sank almost as quickly as the *Bouvet*, but the destroyers were on the alert, and saved most of her crew. Several of the other ships had suffered damage and loss of life from the Turkish guns. The *Gaulois* had been repeatedly hit, her upper works were seriously injured, and a huge rent had been torn in her bows. The *Inflexible* had been struck by a heavy shell, which killed and wounded the majority of the men and officers in her fire-control station, and set her on fire forward.

“As the sun set most of the forts were still in action, and during the short twilight the Allied fleet slipped out of the Dardanelles. The great attack on the Narrows had failed—failed with the loss of three battleships and more than 2,000 men.”

But this was not all. In addition there were heavy damages to others of the fleet. The “memorandum” of Mr. Roch, Report of the Dardanelles Commission, says:

“The *Inflexible* had various compartments flooded, and at one time was in danger of sinking; the *Suffren* was also hit below water and had to be docked; the *Gaulois* was badly damaged and had to be beached on Drepana Island; the *Charlemagne* had her stoke-hole (in American, fire-room) flooded; the *Agamemnon* had one 12-inch gun damaged; the *Lord Nelson* had one 9.2-inch gun put out of action, (and) the *Albion*’s fore turret was put out of action for some days.

“Thus out of the sixteen attacking ships, three were sunk and four others so severely damaged that they had to be docked. In spite of these losses Admiral de Robeck telegraphed to the Admiralty on the following day that the squadron was ready for immediate action except as regards ships lost and damaged but it was necessary to reconsider the plan of attack.”

This eventful day has been described from the Turkish side by correspondents of the American Associated Press. After stating that the Turkish forts had not been silenced and the losses sustained by their garrisons nominal, the report continues:

“The action lasted nearly seven hours, during which time there was a terrific cannonade from the ships of the Allies and the Turkish forts. The fire from the warships at times was exceedingly severe, while the Turkish gunners maintained their precision wonderfully, even when they were literally buried in the earth and débris which the exploding shells from the warships threw broadcast over their positions. The Allies put in an appearance about 11.30 A.M., throwing their first shells in the town of Chanak-Kalessi. Their vessels at this hour numbered four French and five British battleships. A little later five British warships entered the bay, and the bombardment became truly terrific and wonderfully spectacular. The correspondent of the Associated Press had taken shelter in Fort Chimenlik, but he was driven out by shells to a position on a hill outside the town. But even this hill already was burning in two places, as a result of exploding shells. In the beginning the range of the British and French gunners was excellent. The correspondent saw a shell land fair on a corner of the Fort Kale-Sultanie tower and tear a large hole in the masonry. This routed out a party of newspaper correspondents who were just about to leave cover.

“While traversing Chanak-Kalessi several houses were knocked to pieces by exploding shells. The trip to the town was accelerated by the well-directed shots. . . . The hillside toward which the correspondents were making their way was finally reached about 12.30. It was then seen that the British had concentrated their fire upon the forts. The noise of the explosions and the replies of the Turkish batteries were deafening. The area of the fire was so extended that at certain times the correspondents were unable to find cover anywhere. A certain vantage point was, however, finally decided upon, and from this position the observers looked upon a wonderful assault,—the concentrated attack of a large group of modern battleships against well-built and well-defended land fortifications. The British [Allied] ships were firing heavily and continuously. At times the smoke was so thick that it completely blotted out the horizon and totally enveloped the particular Turkish fort under fire. One would get glimpses of the fortifications lifting their higher points out of clouds of gray smoke. The severity of the fire led one to think the fort had been blown away, but time and again the smoke cleared and showed the Turkish position virtually undamaged.




“The fire of the Turks was rapid and accurate, so much so that the fire from the Allied warships began to be erratic. Many shots flew high while others fell short. One result of this was that the town of Chanak-Kalessi, behind Forts Hamadieh and Chimenlik, had wide avenues cut through it. Fire broke out in the Greek quarter and destroyed a considerable number of houses. In the meanwhile Turkish soldiers were formed into fire brigades and were successful in keeping the flames in check.

“The bombardment reached its greatest intensity at 3.15 o'clock in the afternoon, when of a sudden the French battleship *Bouvet* was observed by the Associated Press correspondent to be riding low by the stern. The next minute she swung a little to port. At the same moment her stern disappeared under water. For about two minutes she held in this position, the water nearing her conning tower. Then she settled completely by the stern, her bows clear of the water and pointing toward the sky. The next instant the waves closed over the ill-fated vessel. On shore it was understood that she struck a mine. Boats rushed to the rescue but few men were saved. A few minutes later the Associated Press correspondent was watching a British vessel believed to be the *Irresistible*. He saw a large Turkish shell strike her deck. When the smoke of the explosion had died away it was seen that the vessel's foremast had been cut near the crow's nest and bent on one side. The mast rigging was hanging down in a tangled mass. This same shot apparently damaged the machinery, for it was seen that the vessel was experiencing difficulty in gaining the open sea. This was hardly over when the correspondent saw another vessel struck heavily on deck. She was also obliged to retire under a galling Turkish fire.

“But the greatest tragedy came at about a quarter before five in the afternoon, when a British warship [the *Ocean*] was so badly damaged that she was obliged to run ashore within range of the Turkish guns. For one hour, until a quarter before six, warships of the Allies stood by and protected their stranded companion with a heavy fire on the Turkish forts, but the coming night obliged them to withdraw, leaving behind them the fated vessel. The Turkish guns directed an accurate fire against her and she was holding out at the time this dispatch was written and started on its way to Constantinople. The correspondent saw eight shots strike the vessel's deck full and square in a space of about ten minutes. Nevertheless, she continued to return this terrific fire to the best of her ability. But her shots had no apparent effect upon the forts. As night came on the Turkish guns seemed to be giving the final touch to their work. The fire from all the vessels of the Allied fleet came to an end at sundown. Not one gun of a Turkish fort was silenced in spite of the fact that something between 1,200 and 2,000 shells had been fired at the shore positions.

“The casualties to the Turks undoubtedly were very small and the material damage inflicted by the shell fire of yesterday was very slight. A British vessel, the *Vengeance*, was damaged by the guns of the forts and drifted helplessly toward the entrance to the Straits, where her crew was taken off by the torpedo boats. This vessel did not leave the Dardanelles waters, nor did any other British vessel enter during the night to bring help, but the ship this morning had disappeared. A fourth vessel was struck in the turret and otherwise damaged by a Turkish shell. She was





also taken out of action. The British battleship *Queen Elizabeth* was hit five times by howitzer shell and the battle cruiser *Inflexible* was struck four times.

"The foregoing is a summary of the reports made during the day by observers who were unable last night to reach the Turkish headquarters.

"The Associated Press correspondent," says the *New York Tribune*, "to-day visited the forts which had been bombarded. The material damage was slight generally. The casualties on the Turkish side were about twenty men killed and thirty-five wounded."

Though the Turkish forts had done well and were still serviceable, it was the mines sent down with the current to which the defeat was chiefly due. It is the opinion of the writer that but for these, the forts could have been passed. This would seem to be also the view of the admiral in command (de Robeck), who, in a telegram on March 17th, stating that: "weather permitting I will proceed with operations to-morrow," added: "I am convinced that success depends on our ability to clear the mine fields for forcing the Narrows. . . ." The constant current from the Sea of Marmora to the Aegean was a great factor in the Turks' success.

The next day, March 19th, was so stormy that the aëroplanes could not be used to direct the fire. This, in addition to the serious losses of three battleships, held up further action for the time being. The Admiralty in its statement, however, said: "The power of the fleet to dominate the fortresses by superiority of fire seems to be established." The First Lord (Mr. Churchill) said: "I regarded it only as the first of several days' fighting, though the loss in ships sunk or disabled was unpleasant. It never occurred to me for a moment that we should not go on, within the limits of what we had decided to risk, till we reached a decision one way or the other. I found Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson in the same mood. Both met me that morning [the 19th] with expressions of firm

determination to fight it out." At a meeting of the War Council on March 19th, it was decided to inform Vice-admiral de Robeck that he could continue operations "if he saw fit." But the admiral, though he had previously telegraphed that he did not think the events of the 18th decisive, changed his views on meeting General Sir Ian Hamilton on March 22d and telegraphed on the 26th that he considered a combined operation essential. Mr. Churchill records, as set forth in the Report of the Dardanelles Commission: "I proposed that we should direct the admiral to renew the naval attack, according to his previous intention. The First Sea Lord [Fisher], however, did not agree; nor did Sir Arthur Wilson; nor did Sir Henry Jackson. Lord Fisher took the line that hitherto he had been willing to carry the enterprise forward, because it was supported and recommended by the commander on the spot. . . . Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Balfour, with whom I discussed the matter, were inclined to my view, but as our professional adviser and the admiral on the spot were against it, it was impossible to go further, and I bowed to this decision, but with regret and anxiety."

But the idea of the necessity of the use of a land force had been steadily developing from an early date; not that there was particular doubt as to the ability to pass the forts by the navy, but with the view to occupancy after they were silenced or destroyed. Thus "at an informal meeting of some of the Ministers on February 16th, it was decided to despatch the 29th Division [18,000], to Lemnos and that the Admiralty should build special transports and lighters suitable for the conveyance and landing of a force of 50,000 men at any point where they might be required. . . . the scope of the intended military operations was left in doubt. Lord Kitchener and others still clung to the idea that success was attainable by naval action alone. . . ."

“In the meanwhile, the Admiralty, in accordance with the decision arrived at on February 16th, had been preparing transports to convey the 29th Division to the Mediterranean. It was calculated that their departure would commence on the 22d.

The necessary steps to concentrate troops in the Mediterranean went forward. On the 20th of February, the two Australian and New Zealand Divisions in Egypt were prepared for service at the Dardanelles and placed under the command of General Birdwood. Transports were arranged for them and for the 29th Division and the Naval Division in England. By the end of February, a French division of 18,000 men was ready to embark. The Naval Division of 11,000 men sailed on March 3d. The approximate strength of the force thus available consisted of 81,000 men of all ranks, with 178 guns and 25,036 horses, in addition to which there was a Russian Corps of 47,000 men, 298 guns, and 10,750 horses.

Three weeks of valuable time had, however, been lost. The transports, which might have left on February 22d, did not get away until March 16th.

On March 12th General Sir Ian Hamilton, an officer of forty years' service, had been nominated for the command. He left next day for the Dardanelles. The transports gathered in Mudros Bay whence the great fleet sailed on April 24th for the landing and attack which took place next day, April 25th. The second phase of the great venture, one outside the scope of this chapter, and which was to exhibit the spirit of sacrifice in its completest form, equally by Briton and Turk, was now to begin. The struggle makes a human story of unsurpassed devotion and interest.

Naval action was of course to continue, but it was now secondary. The main effort was now that of the army to take and hold the many forts of the great fortress. The

main objective was Maidos, possessing which, Chanak would have to yield under the combined effort of army and naval attack. But it was not to be.

The naval losses in the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora were: British battleships *Irresistible* and *Ocean* on March 18, 1915, the *Goliath*, torpedoed May 12th, the *Triumph*, May 25th, and the *Majestic*, May 27th, the last two sunk by submarine attack; submarine *E-15*, ran aground in the Dardanelles and was destroyed April 18, 1915, by British picket boats to prevent falling into enemy hands; *AE-2*, sunk in the Sea of Marmora April 30, 1915; *E-7* sunk on September 4, 1915, and the *E-22* sunk on November 5, 1915.

The French losses were the battleship *Bouvet* on March 18th; the submarines *Saphir*, January 17, 1915, *Joule*, May 1, 1915, *Mariotte*, July 26, 1915, *Turquoise*, injured by gunfire, in the Sea of Marmora, November 3, 1915, refloated by the Turks and renamed *Ahmed*.

The Turkish losses were the battleship *Messudieh*, sunk by a submarine in the Dardanelles, December 14, 1914; the *Kheyr-ed-Din*, torpedoed in the Sea of Marmora, August 9, 1915; the destroyer *Yadikar Milet*, in April, 1915, three gunboats during 1915; and the transports, *Nagara*, *Carmen*, and *Rechid Pacha* in May, October, and December, 1915, the *Carmen* being of 4,424 and the *Rechid Pacha* of 8,000 tons.

## CHAPTER V

### THE CAMPAIGN ON THE GALLIPOLI PENINSULA

Topography of the peninsula. The main purpose of the operations. Difficulties of access to the peninsula. Composition of the expeditionary forces. The landings of the British on the peninsula, April 25-26, 1915; great difficulties at the beaches. Descent of the French on Kum Kalé. The battle of April 27-28 and consolidation of the Allied front with the French contingent on the right. Turkish attack on May 1st. The struggle for Krithia, May 6-8. General significance of the operations on the peninsula. The battle of June 4th. The progress of the French, June 21-30, and of the British on the 23th. Need of reinforcements. The plan for the supreme effort in August. The struggle for the Sari Bahr ridge, August 6-10. The new landing at Suvla Bay, August 7th, and the procrastinating methods in that quarter. Failure of the great effort and of the expedition. Conclusions.

The failure of the naval attack on March 18th to effect the passage of the Dardanelles forced recognition of the fact that successful land attacks on the Gallipoli Peninsula were indispensable as a preliminary to the passage of the Strait by the Allied fleets. It is, therefore, with the change of the attack to the military arm that the second chapter of the operations in this quarter is inaugurated.

The most conspicuous topographical feature of the region is the communicating waterway between the seas, which shuns its most obvious place of outlet in the Gulf of Saros and, by swerving to the left, runs for nearly fifty miles in a course roughly parallel with the coast-line of the Aegean, severing the long tongue of land known as the Gallipoli Peninsula from the northwestern littoral of Asia Minor.

The breadth of this peninsula hardly exceeds twelve miles at any point. In the critical section of the forts that

guard the Narrows it is about six miles broad. While all important points were thus within possible range of the most powerful guns of warships operating off the Aegean side, the surface of the promontory was a network of elevations and abrupt ravines which offered abundant chance for cover and concealment.

The proximity of the sea to the back of all the Turkish strongholds on the European margin of the Dardanelles, facilitating the distribution of hostile troops and supplies, and the shortness of the distances to be traversed made this side of the strait unquestionably more advantageous for the operations of a landing force.

All the important forts that closed the passage of the Dardanelles were comprised within the section of the banks facing the narrow channel between Kephez Point and Nagara Point. At a height of about 700 feet the plateau of Pasha Dagh, west of Kilid Bahr, overlooks these strongholds, while further south a rocky barrier traverses the peninsula, the highest peak of which is Achi Baba, about 600 feet above the sea.

The main objective of the offensive on the peninsula was, of course, the possession of the heights overlooking the Narrows, which would enable the Allied artillery to sweep the Turkish fortresses on both banks and command the entire narrow section of the strait.

A rugged country, covered in large part with prickly scrub-bushes, roadless, and with scanty water supply offered unusual obstacles to the penetration of the peninsula. Moreover, the absence of a sheltered harbor made the task of landing troops and supplies dependent on lighters and other small craft, a condition which in the event of unusual stress might imperil operations. The shores were almost everywhere steep and the few available approaches from the sea were easily barricaded. Under German

supervision the Turks had constructed lines of trenches supplied with numerous machine-guns and field-pieces, which, supplementing the natural advantages, obstructed every avenue of progress for the invader.

There were three possible lines of communication between the Turkish defensive positions on the Gallipoli Peninsula and Constantinople: the highway from Uzun Kupru, a station on the Oriental Railway, to Gallipoli and Maidos, which had been extensively repaired in recent years, but passed on the Bulair isthmus within the possible range of fire of hostile warships in the Gulf of Saros; the water-route through the Sea of Marmora, which was eventually rendered perilous by the action of the Allied submarines; and, finally, the land route on the Asiatic side connecting with ferries across the Narrows from Chanak to Kilid Bahr, where the strait contracts to a width of only 1,300 yards.

The Allied plan of operations was based upon a converging movement from various landing-places in the southwestern half of the peninsula towards the heights that overlooked the Turkish forts. Considering the hardships suffered by the invaders in aiming at this central position back of Kilid Bahr, one is led to surmise that with far lighter sacrifices the Allies might have cut off their adversaries and accomplished their purpose if they had launched their principal attack from the innermost recess of the Gulf of Saros across the slender neck of land eastward towards the Sea of Marmora.

But two chief reasons weighed against the adoption of such a plan: first, the distance to the island bases; secondly, the main Turkish defenses near Kilid Bahr could be maintained by the line of communications along the Asiatic shore of the strait. The military operations were after all subsidiary to the action of the fleet and therefore, unless

the forts near Kilid Bahr were silenced and the channel opened, no advantage gained on land could have changed decisively the general situation. Unless the Allies had been prepared to furnish vastly greater forces for the eastern operations, their armies could never have advanced on Constantinople by penetrating the Chatalja lines, which had withstood the onslaught of the victorious Bulgarian hosts two years before.

The British Mediterranean Expeditionary Force consisted of the Twenty-ninth Division, almost wholly composed of regulars, under Major-general A. G. Hunter-Weston, the Naval Division, which had taken part in the defense of Antwerp, the Australian and Australian-New Zealand Divisions, forming a corps commanded by Lieutenant-general Sir W. R. Birdwood, the East Lancashire Territorial Division, which had spent the winter in Egypt, and a considerable number of Indian troops, altogether a strength of three army corps. The general command was entrusted to General Sir Ian Hamilton, who had been Commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean and Inspector-general of the Overseas Forces since 1910, and was already distinguished as a skilful author, gallant officer, and able administrative chief.

The French Corps Expéditionnaire de l'Orient consisted of detachments from the Fusiliers Marins, the Armée Coloniale, and the Foreign Legion, and was commanded by General d'Amade, who in consequence of a severe wound was relieved by General Gouraud on May 10th.

On April 7th, Sir Ian Hamilton, accompanied by his general staff, sailed from Egypt, where the Allied Expeditionary Forces were assembled, to Lemnos, which had been selected as base and chief headquarters.

The landing of the expeditionary forces was set for April 25th and it was arranged that simultaneous disembarkation



The *River Clyde* ashore at V Beach.



Troops in lifeboats being towed from the transports to landings on the Gallipoli Peninsula.



should be made at as many points as possible, so as to distract the enemy. But all the landing-points on the Gallipoli Peninsula were grouped within two distinct sections of the coast-line. The one extended northward from Gaba Tepe and was assigned to the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps,—the initials of which gave the convenient “Anzac,”—while the other stretched around the southern extremity of the peninsula and included Capes Tekke and Helles and the village Sedd-ul-Bahr in its scope.

The Second Squadron, which was assigned to escort the transports conveying the Anzac, sailed from Mudros Bay in the island of Lemnos on the afternoon of April 24th and arrived within four miles of the appointed landing-place just before the moon set about three on the morning of the 25th. No signs of life were seen along the shore. The 4,000 troops of the covering force moved towards the beach in small boats and in the destroyers, which could approach unusually near at this place. But when the boats were quite close, a Turkish battalion, suddenly appearing on the beach, opened a violent fire of small arms.

Scarcely waiting for the boats to touch the beach, here only a narrow strip of land about 1,000 yards in length, the Australians leapt ashore and sprang at the enemy with fixed bayonets. Seized by the impulsive enthusiasm of the moment, many of the boat-crews deserted their less thrilling duties, and, grasping oars or other casual weapons, joined in the impetuous onslaught. The Turks gave way and were hotly pursued for a considerable distance.

Following up their heroic landing the Australians scaled with extraordinary agility and gallantry the steep banks overlooking the beach. The shell-fire of the Turkish warships in the Narrows across the peninsula and the fire of the artillery on the hillsides facing the beach kept the British transports at a safe distance from the shore and thus

retarded the disembarkation. The British squadron bombarded the Turkish position in reply and covered as well as possible the landing of the troops.

By afternoon the units already disembarked formed a continuous semicircular front with the extremities resting on the sea, embracing some of the lesser ridges, but overlooked by the Turkish positions on the more prominent elevations further east. Repeated Turkish attacks, supported by heavy artillery fire, failed to make any impression on the Anzac front, which was growing stronger all the time. By the close of the 26th the possession of an initial position north of Gaba Tepe could be regarded as secure.

The other flotilla left Tenedos about midnight and reached the final rendezvous off Cape Helles just before dawn on the 25th. The war vessels took the positions which had been assigned to them and commenced a violent bombardment of the enemy's defenses about five o'clock. The troops were being transferred to the small boats and as rapidly as possible towed ashore by the pinnaces. The five landing-places were situated respectively about two miles and one mile northeast of Cape Tekke; between Cape Tekke and Cape Helles; between Cape Helles and the village of Sedd-ul-Bahr; and at Morto Bay, just inside the Dardanelles.

The troops landing at the first of the places indicated above gained the summit of the cliffs without encountering any resistance, but were later fiercely attacked by superior forces and compelled to abandon their position and reëmbark on the 26th. The landing at the second of the indicated places was effected without difficulty. But the resistance at the point between Cape Tekke and Cape Helles, supported as it was by the very favorable situation, could only be vanquished by the extraordinary courage and tenacity of the assailants. This section of the beach was

dominated by a sloping cliff furrowed with Turkish trenches where machine-guns and light artillery had been concealed. A barbed wire entanglement extended the whole length of the beach close to the water's edge and another was hidden just beneath the surface of the sea in shallow water. Although the bombardment of the warships was continued until the very moment before the small boats touched the shore, it neither completely destroyed the obstructions nor made the Turkish positions untenable.

The British battalion disembarking about six suffered heavy losses before the entanglements were cut and it reached the base of the cliffs. But the capture, at the point of the bayonet, of some machine-guns on the Turkish flanks, by which the beach had been enfiladed, relieved the situation, and by ten the British troops advancing with impetuous ardor had captured three lines of trenches. The conflict continued and it was not until the next day at one P.M., when definite results had been obtained by the landing force between Cape Helles and Sedd-ul-Bahr, that the position between Cape Tekke and Cape Helles could be regarded as assured.

The landing at the first of the two places last mentioned was attended with even greater difficulties, because the beach was flanked by the village and castle of Sedd-ul-Bahr on the east and by the perpendicular cliffs on the west and was commanded by an amphitheater of hills as a stage is dominated by the balconies. The beach itself, which is 350 yards long and only ten yards wide, was covered with wire entanglements which in places extended into the sea. A converging fire from the Turkish positions swept the beach like a tornado as soon as the small boats touched land.

A portion of the covering troops were brought to shore in the *River Clyde*, a collier which had been especially

prepared for the rapid disembarkation of her complement of troops by the opening of large apertures in her sides and the addition of a broad projecting gangway. By these means it was intended that the troops should quickly pass into the lighters which were to be joined together to form a continuous passageway to the shore as soon as the steamer grounded. The collier, carrying about 2,000 men, was beached but the gangway was swept by a deadly hail of lead and soon the row of lighters was torn from the shore by the violence of the current, and even after communication had been restored the fierceness of the enemy's fire necessitated the suspension of the disembarkation for that day. About 1,000 men who had already gained the beach had to remain crouching in a cramped position behind a natural escarpment of sand about four feet high, close to the water's edge, enduring agonies of thirst.

The rest of the infantry on board the collier disembarked without difficulty after nightfall, but in the bright moonlight the fire of the enemy was so accurate that the situation on shore remained unchanged until daybreak. But finally in the morning, with the support of the guns of one of the ships, British troops gained a footing in the village and old castle of Sedd-ul-Bahr on the right about ten and, pressing forward with splendid perseverance in the face of a galling fire of musketry and machine-guns, made themselves masters by two P. M. of the hill which dominated the vicinity, and thus insured the possession of the beach, and enabled the disembarkation to be completed without more delay. The landing at Morto Bay had been accomplished by 7.30 on the morning of the 25th with very little difficulty.

Concurrently with the landing of the British, a French force successfully disembarked, under cover of the guns of the French squadron, at Kum Kalé at the southern extremity of the Dardanelles on the Asiatic shore, with

a view to diverting the enemy's attention and drawing the fire of the guns on that shore away from the Allied transports and the beach between Cape Helles and Sedd-ul-Bahr. Although the advance of the French was arrested by the stubborn resistance of the Turks, they repulsed all the counter-attacks of the latter and withdrew from their position at the point on the 26th, having accomplished the major purpose of the maneuver. On the evening of the same day the principal disembarkation of the French was begun at the beach between Cape Helles and Sedd-ul-Bahr. Eventually they received the section of the Allied front on the right wing next to the Dardanelles.

For tactical reasons an immediate advance was imperative. The scattered British and French forces were joined and the line was consolidated with the 87th, 86th, and 88th brigades of the Twenty-ninth Division and four French battalions, drawn up in the order mentioned from left to right across the peninsula. The forward movement began on the 27th with Krithia, a village on the southwestern slope of Achi Baba, as the chief objective, but through failure in the supply of ammunition on the afternoon of the 28th the British lost the opportunity of taking Krithia, which was subsequently defended by the Turks with unconquerable obstinacy against all assaults. Yet considerable progress had been accomplished by the Allies, whose front extended by the evening of the 28th from a point on the Aegean coast three miles northeast of Tekke Burnu to a point one mile north of Eski Hissarlik, whence it bore off southward to the Dardanelles.

The progress of the Christian invaders sufficed to draw from the German general commanding the Turks the following spirited appeal to his soldiers:

“Attack the enemy with the bayonet and utterly destroy him! We shall not retire one step; for, if we do, our

religion, our country, and our nation will perish! Soldiers! the world is looking at you! Your only hope of salvation is to bring this battle to a successful issue or gloriously to give up your life in the attempt!"

The landing of the rest of the infantry of the French division and of all but two of the French batteries had been completed by the evening of May 1st; and very opportunely, for about ten o'clock, after a violent cannonading of the Allied trenches lasting about half an hour, the Turks launched a series of furious attacks. The foremost of the three solid lines which they formed, relying solely on the bayonet, crawled forward on hands and knees under cover of the darkness until time for the final rush, and then sprang at their opponents in the Allied trenches. The veil of night, rent by the fitful flashes of musketry or by the gleam of bursting shells, rendered more terrible the spectral death-grapple. A part of the 86th brigade, which first bore the brunt of the attack, gave way, but the front was restored with the help of a detachment from the 88th.

Next the storm bore with special fury against the French left wing, which began to waver, but was sustained by reinforcements from the British. At daybreak the Allies launched a counter-attack and the British made some progress but were arrested by the cross-fire of concealed machine-guns, and the close of the engagement found the Allies in the same general position as at the beginning. The Turks, however, fell back a short distance to intrenchments and redoubts which had been prepared.

A second struggle for the possession of Krithia on May 6-8 by the Allied forces secured a slight gain on the first day in the face of a tenacious resistance, followed on the 7th by an advance by one section of the British to within 800 yards of their objective, where they intrenched. Twice on the 8th the attacks of the Allies were preceded

by a terrific bombardment, in which all the available heavy guns of the fleet and shore-batteries participated. The second attack was prolonged until well into the night, when the front line intrenched itself where it stood. The net result of the three days' conflict was a gain of about 1,000 yards.

The narrowness of the Gallipoli Peninsula and the comprehensive organization of the enemy's defensive positions almost eliminated the opportunity for surprise, excluded enveloping maneuvers, and condemned the Allies to the irksome tactics of siege-warfare.

In the political and economical sense, no less than in the military, the action in the Near East had now developed into one of the most engrossing, tantalizing, suspense-compelling situations of the whole war. Virtually a space of hardly ten miles separated the Allies from the resplendent goal of victory, for beyond the Narrows nothing could have obstructed their advance. An achievement that would have vitally affected the whole course of the war, hastened its completion, and produced incalculable consequences lay almost within their grasp. The capture of Constantinople would have destroyed Germany's grandiose vision of an empire stretching from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf and dominating the most important strategic positions on the whole earth.

The opening of communications with the Black Sea would have broken the blockade that crippled Russia, and alleviated the food problem in the western countries; prevented the treachery of Bulgaria; spared Serbia from submersion; most opportunely quickened the decision of Roumania and strengthened her when she became an ally of the Entente Powers; and completed the circle of steel about the Central Empires. Besides, it would have sealed the long-suspended doom of the Turkish power in Europe.

World-interest centered in the short space along the Dardanelles. Great hopes, now stimulated by even the fluctuating progress of Allied success, now yielding to desperation as its small measure was disclosed, were vainly cherished.

A fresh and vital source of energy had galvanized the Turkish army with unexpected vigor. German military instruction before the war and German control of the army since had accomplished wonders.

The difficulties of the Allies increased as summer advanced. Fresh water became even scarcer, the beaches were still exposed to desultory shell-fire; the transportation facilities were limited to fleet sweepers and other small craft, as the transports had to be sent to Mudros Bay on May 22d for safety from submarines; added to which the lack of roads on the peninsula made the removal of the wounded a particularly serious task. The losses of the British in the peninsula down to the close of May were greater than those which they had sustained during the entire three years of the Boer War.

The Allied front in the southern, or Cape Helles district, was composed of four sections held respectively by the Twenty-ninth Division on the left, the Forty-second (East Lancashire Territorial) Division on the left center, the Royal Naval Division on the right center, and the French Expeditionary Corps, now brought to its full complement of strength by the arrival of the second division, on the right.

The third struggle for Krithia was part of a general action along the Anglo-French front on June 4th. After violent bombardment of the Turkish defenses a curtain of fire was dropped behind the enemy's foremost trenches, and the Allied infantry attacked with fixed bayonets. The British penetrated two lines of enemy trenches in the direction of Krithia and the French took one line towards



Indian troops landing at the Dardanelles.



Lowering dead into a trawler for burial at sea outside the Dardanelles.



Kereves Dere, but an impetuous counter-attack forced back the French at one point and compelled the Royal Naval Division to retreat, which in turn involved the Forty-second Division. The day's operations in spite of heavy losses brought but little advance to the Allies.

The chief causes of the failure to attain the anticipated measure of success on June 4th were the intricacy of the Turkish wire entanglements and the skilful concealment of the machine-gun batteries which largely escaped destruction by the artillery preparation of the Allies.

An instructive episode of this battle was the capture by the Allies of prisoners who belonged to a machine-gun company composed entirely of Germans, sailors from the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, German subjects living in Turkey and mobilizing there, and others who had percolated singly or in groups through Bulgaria.

In the morning of the 21st the Second French Division captured two lines of Turkish trenches and crossed the Kereves Dere. Late in the day the First Division carried the opposing intrenchments and reached a position in line with the Second Division.

By a brilliant charge of the Foreign Legion and a battalion of Zouaves on the 23d, the French gained a position commanding the head of Kereves Dere, and to this success was added on the 30th the capture of a redoubt, known as the Quadrilateral, in the same vicinity, which involved the taking of seven lines of trenches. But in this engagement the French sustained a severe loss in the wounding of General Gouraud, who had to be relieved of the command, and was succeeded by General Bailloud.

Meanwhile, the British, on the 28th, made a determined attack on the Turkish right wing that tenaciously clung to its positions near the Aegean coast. Faultlessly supported by the artillery the British left outer wing captured five


distinct lines of enemy trenches and the inner wing took two. As the result of these successes the Allied front had been converted from a convex to a concave outline.

But the three days' battle on May 6-8 had already shown that the Allied forces on the peninsula were not strong enough to blast their way to the Narrows within a serviceable length of time. Therefore, on May 10th, Sir Ian Hamilton cabled for two additional divisions and on the 17th for two supplementary army corps. The Fifty-second Territorial Division was straightway sent from England, but in the meantime the Russians had given up their naval operations against the Black Sea end of the Bosphorus, and the removal of this continual menace released a far larger force of Turkish troops for service at the Dardanelles.

Finally, however, by the end of July, in answer to the earnest entreaties of Sir Ian Hamilton, three regular divisions of the British New Army and the infantry of two Territorial divisions had reached the eastern Mediterranean, while a mounted division awaited in Egypt the commander's orders. The expeditionary force as thus augmented must have been at least four times as large as the entire British contingent engaged at any one time in the Crimean War.

An entirely new system of defensive works had now been created by the Turks along the slopes of Achi Baba, capable of holding out even in case the Turkish right were turned by the capture of Krithia. The situation was, therefore, no longer propitious for the renewal of the offensive in the southern part of the peninsula and the commander's attention was turned to the possibilities further north. Kilid Bahr dominated the Narrows. The Anzac position was only about six miles from there, while the Allies' southern front was about ten. Repeated attacks by the Turks on the Anzac line showed that a sensitive portion of their





Perspective diagram of the Gallipoli Peninsula and the Dardanelles.

front was near the Anzac position. To the east and rather to the left of the latter rises the Sari Bahr ridge crowned by Koja Chemen Tepe, known as Hill 305, from its height in meters. Not far north of Anzac is Suvla Bay, with an excellent and safe anchorage and protection from submarines; the wide, level shore there is recessed in the foothills of the Anafarta ridge.

Sir Ian Hamilton's plan for the supreme effort comprised a converging movement from the west against a central section of the ridges that constitute the backbone of the peninsula and from this vantage-ground a drive straight through to the Dardanelles. The new divisions were to be landed at Suvla Bay, and from there and Anzac the simultaneous dash for the summits was to be undertaken, while a squadron feinted at the head of Saros Gulf and a forcible attack in the south engaged the attention of the enemy. The inauguration of this great concerted action was set for August 6th. The success of the project depended upon punctual and exact coöperation in all the sections, and to this the inexperience of the new divisions landed at Suvla Bay turned out to be a fatal bar.

A heavy burden of staff work was involved in the distribution of the reinforcements. The restricted capacity of the positions on the peninsula and the great need of secrecy in the preparations required that these new forces should be kept scattered in the islands until the last possible moment. But to provide for the prompt arrival of great masses of raw troops at the right moment and at the appointed landing places, with all their equipment, transport, and supplies, was of itself a formidable undertaking. The water supply was another serious problem, which, as events were to prove, was not completely solved.

Sir Ian Hamilton made his own headquarters in the island of Imbros, the radiating point of communications,

where he could follow the progress of operations in all sections.

The subsidiary offensive begun in the south on the 6th revealed the greatly increased strength and confidence of the enemy. It happened, in fact, that the Allied attack anticipated by only a few hours an intended assault by the Turks, for which the latter had concentrated in considerable numbers. In this quarter the Allies continued their offensive on the 7th and 8th, made slight gains of territory, and immobilized Turkish forces that might otherwise have increased the strength of the resistance in the critical section east of Anzac.

In the chief theater of operations the Australian and New Zealand Division on the left wing of the Anzac front was to advance towards the crest of Sari Bahr simultaneously with the landing at Suvla Bay. An attack by Australian troops on the right of Anzac was to precede and screen the more essential movement on the left. Reinforcements, consisting mainly of the Thirteenth Division of the New Army, were landed at Anzac on three successive nights, escaping the vigilance of a watchful enemy.

After an hour's preliminary bombardment, late on the afternoon of the 6th, about 2,000 Australians dashed from their cover across an open space and after a short but desperate struggle captured the roofed trenches of the enemy on an elevation known as the Lone Pine position. By this action the Australians brought down upon themselves and thereby immobilized a large part of the available Turkish reserves; and, by defending the Lone Pine position for many days against very formidable odds, protected the flank and rear of the principal operating columns.

The main ridge of Sari Bahr throws off a number of spurs in the direction of the coast and these are separated by deep ravines. The principal attack was delivered by

two assaulting columns, one on the right, consisting of the New Zealand infantry brigade under Brigadier-general Johnston, advancing against Chunuk Bahr, the other on the left, made up of the 4th Australian brigade and the 29th Indian brigade, under Brigadier-general Cox, aiming to make a long circuit and gain the summit of Koja Chemen from the northwest.

The columns set out on the night of the 6th-7th and in the morning the left had made fair progress while the right had occupied Rhododendron Ridge, only a quarter of a mile from Chunuk Bahr. There they intrenched in the positions occupied. The attack was resumed the next morning at 4.15. The forces on the right quickly gained the southwestern slopes and principal knoll of Chunuk Bahr, where the enemy assailed them in a series of fierce counter-attacks. On the left the British forces were unable to gain any permanent foothold on the crest.

The action on the 9th was begun with a fierce bombardment of the crest of Sari Bahr by all the available naval guns and shore batteries, covering the whole ridge with masses of flame and smoke. But at this critical stage, the prosecution of the plan of operations was fatally disturbed by the blunder of one of two columns sent out with orders to converge on a hill situated midway between Koja Chemen and Chunuk Bahr. Setting out before daybreak, this column lost its way and did not reach the vicinity of the crucial point in time to coöperate effectively. The gallant 6th Gurkhas of the 29th Indian brigade and a part of the 6th South Lancaster Regiment reached the crest between Chunuk Bahr and their objective and for a moment looked down upon the waters of the Dardanelles.

But before the expected support arrived the Turks rallied, drove the British from the crest, and hurled them down the slope. The Turks swarmed along the ridge in


overwhelming numbers and the New Zealanders on the southwestern half of the knoll of Chunuk Bahr maintained their position only with the greatest difficulty. These troops, who had had no time to dig effective trenches, were relieved on the night of the 9th-10th after three days and three nights of ceaseless fighting. This exposed position only afforded room for 800-1,000 men and the lines of communication were extremely arduous and subject to the enemy's fire. At daybreak on the 10th the Turks attacked with great force the two battalions of the New Army which had taken the place of the New Zealanders and swept them from the summit. The Turks poured down the western slope of Chunuk Bahr, but in this way exposed themselves to the fire of the naval and military guns and musketry and machine-guns from below and were compelled to withdraw with considerable losses.

Further north the contestants grappled in hand-to-hand engagements along the slope and on the spurs, but the Turks were finally repulsed. The British losses thus far had been very heavy. Several units had lost more than 50% of their effective strength. The forces struggling for the ridge of Sari Bahr looked in vain for the expected support from Suvla Bay which might still have definitely turned the tide of battle even when the fortune of the British had begun to wane.

The command of the operations in the region of Suvla Bay was in the hands of Lieutenant-general the Honorable Sir Frederick Stopford. The Eleventh Division of the Ninth Army Corps was transported from Imbros to Suvla Bay in destroyers and motor-lighters, each of the former towing one of the latter until they reached shoal water. The motor-lighters, after landing their own complement, 500 troops apiece, returned to the destroyers and in one trip emptied these also. The Eleventh Division was put ashore



Evacuation of the Dardanelles. *Burning stores at Sivela Bay.*



Disembarkation at the Dardanelles.



at Suvla Bay before daybreak on the 7th, and at dawn the first contingent of the Tenth Division belonging to the same corps arrived from Mitylene.

The Turkish troops on the beach were taken by surprise and driven back. As soon as daylight permitted, the enemy's artillery opened fire, causing some confusion and loss, but not arresting the advance of the British, who spread out over the plain.

The newcomers, called upon at once for arduous and prolonged exertion on the barren, sun-scorched flats, in a torrid atmosphere to which they were absolutely unaccustomed, suffered terribly from thirst, partly in consequence of the inadequacy of the means of distributing water from the lighters, but partly, no doubt, through the injudicious consumption of the supply which had been actually distributed.

The British forces deployed upon a semicircular front, but attacked none of the really important positions on the heights. General Stopford urged his division commanders to press forward with energy, so as to gain the greatest advantage from the unexpectedness of their arrival and place themselves in position to coöperate effectively with the movements further south. But the latter protested that the troops were too exhausted to proceed and their representations overruled the chief commander's sense of obligation. An unwarrantable interval of hesitation and delay sacrificed the coign of advantage won by Anzac, the glowing chance of victory which never would return.

The Ninth Corps wasted the next day in comparative inactivity, although their immediate adversaries were still weak in numbers. Finally, in the evening, at the earnest solicitation of Sir Ian Hamilton, a single brigade was ordered forward to seize an important position on the heights. But the execution of even this tardy measure was delayed until the following morning at four, when strong Turkish

reinforcements had already been hurried to the spot. The brigade was attacked on both flanks, subjected to deadly crossfire, and compelled to retreat, suffering serious losses. But probably the whole adjacent range of hills could have been captured had a general attack been pushed home with vigor even as late as the evening of the 8th. At about the same time the Turkish resistance was stiffened all along the western line. The golden opportunity had vanished.

The Fifty-third and Fifty-fourth Territorial Divisions were landed at Suvla Bay, but the lack of alert, decisive leadership neutralized all the advantage of reinforcements. The fighting was continued with inconsiderable gains. General Stopford, who had shown himself to be unequal to his task, resigned on the 15th, and his place was taken by Major-general De Lisle.


After this, operations languished for several days while Sir Ian Hamilton completed his preparations for a fresh attack. So severe had been the losses in the recent struggle that, in spite of the heavy reinforcements, the Allies now mustered only 95,000 available rifles,—30,000 at Suvla, 25,000 at Anzac, and 23,000 British and 17,000 French on the southern line,—as against about 110,000 Turks who still enjoyed the advantages of position. The British commander begged for sufficient reinforcements to provide 50,000 additional rifles besides bringing the effective strength of the corps already present up to their normal complement. With such an accession of strength he believed that he could clear a passage to Constantinople. But it was impossible to persuade the military authorities in France and England to send so many men at just that time.

The now famous Twenty-ninth Division was transferred in trawlers from Cape Helles to Suvla Bay. Contact had been established on the 12th between the right at Suvla Bay and the left of Anzac. It was now necessary to capture





English bivouac at Gallipoli. *In place of raising tents the troops dug shallow pits in which they rested.*



Australian artillery in operation on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

the projecting Turkish positions on Ismail Oglu Tepe, the southwestern extremity of the Anafarta Sagir ridge, which rises 350 feet above the level of the plains and was covered with almost impenetrable scrub, traversed here and there by goat paths.

At three o'clock on the afternoon of the 21st, two brigades of the Twenty-ninth Division together with the Eleventh Division advanced to the attack on a front of about a mile, the former against Ismail Oglu Tepe, the latter against the Turkish defenses further to the right. The British troops charged with magnificent courage across the bare plain, a distance of about a mile and a half, exposed to the enemy's shrapnel and machine-guns, gained a position on a lesser ridge, but were unable to reach the main crest. During the ensuing night it was found necessary to withdraw them from the position occupied, and the undertaking ended without any advantage to compensate for the 5,000 casualties.

A moderate success brought some consolation for this serious failure. On the 22d a lodgment was effected on Hill 60, on the left flank of Anzac, and on the 27th the Turks were entirely expelled from this eminence. This rendered possible the consolidation of the common front of Suvla Bay and Anzac. But with this exploit the great offensive terminated, and with it all operations on a grand scale on the Gallipoli Peninsula ceased. The summer had been very trying on the arid, sun-parched slopes and plains of the peninsula. The soldiers had suffered severely from thirst, the swarms of flies, and sickness.

The Allies still lingered in their positions for several months, because it required a sterner resolution to withdraw and acknowledge failure than to remain. Perilous as was the attempt to force the passage of the Dardanelles by action of the fleet alone, the general project of breaking

the enemy's grip upon the vital waterway was justified by a fair chance of success and by a consideration of the tremendous advantages which success would have conferred. It is a trite observation that in warfare great decisions almost always involve great risks.

In defending the expedition to the Dardanelles in the House of Commons on November 15th, Winston Spencer Churchill, who had been its sponsor, declared that "the advance, for instance, which took Neuve Chapelle, or Loos, or Souchez, if made on the Gallipoli Peninsula, would have settled the fate of the Turkish army on the promontory, would probably have decided the whole operation, might have determined the attitude of the Balkans, might have cut off Germany from the East, and might have saved Serbia." He added that the army had "stood all summer within a few miles of a decisive victory."

In August the necessary reinforcements had been denied because a great effort was impending in the West. But it is doubtful whether the great offensive did as much to relieve the embarrassment of Russia as might have been accomplished by the opening of the Dardanelles to shipments of munitions. For Russia it was more a question of ammunition than of numbers. The failure at the Dardanelles was one of the many misfortunes and disappointments sustained by the Allies in 1915 by reason of their unwillingness or inability to merge all their efforts in a single consistent and homogeneous plan to win the war.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE DESTRUCTION OF THE POLISH SALIENT AND THE GREAT RETREAT

The situation on the eastern front at the beginning of July, 1915. Second battle of Krasnik, July 5-8. German plan for the grand offensive. Weakness of the Russians. Disposition of the armies on the opposing eastern fronts. Resumption of the offensive by von Mackensen. Ewarts defeated by von Woysch. Von Gallwitz breaks through the northern side of the Polish salient. The situation in front of Warsaw. The critical situation in the Polish salient and the decision of the Russians to sacrifice Warsaw and Poland. Passage of the Vistula forced by the Germans between Ivangorod and Warsaw, July 28th. Abandonment of Warsaw. The supposed analogy of 1812 and 1915. Flight and pursuit. The line of the Bug rendered untenable. Capture of Kovno by the Germans, August 17th. Fall of Novo Georgievsk, August 19th. Attempted landing of the Germans in the Gulf of Riga. Evacuation of Brest-Litovsk, August 25th. The Tsar's resolution to command the armies in person, September 5th. Alexeieff as Chief of the General Staff; his previous career. The final attempt to engulf the Russian armies; the fall of Vilna and escape of the Russian Tenth Army. Failure of the Germans to achieve their supreme purpose and their efforts to gain a suitable stationary front in the East; the Riga-Vilna-Rovno-Lemberg railway and the coveted line for the Teutonic eastern front. The configuration of the southern area of the eastern theater; the Austro-German offensive and the Russian counter-offensive in that section. The German offensive along the Dvina: the Dvinsk sector and the failure of the German attacks; the situation before Riga and thwarting of the German efforts there. The Russian offensive in the south in the winter of 1915-1916.

The capture of Lemberg and the expulsion of the Russians from the northern part of Galicia brought the contending forces in that region back to a position which was almost identical with the situation about ten months before. Now at the end of June, 1915, the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and Field-marshal von Mackensen were pushing northward into Polish territory, while von Boehm-Ermolli, von Linsingen, and von Pflanzer were taking positions to

cover the right flank and rear of these chief operative armies. Von Linsingen captured Halicz on June 28th, turning the enemy's line on the Gnila Lipa, and thus compelled the Russians to retire to the Zlota Lipa. But further north Brussiloff frustrated all the attempts of von Boehm-Ermolli to cross the Bug.

The chief operative section of the Teutonic front now lay between the Vistula and the Bug, where the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and von Mackensen were pushing northward, the former on the left in the direction of Lublin, the latter on the right with Chelm as his immediate objective.

By July 2d the general line of the Teutonic front passed through Krasnik,—the principal intermediate point on the archduke's line of operation,—and Zamosk. On July 4th the Russians took up a position about three miles north of Krasnik, while on the 7th von Mackensen's advance was brought to a standstill half way between Zamosk and Krasnystav.

The archduke was involved in a serious conflict on the 5th. The Vieprz flowing northward between his army and that of von Mackensen on the right prevented their coöperation, while General Lesch, concentrating powerful forces on his right wing, forced back the Austro-Hungarian center. After four days of desperate fighting the archduke was driven back about two miles on a front of eighteen and there was about a week's delay in the offensive movement in this sector. But already the German leaders were forging another mighty blow in the north and presently the campaign was to enter upon its second and vastly more tremendous stage.

The almost uninterrupted battle waged by the Teutonic armies for more than two months in Galicia had been a unique achievement in the art of war, one to which accomplished generalship, incomparable staff work, and the





German pioneers repairing one of the bridges across the Vistula which had been blown up by the Russians on their retreat.



Peasant refugees. *Great numbers of Polish peasants left their homes and fled eastward into Russia before the German army.*

courageous and sustained efforts of the great masses of troops had all contributed. The Russians had been driven from the greater part of Galicia, Austria-Hungary had been given a new lease of life, and the tide of battle had been forced back into Poland from the south. The prospects on the eastern front had undergone a revolution.

The original Polish salient, resting on its framework of strategic railways was now everywhere exposed. The moment was ripe to match the great effort in the south by an attack in the north. With success on both sides the main Russian armies might be entrapped within the salient. Von Falkenhayn, the Chief of the German General Staff, proposed to destroy the Russian armies by the now familiar double enveloping strategy applied with unprecedented strength and energy.

While the Russians were assailed with violence on all parts of the front, the chief operative masses of their opponents would be driven through the opposite flanks of the salient. As the Teutonic armies pushed towards the base of the salient near Brest-Litovsk, a distance of about one hundred miles from their chief operative sectors, crushing all resistance in their path, the Russian army in the apex, 150 miles west of this critical line would almost inevitably be cut off and surrounded. At the same time von Below, who had already overrun Courland as far north as the Vindava, by sweeping to the right would threaten Kovno and Vilna from the flank, cut the main railway line to Petrograd, and intercept the fugitives from the collapsed Polish salient. In pursuance of this plan the great battle in the East raged on with redoubled fury and extent, filling up the measure of an entire campaign. The Germans fought with the confident expectation that the end of this campaign would bring peace with Russia as the prelude to a complete and lasting triumph over all their enemies.

The Russians had entered the war with a good equipment of field artillery and numerous machine-guns, in the manipulation of which they exhibited considerable skill. But ever since the beginning of May the strength of the Russian armies had been largely paralyzed through shortage of ammunition. At different times and places during the summer ammunition for the artillery gave out entirely, so that the rear-guard action to delay the enemy devolved entirely on the infantry with no support from the Russian guns against the enemy's terrific cannonading.

The outstanding feature of the summer's operations is the great retreat of the Russian armies, executed as a whole with admirable skill and in good order. The cohesion and organic action of the Russian army were not destroyed. The campaign was a grievous disappointment to the western Allies, and a formidable blow to Russian prestige, but it was neither a fatal calamity nor did it bring fulfilment of the supreme purpose of the Central Powers.

By this time it was generally recognized that Russia's immense superiority in population over Germany did not compensate for her administrative, economic, and transportational shortcomings. She also lacked reserve officers to replace the fallen and to provide for the formation of new units, and the substitution for these of non-commissioned officers and subalterns was a less satisfactory expedient in her case as compared with the western powers, owing to the low average of education.

The extent of illiteracy in the Russian army must have either seriously restricted the choice of non-commissioned officers and subalterns or debased the general standard of their quality. The vast development in the mechanism of warfare and the present conditions of the battlefield have laid an unprecedented burden of responsibility upon the members of this class. For instance, the intense fire that

sweeps the modern battlefield dissolves the larger masses and leaves the immediate direction of the troops in the hands of the numerous inferior, subordinate leaders. The heavy losses of the Russians may probably be ascribed in no small part to the relative unenlightenment of this humbler leadership, as well as to the scarcity of suitable field officers.

To throw raw formations, imperfectly equipped, supplied, and officered into the fiery furnace of modern warfare is worse than wasteful and inhuman. For the resulting fearful augmentation in the number of casualties tends to unnerve the friendly forces and strengthen the assurance of the enemy, and therefore Russia very wisely held back large numbers of her new recruits for training at the regimental depots during the unfortunate summer of 1915, although her armies were so greatly outnumbered in the field.


The armies which now formed the German-Austro-Hungarian front from the Baltic Sea to the confines of Roumania were disposed in the following order, as indicated by the names of their commanders: von Below in Courland; von Eichhorn on the eastern border of East Prussia; von Scholtz and von Gallwitz along the northwestern side of the Polish salient; Prince Leopold of Bavaria in the central sector west of Warsaw; von Woysch, the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, and von Mackensen facing the southwestern reëntrant of the Polish salient; von Boehm-Ermolli northeast of Lemberg; von Linsingen along the Gnila Lipa down to its confluence with the Dniester: and von Pflanzer along the right bank of the latter as far as the Russian boundary. Fully 2,500,000 Teutonic soldiers awaited the command in readiness for instant action.

Before the close of the summer we find the armies on the Russian side grouped into three general commands,

under Alexeieff in the north, Ewarts in the center, and Ivanoff in the south. The Fifth Army confronted von Below in Courland; the Tenth, under the direct command of Alexeieff, held the Niemen front against von Eichhorn; General Plehve's Twelfth Army occupied the northern side of the Polish salient; the Second guarded the apex in front of Warsaw, and Ewarts and Lesch with the Fourth and Third respectively covered the southern face; while in the south Brussiloff and Lechitsky with the Eighth and Ninth Armies opposed von Boehm-Ermolli, von Linsingen, and von Pfanzer. The Russians were probably not able at any time during this summer to muster 2,000,000 effectives, fully armed and equipped.

Von Hindenburg commanded the group of Teutonic forces in the north, and was entrusted with the congenial task of directing the concentric operations against the northern sector of the Polish salient. Prince Leopold of Bavaria was group commander in the center, and von Mackensen in the south, while von Falkenhayn as Chief of the General Staff supervised and coördinated all the efforts.

About the middle of July almost the entire Teutonic front burst into sudden flame. Along nearly the whole line of a thousand miles the Russians were assailed with the utmost violence and thus robbed of the advantage of striking back with locally superior forces at different crucial points successively, which the possession of interior lines of communication in the Polish salient might otherwise have given them. On the south, between the Vistula and the Bug, where it is said that no fewer than fourteen corps had been concentrated under von Mackensen and the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, the offensive was resumed by the former on the night of the 15th-16th. General Lesch's Third Russian Army of probably not more than half the aggregate numerical strength of its two opponents had



The evacuation of Warsaw. *A Russian regiment marching through the city the day before the Germans entered.*



The Germans in Warsaw. *Officers of the German Headquarters Staff arriving in their gray army staff motor-cars, at the hotel Bristol, to take up their quarters there.*



just received considerable reinforcements, including a corps of Siberians and a division of the Guards, because the Russians themselves had planned another attack in this same region. Generally speaking, the Siberians were regarded as the choice troops of the Russian line.

Although the Russians were still greatly outnumbered in this section and their first line trenches were destroyed by a fearful bombardment, the balance was restored by the Russian Guards, who attacked the enemy with great gallantry. After two days' stubborn fighting von Mackensen's superiority in shell prevailed on the 18th, the Russians slowly retired, and the Germans occupied Krasnystav and reached a point within ten miles of the vital railway between Lublin and Chelm.

The retrogression of the Third Army necessitated the retirement of the four corps of General Ewarts's Fourth Russian Army which was attacked by General von Woysch's army, its slightly convex front, which ran by Radom and Sienno, being perforated near the latter place on the 17th so that the following night the Russians were compelled to withdraw behind the Itzanka. After a further struggle von Woysch occupied Radom on the 20th and the Russian army retreated to the right bank of the Vistula. Von Woysch gained positions commanding the bridge-heads of Nova Aleksandrja and Ivangorod by the 21st. This advance together with that of von Mackensen compelled the Russians to retire from the intervening section opposite the position of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand.

Von Gallwitz fell upon the Russians on the northern salient, swept over their trenches in front of Przasnysz on the 14th and drove the enemy towards the Narev, while von Scholtz further to the northeast was driving the Russians towards the same river between Ostroleka and Lomza. By the 20th the Germans had their heavy guns

within range of several fortresses along the line of the Narev and the Bohr, and von Gallwitz, on the 23d, broke through the Russian lines on a front of about five miles and forced the passage of the Narev northeast of Pultusk.

This threatening advance of the Germans on the Narev front led to the retirement on the 18th of the Second Russian Army from the famous Rawka-Bzura line, twenty-five miles west of Warsaw, which it had occupied since the previous November, to a position running from Novo Georgievsk straight south through Blonie, fifteen miles from the Polish capital, which had been fortified for intended occupancy just before the adoption of the more western line the fall before. The Germans moved up to a position opposite the Blonie line.

The four corps composing the Second Army in their order from north to south were the Fifth Siberian, Sixth, Thirty-fifth Reserve, and Thirty-sixth Reserve. In consequence of Ewarts's retirement behind the Vistula, the left wing of the Second Army, beginning at Grodzisk, was bent back until its extremity touched the Vistula at Goralwarja and thus closed the front.

The closing in of the Teutonic armies on Warsaw and the threatened obliteration of a large section of the Polish salient probably led the Russian military authorities at this time to resolve to sacrifice Warsaw and evacuate Polish territory as a supreme effort to save the Russian armies. But for the successful application of even this heroic remedy it was almost too late.

Only on the extreme Austro-German right wing did the offensive make little progress. With difficulty von Boehm-Ermolli gained possession of some bridge-heads on the right bank of the Bug, while further south the Zlota Lipa remained the dividing line between the hostile armies until the latter part of August. But a further very formidable

danger for the Russians was making its appearance in the extreme north, where the German forces effected the crossing of the Vindava on July 14th, on the right near Kurschany, under the command of General von Below, and on the left near Goldingen, under General von Lauenstein, and swept eastward on a broad front capturing many prisoners. Vindava and Tukcum were taken on the left and Shavli on the right. Von Below defeated the Russian Fifth Army on the 23d and advanced along the Libau-Dvinsk railway, while von Lauenstein, after a violent conflict on the 30th-31st, captured Mitau on August 1st and consolidated his front upon the east bank of the Aa below Bausk. During the first week of the great offensive the Teutonic armies had taken 41,000 prisoners on the portion of the front between the Niemen and the Vistula and 50,000 on the southern operative sector between the Pilica and the Bug.

Beginning on July 24th, the Russians gradually abandoned the Blonie line and fell back on the forts of Warsaw. Any lingering hesitation as to the necessity of their great strategical decision must have been dispelled by the energetic operations of von Woysch. For a portion of his army succeeded in throwing pontoon bridges across the Vistula near the mouth of the Radomka, between Ivanogorod and Warsaw, on the morning of the 28th, and two corps crossed to the right bank, threatening to dislocate the Russian front completely. The left wing of the Russian Thirty-sixth Reserve Corps, which formed the southern member of the Second Army, was drawn back across the river and thus reestablished contact with Ewarts's right, but the situation remained precarious.

The safety of the Second Army was in fact due to the obstinate resistance for about two weeks of the Twelfth Army between the Narev and the Bug, which prevented

the advance of von Gallwitz, and so protected the northern flank of the Second Army. On the 29th von Mackensen cut the Warsaw-Kieff railway and on the next day Lublin and Chelm were both in Austro-German hands. By August 2d four corps had crossed the Vistula below Ivangorod, and this fortress, now included in a concave recess of the Teutonic front and no longer tenable, surrendered to General von Koevess, commander of an Austro-Hungarian army corps on von Woyrsch's right wing, on August 4th. At the same time the fate of the Polish capital was sealed. The tragedy of alternating hopes and fears had touched the limit of its protracted course.

During the evening of the 4th the retreating Russian columns filed through the streets of Warsaw. By midnight the last units were crossing the Vistula bridges which were blown up about three hours later. Prince Leopold's advance-guard entered the city about five A. M.

The news of this positive acquisition, in lieu of the report of repeated, but inconclusive, Teutonic victories, filled Germany with a deep sense of satisfaction. It promised even greater political than strategic results, for Germany might conceivably win the gratitude and coöperation of a nation of 20,000,000 souls through her capacity to invest them with the name and substance of united independent political existence.

Holding to the traditional theory that retreating armies are capable of inflicting serious damage on the armies of an invader, or even pave the way to their destruction, and, clinging to the recollection of the destruction of Napoleon's *Grande Armée* in 1812, the Russians in their retreat in 1915 resorted to insensate devastation of a large part of the territory which they evacuated. They burned crops, villages, and towns, and forced the people to depart with them, not realizing that such measures would cause-





**WESTERN RUSSIA,  
POLAND  
AND THE  
RUSSO-GERMAN FRONTIER**

Scale of Miles  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Scale of Kilometers  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
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relatively small annoyance to the Germans with their remarkable technical mastery of communications and transport. This horde of exiles, numbering fully 2,000,000, so greatly embarrassed the movements of the Russian armies that in some cases the orders for the civilian evacuation were reversed.

The Second Russian Army evacuated the suburb of Praga on the right bank of the Vistula, opposite Warsaw, on August 9th, and entered upon a veritable race with death, though partly protected by the brave defense of the Twelfth Army on its northern flank, being closely pursued by the army of Prince Leopold, while the armies of von Woysch, the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, and von Mackensen were converging towards the critical section of the base of the Polish salient on the upper Bug.

With astonishing alacrity the German engineers pushed forward their work upon the tracks of the victorious armies. In some sections the very trace of the Polish railways had been almost obliterated. Yet only eleven days after the capture of Warsaw the German authorities were able to announce the establishment of an express service of passenger trains between extreme points in the occupied territories East and West. An express train leaving Lille at 6.40 A. M. and Brussels at 8.30, reached Berlin at midnight and arrived in Warsaw in time for luncheon the next day. Without waiting for the reconstruction of the demolished bridges at Warsaw and Ivangorod, the Germans reestablished railway communication across the Vistula by means of pontoon bridges formed of river barges and thus provided for the steady flow of munitions and supplies for the advancing armies.

The archduke expelled Ewarts's left wing from the left bank of the lower Vieprz on August 7th, von Woysch drove the Russian rearguards from their positions west of

Lukov on the 10th, and Prince Leopold reached Kaluszyn on the same day. Lukov was taken on the 12th and the next day Siedlce fell on the very heels of the departing Russians. Possibly the most critical period in the retirement of the Second Army was passed when it escaped from Siedlce and entered a forest region which extends eastward to the Bug.

The resistance of the fortresses barring the river crossings on the northern flank was a most important factor. The Russian leaders decided to sacrifice the garrison of Novo Georgievsk for the sake of prolonging the resistance and obstructing the Danzig-Mlava-Warsaw railway and the navigation of the Vistula at that point. The offensive impetus encountering at intervals the stationary obstruction of the fortresses of Novo Georgievsk, Ostroleka, Lomza, and Osovietz gave the German front a scalloped contour, like canvas bellying before the blast. All these strongholds except Osovietz fell before the 20th, but not without rendering an invaluable service.

At first the Grand-duke Nicholas had probably hoped to hold a line running down the right bank of the upper Bug. Along this line the railway from Brest-Litovsk through Bialystok to Osovietz would provide convenient lateral communications. But the German advance in Courland and more particularly von Eichhorn's perforation of the Niemen barrier soon extinguished every hope of arresting the Teutonic deluge before it had swept on to the soil of Holy Russia.

The continued possession of the fortress of Kovno seemed to be a necessary guarantee against disaster for the Russians. Von Below in the north was pushing towards Dvinsk, and if Kovno fell, von Eichhorn might join in a converging movement against the Russian army on the Dvina and by crushing it open a breach through which

the German hosts could drive at Petrograd. Or its fall might be the natural prelude to an enveloping movement against the Russian center. On its safety depended that of the other Niemen fortresses, Olita and Grodno. Kovno, from its importance as a railway center, was the key to the Lithuanian metropolis.

Kovno was defended by eighteen detached forts, nine on each side of the Niemen; but this system had not been extended and consolidated by continuous lines of earthworks.

Von Eichhorn, in command of the Tenth German Army of five corps, advanced to the vicinity of Kovno and commenced the bombardment on August 5th, employing heavy pieces of every caliber including the 42-centimeter mortars. The heroic defense of the garrison temporarily resisted the advancing tide and permitted the Russians to remove a large part of the stores and valuable equipment. A breach made by General Litzmann's army corps in one of the forts on the southwest opened the way to the Germans and by the 17th the entire fortress was captured, with 1,301 guns, according to the victor's report. A considerable portion of the garrison made its escape from the forts on the right bank of the Niemen.

General of the Infantry von Beseler, the conqueror of Antwerp, attacked the fortress of Novo Georgievsk with his roving, powerful force of heavy artillery. He began operations on the northeast and after taking by storm a large fort and two intermediate redoubts on the 16th overcame the stubborn resistance of the defenders, who relied on the obsolete stationary method, and captured the entire fortress on the 19th.

The Germans reported the capture of 20,000 men and 700 cannon during the final combat and at the surrender of the fortress, but claimed that the prisoners taken during the entire siege reached the amazing total of 90,000. The

larger number, if authentic, must have included all prisoners taken anywhere in the entire vicinity, even in field operations, during the course of the siege. The captured cannon rose, according to the reported final enumeration, to the incredible total of 1,640.

In the meantime von Mackensen, marching north from Chelm, had crossed the Bug at Vladava and threatened Brest-Litovsk in flank and rear; von Woysch, after passing through Lublin in pursuit of Ewarts, was advancing against the west front of Brest-Litovsk; while von Gallwitz, striking eastward, had cut the Brest-Litovsk-Bialystok railway at Bielsk on August 18th. A little further north, von Scholtz took Bialystok on the 26th. In Courland the German pressure was becoming ever more formidable in the region of the Dvina.

The capture of Kovno as already recorded, on the 17th, led immediately to the evacuation of Suwalki and the retirement of the Russians from the forests of Augustovo, so long their favorite refuge and base of attack. Olita had to be evacuated on the 26th and by September 1st the Warsaw-Vilna-Petrograd railway had been cut in this section also northeast of Grodno and the attack on the western forts of Grodno had begun. After the hasty removal of a large part of the military material Grodno was abandoned by the Russians on the 3d.

On August 10th a German squadron of nine battleships, twelve cruisers, and a flotilla of destroyers were defeated in an attempt to enter the Gulf of Riga. On the 17th the lighter craft entered under cover of a dense fog, but their attempt to disembark at Pernau three days later was frustrated and the whole landing-party was captured or destroyed by the Russian flotilla. The landing of a considerable German force in the Gulf of Riga north of the mouth of the Dvina would probably have caused the





Russian prisoners taken at Novo Georgievsk.



Heroic wooden statue of von Hindenburg erected in Berlin.

evacuation of Riga and led to the abandonment of the lower Dvina and this would have opened the way for an attack on Petrograd. Meanwhile, the main Russian and German squadrons had come into action, principally in the Mohn Sound, and the Germans after sustaining serious damage were compelled to leave the gulf. It was reported that two German cruisers and eight destroyers were either sunk or put out of action.

The fall of Kovno imperilled the entire Russian right wing. To prevent the center from being enveloped by a movement of the Germans across the Vilna-Petrograd railway, it was necessary to withdraw the center to a line beyond the range of such a movement.

Accordingly, Ewarts held out at Brest-Litovsk only long enough for most of the material of war to pass on its way towards the interior and evacuated the position on the 25th just as von Beseler was bringing up his heavy siege artillery. Retreating eastward Ewarts's army soon entered the region of the Pripet marshes, where the Russians were doubtless delayed in their retreat by the scarcity of parallel routes, but at the same time relieved from exposure to flank attacks.

In this time of cruel disappointment and keen anxiety, on September 5th, the Tsar announced in terms of heroic earnestness his intention of assuming personal command of all the Russian armies, while the Grand-duke Nicholas was sent to the Caucasus as viceroy, transferred, in other words, to the command in the lesser theater of operations on the Armenian frontier.

The removal of the grand-duke gave rise to the most varied surmises. He had seemingly shown himself to be a competent general, and the great retreat, the inevitable result of the less effective strength and of deficiency in the material equipment of the Russians, had been executed in a masterly way. Probably the misfortunes of Russia had

brought about a state of discontent that could only be appeased by offering a scapegoat. But the chief credit for the elaboration of the plans for the great retreat is commonly attributed to General Alexeieff, who was now made Chief of the General Staff under the Tsar's titular supreme command.

Michael Vassilievitch Alexeieff entered the army from the Moscow Military Academy as ensign in the 64th Kazan regiment on December 1, 1876, and, like many other famous Russian generals of the present time, received his first experience of actual warfare in the Russo-Turkish struggle of 1877-1878. He was promoted to the rank of captain in 1885, completed the course of studies in the General Staff Academy in 1890, and served as professor in the same institution from 1898 to 1904. His experience as Quartermaster-general of the Third Manchurian Army in the Russo-Japanese War was doubtless a providential preparation for the more vital administrative problems of the war in Europe. After serving as Chief of Staff for the military district of Kieff from 1908 to 1912, the Great War found him commanding general of the Thirteenth Corps at Smolensk and the increasing pressure of emergency bore him successively to ever broader fields of action and responsibility, as Ivanoff's Chief of Staff, commander of the northern army group, and finally the practical head of all the Russian armies. Alexeieff must have inspired the confidence of the government. The situation evidently called for the guidance of a man of his peculiar temperament and training, and one might venture the conjecture that the interposition of the Tsar was partly intended as a device to palliate the passage of the virtual chief command from a member of the imperial family to a subject. Russky succeeded Alexeieff as commander of the northern army group, while Ewarts and Ivanoff retained their positions in the center and south respectively.

Although the Russian armies at the center had successfully cleared the base line of the former Polish salient in their eastward flight, von Hindenburg still believed that by breaking through the opposing front at Vilna the Germans could turn the enemy's right center and roll it back upon the Pripet marshes, where it could neither rally nor escape, and thus inflict an irreparable disaster and consummate the supreme purpose of the campaign. To effect this, general pressure was maintained along the whole front, while the left center, by the familiar double enveloping movement undertook to isolate Vilna and bag the Tenth Russian Army. While von Scholtz and von Gallwitz on the south converged in the direction of Lida, von Eichhorn engaged in a frontal attack on the Russians west of Vilna. On September 8th his right center captured near Novo Traki a defile through the chain of lakes that covered Vilna on the west. On the 12th the Russians were driven back across the Vilija where it approaches Vilna from the northeast and the Germans cut the Vilna-Petrograd railway about twenty-two miles northeast of the city.

The situation was now ripe for throwing forward the other arm to encircle Vilna on the north. A great mass of German cavalry under von Lauenstein, numbering about 40,000, swept up the right bank of the Vilija and occupied Vileika on the railway running northeast from Molodetchno. The German lines were now enclosing Vilna within a horseshoe-like formation and the fall of the city was inevitable.

The Russians clung to Vilna with perhaps imprudent tenacity, while with feverish energy military stores and the fortress artillery were being removed through the rapidly diminishing zone of unconquered territory eastward. There was only one suitable line of retirement, the railway and parallel highway through Molodetchno. The railway route

by way of Lida was still in the possession of the Russians, but a retirement by it would have resulted in a fatal congestion with the troops retreating eastward before von Scholtz and von Gallwitz. By the 15th the Germans had crossed to the left bank of the Viliija east of Vilna and were all but in possession of a section of the railway from Vilna through Molodetchno to Minsk. The situation for the Russians was probably the gravest that had occurred since the escape of the army that had been stationed before Warsaw. The hostile ring was fast closing around the Russian army.

The old Lithuanian capital was evacuated on the 18th. The retreat of the Russian army from the Vilna salient, which was executed with masterly skill, is said to have been directed by General Alexeieff from the General Headquarters. The German columns marched into the streets of Vilna, which a short time before had throbbed with life and animation, but where a deathlike stillness now prevailed. Shops and houses were bolted and barred, the shutters were closely drawn, and the tread of the marching thousands reëchoed with a weird and hollow sound.

Eastward the roads presented the usual spectacle of anxious flight; endless trains of artillery, ambulances, and supply wagons; dense crowds of fugitives with every kind of vehicle, encumbered with personal and household articles, old people and young children, the sick and infirm, embarrassing the march of the retreating columns of soldiers. In almost continuous rearguard engagements the Russians struggled desperately to avert the impending disaster, but the fall of Lida on the 19th made the prospect even more disheartening.

The incidents crowding this retreat would seem to express the full sum of human misery. At the stations most harrowing scenes occurred; the terror of the people at the

П Р И К А З Ъ  
А Р М И И И Ф Л О Т У.

23<sup>е</sup> " августа 1915 года

Сего числа Я принялъ на СЕБЯ предводи-  
тельство всѣми сухопутными и морскими  
вооруженными силами, находящимися на театрѣ  
военныхъ дѣйствій

Съ твердою вѣрою въ милость  
Божию и съ непоколебимою увѣренностью  
въ конечную побѣду будемъ исполнять  
наше святое долговое заступничество  
до конца и на всѣхъ границахъ земли  
Русской.

Николай

An historic document.

On the 5th of September, 1915 (23d of August, Russian calendar), the Tsar of Russia took command of the Russian forces on land and sea.

The typewritten paragraph translates as follows: "I have this day taken command of all the forces on land and sea which are stationed in the zone of hostilities."

The Tsar added with his own hand: "With a profound faith in the Divine favor and the immovable assurance of final victory we will perform the sacred duty of defending our country to the end and we will not dishonor the land of Russia."

NICHOLAS.



approach of their pitiless conquerors deprived them of the power of reasoning and deadened all the impulses of compassion. The strong ignored the helplessness of the weak; the sound, the claims of the wounded; a veritable inferno reigned. It was "the contest for survival in all its hideousness!"

An intensely vivid narrative of the horrors of this phase of twentieth-century war is furnished by the journal of a young French lady who was serving as a Red Cross nurse with the retreating Russian army. Her story appeared in the *Revue des deux Mondes* from which we quote the following words:

"We have just arrived at the station of Gondagaye after escaping by a miracle from the pursuit of the Germans. We are ordered to halt and our ambulance is quickly installed. Great battles are in progress in the vicinity. In and around the station what a sight! We fairly walk over the wounded and dying; they are everywhere, on the benches, on the floor, and outside along the platform. . . . Groans fill the station, broken at times by piercing shrieks. A poor little soldier, less than twenty years old, holds with his left hand his right half torn off. Another, older, seated on the floor with his back resting against the wall, his eyes closed and his face pale as death, his side stained red, rolls his head against the wall, crying repeatedly, 'My God, my God.' One can scarcely stop. More wounded arrive, but nothing can increase the horror of the scene. . . . The number of fugitives crowding the station and its vicinity increases every minute. The last train is ready to depart. The wounded crawl towards us in their terror, some of them on mangled hands or stumps of amputated legs. There is a moment of terrible frenzy. We almost have to fight with the refugees to prevent them from occupying the places reserved for the wounded. . . . A voice cries: 'The station is going to be blown up.' Desperately we lash the horses and they rear up and dash

off. . . . We had scarcely gone 500 meters when a formidable detonation tells that 'all has been accomplished.'

"Everything is on fire. Gondagaye burns behind us. Other villages lift their bloody torch upon the horizon. We flee by the light of the conflagrations, a grand and terrible spectacle."

At the supremely critical moment, when like the hosts of Pharaoh the Russian army was threatened with submersion by the hostile tide rolling in upon it from both sides, the violence of the German offensive seemed to falter. By the 20th the Russians, now apparently well supplied with ammunition, were turning on their pursuers with renewed energy and assurance, driving them from Vileika, repelling them at Lebedevo on the 21st, recapturing Smorgon. The neighborhood of Molodetchno remained the high-water mark of the German invasion in this section. The last great crisis of the Russian retreat was past and as the operations subsided into trench warfare the line of division between the fronts settled on the longitude of Smorgon.

The probable causes of the failure of the Germans to grasp their final opportunity were the diverting of part of their energy in the eastern theater to meet the new Allied offensive in the West, the gradual lessening of the alacrity and buoyancy of the troops; the increasing difficulty of employing their most effective instrument of aggression, their heavy artillery, the further they penetrated into a country of indifferent roads; and, specifically, the fact that the flying German wing, wanting the steadying support of infantry and field artillery, crumbled before a determined counter-offensive.

For many months Great Britain and France had struggled in vain to open a suitable avenue through the Dardanelles by which to bear the needed succor to their hard

pressed ally. Their great offensive in the West was probably launched at this time before the attainment of the full measure of their intended preparation in response to Russia's plight.

The gigantic efforts of the Germans, in spite of a succession of astounding victories without parallel, the subjugation of a great number of important fortresses, and the occupation of a vast expanse of hostile territory, had failed to accomplish the destruction of the Russian armies. The available season for active operations on the Russian front was now drawing to a close. The impending great offensive in the Balkan peninsula would henceforth demand the chief attention, while at the same time the activity of the Allies in the West, if not a vital peril, was certainly a cause of serious preoccupation. For these reasons the Central Powers were inclined to restrict their efforts in the eastern theater from now on to such operations as were necessary to gain a suitable stationary front, so as to obtain an interval of comparative repose, be able to withdraw as many troops as possible for operations elsewhere, and make the necessary provision for winter quarters.

In the autumn of 1915 the line connecting Riga, Dvinsk, Vilna, Luniniets, Rovno, and Lemberg was the only railway in the vast zone between Brest-Litovsk on the west and the course of the Dnieper on the east connecting the northern and southern sections of the theater of war in Russia. A section of this lateral railway including Vilna was already in the possession of the Germans and every consideration of strategical expediency demanded the subjugation of the entire line and pointed clearly to the belt of territory lying in front of it as the appropriate general position for the proposed stationary front.-

Operations were already in progress throughout a large part of the eastern theater which looked solely to the

removal of depressions in the Austro-German front and might therefore be regarded as the necessary steps to the consolidation of the stationary winter position. On the left center Prince Leopold's efforts were directed chiefly against Baranovich, an important junction on the much coveted lateral railway. But here the Germans were unsuccessful and the end of September found the Russians firmly entrenched before the place.

The consistent development of the Teutonic campaign required that the German right wing in the south, which had remained practically stationary at the Bug and Zlota Lipa since the early part of July, should be pushed forward and brought into alignment with the center and, particularly, that the forces of the Central Powers should gain possession of the triangle of fortresses, Lutsk, Dubno, and Rovno, which commanded the railway system of Volhynia, including a section of the important line from Riga, through Vilna and Rovno, to Lemberg.

The chief river in the central area is the Pripet, a sluggish stream that imperfectly drains the territory in its course. East of Brest-Litovsk it flows through a shallow basin, where the waters from the surrounding elevations stagnate in the famous Pripet Marshes, which cover an area as large as Scotland or the state of Indiana and exceed 120 miles in width near Pinsk. The principal tributary of the Pripet is the Styr, which enters it from the south.

From the watershed south of the basins of the Bug and the Pripet with their tributaries, the Gnila Lipa, the Zlota Lipa, the Strypa, and the Sereth flow southward into the Dniester, and by their roughly parallel courses constitute for eastern Galicia a succession of important defensive lines.

Towards the close of August von Mackensen was advancing eastward from the vicinity of Brest-Litovsk with





Russian artillery retreating in good order on the road east of Warsaw in the direction of Brest-Litovsk.



How the Russians kept valuable metal from falling into the hands of the Germans. *Showing a portion of a collection in the monastery of Nicolsky, near Moscow, of over three hundred bells taken from Orthodox, Catholic, and Lutheran churches in Russia before evacuation of the territory to the Germans. Each bell is marked with a tag to indicate from whence it came.*

his right wing skirting the southern margin of the Pripet Marshes. A strong cavalry force under General Puhallo filled the gap between von Mackensen's right and von Boehm-Ermolli's left, while the latter's front extended southward as far as Zlochoff near the head-waters of the Bug. Count von Bothmer's army followed along the right bank of the Zlota Lipa and von Pflanze's extended down the Dniester as far as the Austro-Russian border. Brussiloff confronted Puhallo, von Boehm-Ermolli, and von Bothmer, and Lechitsky faced von Pflanze.

By gaining the southern section of the Riga-Lemberg railway and all the lines radiating from Lemberg eastward and by depriving the Russians of the defensive lines of the parallel rivers in eastern Galicia, the Austro-Germans could make their right wing practically impregnable. Consequently the purpose of the Teutonic operations was practically twofold, the subjugation of the Volhynian fortresses and the expulsion of the Russians from Galicia. The plan for the attainment of the first of these objectives was based upon a concentric movement on Rovno, Puhallo advancing through Kovel and Lutsk and von Boehm-Ermolli through Brody and Dubno. The railways from Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk converge at Kovel and from there diverge eastward in the direction of Kieff and Odessa, crossing the Riga-Vilna-Lemberg lateral railway at Sarny and Rovno respectively. Puhallo entered Kovel as early as August 23d, but the inauguration of the great Austro-German offensive movement in the south is commonly dated on the 27th, when a part of von Boehm-Ermolli's army shattered a section of the Russian front on the watershed between the Bug and Zlota Lipa, forcing the Russians to abandon their positions on the Bug. Lutsk fell to the Teutonic forces on August 31st, Brody on September 1st, and Dubno on the 8th.

Simultaneously, further south on August 27th, von Bathmer, fighting on the anniversary and site of the first great battles east of Lemberg, forced the passage of the Zlota Lipa near Brzezany, while von Pflanzer's left wing attacked in the direction of Buczacz on the Strypa. These southern armies reached the Strypa on the 29th and by September 3d the Russians were back on the Sereth, having retired a distance of about thirty miles.

But just as the Teutonic right wing was advancing under full headway, with formidable momentum, and with every apparent prospect of winning a complete victory, it fell unexpectedly upon a determined counter-offensive started by Ivanoff as group commander on the left wing of the Russians. The Austro-Germans staggered backward before the hostile impact. The recovery of the initiative by the Russians and their renewed aggressive operations were the most conspicuous feature of the closing months of the campaign in the southern area. On September 7th the Russians forestalled and thwarted an intended decisive operation of the Teutonic forces planned for the following night, when Brussiloff surprised and defeated the Third Division of the Prussian Guard, the Forty-eighth German Reserve Division, and an Austro-Hungarian brigade with a strong force of artillery, which were moving against Tarnopol on the Sereth. At the same time Lechitsky defeated von Pflanzer in the vicinity of Tremblova. At this time the Russians seem to have had a plentiful supply of ammunition both in the north and south. By the evening of the 9th the Russian offensive on the Sereth had brought in a harvest of more than 17,000 prisoners. On the evening of the 13th the Austro-Germans were back on the line of the Strypa.

Von Mackensen's right wing failed in an attack on the front of the Russian Third Army west of Sarny. But in

the center he took Pinsk on the 16th and almost reached the corresponding section of the intended winter front. The Austro-German forces were unsuccessful in another attempt to reach Sarny and Rovno on the 17th. Von Linsingen succeeded von Mackensen on the eastern front when the latter departed for the campaign in Serbia.

The continued activity of the Russian southern wing was a disconcerting factor in the Austro-German plans. It compelled the Teutonic allies to strengthen their right wing on the Russian front at a time when it was desirable to withdraw as many men as possible from the eastern theater and it completely thwarted their attempt to win the desired line for their front in this quarter. Furthermore, it was a moral as well as strategical asset for the Russians to retain possession of a strip at least of Austro-Hungarian territory. In the latter part of September Ivanoff transferred his chief attention to the Volhynian sector of the Russian front, where Dubno was retaken and Lutsk temporarily reoccupied and the attacks of the Russians were continued throughout October.

Simultaneously with the above-mentioned operations in the southern area a series of severe conflicts were in progress in the extreme northern portion of the eastern theater, where the Germans were likewise struggling to win an adequate position for their front. Here it was imperative that von Hindenburg should extricate his lines from the forests and morasses and gain a strong defensive front along the Dvina. With Dvinsk and Riga and the connecting railway in their hands the Germans could face the coming winter with composure and look forward to an auspicious resumption of their offensive towards Petrograd in the spring. There were no fewer than thirteen German army corps in this northern section, besides von Lauenstein's cavalry, and these were being reinforced

by large numbers of reserves, chiefly Landsturm, from Germany.

For about fifty miles along the Dvina, from Riga up to Friedrichstadt, there is no suitable crossing place, the marshy forests making all approach by an army from the south impracticable. Friedrichstadt was therefore a vital point in the defensive line of the Dvina. On August 29th von Below made a forcible attack at this place, captured the bridge-head, and subjected the section of the Riga-Dvinsk railway opposite to the fire of the German heavy artillery. By September 3d the Germans had cleared the left bank of the Dvina for a distance of about ten miles from Friedrichstadt to Linden.

After this the Germans transferred their chief attention for a time to Dvinsk, a pivotal point in the Russian front, where the line coming from the south swung westward towards the Gulf of Riga. The Russians derived one special advantage from the marshy, difficult character of the zone of territory on the left bank of the Dvina, in that the lines of approach to the Russian front were few and clearly defined and could therefore be more easily watched and intercepted. In the vicinity of Dvinsk this feature was especially pronounced.

Although in a general sense Dvinsk was at the point of a reëntrant angle in the Russian front, the actual operative sector, extending from Lake Drisviaty south of the city to Illuxt towards the northwest, a distance of more than thirty miles, was slightly convex, bulging outward in the direction of the assailant. Russky, in other words, profiting by the lesson of the previous sieges in this war, had thrown out his lines in the form of an arc to a distance of at least twelve miles from the city, so as to shelter this vital center of communications from the enemy's fire. Dvinsk owed its salvation to the fact that it was not a fortress in the

conventional sense but merely an intrenched section of the front.

In the operations against Dvinsk von Hindenburg was aided by the same von Morgen who had given such signal proof of efficiency at the Masurian Lakes. Subsequently his place in this section was taken by von Lauenstein.

Attacking along the Novo Alexandrovsk road near the center of the defensive sector southwest of Dvinsk on September 25th, the Germans pushed the Russians back to a point about eight miles from the city; but this initial success practically marked the limit of their achievement. The numerous lakes scattered throughout the region in front of Dvinsk created strategic problems and possibilities like those of the Masurian region of East Prussia. But the conditions were now in large part reversed. For the Germans had become the invaders and von Hindenburg was no longer in his old familiar haunts, while the Russians had the advantage of convenient lines of communication and adequate supplies of ammunition and had drawn valuable lessons from their experience and mistakes.

A great effort of the Germans on October 3d consisted of a series of desperate thrusts at the intervals between the lakes supported by a great mass of heavy artillery. Von Morgen with ten of the largest howitzers and an operative force of 80,000 failed to make progress along the Novo Alexandrovsk road. Later the Germans endeavored to press in the Russian wings and thus bring a destructive cross-fire to bear upon the Russian center. On October 23d they broke through the Russian lines west of Illuxt and occupied the town, but this advance was checkmated by a Russian counter-attack a little further south. At the end of October the Russians attacked in the central portion of the Dvinsk sector near Lakes Sventen and Ilsen, and by November 11th they had consolidated their positions on

the isthmus between the two lakes and gained control of the western bank of Sventen, advancing in places as much as three miles.

During the conflict before Dvinsk, for almost the first time in this campaign, German bombardments were silenced by Russian guns and German infantry charges were broken by artillery fire alone. The increased expenditure of metal on the Russian side immediately effected a marked decrease in the consumption of human gun fodder.

During the third week of October von Hindenburg launched a determined effort against Riga. In this connection our attention should be directed to the topographical conditions of the region on the left bank of the lower Dvina. Here the River Aa with its tributaries, the Eckau and the Misse, sweeping round in a bold curve, presents a convex front, as a natural defensive outwork of Riga, in the face of an aggressor approaching from the southwest. Several smaller streams, working their way through the marshes and thickets, empty into the Dvina from the left.

Six army corps and a strong force of artillery were concentrated along the German front of about seventy miles which crossed, in the vicinity of Kemmern, from the Gulf of Riga to the Aa, followed the Aa and Eckau, and swung over to the bank of the Dvina near Linden. Von Hindenburg's plan combined a turning movement along the left bank of the Dvina from the southeast with a frontal attack towards Riga from the center of the German front at Mitau. The flanking force ate its way northwestward along the Dvina, until by October 24th it had reached a point within ten miles of Riga opposite the upper end of the island of Dahlen, which divides the river into comparatively narrow channels. Meanwhile, by the 22d, the German center had passed the Eckau and reached Olai on the Misse twelve miles from Riga. But as at Dvinsk

their early efforts brought them to the practical limit of penetration.

Successive attempts to advance along the coast were thwarted by the coöperation of the Russian naval and military forces. The marshes in the center proved to be an insuperable hindrance to the movement of the heavy guns on which the Germans so largely relied. The Germans gained a foothold on the island of Dahlen but were unable to retain it. After a final ineffectual effort in this corner of the field the offensive lapsed before Riga as well as before Dvinsk, and the Germans had to accommodate themselves as best they could to winter quarters in dreary, inhospitable localities.


The situation in the Balkans in December, full of peril for the Allies, seemed to call for a diversion on the Russian front. At the same time the strengthening of the Austro-German right wing in the eastern theater apparently portended an invasion of Bessarabia in the extreme southwest of Russia, perhaps a drive at Odessa. The Teutonic forces on the eastern front, which probably amounted altogether at this time to 120 divisions of infantry and twenty-three of cavalry, were now divided into four group commands under von Hindenburg, Prince Leopold of Bavaria, von Linsingen, and the Archduke Frederick respectively. The right wing consisted of the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, with Puhallo and the First Austro-Hungarian on its right along the Styr; the Second Austro-Hungarian Army under von Boehm-Ermolli extending across the divide in northeastern Galicia; the army of von Bothmer, largely German in its composition, along the Strypa; and the Sixth Austro-Hungarian Army under von Pflanzer along the Dniester and in Bukovina.

At her Black Sea bases Russia had been organizing a new army, the Seventh, under General Scherbacheff, for an

intended attack across Dobrudscha at the rear of the Bulgarians. When such an operation was prevented by Roumania's firm insistence upon the strict neutrality of her territory, Russia decided to strike a blow at the enemy in Bukovina instead.

With the Russian Eighth Army, Brussiloff was at this time facing the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and Puhallo on the Styr; the Eleventh Army under General Sakharoff confronted von Boehm-Ermolli in northeastern Galicia; the new Seventh now took its place along the Strypa against von Bothmer; and Lechitsky's Ninth Army opposed von Pflanzer in Bukovina. Czernowitz was selected as the objective of the Russian offensive, since it was apparent that the capture of this place would effectively preclude an invasion of Bessarabia or an attempt to intimidate Roumania and constrain her to join the Teutonic alliance by enclosing her on the north as well as on the south. The plan was to strike at Czernowitz with the Ninth Army and at the same time execute an enveloping movement with the Seventh. Five German divisions were transferred from Bulgaria to the threatened section and von Mackensen replaced the Archduke Frederick as group commander on the right flank of the Teutonic front in the eastern theater.

Lechitsky's offensive movement began on December 24th. In a holding operation further north Brussiloff captured Czartorysk on the left bank of the Styr on January 7, 1916. The offensive against Czernowitz lasted until January 16th without making any considerable gains in territory; but it probably relieved the pressure on the Allies in the Balkans and thwarted any Austro-German expectations of overrunning Bessarabia at this time.



German gas used previous to an attack. The men about to charge are seen in three ranks behind those discharging the gas.  
*Photographed from a Russian aeroplane.*



## CHAPTER VII

### THE WELTER IN THE BALKANS AND THE SUBMERSION OF SERBIA

The Balkan labyrinth. Conflicting tendencies. The situation in Greece: political revival, 1910-1913; Venizelos as prime minister; the estrangement between Venizelos and the king; problems left by the Balkan Wars; the project for Greek coöperation with the Allies and the resignation of Venizelos; Greek and Italian interests in the Near East; the election of June 13, 1915. The attitude of Bulgaria: the advantage of the Central Powers in bargaining with Bulgaria; the powerful influence of military events on Bulgarian policy; Bulgaria's decision and agreement with Turkey. Obligation of Greece with respect to Serbia. Resignation of Venizelos on October 5th; King Constantine's attitude. The Zaimis and Skouloudis ministries and the Greek elections of December 19th. Bulgaria casts her lot with the Central Empires. The strategical situation of Serbia. Commencement of the Serbian campaign. Union of the Bulgarian and German armies and the crushing of Serbian resistance. Exodus of Serbian fugitives. Flight by the Ibar valley and across the Plains of Kossovo. Escape of the remnants of the Serbian armies through Albania. Arrival and failure of the Allied relief expedition. The British and French establish a fortified base at Salonica. Withdrawal of the Allies from the Gallipoli Peninsula. Reflection on the close of the campaign.

There is no single Ariadne's thread to guide the bewildered explorer through the tangled labyrinth of Balkan politics. Despite Bulgaria's central position, which gave her an importance out of all proportion to her size, strength, or resources, the attitude of Tsar Ferdinand's government was not the sole decisive factor in the welter of conflicting impulses in which the three remaining Balkan states were now involved. Some of the more potent general factors may be enumerated, as follows:

1. *The widespread sympathy among the Balkan peoples for the nations of the Entente.* The Greeks esteemed Great Britain,

France, and Russia as their deliverers from bondage to the Turks, at a time when the Teutonic courts regarded the Greek revolution either with indifference or with suspicious disapproval as a dangerous assertion of the pretensions of nationality. No German poets or enthusiasts laid down their lives for the redemption of the sacred soil of Hellas. Greece owed the Ionian Isles to the magnanimity of Great Britain, and Thessaly to the support of the present Entente Powers. The Roumanians, proud of their Latin origin, regarded Italy and France with the attachment of a sister; and, in spite of recent occurrences, the Bulgarian peasants still harbored a deep feeling of gratitude for Russia as their liberator.

2. *The hostile ambitions and mutual suspicions of the Balkan states.* The outcome of the second Balkan War left an unbridgeable gulf of hatred between Bulgaria and her Christian neighbors. She was inconsolable for the loss of Macedonia in particular and the sight of thousands of refugees, who had fled from Serbia's drastic measures for nationalizing the population of that region, nourished her yearning for revenge.

3. *Dynastic influences favoring the Central Powers.* Serbia and Montenegro were the only Balkan states having sovereigns of indigenous stock. Constantine, the King of Greece, grandson of Christian IX of Denmark, was born on August 3, 1868, and was married to Princess Sophia of Prussia, sister of Emperor William II, in 1889. His accession to the throne of Greece followed the assassination of his father, King George I, which occurred at Salonica on March 18, 1913.

Ferdinand I, Tsar of Bulgaria, was born in 1861, son of Prince Augustus of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and Princess Marie-Clémentine of Bourbon-Orléans, a daughter of Louis-Philippe. His versatile and inquisitive disposition,

dilettantism in art, elegant appearance, astuteness, and cruelty recall the characteristic traits of the Italian despots of the Renaissance. Nature endowed him with great ambition, but seems to have withheld the gift of personal bravery, the place of which was supplied by subtlety and cunning.

Charles I (Carol), King of Roumania, was born on April 20, 1839, the son of Prince Charles Anthony (Karl Anthon) of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. He was elected Prince of Roumania in 1866 and assumed the rank of king in 1881. He married Princess Elizabeth of Wied, better known by her *nom de plume* as Carmen Sylva, in 1869, and was succeeded at his death, October 11, 1914, by his nephew, Prince Ferdinand of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. The latter, who rules as Ferdinand I, was born in 1865 and was married in 1893 to Marie Alexandra Victoria, the eldest daughter of the Duke of Edinburgh and granddaughter of Queen Victoria.


At first the Entente governments seem to have made the mistake of underrating the importance of the dynastic factor in the case of Greece and Bulgaria, and, in the case of Greece especially, the power of the king to thwart the natural inclination of the people. But the sovereigns of Greece and Bulgaria were doubtless actuated far more by practical considerations of interest and prudence than by sentimental attachment for Germany or for the head of the family of Hohenzollern. As officers with German training they were dominated by blind admiration for the high standard of efficiency of the German army and by the conviction that Germany would win the war.

4. *Popular disinclination for warfare and dread of the results of intervention.* After a period of turmoil and bloodshed the peasants of the Balkan states had returned to their neglected farms only a few months before. Their apathy

for fresh schemes of conflict must have been felt in all the states, but was naturally stronger in those which were not stung by a sense of wrongs endured. It is not unlikely that the actual majority of the Greeks, although Greece had most to win by alliance with the Entente, were averse to any warlike enterprises for aggrandizement.

The Balkan peoples watched the titanic struggle of the Great Powers with a sense of awe and consternation and shrank from the fiery arena where a casual shifting of the balance might mean the ruin of a Balkan state.

5. *Apprehension in regard to the designs of Russia.* A statement made by Sazonoff before the Duma on February 9, 1915, though rather enigmatical in form, was generally accepted as an official confirmation of the supposed understanding that, if the Entente should be victorious, Russia would receive Constantinople with the acquiescence of the western powers. Such a result would thwart the fondest pan-Hellenic aspiration, that of recovering the seat of the Greek patriarchs and the ancient capital of the Greek Empire. Bulgaria foresaw that her independence would be destroyed if Russia were installed at Constantinople, and Roumania could not be indifferent to the future disposition of the Strait which was the only outlet for her sea-borne commerce. That the realization of the Teutonic dream of a hegemony extending from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf implied the absolute subordination of Bulgaria's policy to that of Germany seems to have created no apprehension. Perhaps engrossment in their present grievances had dulled the perception of the Bulgarians for the ultimate consequences of a German victory. But it was reasonable to suppose that the diversity of interests of the partners in the Entente would make an Allied victory less dangerous for Balkan independence than a German victory.



Stefanos Skouloudis.



Prime Ministers of Greece.

Eleutherios Venizelos.



Nowhere is the collision of these varied and discordant forces more strikingly illustrated than in the turgid course of Grecian politics. The rather sorry figure made by the Hellenic kingdom during the critical stages of the Great War forms a disappointing epilogue to the wonderful period of national regeneration which commenced in 1910 and reached its culmination in the victories of the Balkan Wars. Greece had fallen into a discouraging state of political corruption and national and military indifference before this revival. But in its extremity the nation shook off this lethargy and found a leader. Eleutherios Venizelos is unquestionably one of the ablest European statesmen of the present age. Born in Crete in 1864, the period of his manhood had thus far been spent in the midst of the passionate struggle for the liberation of his native island and for its union with the Hellenic kingdom, in which his unquenchable zeal and unfailing judgment had made him the leader. Relinquishing the premiership of Crete in 1910, he brought the ardent spirit of a crusader to the service of his brother Hellenes on the mainland, where the fervor of the heroic period had been cooled by the three generations that had passed since the revolutionary struggle with the Turks. By his unswerving devotion to the sacred aspiration of liberating the Greater Greece beyond the limits of the existing kingdom, by his impetuous enthusiasm tempered with prudence, and by his deliberation and consistency of method, Venizelos towered above the shiftily politicians of the mainland, whose selfish intrigues had made the political life of their country a byword of contemptuous ridicule.

Venizelos was a man of dauntless courage as well as magnetic personality. At the time of his reception in Athens, which was made the occasion for a brilliant ovation, he dared to insist, in defiance of the crowd, that the

kingship should be preserved. Chosen a member of the Greek Chamber and summoned to the premiership in 1910, Venizelos turned his energy to the internal rehabilitation of Greece as the indispensable preliminary for the realization of his greater hopes. Administrative reforms and the exclusion of politics from the army prepared the country for taking advantage of opportunities for developing its strength. The army and navy were modernized under the supervision of French and British officers, so that in two years Greece was able to put 200,000 men into the field, well organized and equipped. The tireless devotion, enthusiasm, and tact of Venizelos smoothed the way for the formation of the Balkan League, which without his genius would have been an unthinkable achievement.

To his enlightened statesmanship were chiefly due the Greek victories in the Balkan Wars, but politicians were incapable of understanding his disinterestedness and his loyalty was rewarded with the proverbial ingratitude of princes. Constantine embodied the heroic idea of the people as the result of Greek fortune in war and enjoyed a military reputation that he may not have entirely deserved. Hardly had he become king before indications of friction with his prime minister were apparent. The sting of the latter's successful efforts to secure the complete separation of Crete from Turkey, which brought about the resignation of Constantine as High Commissioner of the protecting Powers in 1906, may have been the original cause of the aversion of the prince, but aggravating circumstances grew out of the irreconcilable conceptions of the sovereign and his minister regarding the nature and function of a constitutional ruler. Added to these were temperamental qualities and inherent egotism, all tending to foster in the king's mind a determination to strengthen and exalt the royal power.

The termination of the Balkan Wars left unsettled some vexatious problems relative to the delimitation of the Hellenic kingdom. One of these was the disposition of the islands seized by Greece from Turkey when she annexed Crete on the outbreak of the Balkan War. By the Treaty of London, May 30, 1913, the annexation of Crete was sanctioned, but the disposition of the other islands was reserved to the Great Powers. Another was the Albanian principality. The Great Powers refused to admit the Greek claim to the whole of northern Epirus and included within the southern boundary of Albania a considerable area where the population was predominantly Greek.

Friction between Turkey and Greece was renewed after the war by the question of the Aegean Islands, when the former purchased the two dreadnoughts then under construction in British yards, which were subsequently requisitioned by the British government, and Greece replied by acquiring the *Idaho* and the *Mississippi* from the United States.

The powers informed Greece by a collective note on February 13, 1914, that on condition of the withdrawal of Greek troops from Albanian Epirus by March 31st, they would permit her to retain all the islands claimed by Turkey except Tenedos, Imbros, and Castelorizo. Greece reluctantly accepted these conditions on the 16th, but on the 24th the Greek population of northern Epirus declared that it would resist incorporation with Albania and set up a provisional government at Argyrocastro. A compromise was brought about in May, by which the Epirotes acknowledged Albanian supremacy in return for extensive local privileges. But this arrangement was soon abrogated by the Albanian revolution bringing in a Moslem supremacy, for the Epirotes refused to live under a Moslem government. Finally, the occupation of Avlona by the Italian

forces in the autumn was responded to by the advance of Greek troops into Albanian Epirus, the turbulent conditions affording a plausible motive for each of these measures.

Meanwhile, there had been intimations that the Turks would endeavor to regain by force the large islands of Mitylene and Khios, which lie directly off the coast of Asia Minor and were thought to be necessary for the protection of the mainland, and relations between Greece and Turkey continued to be strained until the outbreak of the Great War.

The Balkan policy of the Entente in the earlier stages of the world-war was governed by the idea of reconstituting the Balkan League as an ally and thus completing the iron circle about the Central Powers. But the reconciliation of Bulgaria, which was indispensable for this purpose, could only be accomplished by satisfying the Bulgarian aspirations which had been so rudely disappointed in 1913.

The enmity between the Greeks and the Turks naturally led the Allies to hope that they could count on the assistance of the former in their operations at the Dardanelles. In February, 1915, Venizelos and the Allies discussed the project of Greek coöperation, with Smyrna and a considerable section of western Asia Minor as compensation, and Venizelos was inclined to cede Drama and Kavala to Bulgaria as a final means of securing concord. His party which controlled the majority in the Greek Chamber eagerly supported this policy. A council called together of former prime ministers favored immediate war with Turkey. But the king was determined not to join forces with the Entente, and it was possibly at his instigation that the Greek General Staff declared that Greece could not embark upon a campaign at the Dardanelles without positive assurance of Bulgarian neutrality. But Bulgaria required as the price of her neutrality most of Serbian Macedonia



King of Georgia  
БАГРАТ I




Commander of the Georgian Forces at Zakhica  
СЕМЕОН РАЗВИЗИ

PETER I  
King of Serbia.

GENERAL SARRAIL

Commander of the French forces at Salonica.





and all of Greek Macedonia east of the Struma, and with seemingly ingenuous indignation the king refused to sanction the relinquishment of territory which had been won by the blood of the Greek armies and later publicly reproached Venizelos with such a suggestion. Thus thwarted in his foreign policy, Venizelos resigned on March 6th and Gounaris formed a new cabinet on the 9th.

The Entente Powers renewed their offer to the Gounaris cabinet, and Gounaris asked them to define clearly the compensations which they were disposed to grant. Operations in the Near East had now reached a critical stage; for it was evident that without the coöperation of a powerful force on land the undertaking at the Dardanelles could not succeed. This made very palpable the value of the aid that Greece could render. That the Allies were deterred from offering Greece such terms as she would eagerly have accepted may perhaps be attributable to the conditions involved in the terms of compensation to be made to Italy for her support of the Entente, which was apparently secured about the close of April, after the visit of Sir Edward Grey to Rome in the second half of that month. Italian aspirations and Greek interests were in conflict in Epirus and the Dodecanese and probably in Asia Minor.

But notwithstanding the depressing effect of the Allies' agreement with Italy on pro-Entente tendencies in Greece, efforts to align the Hellenic kingdom with the anti-German coalition were not abandoned.

In spite of the exercise of systematic and possibly unlawful pressure to win support for the Gounaris cabinet, the result of the parliamentary elections in Greece on June 13th, the return of 180 Venizelist deputies to the Chamber out of a total of 315, was a brilliant endorsement of the policy of the former prime minister. But the king had no real intention of yielding before this overwhelming demonstration

of the national inclination, and even the resignation of Gounaris, which was the normal consequence of the popular verdict, was delayed until August 16th.

In the meantime the leaders of Bulgaria had probably expected from the first that due provision for the national interests would eventually lead them to throw in their lot with the Central Powers and fall upon Serbia in the rear whenever a favorable opportunity should be presented, and there were not lacking significant indications of a close accord between Bulgaria and her future partners. For instance, early in February, 1915, Bulgaria obtained from the Disconto Gesellschaft an instalment of about \$30,000,000 on a loan of \$100,000,000 which had been negotiated with German bankers before the war.

While the Bulgarian government was accessible to the overtures of both parties and did not commit itself definitely to any policy until July or August, yet the Central Powers had a distinct advantage in competing with the Entente for Bulgaria's support, because they were not beholden to either of the states at whose expense Bulgarian desires chiefly required satisfaction. And for this same reason a Teutonic victory must have seemed to the Bulgarians to be a more trustworthy guarantee for the fulfilment of their stipulations of alliance than a triumph of the Allies. To put the matter in somewhat different terms, the war policy of Bulgaria would be determined by the prospect of regaining as much as possible of the territory which she had lost, from Turkey on the one hand and from Roumania, Serbia, and Greece on the other. Whichever group of belligerents acquired the adhesion of Bulgaria would have to induce one or more of its allies or friends to make a preliminary sacrifice. But the only sacrifice required on the Teutonic side, that namely in the case of Turkey, would be a small one.

It may be added that the adhesion of Bulgaria was indispensable for the realization of Germany's dream of empire and that the spur of necessity is apt to be a very powerful factor of success in competition.

Prime Minister Radoslavoff declared on March 28th in the Sobranje that Bulgaria's conduct would be determined by purely objective considerations of self-interest. The diplomatic representatives of the Entente Powers at Sofia addressed a joint note to Bulgaria on May 29th, urging her to join the Allies in return for extensive concessions, and about two weeks later Bulgaria in reply asked for more definite assurances. The eagerness of the Entente Powers is especially comprehensible at this time when a Bulgarian attack upon the rear of the Turkish position on the Gallipoli Peninsula must have been decisive.

In an interview as late as August 9th Radoslavoff declared that Bulgaria would join the Allies whenever they could give absolute guarantees that southern Macedonia would be restored to her. The final offer of the Entente Powers was presented at Sofia about August 10th. The text of this proposal has not been published; but it is believed that nearly all of Serbian Macedonia and the district of Kavala were offered in return for Bulgaria's participation as an ally.

But any lingering indecision on the part of the Bulgarian government was swept aside by the potent argument of events in the different fields of operations.

Italy's belligerency had failed to shake the resolution of the Central Powers, the British and French had failed thus far to win a decisive advantage at the Dardanelles, and later the ponderous Allied offensive in the West, forecast with so much assurance, accomplished little and was soon exhausted. But the Teutonic hosts were rolling forward from victory to victory in the East. Warsaw had fallen,

the Russians were expelled from Poland, and their armies were threatened with destruction. Russia was tottering on the edge of an abyss. The supreme moment seemed to be at hand when Bulgaria must throw in her lot with the Central Powers, if she wished to share in the prizes of their triumph. Never did a great military effort accord more perfectly with the exigencies of diplomacy as well as strategy than the great eastern offensive of the Central Powers in 1915. The diplomatic triumph of the Balkans was largely won on the battlefields of Poland.

In fact, it is very probable that latterly the apparent willingness of the Bulgarian government to treat with the Allies was only a ruse to cover a decision already formed, that as early as July 17th a secret treaty between Bulgaria and the Central Powers had been signed, and that most of Greek, as well as Serbian, Macedonia, and even a part of Albania were promised to Bulgaria as the price of her intervention. It is also affirmed that Germany guaranteed the neutrality of Greece. If this implies that Constantine gave secret assurance at this time that Greece would stand aside while Bulgaria stealthily assailed her confederate in the rear, we need no further evidence of the treachery and disloyalty of the court of Athens. Germany seems to have promised northern Epirus as a reward for the neutrality of Greece.

On the same day that the Allies presented their final proposal at Sofia, Bulgaria secured a further advance of about \$50,000,000 from the Disconto Gesellschaft, about half of which was delivered in cash.

Germany exerted her influence to bring about a satisfactory agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey. Bulgaria no longer demanded the restitution of Adrianople, of which city and the adjacent territory Turkey had retaken possession during the second Balkan War, but only the cession of the territory on the western bank of the Maritza,





**BALKAN STATES**

SCALE OF MILES  
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

- Railroads ————
- Railroads Proposed ————
- Capitals ————
- Boundaries of Countries ————

Size of type indicates relative importance of places



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M E D I T E R R A N E A N S E A

including the railway station of Adrianople, so as to control the entire railway down to the sea.

Turkey could hardly resist the coercion of circumstances backed by the pressure of German diplomacy. A Turco-Bulgarian agreement was concluded on August 23d, the details of which were published on September 7th, and it was formally ratified on the 22d. Bulgaria ordered a mobilization on the 21st, ostensibly to maintain armed neutrality as agreed upon with Turkey. These occurrences coinciding with the concentration of powerful Teutonic forces along the Save and the Danube left little room for doubt that Serbia would straightway be assailed from both sides by overwhelming forces.

Serbia and Greece had mutually bound themselves by treaty to render aid in case either were attacked by Bulgaria without provocation. As the absolute validity of this compact had never been impugned, Greece was confronted with the immediate and fateful occasion for fulfilling her engagement. Greece began to mobilize on September 24th.

Venizelos had resumed the premiership on August 23d after an agreement with the king that his policy was to be based upon benevolent neutrality towards the Allies, the fulfilment of the treaty obligations in respect to Serbia, and the preservation of the integrity of Grecian territory.

On September 21st Venizelos inquired of France and Great Britain whether they were willing to send 150,000 men to the support of Serbia, supposedly the number that Greece was by treaty bound to furnish in case Serbia were attacked. But the announcement of the landing of a Franco-British force about to march to the support of Serbia across Greek territory on October 2d brought forth a formal protest by the Greek government on the ground that Bulgaria had as yet neither attacked Serbia nor declared war against her.

With scornful derision the spokesmen of Germany have pointed to the intrusion of the Allied forces on the neutral soil of Greece and the subsequent conduct of the Allies with reference to that country as glaring proof of the hypocrisy of the latter's claim that they are fighting to avenge the wrongs of Belgium. But in reality the cases of Greece and Belgium are quite different. The British and French landed at Salonica at the implied request of the existing government in Greece and probably with the approval of the majority of the Greek people. There were other grounds to justify the intervention of the Entente Powers from the legal point of view. The international convention by which Prince George of Denmark was installed on the Hellenic throne in 1866 declared that "Greece, under the sovereignty of the Prince of Denmark and *the guarantee of the three Courts* (London, Paris, and St. Petersburg), forms a monarchical, independent, and constitutional state." This implies a duty as well as right of the guarantors to intervene in Greece, either to defend the country against its foreign foes or to protect the people against any infringement of the constitution which was hereby sanctioned.

As an outcome of the Balkan Wars, Greece had formally granted Serbia a right of way across Greek territory to the sea at Salonica. With much reason would it seem, therefore, that the Allies, who were hastening to the aid of Serbia at the hour of her greatest need, could claim the benefit of this immunity.

Venizelos defended his policy in the Greek Chamber on October 4th and his conduct was sustained by a vote of 142 to 102. But he resigned the next day because the king refused his sanction. Constantine was doubtless convinced that to provoke the invincible might of the Kaiser was to invite certain disaster. Moreover, he and his adherents quibbled over the terms and intent of the Greco-Serbian

agreement, and claimed that Serbia had rendered it void by consenting to territorial concessions for conciliating Bulgaria without the consent of Greece and that it was not intended to apply in the case of a European, as opposed to a Balkan war.

Zaimis formed a new ministry on the 7th and on the 19th rejected the British offer of Cyprus in return for Greek intervention in behalf of Serbia. But his ministry existed only on sufferance of Venizelos, who still commanded the same large majority in the chamber, and it was overthrown by a vote of 147 to 114 on November 4th. The king called Skouloudis to office, dissolved the intractable parliament on November 11th, and called for new elections to be held on December 19th. An appeal to the electorate so soon after the election in June, when the will of the people had been quite emphatically expressed, and at a time when a large part of the electors had been called to the colors and therefore could not vote, so that the returns would not be representative, was regarded by Venizelos and his followers as an arbitrary and unconstitutional proceeding. Venizelos requested his adherents to abstain from voting and Skouloudis secured a majority of the chamber elected by a minority of the voters.

Only the most obdurate optimism could have blinded the vision of any Entente statesman to the real purpose of Bulgaria's mobilization, which was ordered on September 21st, although the Bulgarian government solemnly affirmed that this step was "merely a preventive measure in view of the threatened Austro-German invasion of the Balkans" and not directed against Serbia or Greece. German officers were already present in large numbers at the ministry of war and on the staff of the Bulgarian army.

Sir Edward Grey declared in the House of Commons on September 24th that if Bulgaria assumed an aggressive


attitude on the side of the enemy, the British government would give its friends in the Balkans all the support in its power in the manner that would be most welcome to them, in concert with the Allies, "without reserve and without qualification." But the event seemed to justify Bulgaria's indifference to this pretentious warning.

Russia sent an ultimatum to Sofia on October 3d, stating that the presence of the German and Austrian officers, the concentration of Bulgarian troops on the Serbian border, and the extensive financial support accepted by Bulgaria from Germany left no doubt as to the object of Bulgaria's military preparations. Bulgaria was given twenty-four hours in which to "break with the enemies of the Slav cause and of Russia."

As early as August, 1915, there were reports of an extensive concentration of Teutonic troops and equipment along the Serbian frontier. As soon as it was clear that Germany had missed the supreme decision in Russia, she launched a new movement in the south, where a somewhat longer season of active operations could be expected.

A number of important motives led Germany to undertake the definite elimination of Serbia at this time. The prestige of the Teutonic alliance was at stake, and now the adherence of Bulgaria, which was conditional upon the participation of the Central Powers in a vigorous attack on Serbia, would make the subjugation of the little state a comparatively easy matter. The drastic chastisement of Austria-Hungary's original opponent would serve as an impressive warning to curb the hostile tendencies in Roumania and Greece. More important still, the removal of the only barrier between the Central Powers and Turkey would put at end to the chronic danger of an ammunition famine at the Dardanelles, which had become acute since Roumania refused to permit the transit of military supplies across her territory.





The Serbian retreat. General Putnik, Serbian commander-in-chief, enfeebled by age and hardship had to be carried in an improvised sedan chair.



Occupation of Salonica by the Allies. Greek troops saluting French regiments marching through the city.

In spite of boastful expressions of indifference to the continual increase in strength of the Allied forces in the West, the German leaders probably regarded with anxiety the eventual possibility of being overwhelmingly outnumbered and overpowered in that quarter. They trusted that a successful diversion could be effected and the danger in the West forestalled by this undertaking, which would consolidate the Teutonic Alliance in the Near East, securely blockade the Franco-British armies in the Gallipoli Peninsula, fill England with terror for the safety of the Suez Canal and Egypt, and thrill the hearts of the German people with irrepressible enthusiasm. With these and other motives Germany embarked upon an enterprise through which her splendid dream of an empire from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf was practically realized, for the time at least.

Internationally, as we have seen, the political and commercial significance of Serbia was mainly due to her position on certain of the actually or potentially most prominent trade routes of Europe. For more than a hundred miles in the north her territory bordered on the Danube, including about forty miles where, with Roumania opposite, she separated Austria-Hungary from Bulgaria, depriving the Central Empires of continuous communication with the Turkish Empire. Serbia covered a central section of the railway from the heart of Europe to Constantinople and possessed besides the natural highway from the Danube to Salonica by the Morava and Vardar valleys.

The main trunk of the Serbian railways ran from north to south through this depression and was continued through Greek Macedonia down to Salonica, Serbia's natural outlet on the sea and the supposed goal of Austria-Hungary's ambition. It was evident that the interruption of this central line would dislocate the entire system of communications and fatally divide the efforts for the defense of Serbia's

national territory. The Oriental Railway to Constantinople leaves this central line at Nish and ascends the valley of the Nishava, crossing into Bulgaria a little southwest of Pirot. The other Serbian railway lines were all in reality branches of these two. In the prevailing conditions Serbia was most susceptible to attack where the Bulgarian territory approached nearest to the vital Salonica railway in the south.

By the middle of September ten Teutonic divisions had been concentrated on the northern frontier of Serbia. The flattening of the battle-line in Russia, by reducing the length of the Austro-German eastern front, had permitted the withdrawal of considerable German forces for operations in the southern theater. In fact von Gallwitz's army was transferred thither as a whole and deployed along the Danube from the Roumanian border westward to Semendria. Von Koevess, the conqueror of Ivangorod, commanded an Austro-Hungarian army which extended along the rest of the Austro-Serbian border on von Gallwitz's right. The general supervision of the Teutonic operations against Serbia was entrusted to von Mackensen, who was already a popular hero scarcely less venerated than von Hindenburg.

Bulgaria could muster fifteen divisions of the first line and five of the second, besides three volunteer divisions, probably about 400,000 men in all. Her artillery was armed mainly with the French Schneider-Canet 7.5 centimeter rapid-fire field material, but partly with the German Krupp 7.7 centimeter pieces which had been captured from the Turks in the first Balkan War.

Serbia was not only threatened by forces more than twice as numerous as her own; she suffered all the disadvantages, while unable to realize any of the natural advantages, of an interior position in respect to her enemies. Confined for three hundred miles on her eastern frontier by Bulgaria, for a hundred and fifty in the north and a hundred in the

northwest by Austria-Hungary, she formed a prominent salient and was exposed to attack from three sides at the same time, while the poverty of her means of communication prevented the rapid shifting of troops from one threatened point to another. Furthermore, the attitude of the Albanian tribes was a matter of serious concern. Serbia was dependent upon the single line of railway to Salonica for the replenishment of her meager supplies of ammunition.

The Bulgarian forces concentrated on the eastern Serbian border were grouped in two armies, one under General Bojadieff in the northern section from the Danube to the Oriental Railway, the other under General Teodoroff in the southern section from the Oriental Railway to the Struma. Altogether about 250,000 Bulgarians and 200,000 Austro-Germans were ready to advance simultaneously on converging lines against the Serbian armies, whose effective strength was probably about 200,000 men.

Fourteen months of a kind of warfare which even in this remoter field absorbed unprecedented quantities of mechanical equipment and ammunition had reduced Serbia almost to the limit of her material resources. It is scarcely necessary to add that the Serbians had nothing to match the powerful mass of artillery which the Austro-Germans had now concentrated against them. The Serbian First Army held the angle between the Drina and the Save in the northwest, the Third Army faced von Gallwitz and the Bulgarian right wing in the northeast, and the Second Army was stretched along the eastern border in front of Nish. Although there was a considerable Serbian garrison at Uskub, Serbia had to trust mainly to the expected intervention of the Allies for the defense of the vital zone of communication in the south.

The batteries of von Koevess began to bombard Belgrade on September 19th, but the artillery preparation

along the northern frontier commenced in earnest on October 3d, and the Austro-German forces effected the crossing of the Save and the Danube at several places on the 7th. Belgrade, rendered untenable by the enemy's bombardment, was practically evacuated on the next day, although street fighting continued until the 9th. By the 11th the German authorities announced that the Serbian river front had been won throughout a distance of a hundred miles. To secure its communications, the First Serbian Army in the northwest fell back on the series of ridges where the Austro-Hungarians had been so signally defeated the year before.

The Bulgarians began hostilities as soon as the Austro-Germans had forced the line of the Save and the Danube and were thus definitely committed to the task of crushing Serbia. Bulgarian advance guards crossed the Serbian border on October 11th a few hours before the formal Bulgarian declaration of war, and by the next day serious operations were in progress.


After some sharp conflicts Bulgarian cavalry cut the Salonica railway at Vrania on the 16th. The last train actually crossed a battlefield while conveying the treasure of the Serbian National Bank to safety in Salonica. The Bulgarian offensive was now under way along the entire front and made rapid progress in the south where little resistance could be offered. The capture of Uskub, the important center of communications, on the 22d was a serious blow for the Serbians. Connection between the Vardar and Morava valleys was thus effectively cut.

According to the Bulgarian account, the Bulgarian Crown Prince Cyril and the commanding general of the invading army were received in Uskub with a frenzy of delight by the inhabitants, who wept with joy, the whole town presenting a gala appearance.





The Iron Gate on the Danube.



Railroad bridge over the Save at Belgrade wrecked by the Serbians in endeavoring to prevent the capture of the city by the Germans.

The loss of the central zone of Serbia, the region traversed by the Belgrade-Salonica railway could not be long deferred.

On October 23d the Germans forced the passage of the Danube at Orsova, near the western entrance to the famous defile known as the Iron Gate, and straightway opened the stream for navigation between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, so that a great number of steamers and barges laden with ammunition and supplies for the allies of the Central Powers in the Near East proceeded on their way. The Germans and Bulgarians gained contact in northeastern Serbia on October 26th, but an effective union of the two armies was not secured until about November 4th. In the northwest on October 23d the passage of the Drina, which separates Serbia from Bosnia, was forced by the Austro-Hungarians near Vishegrad; and they were thus enabled to turn the position on the ridges of Suvobor where they had been so disastrously defeated in December of the year before.

The Serbian armies were now confined within a hostile arc the ends of which were being constantly pressed closer, threatening to stifle them within the steel embrace. Practically every avenue of escape was closed except the road through the valley of the Ibar towards the southwest, and it was very doubtful whether the masses of retreating soldiery could pass in time through this narrow outlet, choked as it soon would be with fleeing peasants.

Nish, the temporary capital, was taken by the Bulgarians after a desperate struggle of three days on November 6th. The credibility of repeated Bulgarian accounts describing the transports of enthusiasm with which the Bulgarian troops were greeted as deliverers by the inhabitants of the doubtful regions of the south is rather weakened by the recurrence of the same details in the official reports of their reception in Nish and other towns of Serbia proper.

Von Mackensen and the Germans were chiefly concerned with the opening of a broad connecting zone between the Central Powers and Turkey; the Austro-Hungarians were probably more directly interested in the occupation of as large an area as possible of contiguous territory as a field for future political and economic expansion; but the Bulgarians, stirred by a burning thirst for vengeance and the conviction that the extermination of the enemy was the only guarantee for the tranquil enjoyment of the fruits of victory, pressed forward with indefatigable energy to intercept the Serbian armies. The escape of the Serbians and the maintenance of their communications with Greece by the western defiles through Monastir depended upon the defense of two critical positions, the Katchanik Pass, northwest of Uskub, and the Babuna Pass, the key to the road from Veles southwestward to Monastir. If the Bulgarians had seized the Katchanik Pass in time, they might have thrown a barrier across the outlet for all the Serbian armies in the north near Mitrovitza.

A detachment of about 5,000 of the Serbian contingent which had been stationed around Uskub, reinforced by three regiments from the north, struggled desperately to hold the Katchanik Pass against very much superior Bulgarian forces. They were finally overpowered, but not before the critical period had passed and the chief masses of the Serbian armies had effected their escape. Another detachment of about 5,000 Serbians held out for more than a week in the Babuna Pass against great odds but were finally compelled to give way.

The collapse of Serbia brought with it one of the most terrible tragedies of the Great War, the sudden flight and dispersion of a vast multitude of people, involving untold suffering and misery. The exodus commenced in the north and northeast and every advance of the enemy set

fresh streams of fugitives in motion. All classes of the population, rich and poor, strong and weak, the aged and infirm, young children, the maimed and mangled, were driven to blind, distracted flight by their loathing of the enemy and frightful apprehensions too well substantiated by the memory of previous Balkan wars.

Columns of homeless fugitives were converging on Kralyevo situated on the Ibar, close to its junction with the upper Morava, while the government still tarried in Nish, whence Pashitch addressed despairing appeals to the Allied governments for assistance. In the midst of its agony the Serbian people clung with pathetic confidence to the conviction that the Allies would somehow come in strength for its deliverance. The constant rumor that the Russians were invading Bulgaria across Dobrudscha had a certain basis of fact in that Russia was actually assembling a new army in the south.

On October 28th the order was issued for the retirement of the Serbian armies to the line of Kralyevo, Kruchevatz, Alexsinatz, and Nish, with the effect of contracting the northern battle-front to a much smaller, interior arc. The government repaired to Kralyevo on the 29th, and two days later to Rashka, further up the valley of the Ibar. The hospitals of Kruchevatz and Kralyevo were hastily evacuated. Many of the seriously wounded pulled their strength together by the sheer force of an indomitable determination and chose to endure the indescribable suffering of a journey under the harshest conditions rather than to remain and become prisoners. They were exposed to the most inclement weather without adequate clothing or footwear. Bandages became soaked with rain; wounds that had begun to heal were torn open by the untimely violence of feverish efforts. Mangled and helpless soldiers lay for days upon drenched straw in open trucks, deprived

of food and drink, in spite of the unsparing labor of the inadequate sanitary contingent.


Premier Pashitch, standing on the bridge at Rashka, a pathetic, solitary figure, watching the endless procession of his homeless countrymen, exclaimed with the tears running down his cheeks:

“It is here that we were born; Heaven grant that Rashka be not our grave.”

The line of retreat for both the armies and the civilian throng passed up the valley of the Ibar, which becomes a narrow gorge above Rashka, wildly picturesque, where the road is a ledge along the face of beetling cliffs. Motor-vehicles frequently rolled over the precipice at the narrow windings and often an interruption in the march at a single point delayed the whole line of vehicles behind it.

There was a wild stampede when the government and headquarters staff left Mitrovitza on November 16th. The last train departed with the station beset by a despairing crowd of 10,000 fugitives. Every available vehicle and pack animal was pressed into service. From Mitrovitza the sorrowful procession of misery entered the ill-starred Kossovo-polje, the Plain of Kossovo, or Blackbirds' Plain, forever devoted to the tragic memory of the national disaster, the destruction of the old Serbian Empire by the Turks in 1389.

The misery of soldiers and fugitives was now extreme. Most of them were barefooted and in rags; their precarious diet was the scanty forage of the fields, a little cabbage or maize eaten raw for lack of fuel. The draft animals fell dead in their traces from starvation or were turned loose and abandoned when the fodder was exhausted. The elements conspired to add a second terrible calamity to the gruesome associations of this locality. Incessant rains, which had converted the plain into a sea of mud, were suddenly transformed into a blinding blizzard



Cetinje, capital of Montenegro. *The square building in the center is the palace of the king.*



The German invasion of Serbia. *Both the retreating Serbians and the invading Germans were greatly hampered by the very bad condition of the roads.*



lashed by the icy blasts of winter. Dazed with hunger the hopeless column stumbled on, shut off from the prospect of everything except its own deplorable situation. Thousands fell by the roadside, overcome by famine and exhaustion. The presence of the aged, of women, and of young children made the spectacle more terrifying than the proverbial retreat from Moscow. The route was strewn with half sunken motors, carts, and wagons, dead horses and oxen, abandoned implements and weapons, the wreckage of a nation. But the lugubrious picture was illuminated by heroic touches, the stern endurance and unflinching spirit of the Serbian people unconquerable in death.

The irruption of the Bulgarians through the passes towards the south necessitated a change in the direction of the retreat. Near Pristina two opposite streams of fugitives flowed together and poured westward toward Albania, where the inhospitable ridges already deeply mantled with snow lay like a gigantic dam across their course.

The Serbian armies, now reduced to destitute, disorganized masses, approached the borders of Albania and Montenegro between Prisrend and Ipek. The remnant of the First Army, which had turned towards the northwest from Mitrovitza, retreated to the little plain of Ipek in Montenegro and made its way from there to Scutari and the Adriatic. A portion of the Third Army, after passing Pristina and Prisrend, traversed Albania by way of Scutari, but the majority ascended the valley of the Black Drin as far as Dibre and then crossed by way of El Bassan to Durazzo on the Adriatic. The line of march of the Second Army corresponded with the latter route. This army was joined near Lake Ochrida by the contingent which had fallen back before the Bulgarians from the Babuna Pass. Terrible as had been the hardships of the Serbian troops and people while still within their own

territory, their sufferings in the bleak Albanian mountains must have been still more horrible. There had been ample reason to anticipate a hostile attitude on the part of the Albanian tribes. But fortunately, this cause of anxiety turned out to be largely groundless; since Essad Pasha, whose authority was now recognized throughout the greater part of Albania, had declared for the Entente Allies. In any case, however, it seemed for a long time unbelievable that as many as 130,000 Serbian troops and great numbers of civilians actually reached the shore of the Adriatic across this desolate, frozen region.

King Peter, travelling incognito with three officers and four soldiers, crippled with rheumatism and almost blind, but never faltering in his faith in the eventual liberation and restoration of his country, passed through the hills inhabited by the unfriendly Catholic Albanian tribes to Scutari and proceeded thence to Durazzo, Avlona, and Salonica.

The Austro-Hungarian forces advancing from the north upon the heels of the retreating Serbians occupied the plain of Ipek. On the other hand, Mount Lovcen, the western bastion of the natural fastness which is Montenegro, was bombarded by an Austro-Hungarian squadron from the Gulf of Cattaro. The primitive fortifications, incapable of an effective resistance, were carried by an infantry assault on January 16, 1916. Three days later the enemy entered the capital, Cetinje, but King Nicholas and his army had escaped southward. Continuing their march, the Austro-Hungarians entered Scutari on January 23d, and proceeded southward in the direction of the Italian forces which had occupied Durazzo on December 21st.

Before dismissing consideration of the events that attended the overthrow of Serbia it remains for us to turn to the extreme southern section of the Serbian field of conflict and trace briefly the vicissitudes of the Franco-British

forces which endeavored to come to the assistance of their hard-pressed ally.

The Tenth British and Second French Divisions, which had been withdrawn from the Gallipoli Peninsula about the middle of September, were the first instalment of the relief expedition. They landed at Salonica on October 5-8. The French, under General Sarrail, pushed up the Morava valley, drove the Bulgarians from Strumnitza Station, and occupied the summit of Kara Hodjali which commands an extensive area in Serbian Macedonia including, particularly, a narrow gorge where, without energetic action of the Allies, the enemy might easily have blocked the railway.

This entire region is broken and rugged and exceedingly difficult to traverse, except by a few clearly marked defiles. The French pushed westward from Krivolak, crossed the Tchernia, a tributary of the Morava from the southwest, and tried to reach the defenders of the Babuna Pass across a mountainous interval of ten miles; but they failed in the attempt, and were obliged to take up a defensive position between the Tchernia and the Morava, with their right wing reaching as far as Strumnitza Station. The British, in the meantime, deployed along a line extending from the French right as far as Lake Doiran.

The Serbian defenders of the Babuna Pass were forced to fall back on Prilip, November 16th, and to Monastir on December 2d. Monastir itself was abandoned to the victorious Bulgarians three days later. The advance of the Bulgarians threatened to turn the French left wing. Furthermore, the utter collapse of Serbia left the scanty Allied force to bear alone the full pressure of the Bulgarian army flushed with victory. A prompt relinquishment of all positions in Serbian Macedonia was indispensable for the safety of the Allies. The withdrawal of the French began on December 2d, and by the 12th, the Allies, successfully

beating off the Bulgarian attacks, had retired across the frontier of Greece.

At first Skouloudis, the Prime Minister of Greece, expressed the opinion that consistency with their professed neutrality required that the Greeks should disarm and intern any belligerents who were compelled to seek refuge within their territory. But the British and French governments were quite naturally not disposed to accept this rigorous interpretation. They presented a note at Athens, demanding assurance that the Allied troops would not be interned, but should enjoy full liberty of action, promising at the same time that the territory occupied would be restored and fair indemnity paid for it. The Greek government demurred for a time, but was brought to terms by a commercial blockade. Greece eventually acquiesced in the occupation of an extensive region in the north, including Salonica, and turned over to the Allies the roads and railways in this military zone. The Allies proceeded to establish a very strong fortified base by executing a system of intrenchments from the Vardar to the Gulf of Orpani, passing ten miles north of Salonica.

While the armies of the Central Empires and of their allies in the Near East were rolling together across Serbia, forming the continuous communication between Berlin and Constantinople, the British and French forces tarried on the Gallipoli Peninsula, although all hope of obtaining any substantial results had vanished. It was becoming more and more difficult to remain and perilous to depart, but the Allied governments probably dreaded the loss of prestige in the Mohammedan world which might result from an evacuation and the palpable acknowledgment of failure.

The Turks were constantly receiving new, high-powered German artillery. The Allied positions could not be held without communication by sea and this would be precarious

on an inhospitable coast during the stormy winter season. But it was expected that embarkation in the face of a numerous enemy would mean serious loss, if not disaster. With the available transports the evacuations could only be carried out by instalments and at the mercy of the weather.

Nevertheless, the withdrawal was decided upon in November, the plan was very carefully elaborated, and its remarkably successful execution illuminated with a parting radiance the disappointing Gallipoli campaign.

One British and one French division had already been transferred to Salonica and a British mounted division had gone to Egypt, but about nine Allied divisions still remained on the peninsula. The artillery and other equipment was gradually removed from the positions by night, the effect of these operations being skilfully concealed by day. All but picked battalions had embarked from Suvla and Anzac by December 18th, and the departure of the latter during calm weather on the nights of the 18th and 19th was carried out so secretly that the Turkish batteries shelled the deserted trenches after they had gone. The evacuation of the French and the British at the extremity of the peninsula was also effected without loss on the nights of January 8 and 9, 1916, in spite of a severe southwestern gale.

These were the concluding events in a long period of almost unbroken failure and disappointment for the Allies, who tried to glean a forlorn consolation from the notion that Germany's wonderful victories were really a source of weakness, undermining her vitality, because they destroyed her compactness and prolonged her lines of combat to such an extent that she could not adequately guard them. The Balkan expedition, in particular, was regarded by many as a dissipation of energy on the part of the Central Powers upon an excentric objective, which was bound to compromise their resources at the really vital spots.

This theory rested upon a complete misconception of the facts. In the first place, the modern practice of warfare has tended to strengthen greatly the defensive at the expense of the attack. The evidence of Liége, Namur, and Antwerp, and of the Polish fortresses, which seems to contradict this statement, is confronted by that of Riga, Dvinsk, and Verdun. At the former places, the defense was overcome with startling rapidity, but it had been conducted with antiquated methods against modern tactics and appliances; at the latter, however, every process of attack that the most recent science and experience could devise was employed in vain against a defense maintained in accordance with correct contemporary principles. It follows that the defensive when conducted in an adequate manner was distinctly more effective in localities where the general conditions were fairly equal for both sides. But when the central regions of the Balkan Peninsula had once been encompassed in the Teutonic grip of steel, in lines skilfully fortified and abundantly supplied with artillery and machine-guns, as these were sure to be, the rugged character of the country, scarcity of roads, and remoteness from England and France presented such formidable obstacles for an Allied offensive, that it is not surprising that conditions enabled the Central Powers to effect a great economy in the use of troops for guarding the new, far-flung position. And even more significant in this connection is the consideration that the conquest of Serbia and the protection of the territorial acquisitions thereby made were largely performed by the Bulgarian army whose coöperation was obtained, and could only have been obtained, by the embarkation of the Central Powers upon the Balkan enterprise.

## CHAPTER VIII

### INTERNAL EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPAL BELLIGERENTS

Importance of the internal development. The chief internal problems of Great Britain. Difficulties in the way of a national organization of industry. Munitions shortage, the formation of a coalition government, and the creation of a ministry of munitions. The Munitions Act and the Welsh coal strike. The recruiting problem and the agitation for compulsory service. The National Register, August 15, 1915. The Earl of Derby's recruiting plan and its results. The Military Service Act of 1916, passed in January of that year. Nature of the British financial problem. War loans. The problem of foreign exchanges. The Sinn Fein rebellion. The fall of the Asquith ministry. The economic situation in France. French ministerial changes. French war finance. The economic situation in Germany and the official control of the distribution of the most necessary commodities. Sessions of the Reichstag, votes of war credits, war loans, the attitude of political parties, and the discussion of peace terms. The evolution and conflict of opinions in the higher circles. Situation in Austria-Hungary, death of Francis Joseph. The ministerial changes in Russia. The crisis in September, 1915. The increasing antagonism between the government and the Duma.

Few would deny that the memory of the Great War will endure as a conspicuous landmark in the course of history. As to the precise character of its preëminence, however, the most varied and contrasted views have found acceptance. To some it is primarily a struggle for the independent development of nationalities; to others, a conflict for the vindication of international justice. The Allies regard it as the contest of democracy against despotism. The Germans have variously proclaimed themselves to be the defenders of the West against the hordes of Russia and the champions of the freedom of the seas. Each nation fights with the passionate conviction that it is defending its liberty and existence. All are ostensibly fighting for a lasting peace.

War is a sculptor at whose fiery touch the most rigid forms of society become plastic, but the interpretation of his work is only possible with time, patience, and discernment. This epochal struggle has brought into view latent national energies and developed unlooked-for resources, collective and individual.

Perhaps the most brilliant phenomenon in the internal life of any of the contending nations has been the rapidity and thoroughness with which the French, in spite of the loss of their most important coal and iron deposits and of their leading manufacturing region at the beginning of the war, have adapted and developed their industrial organization so as to supply their deficiency in heavy artillery and provide ammunition of all calibers in abundant quantity. But the evolution most replete in human interest was the transformation of British industry and institutions to conform with the demands imposed by the great struggle, because this process involved a profound revolution in inveterate practices and modes of thought.

Instances of conspicuous enterprise displayed by the British government in dealing with the economical problems of the Great War in its earliest stage have already been observed; but some others deserve mention at this point. The British railways, for instance, were virtually taken over by the government in the first days of the struggle and directed as a single national system by a committee of the several general managers, so that the waste involved in competition was eliminated and the highest efficiency obtained through a uniform and comprehensive policy. The wages of the employees were increased, partly at the expense of the government. At the beginning of the war, moreover, the government requisitioned the cold storage ships running to South America and Australia. The United Kingdom, although the largest



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POUR LA LIBÉRATION DU TERRITOIRE ET LA VICTOIRE FINALE

French war loan poster.

**REMEMBER BELGIUM**



**ENLIST TO-DAY**

English recruiting poster.

consumer of sugar in Europe, produced none of this commodity at home and imported about a half of its supply from Germany and Austria-Hungary. In view of the shortage consequently threatened the government straightway purchased 800,000 tons by cable and had them brought on requisitioned ships. Thanks in part to these and other measures, the increase in food prices was not so marked in Great Britain as among her enemies. By February, 1917, after thirty months of warfare, the cost of living for the laboring classes was said to have increased 119% in Berlin and 122% in Vienna as compared with 40% in England.

The London Stock Exchange reopened in January, 1915, but with severe restrictions to prevent the enemy from raising money by selling stocks in London through the medium of neutral countries. Minimum prices were established, all transactions were required to be for cash within the month, and no fresh issues of stock were permitted without the approval of the Treasury.

The chief internal problems of Great Britain for the conduct of the war were connected with the supply of munitions, the adjustment and application of the financial resources, and the providing of troops in adequate numbers.

In August, 1914, the munitions industry was in an unorganized state and utterly inadequate to meet the demands of the military operations forced on the nation; the labor conventions militated against intensified production; and lack of discrimination in enlistments allowed to serve in the trenches skilled labor that was indispensable to the making of munitions. The nation, as a whole, failed to realize that the fullest systematic coöperation of all its producing capacity was essential to meet the new conditions of war. The consequences of the lack of heavy artillery were bitterly emphasized by the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March,

1916, and the Second Battle of Ypres a few weeks later. Credit for the solution of the munitions problem is largely due to Mr. David Lloyd George, who was one of the first men in England to realize the vital importance of high power shell.

The Defense of the Realm Act passed by parliament in March, 1915, gave the government power to take and exercise control over manufacturing plants capable of being used for the manufacture of munitions. About the same time Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, formed agreements with the representatives of labor of the industries involved providing against delay in work on government munition contracts through labor disagreements or trade union regulations during the course of the war.

In May a coalition ministry was formed, in which the most significant portfolio was the newly-created one of Minister of Munitions, which was held by Mr. Lloyd George. This innovation was quickly followed by the measure known as the Munitions Bill, which was introduced on June 23d and became law on July 2d. The measures incorporated in this law applied a moderate degree of compulsion to all establishments directly or indirectly concerned with the supply of war material and laid the foundation for a vast system of scarcely concealed state socialism in the so-called "controlled" industries.

The arbitration of labor disputes was made obligatory in all munition works and the Minister of Munitions was authorized to extend this obligation to other industries. The same authority could declare any industrial plant a "controlled establishment," which involved the limitation of the employers' profits; the suspension of all rules that might restrict the employment or production; and the control of changes in wages by the minister or arbitration

tribunal. Each munitions tribunal was composed of representatives of labor and capital in equal numbers.

Hardly had the law gone into effect when the Miners' Federation of South Wales and Monmouth ignored it and 200,000 miners struck on July 15th, refusing to submit their grievances to arbitration, although the Munitions Act had been extended to the South Wales area. In the midst of this crisis Mr. Lloyd George went to Cardiff on July 19th and conferred with the representatives of capital and labor, and on the next morning terms of settlement were accepted and the men returned to work. With the gradual consolidation of public sentiment, the increasing spirit of coöperation, and the growing belief in the approximate fairness of the decisions of the arbitration tribunals, labor troubles diminished and finally in large part ceased.

As a result, largely, of the indefatigable activity of the Minister of Munitions, there were in operation in the United Kingdom by September 15, 1915, no fewer than 715 munitions factories as "controlled establishments," employing an army of 800,000 workers. Besides this, the Ministry of Munitions had constructed twenty shell factories and was constructing eighteen more.

Although the voluntary system of enlistments had produced very creditable results, the conviction was growing that it operated in a haphazard, capricious, and unjust manner. But the government was reluctant to consider officially the introduction of the principle of compulsion, which would almost certainly provoke a violent controversy, and on which the members of the ministry themselves were not agreed. In fact, the prime minister himself scarcely concealed his personal distaste for conscription.

Hints were made from time to time, however, that the situation might eventually compel a resort to some form of compulsion. Thus the prime minister declared:

“Under the conditions in which we are now placed, every man in this country, without any distinction of any kind, ought to be doing the thing for which in view of the purposes of the war he is best fitted.”

For obtaining a comprehensive basis of fact for determining the entire number of persons available for some form of national service, a bill was passed establishing a National Register of all persons of both sexes between fifteen and sixty-five years of age, who were required to fill out forms showing their occupation, the number of persons depending on them, and other facts determining their availability. This register was taken on August 15, 1915.

As a final effort to meet the situation without recourse to compulsion, Lord Derby proposed a recruiting campaign based on a comprehensive domiciliary canvass. All men of proper age for enlistment, according to the National Register, were visited by the canvassers and invited to signify their willingness to serve. This trial closed on December 11, 1915. The net result of the campaign showed that 651,160 single men not employed in industries necessary for the prosecution of the war had failed to respond.

Mr. Asquith and most of the cabinet were now convinced of the necessity of compulsion, and a bill to this effect was introduced in the House of Commons on January 5, 1916, passed its third reading by a vote of 483 to 36 on the 24th, and became law three days later. This law, known as the Military Service Act of 1916, which did not extend to Ireland, provided that, with certain exceptions, all single men and widowers without children dependent on them, British subjects, ordinarily resident in Great Britain, who were between eighteen and forty-one years of age on August 15, 1915, should from the appointed date, five weeks after the passage of the bill, be regarded as enlisted in His

Majesty's regular forces "for the period of the war, and to have been forthwith transferred to the reserve," unless exempted in the interval on one of the recognized grounds.

The adoption of compulsory service in Great Britain was a bitter disappointment for the Germans, who had counted from the first upon the supposed apathy of the British character. Now for the first time the British had given unmistakable proof of a determination to prosecute the war with their entire available resources.

The British financial problem was twofold: it concerned the raising of funds internally for domestic expenditure, and the providing by special means for the payment of purchases abroad.

The first British war loan was issued in November, 1914, for funding the floating indebtedness in the form of treasury notes, or short term securities, by which the war expenses had thus far been met. The sum of £350,000,000 was realized by the proceeds of this new government stock, which was sold at a discount of 5% and carried 3½% interest. This successful operation eclipsed the amazing and hitherto unparalleled result of the German loan placed in September.

The second British war loan was placed on the market in June, 1915. It was offered at par, but carried 4½% interest, so that the actual return to the investor was considerably higher than in the case of the November loan. The subscriptions represented the sum of £594,000,000 when the lists were closed on July 10th, by far the largest total ever raised in any financial operation.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced the second war budget in the House of Commons on September 21, 1915. British war expenditure had risen from about £2,660,000 a day in June to £3,500,000 a day in September.

The total British expenditure for the fiscal year 1915-1916 was estimated in round figures at £1,600,000,000, of

which £423,000,000 represented loans to the allies and colonies. It was proposed that somewhat more than £300,000,000, should be raised by taxation, leaving nearly £1,300,000,000 to be covered by borrowing. The income tax rates were increased 40% and the limit for incomes exempted from taxation was reduced from £150 to £130. A new *ad valorem* import duty of  $33\frac{1}{3}\%$  was imposed on a number of foreign articles of luxury, the motive being partly to restrict the importation of unnecessary commodities. An excess profits tax of 50% was levied on all business profits made during the war.

For the fiscal year 1916-1917 an increased expenditure of about £200,000,000 was estimated and the necessary augmented revenue was partly provided by further increases in the income tax and the advance of the excess profits tax to 60%. The United Kingdom gave proof of amazing financial vitality by raising, in the midst of the most tremendous and exacting struggle, the largest sums ever obtained by any power through taxation, and it was the only one of the belligerents that undertook to discharge a considerable part of the war expenditure while the war was still in progress.

The second task of British finance, which consisted in meeting obligations arising from the purchases made by the United Kingdom or her allies in neutral countries presented probably more serious difficulties. The returns for the foreign commerce of the United Kingdom always displayed a considerable excess of imports over exports. In time of peace the national income from external sources, such as the carrying trade, banking commissions, and the interest from overseas investments, not only offset this unfavorable balance, but provided for an annual increment of about £200,000,000 in the total value of colonial and foreign investments. With the outbreak of the war,

however, the income from external sources tended to diminish, while the excess of imports over exports expanded very rapidly.

The problem, moreover, was complicated by the financial burden assumed by the British nation, chiefly through its government, for the benefit of the less affluent colonies and allies. The obligations of this nature assumed by the British government in neutral markets swelled the volume of external debits requiring special means of settlement.

The most serious problem of foreign exchanges was involved in the financial relationship of the United Kingdom and the United States. By June 30, 1915, the trade balance in favor of the United States greatly exceeded the current indebtedness of the latter to Great Britain. Thus the financial equilibrium was disturbed and exchange on London in New York fell alarmingly. The reduction of imports of non-essential articles and the export of gold by Great Britain were insufficient remedial measures. Finally, in September, 1915, an Anglo-French commission arranged in New York for a loan of £100,000,000 at 5%, the proceeds of which were to be employed solely in America for steadying the exchange.

The total amount of British investments in the United States was variously estimated at from £500,000,000 to £700,000,000. Steps were taken by the British government to make a register of all American securities in British hands, so that as necessary they could be taken over in return for war-loan stock and used for paying debts in the United States.

The lack of a consistent plan for the coördination and constructive development of the operations of the Entente Allies was painfully evident. Their indecisive diplomacy in the Balkans created a lack of confidence and a change of ministers in France and governmental changes in Great

Britain resulted. Sir Edward Carson regarded as a breach of national honor the failure to give adequate support to Serbia and resigned from the British ministry on October 12th. The British General Staff was reconstructed and Lieutenant-general Sir Archibald Murray was placed at its head, thus relieving Lord Kitchener, Minister of War, of many overburdensome duties. On November 2d, the Prime Minister announced the formation of a special War Council within the cabinet, consisting of himself, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Bonar Law, and Mr. McKenna, which should communicate its findings for final decision to the cabinet as a whole. This was a useful step towards the concentration in fewer hands of a large part of the governmental functions in connection with the war, for which the cabinet as a whole had proven to be too unwieldy. At the same time Mr. Asquith declared that the responsibility for the Dardanelles expedition rested on the whole cabinet, and thus exonerated Mr. Winston Spencer Churchill from charges which had gained a certain currency. The latter resigned the sinecure position to which he had been relegated in May and joined his regiment in France. The adoption of compulsory service in January, 1916, led to the resignation of the Home Secretary, Sir John Simon, the only member of the cabinet who persisted to the last in opposition to this measure.

The renunciation of party strife at the beginning of the war was extended to the Irish contest, and the truce thus established had been honorably observed by the leaders of the opposing factions. This result had been a disconcerting factor for the plans of Germany, who had counted on Irish disloyalty and disunion. But the Germans did not despair of this situation.

An assiduous revolutionary agitation promoted by secret German agents and supported by German money found a





The Tsar at the reopening of the Duma, February 22, 1916.



The Sinn Fein rebellion. *The Dublin post office after being burned by the rebels.*

convenient nucleus of disaffection in a society called the Sinn Fein, which means literally "Ourselves." This association had been founded about sixteen years before by the extreme Nationalists, but did not owe allegiance to any of the recognized parties. It was at first an academic movement of a harmless character for the encouragement of the Irish language, literature, and crafts. But when, with the progress of the war, the incitement of a vague but spectacular opportunity, intensified by impatience at the deferring of the promulgation of the Home Rule Act, fanned the smoldering fires of sedition, the Sinn Fein in coöperation with the remnants of the Larkinite labor faction became active in the forming of Irish volunteers and in training its followers as a revolutionary force.

Sir Roger Casement, who had formerly been a British consular officer, represented the revolutionary movement at the Kaiser's capital and in the German headquarters and was charged with the coördination of the plans for an Irish uprising with the advent of the stipulated German assistance. Late on the evening of April 20, 1916, a German vessel laden with arms, but disguised as a Dutch trader, accompanied by a German submarine, arrived off the Kerry coast. The vessel was stopped by a patrol boat and ordered to Queenstown, but was sunk on the way by the crew, who gave themselves up as prisoners. Sir Roger Casement with two companions was put ashore from the submarine, but failed to meet the expected party of Sinn Feiners, and was arrested on the morning of the 21st.

This circumstance embarrassed the plans of the conspirators. But the movement had already gone too far to be halted. On April 24th, Easter Monday, armed bands seized St. Stephen's Green, in the heart of Dublin, with the post-office, law court, and part of Sackville Street. But troops hastening to the scene of the outbreak surrounded

the central section held by the insurgents. A territorial brigade arrived from England on the 26th and by May 1st the insurrection had been completely crushed. During May fifteen of the principal conspirators were court-martialled and shot. Sir Roger Casement was imprisoned in the Tower of London, tried by the High Court of Justice, found guilty of treason on June 29th, and hanged.

A national disaster occurring on June 5th filled Great Britain with profound sorrow. Lord Kitchener sailed in the afternoon from the north of Scotland on the cruiser *Hampshire* on a military mission to Russia at the invitation of the Tsar. Two destroyers accompanied the cruiser at the start, but returned toward evening on account of the heavy seas. About eight P. M. the *Hampshire* struck a German mine west of the Orkneys and foundered in ten minutes. The small boats were sunk and only twelve survivors reached shore on a raft. Lord Kitchener perished, but the essential part of the great task of organization, in which he was the central figure, had already been accomplished. It was announced on July 6th that Mr. Lloyd George would assume the Secretaryship of War with Lord Derby as Under-secretary.

It was becoming evident in the autumn of 1916 that the Coalition ministry was losing the public confidence. The government as a whole seemed to fall short of the degree of relentless resolution which the situation demanded and the majority of the nation expected. The prestige of the government suffered from the Roumanian disasters and from the halt of the British advance on the Somme, which created considerable popular disappointment. The government had also shown lack of foresight in not adopting comprehensive measures for dealing with the food situation.

But the fall of the ministry came rather unexpectedly. Late in November Mr. Asquith decided to reduce the

number of the War Committee, which then consisted of seven members, while at the same time increasing its activity. But Mr. Lloyd George was not satisfied with the changes as proposed and announced his intention of retiring from the ministry unless the reform were made more drastic. The resignation of Mr. Lloyd George on December 5th, after the rejection of his counter-proposals, was straightway followed by that of Mr. Asquith himself. The king sent for Mr. Andrew Bonar Law, who, however, declared himself unable to form an administration. Mr. Lloyd George was then summoned and accepted the premiership on December 7th.

A War Cabinet within the ministry was now formed of Mr. Andrew Bonar Law, Lord Curzon, Lord Milner, and Mr. Arthur Henderson, with the prime minister as chairman. As premier, Mr. David Lloyd George became First Lord of the Treasury, while most of the other more important members of the government were of the Unionist party. The Liberal members of the former cabinet, who had passed into retirement, pledged themselves to give the new administration a fair trial.

In spite of the necessity for domestic union, the political truce agreed upon by all parties in France at the beginning of the war, and the broadly representative character of the French cabinet as reorganized in August, 1914, the French government in course of time found itself confronted by an increasing tide of opposition. Struggling as it was in the teeth of the fiercest tempests of the world war, when quickness of judgment and the greatest freedom of action were prime conditions of salvation, it was natural for it to shrink instinctively from exposing its counsels to the vacillating temper of a popular assembly. But it was also natural that the Chamber, jealous of its prerogatives, should have suspected that this reticence concealed unjustifiable

encroachments of the military upon the civil organs of authority. There was, besides, a general spirit of restlessness fed by disappointment at the lack of decisive operations and by rumors of incompetence, especially in connection with the supply of ammunition.

On August 13, 1915, M. Buzon, a deputy, excited opposition to the government by a speech eulogizing General Sarrail, who had been recently appointed to the secondary theater at the Dardanelles and was commonly regarded as an extreme republican. M. Georges Clemenceau started a press campaign against the ministry with a series of bitter attacks in his journal *L'Homme Enchaîné*. The opposition was silenced for a time by a brilliant speech in defense of the government delivered by M. Viviani before the Chamber of Deputies on August 26th, but broke out afresh at the failure of the French and British to send adequate aid to Serbia.

The prime minister's explanation of the Balkan situation was published in the press on October 13th and the same evening M. Delcasse, Minister of Foreign Affairs, tendered his resignation, alleging reasons of ill health as well as disagreement with his colleagues on the Balkan policy. He will be remembered as one of the chief authors of the Entente Cordiale and the foreign minister who defied Germany in 1905. His present resignation hastened the ministerial crisis.

M. Aristide Briand was entrusted with the formation of a new cabinet on the 29th. His aim was evidently to bring together the most eminent administrative talent of the country. In the new cabinet were grouped no fewer than eight former prime ministers: Briand, Viviani, Doumergue, Combes, Ribot, Méline, Léon Bourgeois, and de Freycinet; and its breadth is attested by the fact that both M. Jules Guesde, a United Socialist, and M. Denys

Cochin, the leader of the right, retained their seats in it. The prime minister took for himself the portfolio of foreign affairs. General Galliéni, who had been commander of Paris during the critical days of the Battle of the Marne was called to the Ministry of War and Admiral Lacaze to the Ministry of Marine. But the system of administration was essentially the same, although the situation demanded a radical reorganization. Discontent again became manifest and in the autumn of 1916 the government proposed changes for greater compactness and efficiency of administration, which the Chamber of Deputies approved.

On December 9th the Chamber passed a bill that charged the prime minister with the reconstruction of the government and the reorganization of the high command. In consequence, the cabinet was reduced from twenty-two to eleven members. M. Briand retained with the premiership the portfolio of foreign affairs. M. Ribot remained in the Ministry of Finance, Admiral Lacaze in that of the marine, and M. Thomas in that of national industries. The new minister of war was General Lyautey, the French President General of Morocco, who had given striking proof of his talent as an administrator and soldier in Morocco since April 28, 1912.

An inner Cabinet, or War Committee, was now created, with five members: Briand, Ribot, Lyautey, Lacaze, and Thomas. Quite as sensational were the changes in the high command. General Joffre relinquished the office of commander-in-chief and became military adviser to the War Committee, receiving the distinguished title of Marshal of France, which had not been conferred upon anyone since the downfall of the Second Empire. The new commander-in-chief of the armies in the West was General Nivelle, whose phenomenal advancement from the rank of colonel at the beginning of the war to the command of

the Second Army in the region of the Meuse will be noticed later.

For more than fifteen months the French government provided for its war expenditure by the emission of short term securities and by advances from the Bank of France, the latter facilitated by the increase of the paper circulation. The regular form of the short term security was the *bon du trésor*, or treasury bill, maturing in three, six, or twelve months. By a decree of September 13, 1914, these bills received the appellation *Bons de la Défense Nationale*, or National Defense Bills, and their interest was fixed at 4% for those of three months and 5% for those of six months or one year. By November 12, 1915, National Defense Bills to the value of 8,353,000,000 francs were in circulation in France, while others amounting to 1,059,500,000 francs had been discounted by the British government for purchases of war material made by France in the United Kingdom. France had also received about 1,500,000,000 francs from the joint Allied loan negotiated in the United States.

A law of February 10, 1915, had provided for the emission of decennial obligations of the National Defense, redeemable not later than 1925, bearing 5% interest.

By the close of 1915 the circulation of the Bank of France had risen to 13,000,000,000 francs, and the bank's advances to the state amounted to approximately 5,000,000,000. For the period of the war and until one year after the conclusion of peace the interest on this indebtedness was fixed at the rate of 1%, and subsequently at 3%.

Against these various forms of increased indebtedness should be reckoned 1,056,000,000 francs which France had lent to her allies down to the close of 1915.

In November, 1915, the French government determined to fund a large part of its floating indebtedness by the sale of bonds. Subscriptions for a national loan were open

from November 25th to December 15th. The new bonds bore 5% interest. The subscriptions totalled 14,500,000,000 francs in round figures, of which 5,500,000,000 were covered by coin or bank notes, 2,500,000,000 by National Defense Bills and the remainder by decennial obligations and the former 3% rentes presented for conversion.

The second French war loan was placed on the market in October, 1916. It was sold at 88½, bore interest at 5%, and was exempt from all French taxes. The subscriptions amounted to about 11,360,000,000 francs, of which 54½% was new money, the rest representing conversions.


Postponing the situation in Italy for more convenient notice later, we turn next to the conditions in the Central Powers.

The naval blockade of Germany undoubtedly caused very serious embarrassment, although it failed to produce the prompt and decisive results which had been quite commonly anticipated. It was even claimed by some German authorities that its effect was in at least one respect beneficial to the expected victim. For Germany through a carefully devised system of tariffs, with a systematic organization of supply and distribution, found means to satisfy her most pressing food requirements from the block of territory comprised within her own and her allies coast and battle lines. The problem of supplying her industries with the necessary raw materials was more complicated. But she was free from the question of unfavorable foreign exchanges, the debts contracted were payable to German citizens. By cutting off the importation of foreign war-supplies, the Allied blockade threw Germany back upon her own resources, applying the spur of necessity to the ingenuity of German science in devising substitutes for standard raw commodities and producing a wonderful development of the nation's war-industries.

The Allies had expected that Germany's munitions industries would soon be paralyzed by lack of war materials. In this they seemed justified. For instance, copper, a vital factor, the annual consumption of which in Germany before the war was 250,000 tons, was declared contraband and the importation was largely cut off. Germany's domestic production of copper had never exceeded 50,000 tons. It has been calculated that the wastage of copper by 50,000 men in daily action, even assuming that four-fifths of that used were recovered, amounts to over 180,000 tons a year. The munitions requirements of the constantly expanding operations were met, in part by the requisitioning of the metal that had been used for architectural, electrical, and domestic purposes, and in part by the more thorough exploitation of the copper mines in Germany and in the allied and occupied regions. But when the final record of the industrial phases of the great struggle shall have been composed, the chapter on the devices, expedients, and subterfuges by which the German factories and workshops were nourished and supplied will doubtless vie with the most engaging tales of fiction.

At the outset Germany was far less thoroughly prepared for war in an economic than in a financial or a military sense. The Germans had based their calculations on the expectation of a short, decisive struggle, and had not made exceptional accumulations of food and raw materials. Before the close of the second month of warfare there was a threatened shortage in the supply of ammunition. Nearly five months passed before the government realized the necessity of a systematic regulation of the food supply.

The first comprehensive measures for the regulation of the food supply went into effect on February 1, 1915, when control of the distribution and consumption of cereals was vested in the Imperial Distributing Bureau, under the



Women munition workers' war procession in London. *Cheered by the War Minister, Lloyd George, they reared their shell cases in return.*



Lloyd George watching the parade of women munition workers.



regulations of which all stores of wheat and rye were requisitioned and purchased by the War Grain Association. A communal association was formed to control the distribution of cereals and bread in each locality. The individual bread ration was usually based on a weekly maximum of about two kilograms.

To meet the effects of a protracted blockade it was expected that by a systematic regulation of the supplies and by curtailing the acreage planted to beets and potatoes, of which there had been a heavy surplus production before the war, and increasing to a corresponding extent the grain and fodder crops, in which there had been a shortage, excessive hardship would be avoided.

One cause for serious misgivings, a shortage of agricultural labor as a result of mobilization, was removed by the progress of the war itself, which placed at the disposal of the Germans a great host of prisoners, who were largely assigned to rural tasks. By the end of July, 1915, the number of prisoners had risen to nearly 2,000,000.

The best talent was mobilized in the formulation of a rational dietary and in the apportionment of the grain supply between human beings and the domestic animals. Nevertheless, the government found it necessary to establish maximum prices for meat and butter and to decree meatless and fatless days.

In a similar way control was exercised over distribution of essential raw materials by means of the Central Purchasing Office, which through its branches purchased the entire supply and production of these commodities, the allotment being made by the central office in proportion to the ascertained requirements of the several districts. This system eliminated competitive buying and established prices on a fair and uniform basis. Incidentally, the central control and systematic distribution introduced greater

economy in transportation. This system was the most important step that had yet been taken towards a rational, socialistic organization of industry.

The most conspicuous figure in the management of German war-finances was that of Dr. Carl Helfferich, who, after a brilliant and characteristic career as a banker, at a comparatively early age, became the German Chancellor's right hand man and one of the most influential statesmen in Europe. In 1904 he was made Director of the Anatolian Railway in Asia Minor, the initial section of the Constantinople-Bagdad line, intended as the main highway for German penetration. Four years later he passed to the directorship of the Deutsche Bank, where he especially represented the Near Eastern interests of this great institution.

Dr. Helfferich was appointed Secretary of State to the Imperial Treasury in January, 1915, and passed to the Ministry of the Interior in May, 1916. Thus his control of the Treasury covers the greater part of the period embraced within the present chapter.

German and British systems of war-finance stood in marked contrast. The German policy was to meet the entire war-expenditure by means of loans, the British was to provide for a considerable part of this expenditure by increased taxation during the period of the war itself. British financiers regarded the German practice of contracting an enormous indebtedness without taking any steps for interest and redemption as a gamble on the chance of victory. The successive German war-appropriations voted by the Reichstag with the corresponding war-loans followed one another at intervals of about six months. The successful flotation of the first German war-loan has already been noticed. The second, which was in the form of treasury bills and imperial bonds, sold at 98½, and bearing interest at 5%, was open for subscription from February 27

to March 19, 1915. The subscriptions aggregated about 9,061,000,000 marks. The third, September 4-22, 1915, issued at 99, with 5% interest, realized approximately 12,101,000,000 marks, thus surpassing the phenomenal result of the second British war-loan early in the summer. The fourth, March 4-24, 1916, consisting of treasury bills at 95, with interest at  $4\frac{1}{2}\%$ , and imperial bonds at 98 $\frac{1}{2}$ , with interest at 5%, produced a total of about 10,712,000,000 marks. A new departure was taken at this time in the adoption of the government's proposal to raise 480,000,000 marks of additional revenue by increased taxation. But this was a bagatelle in comparison with the increased load of taxation assumed by the United Kingdom. The fifth German war-loan in September, 1916, treasury bills at 95, with  $4\frac{1}{2}\%$  interest, and imperial bonds at 98, bearing 5% interest, brought in 10,680,000,000 marks. By this time a total of approximately 47,000,000,000 marks had been raised by loans, while the aggregate war-credits totalled about 52,000,000,000 marks.

In considering the attitude of the German people tendencies rather than definite facts present themselves. The opinions of the masses were often the unreflecting response to deliberate formative influences exercised by determined minorities. At first universal exultation possessed the people as the German armies pushed through Belgium and northern France. They looked for a sudden victory, and the failure of this created a diversity of opinion.

With the repeated victories of the eastern and south-eastern campaigns of 1915 the divergency in view of the extreme parties was accentuated. Pan-Germanism, the true character of which was unmasked by the German victories, found its chief supporters in the Conservative and National Liberal parties, who insisted on the annexation of the valuable territory occupied by the German troops,


without respect to the affinity or desires of the population of the regions involved. These aims found striking expression in Friedrich Naumann's *Mitteleuropa*, or Middle Europe, which appeared in the summer of 1915. The underlying idea, which was not original, was here treated in a more definite manner than in any previous work.

Naumann insisted that the central block of European territory occupied by the Teutonic powers with their lesser allies and neighbors would constitute a natural economic unit which ought to form the basis for the political unity of 200,000,000 souls. He urged that the seed be sown for the new order during the stress of the great conflict. It is significant that about this time greater attention was being paid to the improvement of the navigation of the Danube and the development of canals connecting the Danube with the Rhine and the German rivers of the north, so as to provide a more convenient inland water route for German commerce to the Near East.

But the results of the great campaign of 1915 just as naturally stimulated the desire of the opposite extremists for the negotiation of an immediate peace on terms honorable for all parties. Since the Socialists had only been induced to support the war at the beginning by the assurance that it was a struggle for self-defense against the aggressive force of Russian despotism, they naturally tended to become restive as soon as the Slav peril had been destroyed.

Signs of a growing spirit of insubordination appeared as early as the third war-session of the Reichstag, convoked on March 10, 1915, when Herr Haase pleaded for "a lasting peace that will not contain within it the germs of new entanglements and dissensions," and Liebknecht with one companion voted against the budget.

The National Executive of the Social Democratic party issued a manifesto on June 23, 1915, calling upon the



The Design of a Greater Germany as cherished by the Pan-German party after the military collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917. *The red scored with diagonal lines:* Germany—the nucleus of the Pan-German dominion. *The red unscored:* Germany's immediate allies and partners, subservient to her will. *Pink heavily scored:* Protectorates,—in reality dependencies. *Lightly scored pink:* Allied states under German influence.

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government to open immediate peace negotiations. This manifesto was published in *Vorwärts*, which was temporarily suppressed as a punishment for its temerity. Another statement of the Socialists in August of the same year proclaimed, as the suitable conditions for a lasting peace, the integrity of the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, the freedom of the seas, international arbitration, and the promotion of international free trade.

The government identified itself neither with the dictatorial Chauvinism of the Junkers and military set nor with the incoherent, but deep, instinctive longing of the masses for international conciliation. But its attitude in respect to the war aims was often vague, enigmatical, or vacillating. At the opening of the fifth war-session of the Reichstag on August 19th, the Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, reviewed once more the causes of the war, described the Anglo-German negotiations of 1912, and declared that the war would go on until the way was clear for a new Europe, "free from French conspiracies, from Muscovite lust for conquest, and from English tutelage."

At this time thirty-six members voted against the granting of the new war credit in the Socialist party conference. Liebknecht voted against the budget in the Reichstag while most of the minority Socialists abstained from voting.

The discussion of war aims reached a more striking stage when Dr. Scheidemann interpellated the government on the subject of possible terms of peace in the fifth war session of the Reichstag on December 9th, claiming that Germany's incontestable superiority in the field enabled her to make the first move in the direction of peace.

In reply, von Bethmann-Hollweg dwelt on the folly and hypocrisy of the Entente Powers who refused to admit their palpable defeat and made themselves responsible by this stubbornness for all further bloodshed and horrors.

He affirmed that, whenever the Entente would admit defeat, Germany was ready to listen to any proposals which should be in keeping with her dignity and security, but that the longer and more bitterly the enemy waged war, the greater would be the necessary guarantees for Germany's safety. "Neither in the West nor in the East," he declared, "must the enemies of to-day hold in their possession the entrance gates to our country through which they might attack or menace us anew."

In this session nineteen Minority Socialists voted openly against the war credit.

In the spring of 1916 a controversy in regard to the scope of operation of the submarines, which had been smoldering for many months, broke out in a violent ministerial conflict. The Kaiser threw the weight of his authority on the side of the advocates of a moderate policy as against the extremists who demanded the unrestricted use of this formidable weapon. In consequence, Admiral von Tirpitz resigned the Ministry of Marine on March 15th, and was succeeded by Admiral von Capelle. In May of the same year a Ministry of Food Supplies was created and entrusted to Herr von Batocki, who had been President of the Province of East Prussia.

German strategy, as we have seen, consisted of alternating efforts in the West and East, and these mutations were in part determined by the conflict of more or less consciously formulated tendencies among the German leaders. Since it was impossible to strike in both directions simultaneously with effective force, some were inclined to choose the East as the theater for the supreme operations, while others preferred the West. Von Hindenburg was naturally the chief representative of the eastern group, while in the first half of 1916, the Chief of the General Staff, von Falkenhayn, favored the western view. But

the western policy of von Falkenhayn, who was sponsor for the attack on Verdun, turned out to be a conspicuous failure, the coördinated efforts of the Allies were creating an increasingly perilous situation for the Central Powers, and the German nation welcomed with a grateful spirit of relief the appointment of the popular hero, von Hindenburg, as Chief of the General Staff, with von Ludendorff as Quartermaster General, on August 29th.

This was the signal for renewed energy and resolution. In November was established the War Bureau or centralized administration directing and coördinating the departments of works, field ordnance, munitions, war raw materials, factories, substitution service, food supply, and exports and imports, and the Reichstag passed on December 2d the Patriotic Auxiliary Service Bill for the mobilization of all the available man-power of citizens from seventeen to sixty years of age, not called to the armed forces, for compulsory service in the indispensable occupations.

A temporary sensation was created by the convocation of an emergency meeting of the Reichstag on December 12th, at which the Chancellor formally announced that, coincidentally with the other members of the Quadruple Alliance, he had on that day communicated peace proposals to the hostile powers through the representatives of Spain, the United States, Switzerland, and other neutral powers, together with the Vatican. In his speech before the Reichstag he insisted that the unshakable strength of the Quadruple Alliance had been demonstrated, and that with no desire to crush their antagonists Germany and her allies would spare the world a prolongation of the slaughter and so were prepared to negotiate a peace on terms that would insure their own existence, honor, and liberty of evolution. This specious display of magnanimity was quickly seen to be only the willingness of Germany to

conclude peace on the basis of the "war-map" and her own aspirations.

The absolute cessation of parliamentary activity in Austria during the period discussed in the present chapter invested the public life of that country with a partial semblance of concord, despite the rumors of agonizing and seething discontent. The Austrian Reichsrat and the seventeen provincial diets had been closed since the beginning of the war. Count Stürgkh, the Austrian Prime Minister, was shot and killed in the restaurant of a hotel in Vienna on October 21, 1916. His refusal to convoke parliament was probably one of the motives of the assassin, who was a Socialist. His successor, Herr von Koerber, resigned suddenly on December 13th.

In Hungary, as in nearly all the other belligerent countries, the legislative body continued to hold sessions, served to some extent as a mouthpiece for public sentiment, and was often the scene of animated discussions. Count Tisza remained in power and an outward truce continued in force between the principal parties, each pledged to a vigorous prosecution of the war. But in July, 1916, a section of the Independent party seceded under Count Michael Karolyi, declared itself in favor of peace by negotiation, without annexations, and thus became the first non-Socialistic party in the Central Powers to renounce openly the aim of a peace dictated by victory.


The death of the aged monarch, Francis Joseph I, upon which so many speculations had been based, occurred on November 21, 1916. He had been born on August 18, 1830, became Emperor of Austria, December 2, 1848, in the midst of revolutionary turmoil, and was crowned King of Hungary, June 8, 1867. He was succeeded by his great-nephew, the Archduke Charles Francis, who was born on August 17, 1887, was married to the Bourbon Princess Zita





**„Metallsammlung“ auf dem Bahnhof von Anizy (Dep. Aisne). Phot. Gebr. Paeddel**

Collection of metal at the railroad station at Anizy, Department of the Aisne. *Reproduction of an illustration which appeared in the Berlin "Lokal Anzeiger" in October, 1915, showing how the Germans systematically stripped of all metals the territory which they occupied.*



Manufacture of shells of large caliber at the Creusot works in France.

of Parma, and became Emperor Charles I of Austria and King Charles IV of Hungary.

The dark period of Russian adversity in the campaign of 1915 was rendered still more gloomy by the existence of intrigue, corruption, and reactionary tendencies in the administration, impeding the full and hearty coöperation of the government and the more substantial classes of the population, which was essential for the full development of the national energy. The bright promise of the early days of August, 1914, still awaited fulfilment.

General Soukhomlinoff was charged with flagrant misconduct and neglect of duty and compelled to resign the Ministry of War in June, 1915, being succeeded by General Polivanoff.

At the opening of the session of the Duma on August 1st, the president, M. Rodzianko, urged in a patriotic address that the government should collaborate more fully with the people. In the fervor of the patriotic reaction provoked by the crisis in September, the progressive constitutional parties in the Duma formed a combination, demanding the appointment of ministers who possessed the nation's confidence, a frankly conciliatory policy towards the subordinate nationalities within the Empire, the reform of local administration, the punishment of criminally inefficient officials, and the vigorous prosecution of the war. But the enthusiastic coöperation of the most responsible elements was met by the unexpected prorogation of the Duma on the 16th. Suspicion of the government's intentions was increased by the appointment to the Ministry of the Interior on October 10th of Alexis Khvostoff, a confirmed reactionary.

The Prime Minister, Goremykin, resigned on February 1, 1916, for alleged reasons of ill-health and was succeeded by Boris Stürmer, who was of German descent and was regarded as a reactionary. The Duma was reopened on

February 22d. Khvostoff resigned in consequence of a violent discussion in the Duma on March 24th, and somewhat later Polivanoff was succeeded by General Shuvayeff as Minister of War. The dismissal of Foreign Minister Sazonoff in August was a great disappointment to the liberal elements, since he was a statesman of unquestioned ability, breadth of view, and patriotism. The prime minister assumed the duties of the foreign office. The appointment of M. Protopopoff, who was suspected of reactionary tendencies, alienated still further the liberal parties in the Duma. When this assembly was convened on November 14th, Miliukoff, the leader of the Constitutional Democrats, attacked the government in a speech of amazing frankness, accusing it of corruption, incompetence, and a treacherous interference with popular activity in support of the war by repressing such agencies as the All-Russian Zemstvo Union, the Union of Municipalities, and the War Industries Committee. It was predicted that the resignation of Stürmer, which followed this arraignment in the representative chamber, might become a constitutional precedent of supreme importance, leading to parliamentary government.

But Stürmer's successor was M. Trepoff, a strong conservative, although believed to be a patriotic and an honest man, while the retention of Protopopoff prevented the sincere coöperation of the Duma with the ministry.

While the exuberance of the first days of the war in Russia had been chastened and transformed by adversity, the substantial classes of the nation gave increasing signs of solidarity and resolution. But the government, persisting in a narrow, unenlightened policy, looked with suspicion on all private initiative and antagonized the very elements which should have been its chief support. Matters were rapidly approaching an internal crisis which must profoundly affect the whole course of the war.

## CHAPTER IX

### RESUMPTION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE WEST

The defensive organizations and offensive tactics in the West. The Allied offensive of September, 1915; its aims. Subsidiary attacks in Flanders. The principal effort of the British; array of the opposing German and British forces on the sector of attack; capture of Fosse 8 and the Hohenzollern Redoubt; capture of Loos and spectacular charge of the Fifteenth Division; failure to consolidate the extreme positions won. Action of the Tenth French Army in Artois; capture of positions on the Vimy Heights. The supreme effort of the French in Champagne; the local situation; initial assault on the 25th; limit of penetration north of Souain; desperate struggle for the heights north of Massiges; general results of the offensive.

The waning of the Allied offensive in June was followed by a comparative lull in the warlike operations in the western theater, broken only by minor engagements in which local vantage points were contested without noticeable effect upon the general fortunes of the campaign. Yet both sides exerted themselves with unsparing energy in preparing for the crucial test of strength which was believed to be impending on this front. The Allies were constantly increasing their reserves of men and stores of ammunition, and improving and expanding their transportation facilities in the rear.

Popular opinion in the western countries awaited with eager expectancy definite results from the prodigious industrial efforts of Great Britain and France, ascribing the delay to the circumspection of the military leaders, who were presumably unwilling to institute the decisive operation before an overwhelming superiority in men and means should assure an unquestionable victory with the smallest

sacrifices. It was often stated on the highest expert authority that the Allies could drive the invaders from the soil of France whenever they were disposed to pay the necessary price in blood and treasure.

The Germans had lavished skill and labor upon the defensive organization which had enabled them to hold their opponents in the West at bay while the chief weight of their operative forces was hurled with terrible force against the more vulnerable adversaries in the East. Practically the whole German front from the North Sea to the Swiss border was covered by two or three complete, parallel positions. The first or outermost of these consisted of several lines of trenches supported at intervals by very powerful bastions or redoubts, and provided with dug-outs and bomb-proof shelters, the latter often thirty or forty feet below the surface of the earth.

The second, or reserve, position usually followed at a distance of 500-800 yards in the direction of the rear, and was essentially similar to the first in its arrangements. The third position was a mile or more further toward the rear. These successive series of intrenchments were connected by frequent zigzag communication trenches; they were screened by intricate barbed-wire entanglements; and the spaces between them were a maze of lesser trench elements, with concealed artillery emplacements, machine-gun redoubts, fortified villages and farm buildings, and isolated resistance centers of every kind. Almost every avenue of approach was exposed to deadly gusts of fire from hidden guns.

Similar but less elaborate were the positions of the Allies, who apparently assumed that their own rôle would henceforth be that of the assailant.

Now that, with the gradual reversion of the center of gravity to the western theater, the course of events brings us to a period when the chief problem was to shatter continuous





French plan showing the German positions called La Main (the hand) because of the formation of the land, which resembled the outline of a hand with the fingers spread out towards the French. Detailed plan of the territory lying northwest of Massiges taken by the French forces September 25-30, 1915. The lines in purple show the complicated network of German trenches; the French trenches are not shown. The heavy black lines denote the French front on each of the above mentioned dates.

fortified lines of defense, a brief analysis of the methods used in such attempts may assist in forming a clearer appreciation of the remaining conspicuous occurrences of 1915 as well as of all the important operations of the ensuing year.

Events had shown that by means of a tremendous local superiority in heavy guns, fed by inexhaustible stores of ammunition, with the accurate coördination of the action of the artillery and infantry, and efficient staff work, the strongest intrenchments could undoubtedly be demolished and a way opened through the most formidable defensive lines. But the Allies had thus far failed to maintain their offensive efforts at the required pitch of intensity long enough to break completely through the enemy's defensive system.

An indispensable preliminary for the offensive effort was the elaboration of the battle-map or a plan of the contemplated scene of action, upon which all the important natural features of the terrain were indicated, besides all the elements of the enemy's defensive organization as furnished by the intelligence service in conjunction with the aviation corps.

Obviously the mastery of the air during the period preceding a great offensive movement is a fundamental condition of success. It enables the prospective assailant to hide the concentration of his operative forces and supplies, and consequently the position of the contemplated sector of attack, and at the same time to impair his opponent's mobility by bombing railway stations, junctions, and other crucial points in the hostile system of communications. The contestant whose vision ranges over the position of an opponent who is blind enjoys from the first a substantial element of superiority.

A number of days or even weeks before the supreme moment of attack, the general plan of action is drawn up,

and upon this basis the commanding general of each army corps destined to participate prepares his order of battle, describing the general purpose of the intended maneuver and the character of the terrain, defining the zone of attack of the particular corps as a whole and the smaller zones of attack of its component divisions, the successive objectives to be attained, the distribution of the forces for the attack, the initial positions of the reserves, and the command posts. This order serves in turn as basis for the subsequent divisional and regimental orders, through which the original conception is adapted to the guidance of the rank and file. Meanwhile, the special technical sections are constantly employed in plotting by means of the various methods of observation and triangulation the position and range of the hostile targets to regulate the fire of the artillery.

Awaiting the signal for attack, the assaulting units were usually massed in the first line trenches or in the so-called parallels of departure, or "jumping off" trenches, which had been expressly prepared in front of the other elements. The general custom was to open the attack of the infantry at an hour determined in advance, because the telephone was not absolutely reliable as a medium of communication for combining properly the action of artillery and infantry in the case of extemporaneous decisions. The arbitrary determination of the precise moment for attack sometimes involved its execution in quite unfavorable conditions, as those of the weather, which could not be foreseen. But, in the case of operations in which the moment of attack was not prescribed, a failure of the supporting artillery to lengthen its range of fire at the critical juncture, when the infantry was sweeping across the space between the fronts, could easily result in a deplorable catastrophe.

In the night preceding an attack, zigzag passages were cut at intervals through the wire entanglements covering

the section of the front from which the attack was to be launched. The infantry passed through these openings and advanced in successive waves against the hostile lines. The first or skirmishing wave was especially equipped for fighting at close range or hand-to-hand with the defenders of the assaulted trench; and, for this purpose, grenades, revolvers, and knives were found to be more serviceable than rifles.

While this movement was in progress, the supporting artillery projected a curtain of fire to isolate the hostile trenches of the enemy's first line, the first objective for the attacking infantry. As soon as this position had been gained and the units of attack had been reformed, the range of the guns was lengthened at a predetermined hour or at a prescribed signal and the torrent of shell was turned upon the second objective and eventually the approaches leading to it from the opponents' rear. In an ideal offensive operation this concordance was maintained until the final objective had been gained, the artillery sweeping the entire terrain in this series of successive bounds.

However, the most carefully directed artillery preparation almost inevitably varied in the thoroughness of its effects, so that while the assailants penetrated some parts of the enemy's line almost without fighting, at other points the defensive organization remained capable of stubborn resistance. Therefore, in the course of even the most carefully planned attacks, the assaulting line became irregular and broken and was therefore exposed to enfilading fire from the enemy's resistance centers and offered vulnerable spots for the adversary's counter-attacks.


The western German front was probably held in September, 1915, by about 1,250,000 combatants. The different armies, as indicated by the names of their commanders, were stationed in the following order: the Duke of Württemberg, from the North Sea coast to Ypres; the Crown

Prince of Bavaria, from Ypres to Arras; von Bülow, from Arras to the Somme; von Fabeck, in the salient between the Somme and the Oise; von Heeringen, along the Aisne; von Einem, across Champagne; the Crown Prince of Prussia, in the Argonne and on the sector facing Verdun; von Strautz, in the Woëvre; von Gaede, in Lorraine; and von Falkenhausen, in the Vosges and Alsace.

On the side of the Allies, the British had taken over late in the summer an additional sector of the front about thirty miles in length. The Allied front, as we have seen, was divided into three army group commands, that of General Foch from the North Sea to Compiègne, that of de Castelnau from Compiègne to Verdun, and that of Dubail from Verdun to Belfort.

The Belgian army with a French detachment held its old position from the sea to Boesinghe. Sir Herbert Plumer's Second British Army stretched southward to a point beyond Armentières, and the First British Army under Sir Douglas Haig followed as far as Grenay west of Lens. D'Urbal's Tenth French Army held the next section of the front to a point beyond Arras, whence the new Third British Army under Sir Charles Monroe extended to the Somme. Dubois lay between the Somme and the Oise, followed by the Fifth French Army under Franchet d'Esperey along the Aisne and the Fourth under de Langle de Cary, later under Petain, across Champagne. Humbert's Third Army held the Verdun sector, while Dubail and Maud'huy stood in Lorraine and in the Vosges and Alsace respectively. The British had not far from 600,000 combatants in the field, while the French numbered about 2,000,000.

The execution of the great offensive movement, which took place in September, 1915, was probably hastened by the critical situation of the Russian armies. The complete disruption of the German defensive system in the West



French soldiers shooting jets of liquid fire. The apparatus is carried on the back, and the liquid under pressure is delivered through a nozzle held in the hand.



was probably not contemplated by the Allied commanders at this time. Their intentions were rather to breach the German lines at certain places, distract the German counsels, and conquer observing and supporting points which would contribute materially to the success of the eventual culminating effort.

The chief part of the Allied plan was to crush in the defensive shell on opposite flanks of the rounding German salient in northern France by simultaneous blows delivered respectively in Artois and Champagne, where vital lines of communication ran just behind the hostile front. In this respect the offensive of September was significant as a revised edition of the aggressive operations of the spring and the precursor of the mighty efforts of the subsequent campaigns.

Minor attacks in Flanders and elsewhere served to divert the attention of the enemy and dissemble the location of the really important action.

Preparations on what was then regarded as an unprecedented scale had been under way for many weeks. This movement, which extended in some form or other to the greater part of the western battle-front was regulated in its initial stages with almost the unison and coördination of a vast machine. The Allied line burst into flame on September 23d; the preliminary bombardment reached its climax of intensity on the night of the 24th-25th and suddenly ceased on the morning of the 25th, when great masses of infantry on the various sectors of attack dispersed along a front of several hundred miles sprang to the attack.

Beginning our survey in the north, we first consider briefly the events in Flanders. Two British divisions attacked the German trenches near Hooze east of Ypres, carried the first objective, were subsequently arrested by converging fire from the flanking defenses of the enemy, and were compelled to relinquish most of their gains, but

fulfilled their purpose of drawing to this point considerable reserve forces of their adversaries at a time when the really significant operations were in progress elsewhere.

The Eighth Division of the Third British Corps attacked at the same time in the sector southwest of Armentières. The first German position and considerable sections of the second were quickly captured by the attacking units, but the center was arrested by machine-gun positions, so that the British front became uneven and was exposed in places to severe enfilading fire. The British were withdrawn from the advanced positions in good order after the purpose of a holding combat had been achieved.

At this time the Indian Corps occupied the Neuve Chapelle sector with the Meerut Division on the left and the Lahore Division, strengthened by a brigade of the New British Army, on the right. Attacking on the 25th, the Meerut Division was borne with magnificent impetuosity across several lines of German trenches, and disappeared in an impenetrable mantle of fog made denser by the fumes of gas and bursting shells. The unfavorable condition of the weather destroyed the concordance of the British efforts. The Indians had not paused to clear up the trenches passed over in their impulsive charge and no supports had followed to perform this task. Consequently, the surviving defenders recovered their courage and assailed the Indians in the rear, just as the German counter-attacks were developing in front and on the flanks. The Meerut Division sustained serious losses in fighting its way out of this pitfall, while the Lahore Division on the right made little progress in advance. But, of course, these operations had the effect of absorbing the enemy's attention, as was intended.

A fourth subsidiary attack was executed by parts of the Second and Nineteenth British Divisions west of La Bassée, in close relationship with the far greater British effort south

of the canal. No permanent gains were made, but the unpretentious purpose of an action of this kind was doubtless served.

The principal attack of the British occurred between the La Bassée Canal and Grenay in close coöperation with the movement of the Tenth French Army in the next sector on the south. It was doubtless the intention that these two armies, after crushing the opposing sectors of their adversaries' front, should close in on Lens, the important mining center, from both sides. In dealing with the events in these localities we are treading a terrain that was to become forever memorable by the gigantic struggles of the subsequent campaigns.


The German first position confronting the British in the sector northwest of Lens ran southeastward for a short distance from the La Bassée Canal, then southward skirting a gentle rise, and finally turned decidedly to the southwest, reaching the apex of a pronounced salient in front of Grenay, about five miles west by north of Lens. Some of the prominent defensive elements of this sector were a coal mine with a strongly fortified slag-heap, known as Fosse 8, about two-thirds of a mile south of Auchy, the powerful Hohenzollern Redoubt, projecting about 500 yards in front of the German lines and bristling with artillery and machine-guns, the Quarries between the first and second positions, southeast of the Hohenzollern Redoubt, and the so-called Loos Road Redoubt, crowning the summit of the ridge, three-quarters of a mile northwest of Loos. The second or reserve position was roughly parallel with the first and generally not more than a mile behind it. But the third position, after running for some distance in a general course parallel with the two others, bore decidedly to the southeast, where they swung off southwestwards. Besides the continuous lines of intrenchments, the town of

Loos, three miles northwest of Lens, and numerous villages with slag-heaps and other obstructions had been converted into strong resistance centers.


The British front was occupied by General Haig's First British Army, which consisted, in the order of their position from north to south, of the Second, Ninth, and Seventh Divisions composing the First Corps, and the First, Fifteenth, and Forty-seventh Divisions composing the Fourth. But the Second Division was chiefly engaged in the operations already mentioned in the next sector to the north. The German front was held by the Fourth Corps with a portion of the Prussian Guard in reserve.

The charge was launched on all parts of the British front with remarkable precision. The left wing of the Ninth Division attacking in the vicinity of Fosse 8 and the Hohenzollern Redoubt was checked by fire from the flanking position on the higher ground near Auchy, but the right wing captured the two strongholds mentioned after a very severe struggle. The Seventh Division quickly cleared the first and second positions and penetrated a small section of the third. Wheeling northward it reached the village of Haisnes and threatened to cut off the Germans opposed to the Ninth Division on its left. But these extreme gains were soon forfeited through lack of support. A part of the First Division reached the last German line of defense. But it remained for the Fifteenth Division, a formation of the New Army, wholly Scottish in its composition, to register the most sensational performance of the day. Charging with irresistible vehemence it gained possession of the entire first position, several trenches deep, in thirty-five minutes. At the expiration of seventy minutes from the signal of departure the Highlanders were swarming through the streets of Loos, and this town, where every house had been transformed into a little fortress, was





*An example of camouflage. Showing how traffic is protected on a road within possible view of the enemy.*



*Commissary stores. This gives an idea of the great quantity of material which must be handled in order to maintain an army.*

swept clean by nine o'clock. Rushing straight ahead the Scotch were soon over the trenches at the top of Hill 70, an eminence east of Loos, the highest elevation in the vicinity. With unabated ardor they swept down the gradual declivity towards the northeast of Lens, and within three hours' time one brigade had passed through all the German defenses. For a moment Lens was threatened and the fate of the whole German position in the north hung in the balance.

But the British plans had never contemplated an immediate penetration to so great a depth and sufficient reserves were not at hand to consolidate the hold on the advanced positions. The Germans recovered from their bewilderment; reserves were hurried to the threatened spot; many of the defenders who had been overlooked in the trenches and dug-outs on the crest of Hill 70 recovered their organization and turned a reversed fire on their momentary conquerors. The Scots suddenly found themselves in a perilous situation and fought their way out only with the greatest difficulty, paying dearly for their magnificent temerity. The Forty-seventh Division on the south executed its appointed attack with notable precision and coöperated in the capture of Loos.

By the afternoon of the 25th the tide of the German counter-offensive was running strong and the British were struggling with the greatest difficulty to maintain themselves along Hill 70 and northward past the Quarries and Fosse 8. The Twenty-first and Twenty-fourth Divisions, forming the Eleventh Corps, which had been held in general reserve and placed at Sir Douglas Haig's disposition on the morning of the 25th were brought up during the night of the 25th-26th to relieve the hard pressed First and Fifteenth Divisions. But these were new formations that had never been under fire and the hurricane of steel into which they were suddenly launched was an ordeal which was almost beyond the limit of their endurance.

Gradually the British yielded ground throughout the 26th and the First and Fifteenth Divisions had to be recalled to the battle line. The British Guards Division was brought into action on the 27th to break the force of the German counter-offensive and win back the lost terrain. In desperate encounters it pushed back the adversaries on the northern flank of Hill 70, but was unable to consolidate a position on the crest. With the close of the period of intense conflict at the end of September the British front embracing Loos formed a very sharp salient, involving an excessive prolongation of the line, in consequence of which the Ninth French Corps took over the sector from Grenay northeastward to the northern slope of Hill 70.

The aggregate British losses in this conflict were about 45,000. The British gained some points of considerable tactical importance for the eventual resumption of the offensive. The military leaders declared that the purpose of the British effort had been fulfilled. But the public was generally disappointed in the results, and the impression of the spring remained, that the army had done all that personal gallantry could accomplish, but that the effect had been largely neutralized by failure in the leadership and especially by defective staff work.

The September offensive opened with the Tenth French Army in practically the same position in which the waning of the preceding great forward movement had left it at the end of June. Starting at the British right near Grenay, the French front passed west of Souchez village and then southeastward along the eastern margin of the famous Labyrinth where the Germans still clung to a few trench elements. The immediate objective of the Tenth Army was the Vimy Heights directly east of their position. These rise to an elevation of about 400 feet, dominate the Arras-Lens railway, and command an extensive view over the

rolling plain eastward towards the Scarpe. The German positions were held by nine divisions, while the Tenth French Army had been increased to seventeen divisions.

Unlike the operations on all the other sectors of attack, the initial charge of the Tenth Army was not launched until one o'clock on the afternoon of the 25th. At first the wings were more successful than the center, which encountered a very stubborn resistance in the ruins of the village of Souchez. On the 26th the French on the left wing crossed the little Souchez River, which winds through meadows east of the village, and started up the Vimy Heights, while the center dislodged the Germans from their cover on the site of Souchez.

The final movement against the heights was begun on the 28th. The defenders had meanwhile received strong reinforcements, including two divisions of the Prussian Guard. They had prepared a remarkable defensive organization which included a series of very largely connected subterranean shelters opening on a sunken road which ran along the slope about half way to the top. Here the contending forces came to a close and desperate engagement with hand grenades. The Germans were finally expelled from their positions and by the 29th the French held a line running just behind the crest, controlling the whole western slope.


The supreme feature of the September offensive operations as a whole was the French attack in the eastern part of Champagne on a front of about fifteen miles, a part of which corresponded with the battle-front of the earlier offensive undertaken there in February. The surface of this particular region is covered with irregular elevations and depressions and interspersed with woods and thickets. In general the Germans occupied the higher ground. The French front passed just south of Auberive, and just north of Souain, Perthes, and Massiges. North of Perthes a

natural corridor between wooded hills leads northward to the Hills 193 and 201 and the Butte de Tahure, a prominent elevation on the line of the second German position. Opposite Mesnil the Germans held a very strong position flanked by bastion-like elevations. The eastern flank of the German defensive system on the prospective sector of attack was formed by a strongly fortified position on Hills 191 and 199, north of Massiges, which were called La Main from their resemblance in outline to a hand, the fingers of which were outstretched in the direction of the French.

The chief positions of the Germans were two or three miles apart from front to rear. The first consisted of at least three, and sometimes five, parallel trenches. In some places these lines of trenches were separated by wire entanglements from fifteen to sixty meters broad. The second position consisted of a single trench. This position was almost entirely on the reverse side of a crest, so that it was concealed from direct observation of the French artillery. In addition to these main elements, there was a veritable maze of auxiliary intrenchments, communication trenches, isolated redoubts, hidden batteries, block houses, and machine-gun emplacements.

Through their intelligence agencies the French had prepared a battle-map of the proposed sector of attack which was a model of accuracy, showing every natural and artificial feature of the German position.

The Champagne offensive was executed by de Langle de Cary's Fourth Army, which consisted of the Second, Seventh, Twenty-first, and Colonial Corps, and doubtless received very strong reinforcements at the time. The artillery preparation, which was kept up uninterruptedly for three days, was the heaviest bombardment yet experienced on the western front. Parapets were levelled, barbed-wire entanglements wrecked, and subterranean



French officer and dog protected from poison gas by masks.



Type of gas masks used by the English to protect men and horses.



shelters blown to pieces on the German front, while depots, lines of communication, and sensitive points in the rear were shelled by the artillery of longest range.

In spite of a foggy, misty dawn, the attack was opened at the appointed moment, 9.15 on the morning of the 25th. Wave after wave of infantry swept across the space between the opposing fronts. The first part of the operation was executed with such unison, vehemence, and rapidity, that the first position of the Germans was quickly taken with much booty. Cavalry was sent into the zone between the first and second positions and swept in masses of prisoners and many guns. The French 75-centimeter guns were driven forward and coöperated admirably with the advancing infantry.

But soon the French encountered defensive elements which had not been demolished by the preliminary bombardment; the assaulting front was broken into zigzags; and the battle tended to resolve itself into a series of detached engagements which it would be tedious and scarcely profitable to consider in detail. A brief account of some of the more prominent features must suffice.

In the Souain sector the first attack met with brilliant success. On the left the assailants advanced a mile and a quarter, and in the center nearly two miles in less than an hour. In a great effort on the 27th the French perforated the last German position barring the way from Souain northward to the strategic railway at Somme-Py; but the breach was so narrow that they were unable to hold the advanced position.

The Germans had regarded as impregnable their position in "The Hand"; but in fifteen minutes the French scaled the heights north of Massiges on the 25th. The struggle for this position lasted eight days and was waged continuously with the greatest fury. Yard by yard the French fought their way forward through the communication

trenches in desperate hand-to-hand encounters. Continuous files of men stretching back to Massiges maintained the supply of bombs and hand grenades, the most effective ammunition in such a combat, by passing them forward from hand to hand. The final loss of Massiges Heights was a distressing blow for the German General Staff, which at first denied the fact and later claimed that the Germans had withdrawn voluntarily on account of the overwhelming violence of the French bombardment. The freedom of choice implied in this assertion recalls the voluntary renunciation of extensive tracts of French territory by the Germans directly after the Battle of the Marne the year before.

The offensive operations in Champagne, like those near Lens, died away about October 1st. Twenty-five thousand prisoners and 150 German guns remained in French hands as evidence against the German claim that the offensive movement in Champagne had been an expensive failure. The net gain for the French in territory was represented by an average advance of about two and one-half miles on a front of fifteen. The French military authorities expressed themselves in terms of satisfaction with the outcome.

The indirect results of the general offensive in the West may have been far more important than the tangible advantages in territory, booty, and the wastage of the enemy. For it is believed that ten or twelve divisions were withdrawn from the German front in Russia in consequence of the menace in the West, and the Franco-British effort corresponded roughly with the cessation of the phenomenal course of German victories in the East.

Yet the results as a whole fell far below the expectations of the people in the Allied countries and probably lowered still further the military prestige of the Allies in the estimation of certain neutrals upon whose opinion important consequences depended at this time.

## CHAPTER X

### THE STRUGGLE FOR VERDUN

Reasons for the offensive against Verdun. German preparations. Four stages of the offensive. The first stage, February 21-March 2: opening of the attack, steady advance of the Germans, the most critical period for the defenders, fierce struggle for Douaumont on the 25th; General Petain, his arrival; French lines of communication; the turning point. The second stage, March 2-April 11: extension of the combat to the left bank of the Meuse, the attack on March 4th. Successive attacks on Hills 295 and 304, general attack on April 9th. The third stage, April 11-May 3: the waning offensive and French counter-attacks. The fourth stage from May 3d until the waning of the offensive effort in the summer: advent of General Nivelle; renewed German attacks west of the Meuse and conquest of Hills 304 and 295; offensive east of the Meuse and capture of Fort Vaux; last great attack on June 23d. General observations on the struggle.

The great attack on Verdun can be consistently explained as the result of purely military reasons without recurring to such visionary or fantastic motives as the supposed madness of the Kaiser, the necessity of establishing the martial reputation of the Crown Prince, or the desire to thrill the imagination of the German people by the recovery of an ancient and celebrated bulwark of the mediæval empire. Zealous supporters of the throne no doubt rejoiced in the belief that the normal development of events would soon add to the future prestige of the reigning house the splendor of personal laurels of victory. But if this had been the fundamental aim, there is no good reason why the Heir Apparent could not have been transferred to the nominal command of any other section where the situation favored the launching of a decisive blow.

Despite the tremendous expansion of Germany's military strength throughout the first year of the war, the Germans accepted the maxim that time was fighting with their opponents. Any question as to the accuracy of this view does not concern us here. The essential fact is that the German leaders felt that they had no time to lose. For obvious reasons Germany was striving frantically for a decision.

Circumstances in the first winter of the conflict had compelled the Germans to struggle in the deep snows of the Carpathians and in the frozen wilderness of the East Prussian marshes. But Germany was now more fortunate, since she could choose the field for her offensive operations. The early Russian winter had cut short the favorable season for action on a grand scale in the East. The Central Empires turned their striking forces against Serbia and quickly overran the Balkan Peninsula as far as it was expedient to go, accomplishing the most important part of the Pan-Germanic dream of empire.

The Germans looked forward with assurance to the victorious resumption of operations for the overthrow of Russia; but five months intervened before an offensive could be profitably conducted in that direction, and relentless necessity permitted them no respite in their course of strenuous effort.

The western front remained, where operations on a grand scale could be undertaken before the close of winter. Russia, the Balkans, France, and again Russia,—this would be the appropriate round of successive fields of action, following the revolution of the seasons. One more tremendous effort in the West followed by the rapid transfer of the forces for the final thrust at Russia, a repetition of the original plan of operations, should bring the longed for culmination.

Germany resumed the initiative on the western front, choosing the place and form of her assault. With the





Map of the territory upon which took place the German offensive against Verdun in 1916

reversion to the West determined, the choice of Verdun as the sector of attack was the natural outcome of a clear, objective estimation of the possibilities and conditions at the different points along the line.

Defensive impulses, though scarcely yet acknowledged, already found a place in the deliberations of the German chiefs, who could not fail to see that Germany would inevitably lose the chance for a decisive victory and have to exert her utmost energy to avoid complete defeat, unless she managed to eliminate one of her principal opponents before all were fully ready. A marvellous course of victories, unrivalled since Napoleon's, had failed to gain this necessary end. After the collapse of Russia's striking power, the conspicuous development of the aggressive strength of the Allies in the West became the increasing source of Germany's preoccupation. This rising tide of hostile forces and equipment was the inexorable problem for the German General Staff. By sheer force of reckless daring, without adequate leadership or support, British units had on one occasion broken through the entire German system of defenses. What would happen when, to superior numbers and greater personal zest, there were added the foresight, effective coördination, and proficient generalship that must inevitably be acquired in the stern school of experience?

It was generally believed that the Franco-British forces would reach their maximum strength in the early part of the following summer. The situation as presented to the Germans constrained them to deliver a crushing blow before that time.

Sound principles of strategy, moreover, prompted them to parry the impending onslaught of the Allies by striking as far as possible from the chief centers of the opponents' strength, with the hope that the forces of the latter,

particularly those of the British, would be dissipated in a premature and desultory counter-operation or that their laborious organization would be confused and dislocated in an impulsive effort to reach and reinforce the threatened point.

This consideration suggested the Verdun sector, points beyond it towards the southeast being much less favorable for a grand attack.

The capture of Verdun by the Germans would deprive the French of an eventually valuable base for their own offensive operations. The front at Verdun was like a wedge awaiting a mighty impact to drive it straight through the German lines to the chief source of Germany's mineral supply. Besides, Verdun and the upper valley of the Moselle were the natural starting points for a converging movement against Metz, the closed gateway of southwestern Germany.

On the other hand, the fortress barrier extending from Verdun to Toul would constitute, in the possession of the Germans, a wonderfully effective base for offensive operations against the interior of France. The communications between this position and the ammunition factories and sources of supply in western Germany could quickly be brought to the highest state of efficiency. With Verdun captured and the northern flank turned, the remainder of the barrier, already undermined at St. Mihiel, and threatened with assault from the rear, would quickly crumble and fall into the hands of the Germans.

The loss of Verdun would involve the disruption of the French lines for a long distance in each direction. Verdun was the most prominent point on the western lines, the most exposed salient on any front. After the capture of St. Mihiel by the Germans, the hostile lines swept around Verdun on three-fifths of a circle. No other point was such a convenient target for the concentrated fire of artillery or

afforded the same advantage for the converging attack of infantry. In directing their forces against such a salient the Germans had an unusual space for the development of their rear organization, the cantonment of the troops and the elaboration of lines of supply and evacuation, depots and assembling points; they enjoyed the greatest freedom in the distribution of their forces; while the zone of access to the position of the enemy was restricted, the lines of communication were few and inadequate, and the defenders were cramped within a narrow arc. The Germans expected, not simply to indent the Allied front as heretofore, but to sever completely one of its organic sections, leaving the vital interior of France exposed.

Like the keystone of an arch, Verdun sustained the adjacent sectors of the front. The removal of the supporting member would inevitably result in the collapse of the entire structure.

Verdun lies in a depression in the midst of an undulating plateau, which is tilted upwards towards the east and rather abruptly cut from south to north by the winding course of the Meuse. From the elevated eastern border of the plateau, the now famous Heights of the Meuse, there is a steep descent to the plain of the Woëvre. The crest is a ridge of irregular outline which forms the watershed between the streams which descend eastward into the Woëvre and westward to the Meuse respectively, furrowing the slopes into deep ravines. This ridge, especially in the region of Douaumont, is the dominating feature of the entire position.

The Meuse, which is about 150 yards wide in the region of Verdun, was a strategical factor of very great importance. It divided the defensive zone into two parts; and yet the French, instead of concentrating their resistance on the western bank, which might have seemed more prudent,

clung to their eastern positions on the Heights of the Meuse, which formed a sort of natural bridge-head defense as well as an eventual sally-port for an incursion into Germany. The Germans doubtless regarded the position of the river as not the least of the factors in their favor. The Meuse interrupted the close cohesion of the defensive front; it largely deprived the French of the advantage of moving troops from point to point by short interior lines across the space inclosed within the rounding sector of their battle-front; and it hindered the replenishment of supplies of food and ammunition for the troops upon the eastern bank.

The Germans could shift their forces at will from bank to bank at a safe distance from the hostile front, but the bridges at Verdun, or any temporary crossing points available for the French, would be constantly exposed to bombardment by the hostile long range artillery.


The German plan comprised an initial attack of unprecedented fury from the north and northeast against the French positions on the right bank of the Meuse, supplemented by a turning movement from the east; and as soon as the first maneuver had succeeded, and the defenders of the east bank were retreating in disorder, choking the bridges and the war-torn streets of Verdun, a culminating operation on the west bank for sweeping up the whole French army.

Allusion has been made to the wonderful foresight with which the Germans, even when engaged in the most gigantic operations, found time for the systematic preparation of subsequent performances. Preparatory measures for the attack on Verdun, which was not launched until February 21, 1916, went back at least as far as the previous October, when the moral and physical training of the special striking force was started. The Fifteenth Corps





A street in Verdun after the German bombardment.



The Battle of Verdun. *Ammunition in readiness to be transported to the front.*

was taken from the Fourth Army, the Eighteenth Corps from the Second, the Seventh Reserve Corps from the Seventh, and the Third Corps was probably summoned from the East. These troops were installed in cantonments far from the fatigue and turmoil of the front, where they were refreshed in body and soul, and where all exercises calculated to harden their strength, increase their agility, and stimulate their eagerness were applied in anticipation of the supreme ordeal.

There came a period of ominous indications, when the whole world quivered with the expectation of impending great events. The attention of the Allies was challenged by a series of sharp attacks delivered at intervals along the entire course of the western front. At this time the Verdun sector was part of the front of General Humbert's Third Army, and Verdun itself was held by a comparatively small detachment. The French were not misled by any artifices. Perfectly aware of the formidable concentration before Verdun, the French High Command sent six infantry divisions and six artillery regiments to reinforce the units there.

In the zone selected for the first attack the Germans already held the northern edge of the high ground on the east bank of the Meuse. A great force of artillery was concentrated against a comparatively short section of the French front, where the Germans expected to bury the defensive organization beneath the overwhelming weight of their attack. They had beforehand reconnoitered all the French positions from the air and had computed the range of everything in sight. Never was a great military operation prepared with more elaborate skill, equipped with more powerful engines of destruction, or executed with a more astonishing combination of foresight and impetuosity.

The city of Verdun, still encircled by the bastioned enceinte of Vauban, the celebrated military engineer of Louis XIV, had become the center, since the war of 1870-1871, of a series of detached forts, thirty-six in all, forming a ring about thirty miles in circumference. Soon after the outbreak of the Great War the French, comprehending the lesson of Liège, Namur, and Antwerp, hastened to screen their chief centers of defense with lines of earthworks. A shifting defensive organization was substituted for the stationary one. The Verdun position became an integral part of the continuous front, resembling any other part, except that it was geographically one of the most important sectors. The heavy artillery was moved from the permanent forts to emplacements along the field works, where the pieces could be more easily concealed and their position shifted. The existence of the forts was henceforth little more than a casual circumstance; although popular imagination persisted for a time in regarding the position as essentially a closed and self-sustaining fortress, rather than a sector of the front.

The German Crown Prince, as commander of the Fifth German Army, was in official command of the German operations, but the report that old Marshal von Haeseler was his chief adviser was a myth. The general plans were drawn by the Chief of the General Staff, von Falkenhayn.

The Germans counted on winning Verdun by the tactics which had proven invincible in the Galician campaign. The successful advocates of the new offensive argued that no such tornado of fire with tremendous massed attacks of infantry as that which burst through the Russian lines on the Dunajec had been employed against the western Allies. They proposed to grind the opposing lines to dust by the overwhelming weight of men and guns employed against a narrow front. They probably expected that in each

successive stage of the attack the opponents' resistance would be crushed by action of the artillery, so that there would be little for the German infantry to do except to advance and occupy the ground already conquered. Preparations for the first attack were made along a front of about eight miles from Brabant to Ornes. More than 1,000 pieces, largely of heavy high-power artillery, were massed against this comparatively short section. The topography enabled the Germans to use the cover of several neighboring forests for their artillery and to intensify the effect by firing on converging lines against their opponents' convex front.

The first position of the French in the region of the initial attack ran from near Consenvoye, past Brabant, Caures Wood, and Herbebois, to Ornes. A second line ran through Samogneux, Hill 344, and Bezonvaux. The third position corresponded with the principal line of forts and was defined by the villages of Bras, Douaumont, and Har- daumont, by Fort Vaux, and the village of Eix. Eastward, it should be remembered, the French lines ran out into the Woëvre almost to Étain before they swung southwestwards to reach the Meuse at St. Mihiel.


The great struggle for Verdun may be conveniently divided into four general periods: the first, from February 21st to March 2d, the period of the German attacks from the north and northeast against the French positions on the right bank, creating the most perilous situation for the defenders on the 25th-26th; the second, extending to April 11th, the period of combined offensive operations on both banks, culminating in a general assault on the left bank; the third, continuing to May 3d, a period of desultory efforts by the Germans, with an increasing tendency of the French to strike back; and, finally, the fourth, a period of renewed intensive effort of the assailants during May and June, gradually subsiding after July 1st.

During the first stage of the conflict the gradual retirement of the defenders, who were confronted by a vastly superior array of men and means, was inevitable and expected. The assailant chooses the hour and place of his attack, the conditions of which can never be foreseen with absolute certainty by his opponent. In spite of the evidence at hand presaging an impending blow at Verdun, the French High Command could not immobilize a considerable part of their general reserve on any particular sector of the front until they could distinguish beyond a doubt between the essential undertaking of the enemy and his many deceptive demonstrations elsewhere. In the meantime it was the business of the holding units on the defensive lines at Verdun to serve as a buffer to retard the initial momentum of the attack, exact the heaviest possible toll for every rod of ground relinquished, and, if need be, sacrifice themselves for gaining time.


The composition of the German forces concentrated against the Verdun sector during the first stage of the great offensive, in the order of their position from the eastern border of the Argonne around to the limit of attacking operations in the Woëvre, was probably as follows: Seventh Reserve Corps, Fourteenth Reserve Division; Eighteenth, Third, and Fifteenth Corps; Bavarian Ersatz Division, Fifth Corps, Fifth Landwehr Division, and Third Bavarian Corps.

The Germans devoted comparatively little energy to the preparation of special trenches for the first assault. There were neither the customary parallels of departure nor saps projected perpendicularly to the general line of front. The attacking units congregated in the regular first-line trenches, where many bomb-proof shelters had been formed. Consequently, the space to be covered by the infantry in the assault varied greatly at different points along the line, and





General Joffre visits General Petain, commander of the forces defending Verdun.



A piece of woods completely stripped by shell-fire.

The Battle of Verdun.

in some places the attack was launched from the extraordinary distance of 1,100 meters.

Another circumstance that may have been an indication of the absolute confidence of the Germans in the invincibility of their artillery was the fact that the usual preparatory bombardment of forty-eight hours was reduced to one of much shorter length, but of indescribable fury. It began at 7.15 A. M. on February 21st. In the more exposed section the French trenches of the first line were demolished, the parapets levelled, the shelters disrupted, and the occupants blown to pieces or entombed alive; forests were blasted and the very contour of the hills was changed. But the defenders, although cut off from communication with the rear, held on with grim determination, and the French artillery replied to the enemy's fire and strove to diminish the intensity of the bombardment.

About 5 P. M. the German batteries lengthened their range and the demolition fire was converted into a barrage or curtain fire. At once the attacking waves of infantry advanced in close formation, 15,000 or 20,000 men to the mile of front. But contrary to expectation resistance had not been completely stifled in the French trenches. The Germans were received with a deadly fire of rifles and machine-guns where it was believed that no human beings could have survived.

In the center the bombardment had been successful and the assailants occupied, almost without encountering resistance, the first-line positions in the Wood of Hautmont and the Wood of Caures, which afforded useful cover. But the French line was still intact on both sides of this disrupted section, at Brabant and at Herbebois.

The continuation of the attack on the 22d opened with a discharge of liquid fire. The French slowly yielded ground, pivoting on their right wing which held fast at

Herbebois. In the following night Brabant on the left flank had to be evacuated. A fresh bombardment on the 23d was followed by a series of massed infantry attacks more violent than those before. One after another the assaulting waves advanced with unfaltering regularity only to be caught and overwhelmed in the fierce tempest of French fire. By their great superiority in numbers and the rapid succession of their attacks, the Germans hoped to outstrip the progressive wastage of their own effectives. The French, resisting with desperate courage, were borne back by sheer weight of the opposing numbers.

The loss of Wavrille Wood necessitated the abandonment of Herbebois. By the close of the 23d the French front ran from Samogneux, past Hill 344 and Beaumont, to Ornes, while behind this line Talou Hill and Poivre Hill were being hastily organized for defense.

The French lines projecting eastward into the Woëvre were now drawn backward to the foot of the Heights of the Meuse. The progress of the assailants continued uninterruptedly on the 24th. The French relinquished Ornes and Samogneux at the extremities of the sector of attack. The Germans captured Hill 344 and drove forward at the center near Louvemont almost to the last defensive line in front of Verdun. By nightfall the French front was almost back to the line of the chief forts. It formed an arc running from the Meuse at Vacherauville, along the northern edge of Poivre Hill, south of Louvemont, and through La Vauche Wood and Hardaumont to the eastern edge of the plateau.

The most critical period had now been reached. The Germans, after advancing about four miles in as many days, had nearly penetrated the inner margin of the defensive zone. The assailants, repeatedly relieved by the intervention of fresh forces, still fought with energy and force;

while the defenders, probably outnumbered five to one and thus far reinforced by only two brigades, could scarcely spare a single soldier from the battle-line. The same French troops who had faced the opening onslaught, after struggling almost incessantly for four days, were almost at the point of complete exhaustion. The fate of Verdun, and perhaps of France, depended on the speedy arrival of reinforcements, and on the capacity of the battle-worn defenders to hold their last position by a supreme effort of determination until such help should come.

The sector of attack had been contracted to a space of about five miles from Poivre Hill, which overlooks the Meuse, to Hardaumont Wood on the eastern margin of the heights. On the right wing of the French position stood Fort Douaumont, 600 feet above the level of the Meuse and just below the highest point of the entire region, a short distance southeast of Douaumont village and less than five miles on a straight line northeast of Verdun. The efforts of the Germans on the 25th were directed chiefly against Poivre Hill and the Douaumont position, the main bulwarks of the French front.

The day opened with a snowstorm and severe cold. Repeated attacks on Poivre Hill exposed to the flanking fire of the French batteries from the left bank of the Meuse failed to gain any appreciable advantage. The forces attacking Douaumont advanced by converging routes from a concave section of the German front. The German command was determined to take Douaumont at any cost, apparently regarding it as the real key of the entire situation. The Kaiser, accompanied by the chief members of the German Staff, hovered near to animate the ardor of the troops and share in the glory of the decisive victory now believed to be at hand. The Germans applied their familiar method of endeavoring to stop the avenues of death by the

mass and rapid succession of their assaulting waves. The dark columns of advancing troops were relieved against the white background of the snow. Rank after rank went down under the withering fire, but others sprang forward to take their places, and the net result of this repeated ebb and flow was steady progress towards the goal. Finally, the 24th regiment of Brandenburgers penetrated the French front and captured the ruined Fort Douaumont, although the French clung to the village on the west and the redoubt on the east. On the same afternoon the Germans took Louvemont.

History has recorded many an instance of a critical situation, upon which vital issues hung, saved by the timely arrival of a leader of determined personality and perfect self-possession, who by his moral influence revived the energy and faith of those about him.

General de Castelnau had inspected the situation at Verdun and come to the conclusion that the position east of the Meuse could and must be held. He summoned to the task one of his ablest lieutenants, a man who, perhaps more fittingly than any other, may be thought of as the embodiment of the new spirit of France, sobered and transfigured by the fiery ordeal.

General Petain, the hero of Verdun, was then approaching sixty years of age. He was colonel of the 33d regiment of infantry at Arras when the war began and was immediately put in command of a brigade which distinguished itself by its fierce rear-guard actions during the retreat from Charleroi to the Marne. Just before the Battle of the Marne Petain received command of the Sixth Infantry Division. In the spring of 1915 he returned to the region of Arras and as corps commander conducted the successful attack on Cerey which has already been described. As commander of the Army of Reserve in Champagne,





The Crown Prince of Germany distributing iron crosses on the Verdun front.



German heavy artillery before Verdun.

General Petain took part in the September offensive and won fresh distinction in the capture of the "Hand" of Massiges.

His quiet manner, keen intelligence, complete absorption in his profession, and lofty sense of duty were essential qualities for leadership in a warfare of science and endurance. One of his maxims, as repeated by a subordinate, is a fitting commentary on the leader of the victorious defense of Verdun:

"A troop becomes invincible when, prepared in advance to sacrifice itself, it determines to make the enemy pay for its sacrifice the dearest possible price."

General Petain arrived in Verdun in advance of his army on February 25th. But the Germans had now revealed their main purpose unmistakably and the French High Command took prompt and energetic measures in view of it.

As matters stood at the beginning of the great struggle for Verdun, the communications of the French army seemed quite precarious, and this was doubtless one of the chief considerations on which the assailants built their hopes. The railway line along the Meuse had been cut at St. Mihiel. The main line to Paris was exposed to the fire of the German long-range guns in the region of St. Ménéhould. There remained only the single track, narrow-gauge line to Bar-le-Duc, which in its actual state was entirely inadequate.

But the question of supplying and replenishing an army of 250,000 men on the right bank of the Meuse at Verdun without the help of railways had already been studied to the last detail by the French Staff. Within a few hours of the beginning of the Battle of Verdun nine or ten thousand motor-trucks had been assembled for the vital task of conveying men, ammunition, and provisions from Bar-le-Duc, the nearest point on an available trunk line, to beleaguered Verdun, a distance of somewhat more than twenty miles.

On February 21st, the first day of the struggle, the Bar-le-duc-Verdun highway was reserved exclusively for military traffic and placed under the control of an officer as Traffic Regulation Commissioner with his staff and sectional subordinates. Circulation was regulated with the strictness and precision that prevails in the operation of an important railway. For two months there was an uninterrupted procession day and night along this road. As many as 6,000 motor vehicles passed a given point within a single period of twenty-four hours. Without the organization and splendid efficiency of this service Verdun would have fallen. The Germans had thoroughly organized the railway system in their rear so as to establish immediate communication between the front and the bases of supply. It was a contest, therefore, between the automobile and the locomotive, in which the former was not found wanting.

General Petain launched a counter-offensive on the 26th. The Twentieth Corps repulsed the Brandenburgers, but the French failed to dislodge their opponents from the ruins of Fort Douaumont where they clung with unconquerable tenacity. The German striking force was now directed chiefly against the center and southeastern extremity of the sector of attack, where the conflict raged with unabated fury on the 27th and 28th.

The Fifth Corps and the Bavarian Third Corps strove to drive in the French right wing in the Woëvre. But the gains were everywhere incommensurate with the effort and heavy losses and the beginning of March brought a short period of comparative calm.

This interval preceded the opening of the second general stage of the conflict. The German command shifted men and material to the west bank of the Meuse and prepared to strike concurrently at Verdun from the northwest. The progress of the offensive in that quarter would soon

clear the French artillery from the positions on the left bank of the Meuse, opposite Poivre Hill, and, if continued further, would completely intercept the communications of Verdun in the rear.

From the Meuse the French lines ran westward up the narrow, marshy valley of Forges Brook, along the ridge north of Bethincourt and Malancourt, and then, bearing off southwestward, through Malancourt Wood and in front of Avocourt. The lower section of the valley of Forges Brook, is enclosed on the south by a ridge known as the Côte de l'Oie, or Goose's Crest, and near its western extremity the summits of Hill 295, or Le Mort Homme, and Hill 265, were two of the tactically most important points in the vicinity. The same general line of elevations continues westward beyond a southern affluent of Forges Brook and rises at one point to an altitude of 304 meters. The Germans could only reach their objective on the west bank by traversing or outflanking this important natural barrier.

The preparatory bombardment began on March 2d and lasted four days. Simultaneously, the Germans made a determined effort to gain Douaumont village. The furious tide of battle surged to and fro through this village, but left it in the hands of the Germans on the 4th, although the French retained possession of the ridge commanding it on the south. The opening infantry attack on the west bank was executed by two divisions of the Seventh German Reserve Corps on the 6th. The French soon evacuated their advanced positions near the river, because the Germans already outflanked them on the opposite bank, and fell back behind the summit of the Goose's Crest. Before evening the Germans occupied the entire eastern portion of this ridge and the French front swung to the southeast about a mile west of Forges village and ran obliquely across the Goose's Crest to reach the Meuse.

A furious contest raged on the 7th and 8th for the possession of the Crow's Wood, which occupies a central position on the Goose's Crest, but the French remained in possession of the greater part.

The Germans allowed their opponents no respite on the right bank of the river. On the night of the 8th-9th the Third German Corps with a brigade of the Ninth Reserve Division gained possession of Vaux village, southeast of Douaumont, but were quickly expelled by a French counter-attack. The Germans made repeated efforts to gain possession of this village, the importance of which was due to its position in a narrow ravine, opening eastward into the Woëvre plain and westward cutting deeply into the plateau. By gaining the surface of the heights up this ravine, the Germans could have reversed and made untenable the French positions on the ridge of Douaumont. After several unsuccessful efforts the Germans gained the eastern end of the village on the 11th, but failed to establish themselves upon the crest above.

The assailants realized that Hill 295, or Le Mort Homme, was the main supporting feature of the French defensive operations west of the Meuse and that the expulsion of the defenders from this position was absolutely necessary for the further progress of the attack. A bombardment of the French lines between Béthincourt and Cumières began on the 12th and rose to the highest pitch of intensity on the 14th, when German shells fell in the French positions at the rate of more than 120 a minute. The French artillery replied with equal spirit.

A force of about 25,000 Germans, immediately preceded and covered by a moving barrage, advanced from the Crow's Wood against Le Mort Homme. An outlying spur was captured, but the French saved the principal summit after a desperate and heroic struggle. A second attack from the

opposite direction two days later was taken in the flank by the fire of the French guns and broken up.

With the failure of these direct attacks against Le Mort Homme the German command decided to overcome resistance at this point by a turning operation further west. A fresh bombardment between Béthincourt and Avocourt opened on the 17th and reached its greatest intensity at noon on the 20th. That afternoon a Bavarian division forced its way through the eastern portion of Avocourt Wood to the lower slope of Hill 304 west of Le Mort Homme. Here the attack was renewed with larger forces on the 22d. The Germans steadily advanced and the situation on Hill 304 had become critical, when General Petain delivered an impetuous counter-attack on the 29th, driving the Germans from their advanced lines on the slope. Two days later the French troops at Malancourt, beset by greatly superior forces and exhausted by the enemy's repeated attacks, abandoned their exposed position, and the French front was withdrawn to a new line skirting the northern slope of Hill 304.

These aggressive operations on the left bank were accompanied by renewed efforts near the eastern border of the Meuse Heights, where the Germans penetrated to the western extremity of Vaux village and fought their way up the ascent towards the rear of the French lines along Douaumont ridge. The situation here had become critical, when the Germans were repelled by a furious counter-attack on April 3d.

After a few days' lull the struggle resumed its intensity on the west bank, and on the evening of the 7th the French were forced to abandon Béthincourt which had become a dangerous salient through the enforced recession of the front on both sides.

The German command now believed that the time had come for a culminating operation to bring their efforts on

the left bank to a victorious conclusion. This took the form of a general assault along the whole line west of the river, with an attack on Poivre Hill and a general bombardment and pressure on the right bank, altogether the most comprehensive movement during the entire struggle for Verdun. The principal attacks, each carried out by two divisions, were to be delivered in the directions of previous attempts, one from Crow's Wood against Le Mort Homme, the other from the Avocourt and Malancourt Wood against Hill 304.

On the morning of the 9th this fresh storm broke against the French positions, which had become more and more compact under the repeated battering of the assailants and with the gradual flattening of the French front. The preparations for the new attack had not escaped the attention of the French, who faced this supreme test with unflinching resolution.

The German troops attacking from Avocourt Wood were unable to debouch from cover of the trees, the effort from the Crow's Wood was repelled with heavy losses, and forces advancing between the Goose's Crest and the river were thrown back. The Germans repeatedly returned to the attack against the principal objective. The battle raged throughout the front on the next day, but by the 11th it became evident that in spite of the repeated intervention of fresh troops the German attack had failed.

The Germans had been unable to force their way through to Verdun when they enjoyed the advantage of the confusion created by their first whirlwind onslaught. They had persisted week after week in an enterprise which exacted a heavy cost for every yard of territory gained. The defensive became ever more consolidated, the progress of the assailants waned, and by the second half of April the battle lapsed into insignificant encounters, with a return to

inactivity apparently at hand. But the fear of losing prestige and of having to face the full shock of a great Allied offensive impelled the German High Command to renew the effort against Verdun, and the fierce recrudescence of the struggle in May and June, sometimes called the Second Battle of Verdun, will here be treated as the fourth stage of what was practically a continuous battle.

About this time General Petain received a well-deserved tribute for his masterly defense of Verdun by promotion to group commander of the central sector from Soissons to Verdun. He was succeeded in the command of the Second Army defending Verdun by General Nivelle, who had had a similarly rapid advancement since the beginning of the war. Nivelle was colonel of the 5th artillery at Besançon, forming part of the Seventh Corps, in the summer of 1914 and with his unit participated in the first invasion of Alsace. After the Seventh Corps was incorporated in the Sixth Army under General Maunoury, Nivelle won distinction in the fighting on the Ourcq and was promoted successively to the command of a brigade, a division, and the Third Army Corps. He was sent to the Verdun front in April, 1916, a few weeks before he succeeded Petain in command of the Second Army.

In consequence of the physical conditions and of the varied fortunes of the struggle west of the Meuse, the contour of the fronts had become scallop-shaped so that both sides were exposed to flank attacks at different points. The German command decided to crush the protruding sections of the French front covering Hill 304 and Le Mort Homme by a concentrated attack of great intensity. A terrible bombardment beginning on May 3d obliterated the trenches on Hill 304 and was followed by a massed infantry attack late in the afternoon of the 4th, which resulted in the capture of the French lines on the northern slope of the hill.


On the 7th a still more formidable assault was delivered from three sides against Hill 304, while the German barrage fire isolated the defenders of the elevation from communication with the rear. After a heroic defense against an enemy attacking repeatedly with the strength of an army corps, the two French regiments defending the summit were compelled to retire to a line south of the crest.

The fury of the offensive was next turned against the French positions on Le Mort Homme which were now exposed on both sides. A bombardment by more than sixty batteries of heavy artillery prepared the ground for the attacking infantry, which gained the summit, May 20-21. The defenders withdrew to positions on the southern slope.

The Germans attempted to turn the French front west of the Meuse by a vigorous forward thrust along the left bank of the river, taking Cumières. But the French rallied and by desperate fighting at close quarters drove the Germans from the greater part of the ruins of Cumières and blocked their advance on the 26th.

Finally, a general attack west of the Meuse, prepared with the heaviest bombardment and supported by five fresh German divisions, on the 29th, failed to make any decisive gains or break the French front, which was now established on a more direct line south of the much contested crests.

In the meantime, the French had counter-attacked east of the Meuse at Douaumont to relieve the pressure on the left bank. The artillery preparation began on the 20th and on the morning of the 22d a French aëroplane squadron destroyed a number of the German captive kite-balloons, commonly used for observation purposes, by dropping on them bombs of a new type, which, bursting in mid-air, scattered numerous smaller bombs charged with a highly inflammable compound. The French infantry, attacking



*View of Fort Douaumont taken from an aéroplane at the altitude of 1,200 meters on May 19, 1916, before the preparation for the French attack.*



*Under bombardment by the French artillery on the day preceding their attack, May 21, 1916. The recapture of Fort Douaumont. From photographs by the photographic section of the French army.*



with great ardor on the same day, won back the greater part of Fort Douaumont, but was compelled to relinquish most of its gains within twenty-four hours. The conflict was waged with great fury within the ruins of the fort.

The Germans now transferred the chief weight of their offensive to the right bank and tried to turn the inner fortified line in front of Verdun by attacking it at the same time on front and flank. The advance was started from the position won by the Germans on February 26th, less than five miles from Verdun.

The bombardment of the French position at Fort Vaux began on May 29th. The German infantry fought its way up the wooded slopes northwest of Fort Vaux and advanced from Damloup on the southeast, converging from two sides on June 1st. Wave after wave was mowed down by the fire of rifles and machine-guns, but the French front was finally pressed back on the 2d, leaving Fort Vaux with a small detachment of five hundred and fifty men completely isolated. These maintained a heroic resistance until the 6th, holding the main building with their machine-guns against the Germans, who had gained the outer walls, and only capitulated when further effort was impossible.

The weight of the attack was now thrown against the central section of the French front east of the Meuse. By June 12th the Germans had reached a point west of Thiaumont within three and three-quarters miles of Verdun. The last great attack was delivered on June 23d, when 100,000 men were flung against a front of about three miles. Fort Thiaumont was taken and the next day the contest raged in the streets of Fleury, where the French held their ground and stayed the advancing tide. They recovered Fort Thiaumont in a counter-attack on the 30th.

The combined offensive of the Western Allies in the valley of the Somme, starting July 1st, sapped the vitality

of the German operations against Verdun. There were periodic outbursts of activity during July and August but these do not concern us. A period of stagnation gradually setting in on this sector marked the termination of a struggle which had been carried on without interruption since February 21st, at the time the longest continuous battle in history.

The statements of the inspired German press, taxing its ingenuity to prove that the purpose of the General Staff had been achieved at Verdun, is refuted by the evidence of obvious facts. For a period of four months the operative strength of the empire had been employed with frenzied energy. More than half a million men had eventually been concentrated against the Verdun sector. But the methods which had been so strikingly successful on the Dunajec and Biala failed to blast an opening in the French lines. The German High Command had only 130 square miles of scarred and battered territory, two demolished forts, and about forty ruined villages to show for their heavy losses, certainly not less than 250,000 men, and their vast expenditure of ammunition. The drain on Germany's mobile reserves must have been seriously felt throughout the summer. The heroism of the defenders, rallying, against greatly superior forces and equipment, to the battle-cry: "They shall not pass," added imperishable pages to the glorious military records of France.

## CHAPTER XI

### OPERATIONS ON THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONTIER

Physical difficulties confronting the Italians: barrier of the Alps and the threatening salient of the Trentino, the important strategical positions in the hands of Austria-Hungary. General Cadorna. The Italian plan. Italian progress on the Isonzo and in the north. Daring feats of the Alpini. The Austro-Hungarian attack in the region of the Isonzo. Disappointing results of the first campaign. Italy's anomalous position. Underlying motives of Teutonic strategy in 1916. Preparations for the great Austro-Hungarian offensive from the Trentino. The critical situation of the Italian forces. The waning of the attack. Italian counter blows. The capture of Gorizia.

At this point we may appropriately turn our attention to the operations on the Austro-Italian frontier, which were entering on a new and more intensive stage, and were becoming much more closely correlated with the course of action in the other fields.

The Italians had been confronted from the first with very formidable difficulties due to the geographical configuration of the zone of operations. The Austro-Italian boundary, from the Stelvio Pass at an altitude of 9,000 feet to the shore of the Adriatic near its northeastern angle, about 500 miles in length, exceeded in extent the entire battle-line in France and Flanders. The Julian and Carnian Alps enclose the Venetian plain within their arc-shaped barrier on the northeast and north, while further west the sharp projecting wedge of hostile territory in the Trentino threatened the heart of industrial Italy and the communications of all the Italian armies in the field. The demarcation of the Austro-Italian boundary at the close of the last war in 1866 had left the important strategical positions, the

mountain crests and summits of the passes, for the most part in Austrian hands; and in consequence of her unfavorable situation in this respect Italy had been constantly exposed to sudden attack by her ancestral enemy, and the desire to obtain a secure military boundary found a place beside the wish to liberate the kindred population of "Italia irredenta" as an effective motive for Italian intervention in the Great War.

Political and sentimental considerations made Trieste the chief objective for an Italian offensive. But Italy could not conduct a vigorous and sustained offensive toward the east until every outlet for an Austro-Hungarian counter-offensive from the Trentino had been securely blocked. The project for an immediate drive of overwhelming force into the plains of northern Italy, planned by General Conrad von Hötzendorff, the Austro-Hungarian Chief of the General Staff, as the opening and decisive maneuver upon the outbreak of hostilities, could not be executed. Yet on the other hand, while Italy had learned many valuable lessons during the nine months of her neutrality, no nation can put forth the maximum effort until it is engaged in a struggle for existence. From the nature of the situation as described above, the success of an attack on Austria-Hungary would depend on the swiftness and extent of the initial onslaught and the capture of the keys to the important mountain passes. The effect of the first assault of the Italians was impaired by the incompleteness of the Italian preparations and equipment as well as by the delay in entering on hostilities interposed at the last moment through the intrigues of von Bülow and Giolitti, which enabled the enemy to reinforce his positions.

General mobilization was ordered in Italy on May 22, 1915, and executed without confusion or interruption of the normal activity of the country, because a state of partial mobilization already existed. King Victor Emmanuel left



A big Italian gun screened from aeroplane observation. *From a photograph by the official photographic section of the Italian army.*



A road on the Italian Alpine front screened with matting.



Rome on May 25th and assumed the position of commander-in-chief of all the armies. But the actual conduct of operations was entrusted to Count Luigi Cadorna, whose father had crowned a distinguished career in the wars for the unification of the country by leading the troops who captured Rome in 1870. The present Count Cadorna was a calm and methodical, but resourceful commander. He had won an international reputation by his writings on military subjects and had supervised the reorganization of the army during the period of neutrality. He enjoyed the absolute confidence of the nation.

The Italian plan of operations called for a vigorous effort all along the front, with the chief attack eastward to force the evacuation of Trieste and Istria. In the early days of June the war was everywhere carried into the enemy's territory. The Italians secured the keys to many passes and the Austro-Hungarian forces retired to well-fortified positions further back. Just beyond the border on the east, the Isonzo, flowing towards the Adriatic in a winding course, extended like a moat before the enemy's mountain fastnesses. Gorizia, situated on the left bank of the Isonzo, was the chief town and fortress of this region. South of Gorizia lay the barren limestone ridge of the Carso, scarred with caverns and depressions. Converted by the Austrians into a labyrinth of intrenchments, the Carso dominated from the flank the coast route to Trieste.

By June 27th the Italians had gained a bridge-head on the left bank of the Isonzo and early in July had crossed the lower course of the river at all points. But Monte Sabatino and Monte Podgora, respectively 2,000 and 800 feet in altitude and strongly fortified, remained in the hands of the Austrians on the right bank and covered Gorizia.

The operations on the northern border were distinguished by the brilliant conduct of the Alpini or Italian

mountain troops, who scaled the sheerest cliffs and carried warfare to lofty regions scarcely reached by the most daring sportsmen. The guerilla operations in these regions of eternal ice and snow, on rocky ledges and solitary trails, in nooks and crannies over dizzy precipices, abounded in heroic episodes that will never be recorded. The Austro-Hungarian armies displayed remarkable ingenuity in their use of artillery for mountain warfare. Heavy guns had been mounted in permanent emplacements with revolving turrets on commanding crests, while the slopes that overlooked the passes were studded with machine-gun nests and field-gun posts, skilfully concealed on ledges or in natural recesses.

The Italians strove with tireless energy to overcome the advantage which the enemy had gained by his elaborate preparation. Roads had to be constructed in the mountainous regions under conditions of great difficulty for the movement of the heavy guns and of the supplies of ammunition. Sometimes a whole company, or even a battalion, was harnessed to a single gun to draw it to the suitable position. Desperate engagements were carried on at altitudes of 7,000-9,000 feet. Gradually the Italians gained the commanding positions in the passes that converge on Trent.

During the last week in August the Austro-Hungarian forces delivered a furious offensive in the region of the Isonzo. The Italians brought up reserves and counter-attacked with great force and the battle raged with varying success for about two weeks, leaving the Italians in strong positions near the western summit of the Carso.

But, in general, operations settled down to trench warfare. The Italians were greatly hampered by the scarcity of coal and limitation in the output of ammunition. The results of the first campaign were rather disappointing. The Italians had gained no conspicuous advantage and their

action had apparently not checked the course of Teutonic victories elsewhere. There was a feeling both at home and abroad that the Italian campaign had not been conducted with the full force of the nation.

The position of Italy was in fact anomalous, in that she was fighting Austria-Hungary alone, and not the latter's ally, Germany. Italy declared war against Turkey on August 21st, and against Bulgaria in October, but her official attitude towards Germany remained the same. Diplomatic relations between Rome and Berlin had been severed upon Italy's entry into the war, but the rupture had been preceded by an agreement in which the Italian government consented not to sequester German property throughout the kingdom in return for certain privileges accorded Italians long resident in Germany.

The support of a majority of the Italian people had been won for war with Austria-Hungary. But German influence had penetrated too deeply into the intellectual and economic life of the peninsula to be uprooted in a day. The tendency to engage in war with Germany was not yet strong enough to overcome the opposition of those who were still swayed by admiration for the powerful ally of a generation or were led by economical connections to hope for the return of amicable relations, or the reluctance of others who were awed by the swift destruction wrought by German might. Germany who had valuable interests at stake in Italy would certainly not institute hostilities herself. During the period of more than a year before the pressure of events led Italy to declare war on Germany, this ambiguous situation undoubtedly reacted unfavorably on the progress of Italian arms by retarding the complete and hearty coöperation between Italy and her allies, and by leaving the way open for the baneful intrigues of German secret agencies within the kingdom.

At the opening of the Chamber on December 1st Baron Sonnino announced that Italy had formally adhered to the pact of London, binding herself not to conclude a separate peace. A visit of M. Briand, the French Prime Minister, to Rome in February, 1916, was part of an effort for closer coöperation between the Allies. The Italian Ministers Salandra and Sonnino and General Cadorna attended the Allied Conference convened in Paris on March 27th, which was an important step in the same direction. General Cadorna also visited London and Mr. Asquith went to Rome and visited the King of Italy at the front. In this way mutual confidence was strengthened and expression given to the desire for unity of aim and effort.

As we have already observed, the hope of the Central Powers to bring the war to a triumphant issue seemed in the early part of 1916 to depend upon their ability to forestall the simultaneous offensive of all their opponents by dealing shattering blows on chosen sectors of the hostile fronts. The attack on Verdun was the most prominent application of this frenzied strategy. But while the result of that effort was still doubtful, the Austro-Hungarian High Command launched a great offensive southward from the Trentino for the purpose of cleaving the main trunk of northern Italy.

The supposed incapacity of Russia for any serious aggressive action was regarded as a welcome opportunity for delivering the decisive blow at Italy. With powerful forces concentrated behind the boldly protruding front of the Trentino, it seemed possible to overwhelm the Italian lines, which were poorly organized in this section, break through to the Venetian plains, and cut off all the Italian armies operating on the northeastern front.

A glance at the map will show that Trent, near the southern extremity of the great transalpine route descending





War Council of the Allies at the French headquarters. Reading from left to right: General de Castelnau, France; Sir Douglas Haig, Great Britain; General Wielmans, Belgium; General Gilinsky, Russia; General Joffre, generalissimo of all the French armies; General Porro, Italy; and Colonel Pechitch, Serbia.

from the Brenner Pass by the valleys of the Eisak and Adige, was the key to northern Italy by reason of the important highways radiating from it. Southeastwards a road runs through the Val Sugana to Vicenza, Padua, and Venice; southward the main route along the Adige continues through the Val Lagarina to Verona; and southwestwards the Val Judicaria opens towards Brescia and Milan. In this region the Austro-Hungarian forces could be safely assembled under cover of the rounding barrier of mountains and could freely choose the direction of their attack.

But at the same time Trentino presented serious difficulties as the zone of departure for an offensive movement on a grand scale. Southern Tirol was the most excentric part of Austria-Hungary. Only two lines of communication led toward it, the railway routes over the Brenner and through the Pusterthal, and these unite, so that from Franzensfeste southward to Trent one double-track railway had to provide the necessary transportation for the supply and evacuation of the attacking armies. The situation precluded any imitation of von Hindenburg's sensational strategic feats achieved by shifting powerful forces for successive unexpected blows at different points around the perimeter of Venetia. Once the offensive had been launched, the Austro-Hungarian army could account itself fortunate if the railway facilities sufficed for sustaining the aggressive effort on the original lines of operations.

At this time the Austro-Hungarian front from the Adriatic Sea to Tolmino was held by the Fifth Army under General Boroëvic von Bojna, comprising the Seventh and Sixteenth Corps. Between Tolmino and Carnia lay the Tenth Army commanded by General von Rohr. The Fourteenth Corps, recruited in the Tirol, defended the Pusterthal north of Cadore, and the Trentino was held by the armies of General Dankl and General von Koevess.

The Archduke Charles Francis Joseph, Heir-Apparent of the Austro-Hungarian throne, now assumed the supreme command in the Trentino, where, during the spring months, the forces were increased in anticipation of the great offensive to eighteen divisions, or at least 400,000 effectives, with 2,000 pieces of artillery, 800 of them being heavies, including forty 305-millimeter Skoda howitzers, four 385-millimeter naval guns, and four of the famous 420-millimeter mortars.

The line from the Adige to the Val Sugana, a distance of about thirty miles, was chosen as the sector for the Austro-Hungarian attack. At this time the Italian front left the eastern bank of the Adige at a point about fifteen miles north of the boundary, skirted the northern slope of the mountain mass of Pasubio, ran from there northeastward just within the Austrian frontier, and then turning northward from the vicinity of the Cima Manderiolo to Mount Collo cut deep into Austrian territory west of Borgo. But the main bulwarks of the defense were Mount Pasubio, the ridge south of the Val Posina, and the Sette Comuni plateau, all behind this line. The Italian front in this region as a whole, running as it did athwart the valleys, was broken by the intervening ridges and was thus defensively weak from want of good lateral communications. In many places the first line was only a series of detached outposts, often situated at elevations where they could only be supplied by aërial cars suspended from cables.

In April General Cadorna inspected the First Army on this sector and substituted General Pecori-Giraldi as commander for the inefficient General Brusati.

The great Austro-Hungarian attack was preceded by a laborious preparation in building roads; forming great accumulations of ammunition and supplies, replenishment depots, and transport parks; constructing hospitals, artillery emplacements, and the necessary additional trench

system. It was intended to repeat the Dunajec victory of the year before by a concentrated bombardment of similar intensity, followed by successive massed attacks.

The bombardment opened along the entire sector on May 14th and the attack of the infantry was launched on the evening of the 15th. The Italian left wing retired until resistance rested on the heights of Coni Zugna and Pasubio, which commanded the road from Rovereto to Schio, a key to the rear of the Italian center. The desperate conflict in this section reached a climax on the 30th with the Austro-Hungarian attack on the Buole Pass, which would have opened a way into the lower valley of the Adige. The invaders were repulsed, largely through the gallant conduct of the Thirty-seventh Italian Division. But the conflict raged around the slopes of Pasubio for three weeks more before the offensive finally spent its force.


In the center it was impossible for the Italians to hold their inadequate defenses against the crushing bombardment. Valuable strategic positions had to be abandoned almost without a struggle, and the left center withdrew behind the Posina on May 24th. The Austro-Hungarian forces descending the Val Posina occupied the small town of Arsiero, seven miles within the Italian border and assailed the position on the ridge of Mount Ciove, only eighteen miles from Vicenza and three miles from the plain. The Italians clung to their last mountain defenses with grim determination against heavy odds. To the troops defending this ridge south of Arsiero, General Cadorna issued his memorable order on June 3d: "Remember that here we defend the soil of our country and the honor of our army. These positions must be defended to the death." One Italian brigade of 6,000 men fighting on Mount Ciove lost two-thirds of its effective strength in killed and wounded during these crucial days.

But already the Italian resistance was stiffening. Orders had gone forth for the concentration of all available reserves at Vicenza, where the formation of the Italian Fifth Army was rapidly accomplished with a complete equipment of transport columns, field kitchens, sanitary service, heavy artillery, and abundant stores of ammunition. By June 3d powerful reinforcements from this source were arriving at the threatened points, and General Cadorna could announce that the progress of the invasion had been checked.

Further towards the Italian right the Austro-Hungarian forces had reached Asiago on May 28th, eight miles within the border. Here the assailants gained the greater part of the Sette Comuni plateau, but on June 18th twenty battalions flung as a culminating effort against a front of two miles were driven back with heavy losses.

The tide had everywhere turned and the Italians were pushing their counter-offensive with increasing force. The Austro-Hungarian armies drew back in good order without relinquishing all their gains, and dug themselves in on a new line from three to seven miles in advance of the old one and in better positions.

Meanwhile, the Italian Chamber had convened on June 6th while popular feeling was still deeply affected by the impressions of the critical period from which the nation was just emerging. The hardships and privations of the struggle, the disappointment in the hope of a rapid victory, the revelation of defects in the Italian preparations, and the anxiety created by the present situation were reflected in a general state of restlessness. The prime minister's admission that General Brusati, commander of the First Army, had been lax in the preparation of defenses involved the government in blame. The extreme parties joined in an attack upon the ministry; a vote of confidence was lost on June 10th, and Signor Salandra resigned two days later.





Map showing the Austro-Italian frontier.

Signor Baselli was entrusted with the formation of a new ministry in which Signor Sonnino retained charge of foreign affairs.

The Austro-Hungarian offensive with all its elaborate preparation, excellent equipment, and superiority of fire, had deferred, but not prevented, the intended powerful Italian offensive on the Isonzo front, for which methodical preparations were now under way. In July, 1916, the Italian front in this sector still lay west of the river from Tolmino to below Gorizia, except at one point where the Italians held a bridge-head on the eastern bank in a bend of the river opposite Plava.

Gorizia lies in a recess of strongly fortified mountains and is screened by the lesser heights of Monte Sabotino, Oslavia, and Podgora on the west bank of the Isonzo, which were still held by the Austro-Hungarian forces. The Italian front crossed the Isonzo southwest of Gorizia and ran along the margin of the Carso to the sea. A depression called the Vallone runs southward from the plain of Gorizia to the sea, setting off the rounding western extremity of the Carso as a chord defines the segment of an arc. At the northern extremity of this western segment, in the angle between the Vallone and the valley of the Isonzo, rises Monte San Michele, the key to the possession of Gorizia. The Fifth Austro-Hungarian Army under General Boroëvic von Bojna holding the front from Tolmino to the sea was confronted by the Italian army commanded by the Duke of Aosta. It is probable that the Austro-Hungarian commander overestimated the effect of the offensive launched from the Trentino and did not expect any serious effort against Gorizia during the remainder of the campaign.

The Italian bombardment commenced on August 1st along the entire front from Monte Sabotino to the sea. By attacking near Monfalcone on August 4th, the Italian

right drew the enemy's attention to that quarter. Two days later the bombardment was resumed with greater fury on the real front of attack extending about eight miles from Monte Sabotino to Monte San Michele. The advanced works of the enemy were largely demolished and at four P.M. the Italian infantry sprang to the attack with great ardor.

On Monte Sabotino the Italian forces captured the first three trench lines in twenty minutes and within an hour had gained the summit 1,500 feet above the river. Podgora offered more serious resistance and was only completely won after two days of desperate fighting. The storming of San Michele, which presented very great difficulties, was also accomplished in two days. By noon on August 8th all the heights on the west bank together with San Michele were in the hands of the Italians.

The main part of the Italian army crossed the Isonzo on the morning of the 9th and on the same day the King of Italy and the Duke of Aosta made their triumphant entry into Gorizia while the Austro-Hungarian forces retired eastward.

The offensive was now turned in the direction of Trieste but waned by the 15th after the whole surface of the Carso west of the Vallone had been won. The Italians had taken 18,758 prisoners during these operations, including 1,393 officers.

The capture of the entrenched camp of Gorizia, the chief Austro-Hungarian defensive center on the Isonzo front, was greeted with profound satisfaction throughout Italy and contributed to the renewed national spirit of confidence and resolution. Thus encouraged, Italy declared war on Germany, August 28th, putting an end to an anomalous situation and removing a great obstacle to the complete community of interest with her allies.

## CHAPTER XII

### THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME

The difficulties of the Allies and the need of closer coöperation. First joint war council of the Allies in Paris, March 27-28, 1916. Auspicious course of Allied operations in 1916. The situation in Picardy. Dispositions for the Allied offensive in the region of the Somme. Character of the German defensive organization. Aims of the British and French. Three general stages of the battle. The first stage, July 1-13: the initial attack by the Fourth British and Sixth French Armies and its results; further advances of the British; the progress of the French. The second stage: general attack on July 15th and the capture of the second German position by the British; the attack on July 23d; capture of Pozières; French attack north of the Somme; the attack on September 3d and the intervention of the Tenth French Army. The general hopeful situation for the Allies. The third stage, September 15-November 18: general attack on September 15th and first appearance of the "tanks"; attack of September 25th and occupation of Combles; disappointing effect of the weather on the Allied plans; desultory offensive operations; closing of the battle with the attack of the Fifth British Army. Results of the battle.

We have already seen that the successes of the Central Powers were largely due to a virtually unified supreme command, which insured coherent strategy, the strict subordination of every effort to the attainment of the crucial aims, and the unhesitating execution of the plans adopted. The available operative forces were shifted and grouped with singleness of purpose to dash with staggering effect upon the more clumsy enemy. On the other hand, the Allies labored under the difficulties inherent in coalitions, which are familiar to every student of European history. Chief among them is the demoralizing effect of diverse political ambitions on military policy. The aims of the several members of a coalition rarely coincide at the

beginning, and there is still further danger that discrepancies will be generated or increased through the vicissitudes of a protracted struggle. Confusion of ultimate aims is inevitably reflected in incoherent military efforts. The outcome is rarely satisfactory to all the partners and even the terms of a victorious peace are apt to contain the germs of future strife between them.

The league of the Central Powers was practically free from these distracting tendencies, because the prominence of Germany gave her a position of unquestionable superiority, imposing her strategical conceptions upon her partners. In moments of depression the Germans derived assurance from the reflection that Prussia had emerged unconquered from the Seven Years' War, when the odds against her were far greater than the preponderance of Germany's opponents at the present time.

Lack of a consistent policy and prompt coöperation were largely responsible for the misfortunes of the Allies, such as the failure at the Dardanelles, the diplomatic reverses in the Balkans, the collapse of Serbia, and the defeats of Russia. The most important lesson taught by the experience of eighteen months of warfare was the need of unity in aim and strategy.

With this in view the first joint war council of the Allies was held in Paris on March 27-28, 1916. France, Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, and Serbia were represented by their premiers and foreign ministers, and Russia, Japan, Montenegro, and Portugal by their ambassadors or ministers. Generals Joffre, Castelnau, Cadorna, and Robertson, Lord Kitchener, Mr. Lloyd George, and M. Thomas were present at the council. It could scarcely be expected that nations so diverse, so jealous of their independence, and so conscious of their individuality would sacrifice their egoistic sensibilities to the point of accepting the supreme



“Le Cerf Volant.”

“The Flying Stag,” as the arrangement is called by the French, is a train of box-kites with an observation basket suspended from the retaining rope. Used on days too windy for balloons or aeroplanes.



Zeppelin observation car. From a Zeppelin brought down in East Anglia: it is fourteen feet long, built of aluminium and weighs one hundred and twenty-two pounds. It was suspended by a wire cable 5,000 feet in length, through which ran a telephone wire. Observation windows are at the front and vertical and horizontal stabilizers at the stern.



advantage of a single high command. Yet undoubtedly an effective step in the direction of closer coöperation was taken at this meeting, while the general lines of strategy were laid down for the following campaign.

As a further indication of the desire to reach a common policy, mention may here be made of the Economic Conference of the Entente Powers, held in Paris, June 14-17 of this same year, when plans were approved for making the blockade more effective and prolonging the commercial contest after the war by a partial exclusion of German goods.

The first part of 1916 was a period of increasing promise for the Allies. Great Britain had nerved herself to compulsory service. France maintained the same intense degree of effort without signs of exhaustion. The Western powers had carried out a comprehensive industrial mobilization and had enormously increased their output of munitions. In Great Britain, for instance, four days' production of heavy shells now equalled the entire output of the first year of the war. When the Germans were wasting their picked troops in feverish efforts to break down the defense of Verdun, the operations of the Allies began to show the rational sequence of a well-developed plan. While the Italians resisted the fierce onslaught of their opponents from the Trentino, and the choicest Austro-Hungarian units were immobilized in an excentric corner of the empire, the Russian offensive was launched with unexpected vigor. Later, when the spare forces of the Central Powers had been diverted to the Eastern front, the gradually accumulated tempest broke with formidable force against the German bulwarks in the West. From June to October, 1916, the military organization of the Central Powers labored under the terrible pressure on both sides.

By the spring of 1916 the British military system had undergone a phenomenal transformation. The four original

divisions on the continent had been increased to seventy, including the Indian and colonial contingents. There were about 1,500,000 British troops in Belgium and France and as many more in training and concentration camps and garrisons at home. A Military Service Bill, which was introduced into the House of Commons on May 3d and became law on the 25th, extended the principle of compulsory service to all married men between the ages of eighteen and forty-one. In March the British had taken over the entire sector of the Tenth French Army, which had so long adjoined them on the south in Artois, the French being transferred to a sector further south. Thereafter the British front stretched from Boesinghe southward to a point slightly beyond the Somme and covered a distance of twenty-five miles in Belgium and sixty-five in France. They were faced on this front by about forty German divisions in line and in the local reserves, forming, in order from north to south, the Fourth Army, formerly of the Duke of Württemberg, the Seventh of the Crown Prince of Bavaria, and the right wing of the Second, whose former commander, General von Bülow, had been succeeded by General Otto von Below, cousin of the General Fritz von Below who commanded the Eighth Army on the eastern front in Courland. On December 15, 1915, announcement had been made of the promotion of General Sir Douglas Haig to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in France and Belgium, succeeding Field-marshal Sir John French, who, upon his own request, was relieved of the command of the forces on the continent. He was created a viscount and given the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Armies in the United Kingdom. Sir Douglas Haig will be recalled as commander of the First British Army Corps and subsequently of the First Army, and he had shown himself to be "a skilful, bold, and decisive" general.

All through the spring of 1916, while the French were struggling manfully against superior strength at Verdun, the British remained inactive or were engaged in merely desultory incidents of trench warfare. This contrast, upon which German commentators dwelt with the obvious intention of sowing jealousy and mistrust between the allies, accorded with the mutual understanding of the French and British leaders. The British were intentionally reserved for the chief part in the great offensive effort after the Germans had worn down their strength in costly efforts on the Meuse. The British, furthermore, were not yet fully prepared for an operation of the desired scope, intensity, and duration.

To provoke a premature counter-offensive by the British would have suited German interests, as the Germans feared above all a simultaneous onslaught of their adversaries. As it was, the combined British and French offensive was somewhat hastened by the need of relieving the severe pressure upon the Verdun sector.

The theater selected for the long contemplated blow was the region of Picardy, where the Somme winds through a belt of green fields and meadows enclosed by irregular elevations of chalky formation. Although this sector lay near the most prominent part of the general salient formed by the German lines in northern France, no important fighting had occurred upon it since the memorable race for the North Sea in the autumn of 1914. Throughout this section the Germans held the commanding positions. Running southward from Artois, the German front line descended the southern slope of the watershed and crossed the Ancre, a tributary of the Somme, about five miles above Albert, bore off southeastward to the village of Fricourt beyond the Albert-Bapaume road, and then turned sharply to the east and skirted the southern declivity of a high

undulating tract, known for convenience as the Thiepval-Morval ridge, which forms the watershed between the Somme and the tributaries of the Scheldt flowing northeastward into Belgium. After running eastward for about four miles the line swung around the northeastern margin of the village of Maricourt and continued southward to the Somme near Curlu, about eight miles below Péronne. South of the Somme the general course of the line within the battle-zone was southward. It will be seen that Fricourt stood at the apex of a local salient in the German front pointing towards the southwest, while Maricourt marked the inner extremity of the southern reëntrant of this salient. A short time before the battle the British relinquished to the French the southernmost section of their front, so that Maricourt was now the junction point of the two allied armies.

For two years the Germans had spared no pains to make their defenses impregnable in this section. A second defensive system ran along the southern crest of the watershed from 3,000 to 5,000 yards behind the first. Each system consisted of several parallel trenches with elaborate series of shelters hollowed in the chalky soil. There were special strongholds at the most important points, numerous redoubts, and machine-gun emplacements arranged for sweeping laterally the zones of approach. The front of each system was protected by wire-entanglements, many of them in two belts, forty yards apart. The space between the defensive systems was traversed in every direction by communication trenches. Woods and villages had been converted into veritable fortresses. Deep cellars, pits, and quarries were utilized for trench mortars. A third system of defense was being organized during the progress of the battle.

It was clear that the Allies could only succeed in breaching such an obstacle by a tedious battering process, requiring





Map showing the Somme territory upon which took place the Allied offensive in the summer of 1916.

an enormous consumption of ammunition, the frequent intervention of fresh troops, and unflagging perseverance. The British and French had made their preparations on an unprecedented scale. Many miles of new railway tracks were laid to facilitate the replenishment of supplies and ammunition. Vast stores of shell had been accumulated at depots behind the front. But the Allied leaders indulged in no deceptive hopes of obtaining sensational results directly. Their aims, according to the words of the British commander-in-chief, were to relieve the pressure on Verdun, assist the Allies in the other theaters by arresting the transference of German troops from the Western front, and wear down the strength of their immediate opponents. The offensive eventually developed upon a front of about thirty miles from Gommecourt to a point about twelve miles south of the Somme. The great Allied attack was undertaken by the Fourth British Army under Sir Henry Rawlinson, which consisted, in order from north to south, of the Eighth, Tenth, Third, Fifteenth, and Thirteenth Corps, and the Sixth French Army under General Fayolle, composed of the Twentieth, First Colonial, and Thirty-fifth Corps. Beyond the latter lay the French Tenth Army, in the command of which General d'Urbal had been replaced by General Micheler, and a Fifth British Army was forming behind the Fourth. Bapaume served as general objective for the British and Péronne for the French, while Combles, situated practically on the line of demarcation of the zones of operation of the two armies, was a sort of intermediate objective for both.

It would be impractical to present in detail the number and identity of the bodies of troops engaged on either side throughout the long continued struggle on the Somme, because they changed so often.

The struggle may be divided with special reference to the progress of the British into three general stages: the first, in which the assailants gained possession of the forward crest of the plateau; the second, in which they fought for the plateau; and the third, when they gradually drove their opponents down the reverse slope.

The operations displayed from the first a great advance in the Allied equipment and technique. Thus, before the battle, a swarm of Allied "battle-planes" of improved design swept over the enemy lines, dispersed the German air scouts, destroyed the German observation balloons, and brought back accurate photographs from which the plans for the artillery demolition fire were made. In spite of their original indignation the Allies had not only acquiesced in gas as an accepted means of warfare, but even improved upon the German gas and liquid flame attacks in some particulars.

A steady bombardment of the German position began on June 28th, while intense activity prevailed throughout the communication zone behind the Allied lines. The sun rose bright and clear on July 1st, the most momentous day for the Allies in the West since the close of open warfare in the autumn of 1914. The "spring offensive," to which millions had looked forward with keen expectancy, postponed a year and then put off until summer, was finally at hand.

The bombardment reached its highest pitch about 7.15 A.M. and at 7.30 the artillery lengthened its range and the bombardment was transformed into a barrage. The British and French troops cleared their parapets and fell upon the first German position.

In the region of the Ancre the British could scarcely make any progress. The counter-action of the German artillery, accurately directed from observation posts on the higher ground, was terribly effective. In some places the

foremost British trench was obliterated and the attacking infantry was compelled to form on the open ground behind it.

Further to the right the results were highly gratifying. Instead of assaulting Fricourt, the British attacked the two sides of the salient of which this village formed the apex. On the left the British fought their way up to the outskirts of La Boisselle, on the right they captured Mametz and Montauban, so that the Germans were compelled to relinquish Fricourt the next day.

The French attacking on the British right took their opponents rather by surprise and made rapid gains. Thus on the first day from Mametz to Fay at the southern extremity of the French front of attack, a distance of fourteen miles, the Allies carried the entire first German position, consisting of three or four parallel trenches, and captured 6,000 prisoners. An announcement in the Berlin press that the frequent sorties of the British and French had everywhere been repulsed and prisoners and booty taken, was followed by a singular reticence for several weeks, as though the conflict on the Somme were only a minor operation.

The left wing of the British front from the Albert-Bapaume road northward was now turned over to the new Fifth Army commanded by Sir Hubert Gough, the greater part of which did little more for several months than hold its original position.

The problem now confronting the British was to capture a number of fortified villages in the general region of the Albert-Bapaume road and drive the Germans from an intermittent zone of woods running along the slope from the vicinity of Fricourt eastward.

La Boisselle was carried after a fierce struggle on the morning of the 5th, and, in spite of the presence of the

Third Guards Division to stiffen the German resistance, Contalmaison was overtaken by the same fate on the 10th.

The advance through the woods referred to was attended with unusual difficulties by reason of the dense undergrowth, concealed trenches and machine-gun emplacements, and the intricate barbed-wire entanglements. The ground had to be conquered yard by yard and repeatedly defended against determined counter-attacks. But by the 12th the British had traversed this belt of woods and faced the second German position which ran along or near the southern crest of the ridge.

The French meanwhile had made comparatively rapid progress south of the Somme. On the second day of the attack they broke through the second German position in several places. On the third they penetrated the third line in one place, and by the 9th the point of their wedge had been pushed to within a mile of Péronne. In less than two weeks the French under General Fayolle, advancing on a front of about ten miles, reached a maximum depth of six and one-half miles and took more than 12,000 prisoners.

The second stage of the great offensive opened with a British attack on a section of the second German position running from Pozières through Bazentin-le-Petit, Bazentin-le-Grand, and Longueval, to Guillemont, a distance of about four miles.

The French national holiday, July 14th, was celebrated in Paris with exceptional brilliancy, rendered especially impressive by the parade of numerous troop detachments from the front, including British, Belgian, and Russian combatants, who were reviewed by the president, ministers, and leading generals. Circumstances seemed to justify this foretaste of the exaltation of a final Allied victory.

On the same day and with corresponding enthusiasm the British forces near the Somme shattered the German second





A British tank.



French observation balloon about to arise. The observer is in the "nacelle," or basket, suspended underneath and communicates with the ground by telephone. The large semicircular curved bag at the rear is open at the front to allow the wind to fill it and thus hold the balloon's head to the wind. A gasoline windlass on a truck hauls the balloon back to the ground when desired.

position. This attack was delivered by the Third, Fifteenth, and Thirteenth British Corps on a front of about four miles in the gray light of early dawn at 3.25 A. M., and before night the assailants had won the second position to a width of more than three miles from Bazentin-le-Petit to Longueval. In this engagement British mounted cavalry were used for the first time in eighteen months to sweep up the area behind the captured trenches. On the next day the British on the right began a struggle for the possession of Delville Wood lasting thirteen days, when the Third Guards and Fifth Brandenburg and other German divisions strove in vain to stay the gradual progress of the British.

Simultaneously the British gave their attention to capturing Pozières and Guillemont at opposite extremities of the hollow already made in the German front. Two additional corps, the Second Anzac and First Anzac, arriving at the battle-front, took up positions in the order mentioned from north to south between the Ancre and a point just south of the Albert-Bapaume road.

The most important feature of a general infantry attack on July 23d was the operation against Pozières, lying in a dominating position on the ridge north of Fricourt and strongly fortified. A British Territorial division and an Anzac division started about midnight from opposite sides for a converging advance against this place.

After a furious struggle the Australians gained a position along the edge of the highway traversing the village, where they were separated from the enemy by the width of the road alone. Advancing step by step on the 24th and 25th, the assailants joined forces at the northern corner of the village on the morning of the 26th. On August 4th they gained a section of the German second line northeast of Pozières.

The German High Command, compelled repeatedly to reinforce the threatened sector in the West, restored the

First Army, which had been abolished in the spring of 1915, placing it under the command of General von Below, while General von Gallwitz assumed the command of the Second Army. The First Army held the battle sector north of the Somme, and the Second, that on the south.

The French, after carrying the third German position and advancing almost to Péronne on the south side of the Somme, delivered an attack north of the river on August 12th and broke through the German third position on a four-mile front.

There was a lull in the offensive during the rest of August, while the Allies moved forward their heavy artillery to suitable positions for resuming the attack. By September they were ready for operations on an even greater scale.

A severe bombardment during the night of September 2d ushered in a fresh assault of the Allied infantry at noon on the 3d, when the British gained possession of Guilleumont and part of Gauchy on the Thiépval-Morval ridge beyond the already captured second German position. The French won several villages between Maurepas and the Somme and advanced to the outskirts of Combles. The advance was sustained with vigor and General Micheler's Tenth French Army, on the right of the Sixth, joined in the offensive on September 5th and carried the German first position opposite its own front on a width of about three miles. The Germans struggled resolutely to regain the lost terrain; but the repeated counter-attacks on September 6-8 were ineffectual, despite the participation of the four divisions of the Prussian Guard.

The intensity with which the contest on the Somme had thus far been conducted may be measured by the observation made by the Allies that down to the close of the second week in September altogether sixty-one different German

divisions had been engaged, the front in the battle-zone being then held by fifteen.

By this time the Allies had gained possession of the surface of the main part of the ridge north of the Somme. The Germans had already perfected their third defensive system which ran along the reverse side of the main ridge and was based on a number of fortified villages such as Courcellette, Martinpuich, Flers, and Morval. They were even preparing a fourth position further to the rear. But the course of events in all the theaters seemed to be moving concordantly in the direction of a great Allied success. Brussiloff was still assailing the Austro-Germans on the Eastern front, the Roumanians had declared war and were pouring into Transylvania, Sarrail had opened a vigorous offensive in the Balkans and the Italians were threatening the Carso. The time was ripe to renew the struggle in the West with greater energy, and this brings us to the opening of the third stage of the Battle of the Somme, when the Allies pushed the Germans down the reverse slopes of the Thiepval-Morval ridge.

The new attack was preceded by a general bombardment along the British front from Thiepval to Ginchy, beginning on September 12th. The cannonading rose to its highest pitch at six on the morning of the 15th and twenty minutes later the British infantry went over their parapets.

This was the occasion for the first appearance of the new armored cars of the Heavy Section of the British Machine-gun Corps, commonly called the "tanks." These ponderous, ungainly engines, mounted on a revolving caterpillar tread, waddled forward with deliberate indifference to the hottest fire and the most formidable obstacles, spitting right and left the deadly streams of lead from their machine-guns, crushing barbed-wire entanglements, and pausing at times astride the enemy trenches to mow down the rows of the defenders.

Twenty-four tanks took part in the initial performance. They broke through the enemy line, followed closely by the first wave of infantry with hand grenades. The attack met with almost immediate success. By 8.40 the tanks were entering Flers, covering the advancing infantry. Courcellette and Martinpuich were taken in the afternoon. The British advanced to an average distance of more than a mile along a front of six miles. Similar gains were made by the Third, Fifteenth, and Fourteenth British Corps in the next great effort on the 25th, while the French pushed forward to the Bapaume-Péronne road. Combles, outflanked by the Allied armies on both sides and no longer tenable, was evacuated by the Germans on the 26th.


The progress of the offensive seemed to have reached the eve of a decisive victory. The morale of the Germans had been seriously shaken. They had been driven back upon their improvised fourth line. Their defensive system worn thin by constant abrasion threatened to give way at any time. But at this propitious moment the radiant Allied prospects vanished in a long period of bad weather. The operations were impeded and the replenishment of ammunition and supplies was rendered very difficult across the desolate zone behind the Allied front, where the roads had been worn out by incessant traffic.

With the loss of the chief elements of their third position the Germans had fallen back on the fourth which lay behind the spurs debouching from the Thiepval-Morval ridge and thus were screened from direct observation. The immediate task of the Fourth British Army was to gain possession of the commanding spurs which were held by strongly fortified German outposts, that of the Fifth Army, to master the rest of the high ground in the vicinity of Thiepval. But the offensive lapsed into partial intermittent efforts.





*Under fire.*



*The German trench known as Vilebrequin before the fire of the French artillery.*



*Photograph taken immediately before the attack of July 1st, showing the effects of the French fire. Destruction of the German trenches. From photographs by the French aerial photographic section.*



It took nearly a month to overcome the stubborn resistance of the Twenty-sixth German Reserve Division and marines of the Naval Division in the Schwaben Redoubt and other centers of defense north of Thiépval, where the ridge overlooks the valley of the Ancre.

The Sixth and Tenth French Armies were coöperating with the general view of expelling the Germans from Péronne. The former was gradually working round the flank of Mont St. Quentin, the chief defense of Péronne on the north. At the end of September it pierced a section of the German fourth position at St. Pierre Vaast Wood, about two miles east of Combles.

From July 1st to November 1st the Allies took as prisoners 1,469 officers and 71,532 men and captured 173 field pieces, 130 heavy pieces, 215 trench mortars, and 988 machine-guns. At the latter date the German battle-front was held by twenty-one divisions.

The closing events of this gigantic battle occurred chiefly on the British left wing where the Fifth Army had mainly served thus far to hold the existing British lines. North of the Ancre, between Beaumont Hamel and Serre, the Germans still occupied their original front position, which was very strong and provided shelter for whole battalions in the subterranean shelters. Finally the British undertook to widen the hollow already created in the enemy's front by driving back their opponents in this quarter also. The Fifth British Army stretched from Gommecourt to the Albert-Bapaume road, but the new attack was confined to the section north of the Ancre. The artillery preparation began on November 11th, and the infantry attack was launched in a dark fog before dawn of the 13th.

On the left the attack was unsuccessful. In the center the Highland Territorials attacked the fortified village of Beaumont Hamel, where four successive German trench

lines were connected by subterranean passages. Here the assailants came to desperate hand-to-hand encounters with the enemy and many of the Germans were trapped in their own dug-outs. By nightfall the British had gained possession of the village. On the right the first attacking wave swept over the front and supporting trenches, but was arrested by a strong machine-gun redoubt. This was later silenced by a tank. Beaucourt was taken on the 14th. But the attack soon lost momentum and ceased on the 18th.

Measured in geographical terms the results of the Battle of the Somme were small. The Allies nowhere advanced more than seven miles and only conquered about 120 square miles of territory. They failed to reach Bapaume or Péronne. But by holding a part of Germany's available forces in this corner of the Western front the offensive on the Somme removed the pressure on Verdun and made possible the sweeping Russian victories, while wearing down the German strength. It did not obtain decisive results or save Roumania from a catastrophe. But the fact that Germany was held continually on the defensive for so many months made generally a deep impression and the campaign of 1917 was eagerly awaited by the Allies with the expectation that it would crown the great efforts already made with complete and final victory.

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE RENEWED RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE AND THE INTER-VENTION AND COLLAPSE OF ROUMANIA

Dispositions on the eastern fronts in the spring of 1916. Offensive of the Second Russian Army between Lakes Narotch and Vishnevsky. Opening of Brussiloff's great offensive in the south on June 4th. Rapid successes on the Volhynian sector. Anxiety and counter-offensive of the Austro-Germans. Attacks of Scherbacheff against von Bothmer and of Lechitsky against von Pflanzer. Czernowitz captured, June 17th, and Bukovina cleared. Lesch's attack on the sector adjoining the Pripet marshes on the south. Von Boehm-Ermolli defeated by Sakharoff, and fall of Brody, July 28th. Converging operations against von Bothmer. Fall of Stanislaw, August 10th. Critical situation of the Central Empires, transference of troops from other fronts, revision of the command, von Hindenburg as supreme commander in the East. Attitude of Roumania and the causes of her entry into the war. Her military and strategical situation. Roumanian declaration of war and mobilization. General plan of coöperation with the Allies. Roumanian invasion of Transylvania. Measures of the Central Powers, von Falkenhayn in chief command. Situation in Greece and on the Salonica front. Capture of Monastir. The uncertain condition of Greece. Von Mackensen's invasion of the Dobrudscha. Culmination and decline of Brussiloff's offensive. Austro-German counter-offensive in Transylvania. Defective coöperation of the Russians and the Roumanians. The Tchernavoda-Costanza railway cut by von Mackensen, October 20th. Carpathian passes forced by the Austro-Germans. Passage of the Danube on the south. Collapse of the Roumanians, and fall of Bucharest on December 5th. Roumanian retirement to the Sereth. Close of the campaign.

The recovery of the Russian army after the staggering disasters of 1915 and the unexpected return to offensive operations were, as we have seen, one of the most remarkable features of the Great War. But the close of the Russian offensive in Bukovina, mentioned at the end of Chapter VI, was followed on the Eastern front by more than two months of comparative inactivity. Von Hindenburg remained the chief commander of all the forces, almost exclusively German, deployed along the Teutonic front from the Baltic Sea to the Pripet River, while the

Archduke Frederick exercised the same authority over the forces, chiefly Austro-Hungarians, from the Pripet to the Roumanian border.

Von Hindenburg commanded directly von Below's Army opposite Riga, von Scholtz's Eighth Army facing Dvinsk, von Eichhorn's Tenth Army between Vidzy and Smorgon, and von Fabeck's Twelfth Army, and through the mediation of Prince Leopold of Bavaria von Woysch's Ninth Army and a detachment of three infantry and two cavalry divisions in the vicinity of Pinsk.


On the Russian front Kuropatkin, Ewarts, and Ivanoff held the chief commands in the north, center, and south, respectively. Ewarts's command extended from Vidzy to a point just south of the Pripet River and included from north to south the First, Second, Tenth, Fourth, and Third Russian Armies.

The armies under von Hindenburg had a combined fighting strength of about 1,000,000 men, and it was believed that, with the coming of spring, the Germans would resume their offensive operations, either against Riga and Dvinsk or in the drier region east of Vilna. But the Russians forestalled the execution of a German offensive in these regions by a timely stroke delivered on Ewarts's right center in the sector of the Second Russian Army, which was commanded by General Smirnoff.

The Second was the largest army on the Russian front and contained eleven army corps. The attack to be described was executed by the Second Army's right wing, which held the pass between Lakes Narotch and Vishnevsky, about fifty miles east by slightly north of Vilna. It consisted of the Fifth, Thirty-fifth, and Thirty-sixth Corps in line, and the Third Siberian in reserve, and formed a subordinate command under General Baluieff. Facing them was General von Eichhorn's Tenth German Army.



General Alexieff, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian army after the assumption of command by the Tsar.



General Brussloff, Russian Group Commander in the South.



The German front on this sector was covered by a great marsh midway between the two lakes and by a formidable system of trenches. After a two days' artillery preparation the Russian assault was launched on March 18, 1916, the Fifth Corps attacking on the right where low sandy elevations descend to Lake Narotch, a division of the Thirty-fifth Corps between the Fifth Corps and the marsh, and a division of the Thirty-sixth on the south side of the marsh. In the course of eight distinct attacks down to April 14th, the Fifth Corps carried two German lines and advanced about a mile and the troops of the Thirty-fifth advanced about a half-mile, but those of the Thirty-sixth scarcely made any progress at all.

Offensive operations were then discontinued, probably because the purpose of thwarting the enemy's aggressive schemes had seemingly been achieved, while further progress promised to be too costly by reason of the German superiority in machine-guns. Later the Germans took advantage of the removal of much Russian heavy field artillery. After a fierce bombardment which demolished the defenses of the Fifth Russian Corps on April 28th, the Germans broke through their opponent's front to a depth of two and one-half to three miles. But Russian reserve regiments attacking the right flank of the protruding German units drove them back and the series of operations closed with the Russian front in practically its original position.

Month after month the Russians had been accumulating their resources for a great offensive in close coöperation with the Allies, after Germany had been allowed to waste her strength in vain assaults on Verdun and the new British armies had been thoroughly equipped and drilled for the supreme performance. The Russian battle-line running southward from the Pripet River now followed the Styr

for some distance, cut the Lemberg-Rovno railway just east of Dubno, left Tarnopol in Russian hands, kept a few miles east of the Strypa down to the Dniester near Uscieszko, followed the Dniester for a certain distance and then cut southeastward across the strip of territory between the Dniester and the Pruth, terminating at the northern limit of Roumania. In April Brussiloff succeeded Ivanoff as Russian group commander in the south, and under his orders, from right to left, were ranged the Eighth Army, then commanded by General Kaledin, with headquarters at Rovno, Sakharoff's Eleventh Army, Scherbacheff's Seventh Army and Lechitsky's Ninth Army. The opposing Austro-Hungarian-German front was well-organized, but somewhat scantily manned by forces which did not exceed an aggregate of 1,000,000. Their distribution had been somewhat changed. Under the general command of the Archduke Frederick of Austria there were now deployed, from north to south, the First Austro-Hungarian Army of Puhallo, the Fourth of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, the Second of von Boehm-Ermolli, the mixed army of von Bothmer, and the Sixth of von Pflanzer.

The critical situation for the Italians on the Trentino front seems to have hastened the inauguration of the intended Russian offensive, but this was launched with a violence that took the Austro-Hungarians entirely by surprise. Brussiloff's artillery preparation began on June 3d and the infantry attacks followed the next day along practically the whole front from the Pripet to the Pruth.

In the region of the Volhynian triangle the Austro-Hungarian front lines were swept away on the first day of the attack by the armies of Kaledin and Sakharoff and a great number of prisoners fell into the hands of the victorious Russians. Two days later the Russians captured Lutsk with extensive military stores. Dubno fell on the

9th and by the 16th the Russians in this quarter had advanced fifty miles and taken about 70,000 prisoners. It was the most spectacular Russian achievement since the first weeks of the war. Again the Austro-Hungarian front seemed like a hollow shell that could be shattered into fragments by well-directed blows. Kovel was now the critical point, since its fall would interrupt the main line of lateral communications serving the Austro-German front. The further advance of the Russians in this section would undermine a great part of the Teutonic defensive system.

The Central Powers were thoroughly aroused to the emergency. Von Ludendorff hastened to the threatened point and several divisions were shifted thither from the German sectors further north. Austrian troops were brought from the Tirol and the Balkans and four German divisions were transferred from France. One German corps was shifted from Verdun to Kovel in six days. Von Linsingen took over the command in this section. A counter-offensive started on the 16th was kept up until the end of the month. By strenuous effort Kovel was saved and a sustaining buttress lodged in the tottering fabric of the Austro-Hungarian front.

Further south Scherbacheff's attack against von Bothmer was checked on the right, but gained immediate successes on the left, where Buczacz was carried on June 8th and the Strypa crossed in several places.

On the extreme left of the Russian battle-front Lechitsky fell upon von Pflanzer from two sides and defeated him in the strip of land between the Dniester and the Pruth, taking more than 18,000 prisoners by June 9th. The Russians occupied Zaleshyki, an important bridge-head on the Dniester, thus establishing convenient direct communication between the armies of Scherbacheff and Lechitsky.

Following the routed masses of von Pflanzer's army, the Russians crossed the Pruth, entered Czernowitz on June 17th, and overran within a few days practically the whole of Bukovina.

During the first three weeks the Russian offensive as a whole brought in nearly 200,000 prisoners, crushed the Austro-Hungarian lines in several places, and effected a partial return to open warfare. Striking out towards the northwest, Lechitsky entered Kalomea on June 29th and captured Delatyn on July 8th, cutting the railway running from Halicz and Stanislaw through the Jablonica Pass into Hungary.

The Russians had now pushed forward two formidable wedges, one in Volhynia and the other in Bukovina. But before penetrating further it was necessary to broaden and consolidate these protruding positions. Brussiloff's front was strengthened by the shifting of Lesch's Third Russian Army to the section directly south of the Pripet Marshes, adjoining on the right the new position won by General Kaledin. In this section a sandy plain extending from the Styr to the Stokhod, a distance of about thirty miles, offered a suitable theater for the next attack. After a heavy bombardment Lesch's army crossed the Styr on July 4th and by the 7th the right wing had fought its way to the Stokhod, while the center and left wing extended southward about midway between the two rivers. In four days the Russians had pushed forward twenty-five miles on a front of forty. But by the 15th the offensive lapsed into stationary warfare and Kovel had again been saved.

Von Linsingen was now preparing a counter-blow from von Boehm-Ermolli's sector which ran across the Lemberg-Brody railway, and twenty divisions were concentrated for this purpose. But Brussiloff learned of the enemy's design

and decided to forestall it. On the 15th Sakharoff's army moved against the threatening sector of the hostile front and on the next day defeated the Teutonic forces, taking nearly 13,000 prisoners, and crossed the Styr on the 21st. Brody, the former headquarters of von Boehm-Ermolli fell on the 28th after a three days' contest in which the Russians took nearly 14,000 prisoners.

The situation was now ripe for Sakharoff on the north and Lechitsky on the south to close in on von Bothmer's flanks, while Scherbacheff attacked his front in the region of the Strypa.

After a long delay on account of bad weather, Lechitsky captured Stanislaw, a very important center of communications, on August 10th. Scherbacheff, pushing forward his left wing, crossed the Zlota Lipa near its mouth. Von Bothmer, assailed on the left by Sakharoff and in front by Scherbacheff, his right wing bent back in a cramped and embarrassing manner and his communications threatened by Lechitsky's encircling movement towards his rear, was compelled to fall back to a new position where his right wing rested more securely on the Zlota Lipa.

The Central Empires quivered under the terrific pressure both on the east and west and there was imminent danger that the Galician front would collapse. In the midst of the Battle of the Somme the Germans were compelled to transfer reinforcements from the West to restore the wavering Austro-Hungarian lines. From the beginning of the Russian offensive on June 4th until the middle of September as many as sixteen infantry divisions appear to have been shifted from the western to the eastern front, while seven Austro-Hungarian divisions were transferred from the hard pressed Italian front, and two divisions were contributed by Turkey. Time will probably reveal further evidence of the intensity of this crisis.

The situation necessitated a general revision of the command without much regard for Austro-Hungarian sensibilities. The Archduke Frederick of Austria relinquished the chief command of the southern half of the Teutonic eastern front and on August 2d von Hindenburg assumed the supreme control of this entire front. Later, it is true, the Austro-Hungarian Heir Apparent, Archduke Charles, took over the command of the three southern armies. But von Tersztyansky was substituted for the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, while von Pflanzer and his army disappeared and were replaced by the Seventh Austro-Hungarian Army under von Kirchbach. A new army, the Third, formed in Transylvania, under von Koevess, took its place on the left flank of the Seventh and a German army under von Linsingen covered Kovel. With these adjustments the disposition on the eastern front from north to south under von Hindenburg was as follows: the general command of Prince Leopold of Bavaria, comprising von Eichhorn's group made up of the Eighth German Army, von Scholtz's detachment, and the Twelfth, Tenth, and Ninth German Armies, and von Linsingen's group made up of his own Army of the Bug, the Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army under von Tersztyansky, the First under Puhallo, and the Second under Boehm-Ermolli; and the Archduke Charles's general command, including von Bothmer's Army, von Koevess's Third Austro-Hungarian Army, and von Kirchbach's Seventh Austro-Hungarian Army.

At this momentous period of the campaign the intervention of Roumania was accepted by a large part of the world as a doubly significant event: affording an indication that a deeply interested spectator, viewing the struggle at close range, believed that the turning point had arrived; and an addition of strength to the cause of the Allies, with whom

Roumania cast her lot, that would inevitably insure the triumph of the Allied armies. The causes of the prolonged attitude of hesitation on the part of Roumania and of her final and fateful decision require some words of explanation. The Roumanians pride themselves upon a supposed unbroken descent from the Roman colonists of ancient Dacia, citing the obviously Latin origin of their language as palpable evidence of their distinctive character. This remarkable phenomenon of linguistic continuity in the midst of regions swept by so many torrents of migration is a baffling problem for the philologist. But the essential fact for the present is the existence of a strong consciousness of national individuality uniting the Roumanian people under different governments.

The principalities which were eventually combined to form the Kingdom of Roumania, as it existed before the present war, were subjected for several centuries to Turkish suzerainty, but this was reduced to a mere shadow in the first half of the nineteenth century. The Treaty of Paris in 1856, while reaffirming the existence of the Turkish suzerainty, guaranteed a considerable degree of autonomy to Moldavia and Wallachia under princes to be chosen for life. The rising spirit of Roumanian nationality led to the union of the two principalities under Prince Cuza in 1862. Four years later, he was driven from power by a revolution, Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was installed in his place as Charles (Carol) I at Bucharest, and the constitution was adopted. Roumania now entered upon a long period of economic and political development.

At the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877, Prince Charles (Carol) I declared his independence of Turkey and joined forces with Russia, lending valuable aid in the operations south of the Danube. But the results for

Roumania were rather disappointing. The independence of the country was recognized in the Treaty of Berlin and the prince assumed the title of king in 1881, but Russia took back the portion of the fertile province of Bessarabia, which she had been compelled to cede to Moldavia in 1856, although it contained a large Roumanian population, and Roumania was shabbily compensated by receiving the main part of the comparatively barren peninsula of Dobrudscha.

Estranged from Russia in consequence of this treatment, Roumania drew closer to the Teutonic powers and made a secret agreement with Austria-Hungary and Germany in 1883, by which she virtually became a member of the Triple Alliance. Teutonic influence took deep root in Roumania and was especially prominent in commerce and banking, most large undertakings being financed through German institutions. As in many other countries German enterprise and assiduity won rich rewards, the Deutsche Bank and Disconto-Gesellschaft became familiar symbols in all important business centers, and trade followed the natural channels leading to the Central Powers.

But the intimacy between Roumania and Austria-Hungary suffered a rude shock by the intervention of Roumania against Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War, when Roumania compelled Bulgaria to yield a strip of territory with an area of 2,983 square miles, including the fortress of Silistria, along the border of the Dobrudscha.

Upon the outbreak of the Great War the sentiment of the Roumanian people was overwhelmingly in favor of the Entente, partly from admiration for the Western powers and a sense of cultural community with France, and partly from the nature of Roumania's national aspirations. There was a Roumanian irredentist problem of fundamental importance. The Kingdom of Roumania, as it then existed,





Transport of Russian artillery. *By means of small trucks running on rails laid on flat cars the handling of guns by railway is greatly expedited.*



Russian field artillery.

with an area of 53,244 square miles and a population of about 7,500,000, only embraced about one-half the territory peopled by Roumanians. Nearly four million Roumanians lived under the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in Bukovina, the Banat of Temesvar, and especially Transylvania, and others were subjects of the Russian Empire in Bessarabia. The political union of all these regions with Roumania would form a state of nearly 12,000,000 souls, occupying a compact, oval-shaped block of territory with an area of about 110,000 square miles, great natural resources, and a favorable location.

But unfortunately the racial homogeneity of such a territory would be broken by considerable Saxon and Magyar populations in southeastern Transylvania and by the prevailing Russian population of southeastern Bessarabia on the sea.

In consequence of the vastly greater number of Roumanians under Austro-Hungarian rule and the manifestly oppressive policy of the Hungarian government towards Roumanian nationality, the irredentist instincts of Roumania operated mainly as an incentive to war with the Dual Monarchy.

Aside from her potential military strength as a belligerent, Roumania's importance to the contestants in the Great War lay in her agricultural and mineral wealth and her strategical position commanding the lower section of the Danube. The fertility of a large part of Wallachia and almost all of Moldavia makes Roumania an important grain-exporting country, while the extensive oil-fields in the region north of Bucharest formed with those of Galicia the chief European sources for the petroleum supply of the Central Powers. Roumania produced 13,554,768 barrels of petroleum in 1913.

The Danube, 1,750 miles in length and navigable for all but 125 miles of its course, is the finest waterway in Europe and the natural artery of traffic between the Central Empires on the one hand and Southern Russia and the Near East on the other. The lack of adequate channels through the delta and the difficulty of navigation at the famous Iron Gate had prevented the full development of traffic. The stream was navigable for vessels of not over two meters draught from Galatz to Ratisbon. The further improvement of the Danube and the formation of an extensive system of canals linking the Danube with the chief German rivers of the north was prominent among the plans for the future expansion of Teutonic commerce.

The Danube formed the southern boundary of Roumania for a distance of about 270 miles. The northern arm of the delta through which its waters reach the Black Sea was part of the Russo-Roumanian boundary, the other arms were all in Roumanian territory. Throughout almost her entire periphery, Roumania was separated from her neighbors by clearly defined natural boundaries. The Pruth formed the line on the northeast between Roumania and Russia. The Carpathians, or Transylvanian Alps, separated her from Austria-Hungary for a distance of about 400 miles. Their chief peaks were from 7,000 to 8,000 feet in height.

The protection of the Danube on the south was reinforced by the broad zone of marshes stretching along the Roumanian side of the river. The only open section of frontier was the line from the Danube to the sea across the Dobrudscha.

Yet the elongated contour of the country, stretching elbow-like around two sides of Transylvania, involved a serious strategical weakness. While hostile forces operating in Transylvania enjoyed the advantage of convenient,

interior lines, communication between the different sections of the Roumanian border opposite was slow and difficult. The Roumanian railway system was strategically far from adequate.

The long period of uncertainty as to Roumania's ultimate conduct in the Great War is readily explained. In the first place, many internal influences tended to counteract the prevailing inclination of the Roumanian people. The propaganda favorable to Teutonic interests was conducted with great energy and the support of some leading Roumanian papers was purchased for this cause. To suit the circumstances, German emissaries strove to undermine by threats the spirit of the Roumanian people or to cajole them by promising rewards for their benevolent neutrality. Intervention on the side of the Allies, moreover, meant the loss of the profitable market of the Central Powers.

Bratianu, the prime minister, who had come into power in 1914 as leader of the Liberal party, favored a policy of circumspection. Take Ionescu, head of the advanced Conservatives, was the determined advocate of participation in the war on the side of the Allies. Carp, Majorescu, and Marghiloman supported intervention on the Austro-German side. The king favored the latter view, feeling himself bound by the treaty of 1883, but failed to convince a crown council, summoned on August 4, 1914, to consider Roumania's attitude. As mentioned already, King Charles (Carol) I died on October 10th of the same year and was succeeded by his nephew, Prince Ferdinand.

For two years Roumania wavered on the brink of action. By the early summer of 1915 the idea of eventual intervention on the side of the Allies had practically prevailed in principle, and the Roumanian ministry had entered into

secret negotiations for the determination of Roumania's ultimate compensation.

But before the grain crop had been harvested, the disruption of the Russian western front, followed by the great retreat, created a situation in which the intervention of Roumania would have been too perilous, especially as the Allies had failed to gain any decisive advantage at the Dardanelles. In the same year, Bulgaria, whom Roumania had mortally offended, joined the Central Powers. Serbia was invaded and crushed, and Roumania was thereafter menaced on three sides, should she move against the Quadruple Alliance.

Nevertheless, the campaign of 1916, as we have seen, brought a marked change in the complexion of affairs. The Allies, after perfecting their organization and learning to coördinate their efforts, wrested the initiative from the Central Powers on all fronts. The Russian offensive advanced steadily into Austria-Hungary; by June, 1916, Bukovina, coveted by Roumania, was in Russian hands. The Roumanians naturally believed that the hour of their nation's destiny had sounded and that the opportunity might soon pass, never to return. Take Ionescu had striven persistently to consolidate public sentiment in favor of the supreme step on the side of the Allies. Bratianu and the government, at length convinced, completed the negotiations with the Entente. Action was delayed, apparently, for the gathering of the Roumanian harvest, and the decision was concealed from the future hostile group of powers until the very last. Finally, a crown council of all the leaders was held in presence of the king on August 27th and on the evening of the same day the declaration of war was handed to the Austro-Hungarian minister. Germany declared war on Roumania the next day and Bulgaria followed on September 1st.

In August, 1914, the military establishment of Roumania consisted of the active army, the reserve, and the militia. The first was mobilized in five army corps, each composed of two divisions. The remaining reservists formed five additional divisions. Together these categories constituted the first-line forces, numbering 220 battalions, 83 squadrons, and 19 companies of fortress artillery, 250,000 rifles and 18,000 sabers. It was hoped that five additional reserve corps could be organized.

The rapid collapse of Roumania was one of the most pathetic spectacles of the Great War. Overflowing with abundance, courted by both sides, Roumania entered the war, as was commonly believed, on the eve of the glorious triumph of the cause which she espoused. But in reality, after a few illusory successes, she suffered an uninterrupted series of reverses. Her territory was invaded, her prosperity turned to tribulation, her sorrowing population compelled to subsist on a pittance of their former store accepted from the hands of their stern conquerors.

The Roumanian disaster may be largely attributed to lack of insight and an unusual combination of unfavorable circumstances. The Allies with their new adherent undoubtedly overestimated the effect of the drain on Germany's resources in the conflict before Verdun and on the Somme. They believed that Germany would be unable to send more than sixteen additional divisions to the aid of Austria-Hungary, that Roumania could put into the field at least twenty-two divisions of excellent troops, and that this would more than turn the tide. In reality, however, a large part of the Roumanian forces were inadequately trained and defectively equipped.

Roumania counted upon the effective coöperation of her allies, the plan for which had been elaborated. It was

expected that a vigorous Allied attack on the Salonica front would hold the bulk of the Bulgarian army, while at the same time a force of 50,000 Russians would aid in the defense of the Dobrudscha. Brussiloff was to push his offensive southwestwards from Bukovina into Transylvania, forming contact with the right wing of the Roumanian armies on the Carpathian front. Russia, furthermore, was pledged to provide Roumania with certain necessary supplies of munitions. One by one the expectations embodied in this plan were brought to naught. Bad luck pursued the Roumanian operations with such persistent regularity that every hopeful anticipation was deceived.

According to many critics, the plan of campaign itself invited failure. The Roumanians had to choose between two contrasted plans, either to rest on the defensive along the line of the Transylvanian Alps and strike with great force from the Dobrudscha southwestwards into Bulgaria, gradually extending the front to keep the flanks of the advancing forces covered by the Danube and the sea, or to hold to the defensive on the Bulgarian front and drive at once with full force into the coveted province on the north. The first gave hope of squeezing Bulgaria between the opposite Allied fronts, capturing Sofia, and intercepting the Oriental railway and all connection between the Central Empires and Turkey. But political and sentimental motives made the second plan prevail.

Three Roumanian armies were ranged along the Transylvanian border. The First, consisting of six divisions under General Culcer, formed the left wing, from the Danube at Orsova to the Rother Turm Pass. The Second, under General Averescu, in the center, extended from the above-mentioned pass around to the Oitoz Pass. The Fourth, under General Presan, continued the front as far as the

northwestern extremity of Moldavia. The Third Army, under General Aslan, was assigned to the defense of the Dobrudscha.

As soon as war was declared the Roumanian forces poured into Transylvania. Columns of the Second Army, advancing through the Torzburg and Predeal Passes, converged on Kronstadt, which was taken on August 29th. Culcer's right wing, entering Transylvania through the Rother Turm Pass, occupied Hermannstadt on September 10th. Two days later Orsova was taken on the extreme left.

The Austro-Hungarian covering troops, consisting of five divisions, fell back without offering much resistance towards a good line of lateral communications formed by the railway and highway through the Maros valley. By so doing, they contracted their own front and permitted the Roumanians to lengthen their lines of communication through a difficult, mountainous country. In some places the invaders penetrated to a depth of fifty miles into Transylvanian territory.


While the Roumanians were rejoicing in their easy victories the Teutonic High Command was swiftly but unobtrusively preparing its counter-strokes. Von Falkenhayn, who had retired from the position of German Chief of Staff a few days before, was placed in command of the new Austro-Hungarian Ninth Army assembling in the lower Maros valley. But the first blow was delivered from the south, despite the efforts of the Allies to engage the attention of Bulgaria on the Salonica front. The correlation of events requires a brief account of the situation in the latter region.

The uncertain situation in Greece and the pro-German intrigues, acquiesced in and even fostered by the Athenian court, were a constant menace to the rear of the Allied armies on the Macedonian front. Since the autumn of

1915 constitutional government had practically ceased to exist in Greece and the policy of the country was manipulated by the court and an irresponsible bureaucracy. After the Bulgarians had occupied Fort Rupel, near the north-eastern frontier, with the connivance of the Greek court, the British government instituted a pacific blockade of Greece on June 8th. Four days later there were disturbances in Athens and the Allied embassies were insulted. This was followed by an ultimatum from the Allies, demanding guarantees of good behavior on the part of Greece, complete demobilization of the Greek army, the substitution of an unbiassed cabinet, general elections after demobilization, and the dismissal of certain obnoxious police officials. There was no alternative for the Greek government but to accede. Skouloudis resigned and on June 21st was succeeded as prime minister by Zaimis, who accepted the Allied ultimatum. Unfortunately, reservists' leagues were formed among the disbanded soldiery, which formed a hotbed for agitation, perpetuating the disturbed condition of affairs. Greece remained a distracting factor throughout the campaign of 1916.

Along the Macedonian front of the Quadruple Alliance were ranged from west to east, the First Bulgarian Army under General Gueshoff, the so-called Eleventh German Army (now reduced to a single brigade) under General von Winckler, and the Second Bulgarian Army under General Teodoroff. These were opposed by the Serbian army under the Crown Prince Alexander, the French army under General Sarrail, and the British army under General Milne. Eventually, the Italian forces from Avlona in Albania coöperated with the left wing of the above-mentioned Allied forces.

A general offensive on the Allied front was planned for the second week in August and General Sarrail was placed



Monastir from an aeroplane. Photograph made by the French Aerial Photographic Section.



in chief command. The Allies were joined by a Russian contingent which had made the long journey by sea from Vladivostok. Just as the Allies were about to move, their plans were forestalled by a vigorous Bulgarian offensive launched on August 17th.

Teodoroff moved swiftly into the region east of the British right flank, which was garrisoned by the neutral Greeks, occupying the forts of Kavala on August 25th and the town itself on September 14th, when the bulk of the Fourth Greek Corps surrendered without resistance and was transported to Germany as "guests" of the German government. The suspicion of duplicity rested on the Greek government, in spite of its assertion that the Fourth Corps had acted without orders.

Monastir, near the Greek border in the western part of the Macedonian territory, claimed, and at that time occupied, by Bulgaria was the most practical objective for an Allied offensive operation. A serious attack upon it was sure to retain considerable Bulgarian forces for its defense, since it was Bulgaria's most cherished conquest. Consequently, the bulk of the French forces, the Serbian corps, and the Russian contingent were assigned for offensive operations west of the Vardar, while the British were to exert a general pressure east of this stream.

The Allied offensive in the direction of Monastir started on September 7th, while at the same time the Italians became active in Albania, east of Avlona. Monastir lies in a plain formed by the expansion of the narrow valley of the Tcherná, about twenty miles in length from north to south and ten in width, surrounded by mountain ranges. The route from the Greek territory in the south to Monastir by road and railway crosses the watershed northwest of Lake Ostrovo and descends past Florina into the Pelagonian plain in which the place is situated.

The Serbians crossed the dividing ridge north of Lake Ostrovo and reëntered their native land on September 20th, while the French and Russians operating further west carried Florina by storm on the same day. By October 5th the Serbians had crossed the Tcherná southeast of Monastir, with the intention of turning the Bulgarian lines stretching across the plain to the north of Florina, which were too strong to be taken by frontal attacks. By the middle of November the advance of the Serbians on the east side of the Tcherná compelled the Bulgarians and Germans to fall back on another line only four miles south of Monastir. Finally, Monastir was evacuated on the 19th, when the Serbians had reached a point to the northeast threatening the Bulgarian line of communications. The Allies marched into the city on the fourth anniversary of its capture from the Turks. Monastir was a prize of considerable importance, but with its acquisition the offensive on the Salonica front practically ceased. The effort of the Allies failed to shake Bulgaria and fell short of furnishing the necessary support for Roumania. The Allies did not prevent Bulgaria from actively participating in the operations against Roumania.

Von Mackensen, who was in Bulgaria when Roumania declared war on Austria-Hungary, had organized an army of mixed forces with remarkable celerity. By the beginning of September he was ready to enter the field against the Roumanians in the Dobrudscha with three Bulgarian infantry and two Bulgarian cavalry divisions and the greater part of a German army corps, while two Turkish divisions were on their way to join him. His business was to close the door against a Roumanian invasion of Bulgaria from the Dobrudscha, distract the attention of Roumania from the operations in Transylvania, and eventually form an anvil upon which Roumania would be crushed by the

sledge-hammer blows of von Falkenhayn. In the execution of the first of these intentions it was obviously good strategy to reduce to a minimum the space to be barricaded by advancing from the existing Roumanian boundary, where the Dobrudscha is about 100 miles in width, to the line of the Tchernavoda-Costanza railway, where it is only thirty. The capture of this railway, furthermore, would practically sever Roumania from direct communication with the sea.

With these purposes in view, the Bulgarians crossed the border on September 1st and six days later compelled a whole Roumanian division to surrender with 100 guns at Turtukai on the right bank of the Danube, only thirty miles southeast of Bucharest. The Roumanians evacuated the fortress of Silistria on the 9th and a week later von Mackensen's forces held a line across the Dobrudscha peninsula only a dozen miles south of the important Costanza railway.

The Roumanians, thoroughly alarmed, weakened their offensive in Transylvania by hurrying three divisions from there to the threatened region. At the same time, Averescu, their ablest general, was transferred to the Army of the Danube in the Dobrudscha. This army now contained a considerable Russian contingent.

The strength of the opposing forces in the Dobrudscha was about equal. Von Mackensen was superior in artillery but the main railway formed a good line of communication in Averescu's rear. Natural barriers precluded any out-flanking movements. After several days of severe fighting von Mackensen was forced back about ten miles. The immediate danger to Roumania in this quarter was now past and activity in the Dobrudscha waned for several weeks.

In the meantime the more formidable blow was impending in the north. About 250,000 men had been concentrated in Transylvania under von Falkenhayn to deal

with the First and Second Roumanian Armies, while the right wing of von Kirchbach's Seventh Austro-Hungarian Army was extended southward to ward off the Fourth Roumanian.

In their hasty invasion of Transylvania the Roumanians had relied upon the direct coöperation of the Russians advancing from Bukovina. The brilliant course of Brusiloff's offensive has already been described down to about the middle of August. It remains to be explained why the Russians failed to coöperate effectively with the Roumanian offensive in Transylvania. About the middle of August results of decisive importance seemed clearly within reach of the Russians, but soon their tide of victory began to ebb. The reorganization of the Austro-German command was a first step in the rehabilitation of the southern sectors of the Teutonic eastern front, while, on the other hand, the strength of the Russians turned out to be unequal to the increased tasks before them. Russian coöperation with the Roumanian offensive implied a twofold objective for the Russian operative front. Brussiloff now aimed to push Lechitsky's Ninth Army through the Carpathian Passes to establish contact with the right wing of the Roumanian armies and, at the same time, to continue the converging movements of Scherbacheff and Sakharoff towards Lemberg.

Scherbacheff's immediate objective was now Halicz, which stood on the right bank of the Dniester, commanding the most important crossing point in that region. The capture of Halicz by the Russians would have meant the turning of the line of the Gnila Lipa. Von Bothmer's right wing, which bent back sharply from Zawalow on the Zlota Lipa to the Dniester at Mariampol, was defeated by Scherbacheff in a five days' battle, August 30-September 3, while further north there was a fierce struggle for Brzezany. On the 4th the Russians reached the Gnila Lipa,





Jon J. C. Bratiano, Prime Minister of Roumania at the time that country declared war.



General Averescu, commander of the Roumanian Second Army.



Nicu Filipescu.



Take Ionescu.

Pro-Ally leaders of Roumanian Irredentist party.

but reinforcements, including the Third Prussian Guards Division, were hurried to the assistance of von Bothmer, increasing his strength to a total of thirteen or fourteen divisions. A counter-attack delivered on the 4th saved Brzezany for the Austro-Germans. Fighting continued throughout September along the Narajonka, a tributary of the Gnila Lipa, without definite gains for either side, and the conflict became stationary.

Meanwhile, about the middle of August, Lechitsky won the Jablonica and Kirlibaba Passes in Bukovina. He was in touch with the Roumanian right wing by September 11th; but the early winter with the deep snow in these higher altitudes crippled all his efforts, and he was unable to penetrate the mountain barrier. In spite of the enthusiasm inspired by their illusory victories, the Roumanians who invaded Transylvania failed to reach the line of the Maros, where alone a coherent front might have been formed against the future counter-attacks of the enemy. The direct coöperation of the Russians on the right flank of the Roumanians failed of its effect. The unexpected incursion of von Mackensen into the Dobrudscha had already created an impression of uneasiness in Roumanian circles and the situation seemed ripe for von Falkenhayn to launch his main attack from the side of Transylvania.

The initial Austro-German blow fell upon the principal portion of the First Roumanian Army, which had advanced through the Rother Turm Pass and was now north of Hermannstadt, having tenuous lines of communication which threaded the winding valleys in the rugged territory at its rear. Von Falkenhayn seized the opportunity to turn its flank; a column of Bavarian Alpine troops, starting from the Austro-German right wing on September 22d, traversed several mountain ridges and seized the commanding positions in the Rother Turm Pass on the 26th.

On the same day the Austro-German center began the bombardment of the Roumanian front near Hermannstadt, while the forces on the left threatened their opponents' right flank. With its main line of communications interrupted, this portion of the First Roumanian Army was thus compelled to retreat in a southeasterly direction and made its escape by difficult routes across the frontier range, although with comparatively small losses.

The configuration of the country and the effectiveness of the Austro-Hungarian strategic railways enabled von Falkenhayn to move the bulk of his forces successively and unexpectedly against the isolated groups of the opposing forces. He now proceeded eastward against the left flank of the Second Roumanian Army. The Second and Fourth Roumanian Armies were at this time converging on Schassburg, where the invasion reached the deepest point of penetration on October 3d. But at once the pressure of the Austro-German forces became too great and these two armies withdrew along divergent lines towards the passes through which they had entered Transylvania.

Crainiceanu, who had succeeded Averescu in command of the Second Roumanian Army, retreated through Kronstadt towards the Torzburg, Predeal, and Buzeu Passes. The Austro-German forces recovered Kronstadt on October 7th, and by the 10th the Roumanians were back on the frontier. With this sudden collapse of the Roumanian offensive Averescu was recalled from the Dobrudscha to the command of the Second Army. At the same time, General Berthelot with the French military mission arrived in Roumania to assist with their expert advice the councils of the Roumanian General Staff.

It was necessary for von Falkenhayn to force his way into Roumania with the least possible delay before the

advent of winter in the mountainous regions impeded his offensive. The first plan had been to penetrate the mountain barrier by the central passes, so as to debouch into the oil-region, cleave the heart of Wallachia, and cut off the retreat of all the Roumanian forces further west. But the Roumanians, fighting valiantly, held their opponents in the vicinity of the Torzburg and Predeal Passes. The Austro-Germans forced their way through the Gyimes Pass on the Moldavian frontier further north but were unable to exploit their advantage. Early in November Lechitsky's left wing was extended towards the south, taking over the front of the Fourth Roumanian Army as far as the region of this pass.

The renewal of activity late in October by von Mackensen, whose forces had been reinforced by one German and two Turkish divisions, was a prelude to von Mackensen's new departure. The mixed army of the Quadruple Alliance in the Dobrudscha began an advance on October 20th, cut the Tchernavoda-Costanza railway on the next day, and entered the Roumanian seaport, Costanza, on the 23d. The Roumanians abandoned the famous Tchernavoda bridge across the Danube, which is more than 1,000 yards in length and 100 feet above the river, and blew up one of the spans as they retreated. The Russo-Roumanian army of the Dobrudscha retreated towards the northern part of the peninsula. The Russian General Sakharoff, with several Russian divisions, joined it on November 1st, assuming the command.


Von Falkenhayn decided to shift his main attack westward to the Vulcan Pass, through which the highway descends the Jiu valley to one of the least accessible Roumanian rail-heads at Targul Jiu. About the middle of October the Roumanians had been forced to retire through this pass, but had subsequently turned upon their opponents

and repulsed them. To divert attention from the decisive attempt to invade Roumania by this route, Austro-German activity was redoubled near the principal passes to the east. The main advance down the valley of the Jiu began on November 10th and on the 15th the Austro-Germans captured the rail-head at Targul Jiu. In a second battle on the 17th Roumanian resistance was shattered by superior numbers and superior strength of artillery and two days later the Germans reached Filiasi on the main railway line from Orsova to Bucharest, cutting off the retreat of a Roumanian division at the former place.

The weakness in the situation of Roumania uncovered by the Austro-German strategy soon proved fatal. Roumania was unable to shift her forces with rapidity or concentrate reinforcements at the threatened points in time to stay disaster. The rapid retreat following the defeats in the Jiu valley indicated a serious shortage in ammunition. It now appeared, moreover, that the Allies had greatly underestimated the forces which Germany could send to the Roumanian theater. The advent of winter in the northern portion of the German eastern front, by greatly hindering the aggressive operations of the Russians, released numerous German forces for the operations against Roumania. Between September 1st and January 1st Germany sent no fewer than thirty divisions to participate in the Roumanian campaign. In the middle of October about eight to ten Russian army corps were assigned to the support of Roumania; but they arrived at intervals, in instalments, which were swept back by the retreating wave without exercising any distinct influence on events.

After the defeats mentioned above, the First Roumanian Army hastily fell back eastward, hoping to rally on the line of the Aluta; but this was rendered difficult by the fact that the railway runs on the west bank of the river,





The docks at Costanza, the Roumanian port on the Black Sea.



Oil region of Roumania. *Great quantities of oil were set on fire by the Roumanians as they retreated before the troops of the Central Powers.*

exposed to the attack of the approaching enemy. Now came a second crucial blow for the Roumanians. Von Mackensen crossed the Danube at two places where the presence of islands facilitated the placing of the pontoon bridges. This operation, to which the Russians had devoted thirty-three days in 1877, was now accomplished in eighteen hours. The passage of the Danube below the mouth of the Aluta turned the left flank of the First Roumanian Army and made the contemplated defensive line untenable. In a short time the Bulgaro-German forces were crossing the Danube at many points.

The Roumanians were powerless before the combined strength of von Falkenhayn and von Mackensen now coöperating in the heart of Wallachia. It was only possible to delay the enemy's advance so that the bulk of the Roumanian armies could escape eastward. The Roumanians still held the line of the mountains westward as far as the Predeal Pass, so that the right flank of the retreating army was in part protected. On December 1st General Presan, striking southwest of Bucharest, endeavored to drive a wedge between the chief masses of the invading armies, but was repulsed after an initial success.

This effort was probably only intended to gain time for the evacuation of the capital. Experience had shown the futility of attempting to hold Bucharest, although it had been fortified by a system of nineteen detached forts by Brialmont in the period before the war. The ministers, banks, and foreign legations were removed on December 1st to Jassy, which became the provisional capital, and von Mackensen entered Bucharest on the 5th.

As von Falkenhayn advanced eastward towards Ploeshti, the center of the oil-region, on a line passing north of Bucharest, the retreating Roumanians and Allied agents

set fire to the oil-wells, granaries, and military stores, sacrificing property of great value. Huge columns of smoke heralded the progress of the invasion and the highways were crowded with fugitives. The Predeal Pass was abandoned, all Wallachia was doomed, the only course for the Roumanian armies was to fall back as rapidly as possible to the natural defensive line of the Trotus and Sereth, running from the neighborhood of the Gyimes Pass southeastward to the Danube just above Galatz and covering the greater part of Moldavia. The security of this line depended upon the ability of Lechitsky's Russian army to defend the mountain barrier of Moldavia from the Gyimes Pass northward.

The Germanic forces advanced, sweeping Wallachia from the mountains to the Danube, wheeling to the left in conformity with the rounding contour of Roumania. In the meantime, General Sakharoff retired northward in the Dobrudscha, in general alignment with the receding Roumanian front in Wallachia, and crossed the Danube on January 4, 1917. On the next day the Germans and Bulgarians entered Braila and the first German troops reached the Sereth.

Upon the completion of their retreat, the Roumanians were mostly withdrawn for reorganization under Averescu to positions in the rear, and the Russians took over the main defense of the new line. Reaching the natural obstacle at the mouth of the Sereth, the extreme right wing of the Teutonic armies became stationary and served as a pivot upon which the front swerved to the right sufficiently to face the new Allied position. Von Falkenhayn entered Focsani on January 8th and by the middle of the month the Teutonic forces were in contact with their opponents along the entire Moldavian line. But several attempts to penetrate the new Russo-Roumanian front were unsuccessful and major operations ceased.


Besides the bitter disappointment to the Allies and the severe blow to Allied prestige, the results of the Roumanian campaign brought very substantial advantages to the Central Powers. The delight of certain German leaders at the opportunity of returning to open warfare after the irksome months of purely defensive operations had turned out to be well founded. The German people were heartened by a rapid series of victories. The conquest of Wallachia removed a deep and awkward depression in the eastern border of the Quadruple Alliance and consolidated German communications with the Near East. The Germans lost no time in exploiting the economic possibilities created by their victories. Every effort was made to restore Roumanian agriculture and to improve its methods, which had remained backward in consequence of the poverty and ignorance of the peasantry and the indolence of the large proprietors. The production of grain crops was stimulated by the rising prices and the military administration gave special attention to encouraging the production of oil-seeds and the extraction of vegetable oils and the development of the fruit and vegetable canning industry.

The population of the larger towns was put on rations,—225 grams of white flour and 150 grams of corn-meal daily, with a weekly meat allowance of 150 grams. The railways were quickly repaired. The Danube was opened to navigation. A towing railway had already been installed along the margin of the artificial channel through the rapids at the Iron Gate, by which the possible amount of up-stream tonnage was increased five-fold. By these means a considerable quantity of Roumanian produce was made available for exportation. Thus, Germany and Austria-Hungary together received 960,000 tons of grain from the Roumanian crop of 1916-1917.

On the other hand, the Roumanian parliament convened at Jassy on December 22, 1916, a coalition government, which included Take Jonescu, was installed on the 24th, and compensation for the national calamities was sought in a series of legislative reforms, such as the introduction of universal and direct suffrage and the extension of peasant proprietorship.

Early in 1917 the Russians, unable to compensate for the Roumanian losses by a vigorous counter-offensive from the line of the Sereth, attempted a diversion in other quarters. Minor gains were made by attacks in the vicinity of Riga and Dvinsk on January 5th and 9th respectively, and on the 28th Lechitsky made a temporary breach in the Austro-Hungarian front near Kimpolung in the southwestern corner of Bukovina. But these results were inconsiderable. Russia's martial force was waning. The patriotism of the masses was too feeble to overcome their war-weariness and the energy of the enlightened classes and the service of the armies were corroded by inefficiency, corruption, and suspicion. Only a miracle could have enabled the Empire of the Tsars to astonish the world again by such a powerful and sustained effort as it put forth in 1916.





Map showing the territory of the Mesopotamian campaign.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE OPERATIONS IN ASIATIC TURKEY

Strategical situation of Asiatic Turkey. British-Indian expedition to Mesopotamia; occupation of Basra, November 21, 1914, and of Kurna, December 9th. Character of the Mesopotamian plain and difficulties of the offensive operations. British capture of Kut-el-Amara and advance on Bagdad. British failure at Ctesiphon and retreat to Kut-el-Amara, which is besieged. Failure of the British relieving expedition to break through in time and surrender of Kut, April 29, 1916. Operations on the Russo-Turkish front. Complete failure of the Turkish offensive in the winter of 1914-1915. The Armenian massacres. The situation in Persia. Capture of Erzerum by the Russians, February 16, 1916, and the Russian advance throughout Armenia. Operations in Persia. Action on the British front in Mesopotamia leading to the capture of Kut-el-Amara. Occupation of Bagdad by the British, March 11, 1917, and further operations northward. Turkish hopes in respect to Egypt. Turkish attack on the Suez Canal defeated, February 3-4, 1915. Revolt against Turkish rule in Arabia. Defeat of the Turkish expedition against Egypt on August 4, 1916. Advance of the British to the border of Palestine. Battles before Gaza, March 27th and April 17-19, 1917.

Asiatic Turkey could be regarded as the vestibule of three continents. It opened onto Africa in the region of the Suez Canal, formed the approach to Asia, and gave access to Europe through the Caucasus and across the Dardanelles. Through it or near it passed the world's most famous trade routes past and present. It held a naturally central situation in the Eastern Hemisphere. It had once contained the mightiest seats of power and might again become strategically a crucial area.

Patiently and systematically, as we have seen, the Germans had striven to consolidate their influence in the Ottoman Empire, chiefly with a view to utilizing the vast military and commercial possibilities of Asiatic Turkey

which touched Egypt and the Persian Gulf and contained the points of departure for the great routes through Persia. The seeming wealth of opportunities made it difficult to predict the immediate intentions of the Turkish leaders and their German mentors at the beginning of the war. But on the other hand, the geographical advantages of this region, while engaging the imagination, still required a vast labor of development and organization before they would become a decisive factor.

The great distances and paucity of improved lines of communication prevented the Turks from profiting by their central position to shift their own forces rapidly from one front to another so as to overwhelm their opponents in detail. However, the isolation of the Allied forces on the different fronts and the lack of a just appreciation of the strategical problem delayed the systematic execution of a coherent plan for offensive operations.

One of the salient geographical features of the situation was the natural barrier of the Taurus Mountains running from the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea near Trebizond. The Constantinople-Bagdad railway still presented a gap of forty-five miles through these mountains and even the connecting highway by way of the famous Cilician Gate was not made practicable for motor traffic until after the intervention of Turkey in the Great War. The British possessed an admirable naval base in Cyprus threatening the Gulf of Alexandretta and the susceptible region of Adana, where the Constantinople-Bagdad railway runs within a short distance of the sea, and the Italians held naval stations in Rhodes and other islands near the southwestern extremity of Asia Minor. Clearly, the question of supply and the replenishment of munitions was fraught with difficulties and dangers for the Turks, particularly in the early stages of the struggle.

Later the situation was considerably improved through the indefatigable efforts of the Germans.

The Germans had counted on the Turks inflaming the numerous Moslem populations of the British and French dependencies to engage in a holy war against their Christian rulers. Although the proclamation of the Jihad met with practically no response, the prospect of using Asiatic Turkey as a base for attacks against the British Empire in its most vulnerable parts continued to fascinate the German imagination, and the German leaders expected at least that a demonstration against Egypt or a threatened blow at India would divert the attention of the British from the prosecution of the war in Europe.

The control of Mesopotamia with a harbor on the Persian Gulf was an essential part of the plan for the Greater Germany. Mesopotamia itself offered enormous possibilities for development. It was, moreover, the natural base from which Persia could be penetrated by German influence and the secret activity of German agents in Afghanistan and India could be sustained, directed, and controlled. The Germans securely established in Mesopotamia, working through subterranean channels and enlisting the fanatical support of the Mohammedan populations, might eventually have undermined the Asiatic power of both Great Britain and Russia.

But British influence had been established in the Persian Gulf before the Ottoman Empire claimed dominion on its shores and it was a settled principle of Anglo-Indian policy that the security of these waters was essential to the safety of the Indian Empire. It was, naturally, the Indian government which undertook to thwart the Turco-German programme by sending a brigade under Brigadier-general W. S. Delamain, which disembarked at the head of the Persian Gulf and was shortly joined by Lieutenant-general

Sir Arthur Barrett with two other brigades. This expeditionary force compelled the Turks to evacuate Basra on November 21, 1914, and erected the British base-camp at that point. Kurna, at the confluence of the Tigris and the old channel of the Euphrates, was captured on December 9th and the British entrenched themselves there and at Mezera on the opposite bank so as to close the gateway from the interior to the sea.

Still the Turkish forces greatly outnumbered the British in this region and the situation remained precarious. Lieutenant-general Sir John Nixon arrived from India with reinforcements and assumed the chief command. The Turks slowly gathered their forces around the British area of occupation. A series of minor engagements culminated in an attack west of Basra by about 18,000 Turks, beginning on April 12, 1915, and lasting three days, when the Turks were defeated with severe losses.

The essential zone of Mesopotamia is an alluvial plain of great natural fertility formed by the Tigris and the Euphrates, which approach to about twenty miles of each other near Bagdad, then swing apart, and finally unite about a hundred miles above the head of the Persian Gulf. This fruitful belt is enclosed on both sides by deserts. The hydrographical conditions were a serious hindrance to the operations of the British. The extremely tortuous course of the rivers increased the length of the lines of communication several fold and this difficulty was greatly increased by the uncertain conditions of the navigable channels. The melting of the snow in the Armenian mountains in the spring causes the Tigris and the Euphrates to overflow their banks, converting a large part of the plain into a morass. At other times the water falls to such a low stage that navigation by steamer is greatly impeded by the shallows. The ancients prevented inundations by means of dykes and artificial lakes,



Lieutenant-general Sir John Nixon, commander-in-chief of the early operations in Mesopotamia.



Lieutenant-general Sir Percy Lake, successor to General Nixon as commander of the British forces in Mesopotamia.



Major-general C. V. F. Townshend, commander of the British forces captured by the Turks at Kut-el-Amara.



Lieutenant-general Sir Stanley Maude, commander-in-chief of the British forces which captured Bagdad in March, 1917.



but their indolent successors neglected these works, which gradually disappeared. At all times the plain is interrupted by canals, lagoons, and swamps forming defensive barriers.

Notwithstanding these difficulties and the smallness of the numbers of the British, the forces from Kurna pushed on boldly up the Tigris. On June 3d they occupied Amara, seventy-five miles above Kurna, while the Turks retired on Kut-el-Amara, 150 miles further up the river. Kut-el-Amara was a place of considerable strategic importance, because from a point opposite a channel called the Shatt-el-Hai leaves the Tigris and flows to the Euphrates at Nasiriyeh, the reputed site of the Garden of Eden, situated about a hundred miles northwest of Basra. The Shatt-el-Hai, as long as it was open to the Turkish forces, offered an opportunity for threatening the British on the flank or in the rear. But on July 25th a British force sent out from Kurna took Nasiriyeh. It remained for the British to close the entrance of the Shatt-el-Hai from above.

Early in August a division under Major-general C. V. F. Townshend started from Amara to attack Kut-el-Amara. The enemy, about 10,000 in number, awaited them about seven miles below the town, deployed on a front of six miles extending across the river. The British attacked at dawn on September 28th. The chief attack was delivered against the Turkish left flank, which was driven in about 10 A. M., so that the British turning the enemy's front dispersed the reinforcements advancing towards his center. The Turks abandoned the field during the following night and the British entered Kut-el-Amara on the 29th. Thus far the campaign had been brilliantly conceived and executed.

Soon, however, the effect of the important events in the Balkan peninsula began to be felt in the campaigns of

Asiatic Turkey. The collapse of Serbia removed the chief obstacle to the flow of German munitions to the Turkish theaters of operations and the failure of the Allies at the Dardanelles and their eventual withdrawal from the Gallipoli peninsula released an army of about 200,000 Turks for action elsewhere. Notwithstanding the inadequacy of the British force and the natural difficulties already enumerated, in spite of his own misgivings, General Townshend pressed on towards Bagdad at the command of General Nixon. The distance by land is about a hundred miles, but by river vastly greater, and the treacherous character of the tribesmen, added to the difficulties of navigation, made the British communications very precarious. But the conquest of Bagdad offered great political advantages and promised to restore British prestige in the East, which had been seriously shaken by the failure of the Gallipoli campaign.

The British advance began early in October and by November 12th General Townshend was encamped seven miles below the Turkish position at Ctesiphon, or about thirty miles below Bagdad. The British numbered about 12,000 combatants, the Turks about 20,000. The main part of the Turkish army was strongly intrenched on the left bank of the Tigris. The British plan, as at Kut-el-Amara, was to aim the chief blow against the enemy's left flank. The assailants advanced to the positions of attack during the night of November 21st-22d and the engagement was begun about nine the next morning. The main Turkish front was pierced about 1.30 but the left flank remained intact and the Turks retired to a second position which the British attacked in vain. Reinforcements reached the Turks, who turned upon their assailants, driving them back to the former Turkish first-line trenches. The British withstood repeated attacks on the next day, but their losses

in the battle totalled about 4,500 and the Turks were constantly receiving additional reinforcements. The situation was perilous and General Townshend began a retreat at midnight on the 25th. After exhausting marches the expedition reached Kut-el-Amara on December 3d where it was straightway invested by the Turks. The British were confident that it was merely a question of time before the siege of Kut-el-Amara would be lifted and General Townshend's forces would be released. The two Indian divisions had already been withdrawn from the Western front, where the Anzac Corps replaced them, and had embarked for the Persian Gulf. Kut-el-Amara is almost completely enclosed within a bend of the Tigris. The British strongly intrenched the neck of land forming the approach from the north. The blockading army, consisting of four divisions, began to bombard the British on December 7th and attacked without success on the 11th. An additional Turkish division arrived from Gallipoli on the 23d, but a fresh assault was repulsed on the evening of the 24th, after which the besiegers abandoned their efforts to take Kut-el-Amara by storm and resorted to the slower process of starving their opponents out.

Meanwhile, Sir John Nixon resigned the post of commander-in-chief in Mesopotamia on account of ill health and was succeeded by Lieutenant-general Sir Percy Lake, Chief of the Indian Staff, and a relieving force was sent to Kut-el-Amara consisting of the Lahore Division, part of the Meerut Division, and a number of British Territorial battalions from India, under General Aylmer. This force came into touch with the Turks about twenty-five miles below Kut-el-Amara on January 6, 1916.

The Germans were devoting close attention to the course of events in Mesopotamia. The aged Marshal von der

Goltz had been sent to conduct the Mesopotamian operations. With experienced German assistance the Turks had now blocked the lines of approach to Kut-el-Amara by successive strongly fortified positions, particularly on the left bank of the Tigris. Partial successes won by the British relieving force on January 7th, 8th, and 21st were followed by a period of stagnation.

Finally, General Aylmer determined to make a sudden advance across the desert on the right bank along the segment of the broad arc formed by the general course of the river east of Kut-el-Amara and surprise Es Sinn, a position commanding the Turkish right wing, seven miles below the beleaguered British camp. The march was successfully performed on the night of February 7th-8th, but the attack was fruitless and the British were compelled to fall back to their old position.

There was another period of inaction for about a month, until Lieutenant-general Sir G. P. Goringe, who had succeeded General Aylmer, delivered a frontal attack on the left bank on March 13th with the Thirteenth Division, which had arrived as reinforcements. The British carried five successive lines while the Lahore Division cleared up the corresponding enemy positions on the right bank, but the spring floods coming on made further advance impossible.

The situation of the British force shut up in Kut-el-Amara became daily more critical from the depletion of their stores. Resistance was a continual struggle against famine. An attempt to bring supplies by steamer failed, as might have been expected. Aëroplanes occasionally brought provisions, but the amount was insignificant. After holding out to the extreme limit of endurance, the troops under General Townshend, now reduced to about 8,000, 6,000 of whom were Indians, laid down their arms on April 29th.



The great arch at Ctesiphon. *Remains of the palace of Takhti Khesra, built by Chosroes I, A. D. 550 The arch, built of brick, is eighty-three feet wide and ninety-five feet high.*



Kut-el-Amara. *After the British first expedition against Bagdad was repulsed at Ctesiphon, they retreated to Kut-el-Amara, where they entrenched, but finally surrendered to the Turks in April, 1916.*



The impression made by the surrender to the Turks of a considerable British force appeared all the more significant, of course, because it followed the Franco-British failures at the Dardanelles. But the British, taught by disappointment, now applied themselves to the task of creating a systematic material organization for the prosecution of the campaign. They dredged the lower Euphrates, established wharves for ocean-going steamers at Basra, and began the construction of a railway towards the theater of action. Supplies were accumulated for a fresh advance towards Bagdad. The critical point in the British campaign had now been passed and as operations advanced it became more and more evident that the British and Russian forces in Asiatic Turkey should eventually coöperate, form a continuous front, and together sweep their opponents westward. We should therefore turn our attention to the Russo-Turkish border in Armenia and trace the progress of the Russian army towards this expected consummation.

The Russian province of Transcaucasia is mainly a great trough extending nearly across the isthmus from the Black Sea to the Caspian, confined on the north by the Caucasus range, with the loftiest peaks in Europe, and on the south by the vast mountainous mass of Armenia. The Turks were eager to recover the fortress of Kars and the port of Batum, which had been taken from them by the Russians in 1878; the Germans hoped that an invasion of Transcaucasia would distract the Russians from operations on their European front; and Germans and Turks alike were lured by the prospect of controlling the natural resources of this province, particularly the rich oil-wells of Baku.

Kars guarded the route from Erzerum, the Turkish advanced base, to the heart of Transcaucasia. A main railway

line traverses the province from the Black Sea to the Caspian, sending off branches on both sides, one of which runs southwestward from Tiflis and forks at Alexandropol, one arm extending through Kars to Sari Kamish, fifteen miles from the Turkish frontier, the other bearing off to the southeast through Erivan and running for a considerable distance along the border of Persia. Erzerum, on the other hand, the Turkish fortress facing Kars, was about 500 miles from the railhead on the most direct land route to Constantinople.

Late in 1914 the Turks had concentrated the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Corps, with three other divisions, on the Russian border, an army of about 150,000 men in all, under the command of Hassan Izzet Pasha, when Enver Pasha, who was also present with a large German staff, conceived the bold project of seizing Kars and cutting off the Russian army by a series of rapid maneuvers in defiance of the rigorous winter climate of these lofty regions. His plan was to recede before the Russians on his right, drawing them as far as possible from their railhead, while with his left he executed an enveloping movement against Sari Kamish, Kars, and the connecting railway.

The Russians crossed the frontier and occupied Keuprikoi on November 20, 1914, when the execution of the Turkish plan began. While the Eleventh Turkish Corps occupied the attention of the Russians in front, the Ninth and Tenth on the left advanced against Sari Kamish and Kars, and the First, which had landed at Trebizond, marched on Ardahan with the view eventually of cutting the railway back of Kars.

The Eleventh Corps withstood and even drove back their opponents until by December 25th the Ninth and Tenth Corps had made their way over the storm-swept ridges and were descending on Sari Kamish and the railway and the

First Corps had reached the vicinity of Ardahan. But the problems of supplying the Turkish armies and maintaining communication by primitive routes, rendered almost impassable by snow, presented enormous difficulties. The more concentrated position of the Russian forces enabled them to deal with their adversaries' columns in detail. They defeated the Tenth Corps in a fierce struggle at the end of December. The retreat of the Tenth Corps exposed the left flank of the Ninth, which was surrounded and captured near Sari Kamish. The Turkish First Corps entered Ardahan on January 1st, but was driven out and routed three days later. Finally, the Eleventh Corps was defeated and put to flight with heavy losses on the 17th. Enver's plan resulted in a complete failure and Transcaucasia was freed from the danger of invasion. The campaign subsided into desultory operations while the Russians cleared the whole frontier region of the enemy.

These events were followed in the adjoining Armenian provinces of the Turkish Empire by the most appalling tragedy of the whole war. With the removal of the restraining influences exercised through the international intercourse of peace times, the latent ferocity of the Turks burst forth against the defenseless Armenian race, charged collectively with treason, and easily eclipsed in ghastly horror the sanguinary work of Abdul Hamid in 1895-1897 and the atrocities of the Young Turks in the Adana massacres of 1909. This wholesale slaughter was largely carried out by bands of irregular soldiery, some of whom were fired by ancestral hatred for their victims. Hundreds of towns and villages were plundered and laid waste. Thousands of Armenians were butchered with the most revolting cruelty. The women and children were dragged off into slavery. Thousands perished of starvation. About 250,000 Armenians escaped into Russia after suffering untold privations,

reduced to utter destitution. The total number of victims was probably more than half a million. The world shuddered at tales of unspeakable savagery. This crime was instigated by Enver Pasha and Talaat Pasha and it is significant that the German and Austro-Hungarian ambassadors at Constantinople refused to join with the American ambassador in a strong protest to the Porte, on the ground that they could not interfere in the domestic affairs of Turkey. There were not lacking publicists in Germany who defended the work of destruction as deserved by the Armenians. But widespread opinion in many lands theretofore inclined to condone the Turks as victims of misrepresentation was now convinced that Turkish rule had been a blight and curse to the fairest regions of the earth.

The unsettled condition of Persia and the presence of Russian forces in some parts of the country before the war made it a theater of the general conflict. The Turks had captured Tabriz in northwestern Persia early in January, 1915, but the Russians brought troops from Kars and retook it. During the spring the Russian forces gradually occupied the province of Azerbaijan. But the German Minister in Teheran, the Prince of Reuss, was working indefatigably to bring Persia into alignment with the Central Powers and had won over a large part of the Persian gendarmerie, which had been established by Great Britain and Russia and placed under Swedish officers. A detachment of the Russian army of the Caucasus marched on Teheran in November. The Austro-Hungarian and German Ministers left the capital on November 14th, after vainly endeavoring to persuade the boy-ruler, Ahmed Shah, to accompany them, and the Prince of Reuss raised the standard of revolt and undertook to hold strategical points, such as Hamadan and Kum, with a force of 6,000 of the Persian gendarmerie, about 3,000 Turkish irregulars, and the disaffected Persian





The Sheikh-ul-Islam in Constantinople proclaiming the Jibad, or Holy War.



Troop of Kurds. Turkish irregulars with a reputation for lawlessness and cruelty. Inhabitants of Kurdistan, a territory lying south of Lake Van and north of the Tigris River.

tribesmen, about 15,000 in all. By the end of the month Teheran had been taken by the Russians and in December the shah was induced to appoint a new pro-Ally cabinet with Prince Firman Firma at its head.

The appointment of the Grand-duke Nicholas to the viceroyalty of the Caucasus with command of operations on the Russo-Turkish frontier foreshadowed a vigorous prosecution of the Russian offensive in Armenia. The Turkish forces, then numbering about 100,000 men, extended on a long front from the Black Sea to Lake Van. The supremacy of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, the lack of Turkish railways, and the inadequacy of the highways in these rugged regions made it difficult to keep the Turks supplied with stores and munitions. They were dependent on the land route from the railhead at Angora, through Erzingan in the upper valley of the Euphrates, to Erzerum, a distance of about 500 miles, largely over indifferent roads. The Russian railhead was only eighty miles from Erzerum, although the intervening country was very mountainous.

Erzerum is situated at an altitude of 6,000 feet. Its outer ring of fortifications, running along the horseshoe ridge of Deve Boyun, which covered the city on the east, was well equipped with artillery.

The number of Turkish troops on the Erzerum front had risen to about 150,000 by January 1, 1916, and there was the prospect of a very great additional increase in consequence of the withdrawal of the Allies from the Gallipoli peninsula. The Grand-duke decided to strike at Erzerum before the additional Turkish forces could be shifted thither from the Dardanelles. The immediate command of the Russian army, at this time of similar strength to that of the Turks, was vested in General Nicholas Yudenitch, to whom is due the chief credit for the execution of the

difficult project. The commander of the opposing Third Turkish Army was Kiamil Pasha.

The advance of the Russian forces on a broad front for the converging operation against Erzerum was started on January 11, 1916, in spite of the severity of the Armenian winter. The main column in the center reached Keuprikoi on January 16th and routed the Third Turkish Division two days later, and by the 20th the Russians stood before the ridge of Deve Boyun. Meanwhile, the column on the right had penetrated to the upper valley of the Western Euphrates, threatening the defenses of Deve Boyun in the rear. One by one the forts on this ridge were forced to yield. The last works were evacuated on the morning of February 16th and before noon the Cossacks rode into Erzerum, where the three Russian columns met. The Russians took 235 officers and 12,753 unwounded men prisoners and captured 323 guns. It was a brilliant achievement, although the greater part of the Turkish army escaped with its equipment.

Yudenitch continued the advance. His right wing was directed against Trebizond, although the greater part of the assaulting troops were brought by sea. Trebizond was the goal of the Ten Thousand Greeks under Xenophon in their famous march to the sea. In the Middle Ages it became one of the most important centers for the trade between the East and Europe. Having the best harbor on the coast it would afford the Russians an extremely valuable additional base of communications, as a good road connected it with Erzerum.

A Russian force was disembarked about sixty miles east of Trebizond on March 4th and, after another landing had been effected west of the city, Trebizond was occupied by the Russians on April 18th. The Russians occupied Van, 150 miles southeast of Erzerum, on May 23d. Progress in

the center was slower; but on July 15th the important town of Baiburt was taken and ten days later, Erzingan, on the western edge of the mountainous country of Armenia. The Turks replied by an offensive directed against the Russian left wing and took Mush and Bitlis, but the Russians in their turn dispersed the Fourth Turkish Division near Rayat on August 25th, and this enabled them to resume their advance westwards.

A Russian force of about one division had been sent to western Persia in December, 1915. It drove the Turks and insurgents before it, occupied Hamadan in January, 1916, and reached the Turkish frontier, 150 miles from Bagdad, by the middle of May. It was expected that this unit would eventually effect a juncture with the British army in Mesopotamia. In fact a Cossack company of five officers and 110 men left the Russian encampment on May 8th, rode southward a distance of about 180 miles through the territory of disaffected tribesmen, crossing several mountain passes at an altitude of 8,000 feet, and reached the British front on the Tigris on May 18th.

In the meantime the situation of the British in Mesopotamia was steadily improving, particularly after Lieutenant-general Sir Stanley Maude took over the chief command in August. The immediate problem was to overcome the Turkish resistance in the vicinity of Kut-el-Amara.


Very thorough preparations were made for the new offensive. The wharves were completed at Basra where steamships coming direct from India could discharge vast cargoes directly; the railway was constructed along the Tigris by laborers from the tropics, accustomed to the excessive heat; and strong reinforcements were brought from India.

The British operated in two parts: that on the right, under Lieutenant-general Sir A. S. Cobbe, was to hold the

enemy on the left bank of the Tigris in the position at Sanna-i-yat, fifteen miles below Kut-el-Amara, while that on the left, under Lieutenant-general W. R. Marshall, was to win a position on the Shatt-el-Hai, south of the Tigris, and eventually threaten the enemy's communications in the rear. It was essentially an enveloping maneuver by the British left wing.

The British forced the passage of the Shatt-el-Hai on December 13th and after repeated attacks succeeded in enclosing the part of the Turkish army on the right bank of the Tigris, opposite Kut-el-Amara, by February 11, 1917. A few days later the Turks evacuated this bank altogether, and on the 23d the British effected the crossing of the Tigris above Kut-el-Amara. On the same day General Cobbe stormed the Turkish lines at Sanna-i-yat. These operations forced the Turks to abandon Kut-el-Amara and the British entered it unopposed. The Turks lost at Kut-el-Amara and during the subsequent retreat 20,000 men and many guns.

The British pushed their advantage vigorously, passed Ctesiphon on March 6th, and on the next day were in contact with the Turks along the line of the Diala, which joins the Tigris from the east, eight miles below Bagdad. The British prepared a turning movement on the right bank as at Kut-el-Amara. The Tigris was crossed by a pontoon bridge below the mouth of the Diala and one column advanced on the right bank, British cavalry reaching the Bagdad railway station just before dawn on the 11th. Meanwhile, the passage of the Diala had been forced, and General Marshall also reached Bagdad a few hours later on the 11th. Six important roads converged at Bagdad, one of them, the historic route to Persia, running up the valley of the Diala to Khanikin and thence eastward, over the Persian tableland, through Kermanshah and Hamadan. By this route the Russian division under General Baratoff had





retreated to beyond Hamadan, followed by the Thirteenth Turkish Corps, after the Turkish capture of Kut-el-Amara had destroyed the hope of uniting with the British. But the renewed British advance in Mesopotamia reversed the situation, and by the time that Bagdad fell the Thirteenth Turkish Corps had retreated to Kermanshah and it was a vital question whether it could pass through Khanikin and cross the Diala before the British intercepted its retreat.

General Maude divided his forces at Bagdad into four columns, one to advance along each bank of the Tigris, a third to proceed westward against Feluja, the nearest important point on the Euphrates, and the fourth to ascend the valley of the Diala and if possible reach Khanikin ahead of the retreating Thirteenth Turkish Corps. Feluja was captured on March 19th and at first rapid progress was made up the valley of the Tigris in the direction of Samarra, the northern extremity of the completed terminal section of the Bagdad railway. The eastern column left Bagdad on March 15th and crossed the Diala two days later. The situation of the Turkish corps retreating from Persia was now desperate; but its rearguard succeeded in holding the Piatak Pass against the advancing Russians while an advance guard occupied a ridge obstructing the British line of advance in the Diala valley until the corps had escaped from the trap, gaining contact with the Eighteenth Corps, which had retreated from Bagdad up the Tigris valley. Together they turned southward to counter-attack the British. The latter withdrew in the Diala valley to concentrate their position, while the column on the left bank of the Tigris turned eastward, attacking the Turkish flank on April 11th. The battle lasted until the 13th, when the Turks were defeated and compelled to resume their retreat northward. Continuing their march up the Tigris, the British crossed the Shatt-el-Adhaim, an affluent of the Tigris from the

northeast, on the 17th, defeating the Turks on its right bank, and entered Samarra on the 24th. The Thirteenth Turkish Corps, which still threatened the right flank of the British, was repulsed in engagements on April 24th and 30th. The advance up the Tigris was continued and on September 28th the British defeated the Turks at Ramadje, about sixty-five miles northwest of Bagdad, taking 3,800 men and thirteen guns. These events, in connection with the advance of the British forces from Egypt into Palestine, encouraged the expectation that the Allied armies would soon converge with overwhelming forces from three directions to crush the remaining Turkish power in Asia.

Allusion was made in the Third Volume to the formal establishment of a British protectorate over Egypt on December 17th, 1914, when Lieutenant-general Henry MacMahon was appointed High Commissioner and Prince Hussein Kemel, eldest son of Ismail, ascended the throne with the title of Sultan. The Turks were naturally eager to invade the country, cut the Suez Canal, foment a native uprising, and recover this former valuable dependency, and the prospect of severing the vital artery of British power was repeatedly invoked in Germany to animate popular enthusiasm.

Egypt still holds the keys both of sea and land and is still most difficult of access, as she was once characterized by the greatest of the Roman historians.

More than a hundred miles of waterless desert intervened between the Turkish outposts and the Suez Canal and the canal itself constituted a very effective defensive line which it was difficult to approach across the expanse of sand without cover except for a few dunes in certain places.

Egypt became a central clearing camp and distribution center for the Indian, Australian, and New Zealand forces of the British Empire, and the protectorate was already

guarded by the Australian and New Zealand contingents and a number of British Territorial units, besides the regular Egyptian army. Nevertheless, the Turks concentrated a numerous force in Syria under Djemal Pasha, the Minister of Marine, with the evident intention of undertaking a campaign against the canal. Three routes traversed the Sinai desert. The northernmost ran along the northern coast from Rafa to El Kantara on the canal, a distance of 120 miles; the central route extended from Beersheba to Ismailia, 140 miles; and the southern reached from Akaba at the head of the eastern arm of the Red Sea to Suez, 150 miles. There was a track, moreover, connecting Nakhel on the southern road diagonally with the central route, running for a part of its course along the Wadi-el-Arish, or "River of Egypt," a dry watercourse.

The Turks made a reconnaissance in force in February, 1915. Advancing mainly by the central route, about 12,000 Turks approached the canal in two detachments, one near Ismailia and the other opposite Toussum. The battle began on the night of the 3d-4th and continued throughout the 4th. A few of the assailants who got across the canal were slain or taken prisoners, every attempt to place in position pontoon bridges failed, and the Turks were finally driven from the eastern bank with heavy losses.

During the winter of 1915-1916 the forces in Egypt were permanently strengthened in consequence of the withdrawal of the British from the Gallipoli peninsula, notwithstanding one British division was eventually transferred to Mesopotamia and the Anzac Corps to the western battle-front. But the Turks, assisted and urged on by the Germans, were making elaborate preparations in Syria for an offensive on a much greater scale.

The execution of their plans was delayed by a serious revolt against Turkish sovereignty, secular and spiritual, in


Hedjaz. The Arabians had never been entirely reconciled to the overlordship of the Turks, whom they regarded as upstarts. The pretensions of the Sultans as successors of the Prophet were particularly galling. Accordingly, the Grand Sherif of Mecca, the most powerful prince of central and western Arabia, took advantage of the international situation to proclaim the independence of Arabia on June 9, 1916. It was particularly embarrassing for the Pan-Islamic propaganda, conceived and largely engineered by Germany, that the Holy City of Islam abjured the movement. Mecca was immediately occupied and Medina was closely invested by the insurgents.

But the Turks persevered in their designs on Egypt. An attacking force of 18,000 Turks, led by the German General von Kressenstein, fell upon the Fifty-second British Territorial Division twenty-three miles east of the Suez Canal about midnight on August 3, 1916, and the battle lasted throughout the following day. Receiving reinforcements, the British counter-attacked about 5 P. M. and put the Turks to flight with a loss, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, of about half their total strength. The result of this engagement was the abandonment of the Turkish expedition.

During the following autumn Sir Archibald Murray, the British commander in Egypt, constructed a railway from El Kantara eastward across the desert. On the night of December 19th the Turks abandoned their elaborately fortified position at El Arish before the British advancing in front of their railway. The latter immediately built a pier there and within a few days ships were unloading supplies at this place, which became the advanced base of the British operating forces. On January 9, 1917, the British took Rafa, about thirty miles northeast of El Arish, and defeated a Turkish detachment in the vicinity, thus gaining a foothold on the eastern margin of the desert.



View of Erzerum from the citadel. *Showing the snow-covered city still on fire after capture by the Russians.*



Street in Trebizond. *Armenians being forcibly taken from their homes. Those not killed at once were collected into groups with no regard for family ties, men in one and women and children in another, and marched into the interior, where those not dying of starvation were sold as slaves.*



The western part of Palestine is an open plain bordering on the Mediterranean, enclosed on the east by the hills of Hebron. The coast region in the southwest, which the British were now approaching, had been repeatedly the arena of conflict for the great empires of history; Egyptians, Assyrians, Macedonians, Crusaders, and Turks had here contended. Napoleon had advanced from Egypt, like the British, before his unsuccessful siege of Gaza.

The British expedition, known as the Eastern Force, was under the immediate command of Lieutenant-general Sir Charles Dobell and consisted of five infantry divisions, two mounted divisions, and the Camel Corps. The two mounted divisions and one infantry division formed the Desert Column, a subordinate command under Sir Philip Chetwode. The British advanced to the river Wadi Ghuzze, about five miles southwest of Gaza.

There was a Turkish garrison of considerable strength in Gaza and a line of Turkish posts extended from Gaza southeastward to Beersheba. The Turkish forces in this region were commanded by General von Kressenstein, a competent officer, under the superior authority of the Turkish Minister of Marine, Djemal Pasha, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Syria.

The British command planned a surprise attack on Gaza, which almost succeeded. The cavalry of the Desert Column was ordered to encircle the city on the east and northeast, so as to intercept Turkish reinforcements advancing from those directions. The Fifty-third Division was to attack the town, while the Fifty-fourth covered its right wing. The operating troops set out before dawn on March 27th, and although their advance was at first impeded by a dense fog, the cavalry screen was successfully thrown around the town.

The Fifty-third Division attacked the Turkish position on Ali Muntar Hill, which covers the town, about noon, and later one of the mounted divisions was sent to support it. The Ali Muntar position was captured and the British were already fighting in the streets on the outskirts of the town when darkness intervened before their task had been completed. Turkish columns were now converging on Gaza from the northeast and east and the British withdrew under cover of the night. On the next day the British resisted the fierce counter-attacks of the Turks, but withdrew on the following night behind the Wadi Ghuzze.

Thus the British lost the opportunity of taking Gaza by a sudden attack. The Turkish forces confronting them were increased to at least five infantry divisions, with several cavalry divisions and a strong force of artillery, and the Turkish front was now systematically organized. The problem of breaking into Palestine became very much more difficult.

Nevertheless, the British railway was extended to Deir-el-Belah near the Wadi Ghuzze, measures were taken for providing an adequate supply of water, and, although the British no longer possessed a preponderance of strength, the offensive was resumed on April 17th. The preliminary attacks progressed favorably on the 17th and 18th, but in the main attack delivered on the 19th the British suffered heavy losses and made only minor gains. After this, operations waned and the fronts remained practically stationary throughout the summer; the British retaining the salient which they had won north of the Wadi Ghuzze.

## CHAPTER XV

### THE ALLIED OFFENSIVES OF 1917 IN THE WEST

Brilliant operations of the French at Verdun, October, November, and December, 1916. Plans and preparations for a great Allied offensive in 1917. Winter operations. Von Hindenburg's strategic retreat to the "Siegfried" line. The devastation of the relinquished territory. The revised plans of the British and French. Battle of Arras: the attack of April 9th and rapid progress for three days; increasing resistance of the Germans; the new "Stosstruppen." Plans of General Nivelle. Second Battle of the Aisne, beginning April 16th: Aisne Heights, Craonne and the Miette Valley, Maronvilliers Heights; changes in the French High Command; capture of Craonne; results. The capture of Messines Ridge by the British, June 7th. Successful local attack by the Germans near the North Sea coast. Third Battle of Ypres: great Allied attacks on July 31st, August 10th and 15th, and in the autumn. Italian offensives: situation on the Isonzo front; Cadorna's plan in May, 1917; struggle north of Gorizia for the Bainsizza plateau; great attack between the Carso and the sea; results of the May offensive.

It remains for us to consider a brilliant closing episode of the campaign of 1916 in the West before passing to the events of 1917, the series of operations by which the French recovered in a few weeks and with a comparatively small expenditure of men practically all the gains in the Verdun sector on the right bank of the Meuse for which the Germans had lavished so many lives throughout a four months' struggle. The French were unwilling to leave their enemy in tranquil possession of those desolate ridges which had been hallowed by the heroism and graves of their defenders.

In October, 1916, General Nivelle commanded the Second French Army which at that time held the front from the Argonne to Lorraine. The proposed attack against the German positions on the heights northeast of Verdun

was assigned to a group of divisions under General Charles Mangin, who had commanded the 8th brigade at the beginning of the war, had shared in the Battle of the Marne as commander of the Fifth Division, had come to Verdun in March, 1916, and had been promoted to the command of the Third Colonial Corps the following June.

It was proposed to drive the foe from Douaumont and Fort Vaux with three divisions. These divisions were withdrawn from the battle-front for a period of rest and special training for the attack on a piece of ground modelled to represent the actual terrain. Provision was made for the application of all the lessons derived from the summer's fighting on the Somme and no operation was ever prepared with more accurate foresight. Ammunition was accumulated in great quantities, light railways were constructed, new trenches and shelters were dug, and the systems of replenishment and evacuation were thoroughly organized.

The Germans had fifteen divisions on the entire Verdun front from Avocourt to Les Épargés, eight of them in the first lines. They had already covered the captured eminences on the right bank with the usual maze of trenches. The French command proposed to assail the German lines on a front of about four miles. The artillery preparation began on October 21st and the infantry attacked just before noon on the 24th, with Generals Joffre, Nivelle, and Petain present as eye-witnesses of their prowess. By three the French were in Fort Douaumont and by nightfall they had gained practically all the intended objectives and had taken 4,500 prisoners, although resistance in Fort Douaumont was not entirely vanquished until the next morning.

The struggle continued along Vaux Ridge on the 26th. A fresh bombardment of Fort Vaux led to its abandonment by the Germans on November 2d. On the next day the

French occupied Vaux village, which had been so fiercely contested eight months before, and fought their way up Hardaumont Ridge.

Nivelle now planned to push back the Germans to the north of Douaumont, where their positions had been rapidly strengthened and where the defenders were echeloned in depth, with five divisions on a front of about six miles and about 9,000 defenders on the first line.

Four French divisions were assigned for the fresh attack and these were especially trained as before on ground which was the counterpart of the actual terrain. The artillery preparation was begun on December 11th and General Nivelle, who was shortly to assume his new duties as commander-in-chief in the West, remained to direct the execution of the final operation which he had himself conceived. The infantry attack was launched on the 15th at 10 A. M. from Poivre Hill to Hardaumont Wood. The attacking front swung forward, pivoting on the left flank. The crest of Poivre Hill was quickly won; Louvemont was taken in the center; but the right wing, which had a far greater distance to traverse, encountered a more serious task. Here the French were held up by the German second-line trenches, which they carried the next day, making good their hold against desperate counter-attacks. This operation gave the French 11,387 prisoners and brought the French front to the position it had held on February 24th, the fourth day of the great Battle of Verdun.

The Allied commanders, conferring in November, 1916, decided on the general plan for a combined offensive in the spring of 1917, to follow up the successes of the campaign just closing, and all through the ensuing winter the British and French engineers directed their energies to the preparations on a vast scale, the repairing and extension of

the system of highways, the construction of a network of light railways, the transference of the heavy artillery to new emplacements, and the elaboration of the trench and shelter organizations. Major-general Sir Eric Geddes, the Director-general of Transportation in the British army, distinguished himself particularly by his unsparing efforts to improve the communications behind the front. British resources in material were taxed to the utmost; some railways in Great Britain and Canada were even stripped of their metal to supply the necessary rails. At the same time great activity in training, organization, and staff work was constantly in progress. The Allies were animated by the expectation that, barring unforeseen complications, their united efforts would achieve the victorious consummation of the war in 1917.

The British, whose natural inclination was to drive the Germans from their submarine bases on the Flemish coast, yielded to the desire of their allies that the first blows be delivered against the foe in northern France. It was decided that the British should first attack the German salient between the Scarpe and the Ancre and coöperate with the French in consummating the projects of the previous summer, turning later to the contemplated operations in Flanders. During the winter the British gradually fought their way up the valley of the Ancre in a series of minor engagements. On January 11th they captured 1,500 yards of trenches along the crest of the ridge east and northeast of Beaumont Hamel village. On the night of February 3d-4th, Grandcourt fell into their hands. As a result of attacks on the 17th and 18th the British gained the high ground commanding the German artillery positions in the upper Ancre Valley, so that the Germans abandoned all their positions in front of the Le Transloy-Loupard line, the defensive position covering Bapaume, on the night of

the 21st-22d, and this line itself on March 12th-13th. On February 26th the British had extended their battle-line on the right as far as Roye, making their entire front in the West 110 miles in length.

Soon after the close of the Battle of the Somme the rumor had become current that the Germans were creating a new defensive line in the West far to the rear of their actual positions and it had now become evident that they intended to execute a systematic withdrawal of their front. Von Hindenburg, who was now responsible for the higher German strategy, had been the natural leader of the eastern school of strategists, those who looked for the crucial issues of the war in the struggle with the Russians. He was doubtless convinced that the Allies now possessed a distinct preponderance of strength in the West and that, therefore, pending favorable developments in Russia, the Germans should confine themselves to a generally defensive strategy in France and Flanders, shortening their battle-front and thus economizing in their use of man-power, but at the same time retaining all points that were essential for the conduct of the war. The wonderful confidence bestowed on von Hindenburg by the German people made it easier for him to abandon deliberately a portion of the conquered territory. The retirement, moreover, and the adoption of a generally defensive strategy would not preclude a sudden return to the offensive whenever the circumstances offered an especially favorable opportunity. In fact, the theory was quite generally held among the Allies that von Hindenburg's main purpose was to turn upon them from a carefully selected and prepared position before they had organized a new front in advance of their old one.

The new "Siegfried" line, as it was named, although now more commonly known as the "Hindenburg" line, diverged from the old front near Arras and ran southeastwards,

passing a few miles west of Quéant, St. Quentin, and La Fère, and joined the old line on the heights above the Aisne, northeast of Soissons. The fighting front from which the Germans retreated was about 120 miles in length, including all its sinuosities, two-thirds of it opposite the British and the remainder opposite the French. The change reduced the total length of the German western front by about forty miles.

The British and French began a general advance on the entire front from Arras to the vicinity of Soissons on March 17th. During their retirement the Germans left machine-gun units in selected positions to delay the advance of the Allies and devastated the country in a ruthless manner, not only impeding or destroying the lines of communication, but pillaging and burning towns and villages and committing many senseless acts of barbarism not justified by military expediency.

By the night of the 17th the Australians of the Fifth British Army had entered Bapaume and the troops of the Sixth French Army had entered Roye. The British occupied Péronne and the French, Noyon, on the next day, and by April 1st the Allies confronted the new "Hindenburg" line at nearly all points. They had recovered about 1,000 square miles of French territory and had penetrated to a maximum depth of about twenty miles.

The plans of the British and French were greatly altered by the German retreat. Throughout the larger part of the front affected by it, they were, for the time, rendered incapable of wielding a serious blow. Their elaborate preparations for the proposed offensive, narrow-gauge tracks, heavy-gun emplacements, magazines, shelters, assembling centers, were left high and dry by the receding tide of battle. For this and other reasons the British and French undertook to dislodge the enemy from the pivotal positions





Excavation, thirty-two feet deep, made by the French to unearth an unexploded 15-inch German shell.



Crater made by the explosion of a big shell.

at the respective extremities of the "Hindenburg" line, where the existing organization of the Allied front could still be used by the attacking troops, and this resulted in the Battle of Arras and the Second Battle of the Aisne.

The British armies were now deployed as follows from the North Sea southwards: the Second, under Sir Herbert Plumer, in Flanders; the First, under Sir Henry Horne, facing La Bassée and Lens; the Third, under Sir Edmund Allenby, in the region of Arras; the Fifth, under Sir Hubert Gough, in the upper valleys of the Cojeul and the Sensée; the Fourth, under Sir Henry Rawlinson, in the sector opposite St. Quentin. The army group of the Crown Prince of Bavaria, confronting the Allies between the coast and the river Oise, contained about sixty divisions and formed three armies: the Fourth, under von Arnim, stretching from the sea to the Lys; the Sixth, under Otto von Below, from the Lys to the Sensée; and the Second, under von der Marwitz, from the Sensée to south of the Oise.

Between Lens and the northern point of deviation of the "Hindenburg" line from the old front, the German defenses were very strong, consisting in depth of three main positions, each formed by four parallel lines of trenches. As an additional protection for the vital points, Douai and Cambrai, the Germans designed an additional fortified line in the rear, from Drocourt, southeast of Lens, to the "Hindenburg" line near Quéant. The key to the battle-zone between Arras and Lens was believed to be Vimy Ridge, on the western side of which the British held a foothold. The sector chosen for the main British offensive in the Arras region was about twelve miles in length. Along this front from north to south stood the Canadian, the Seventeenth, Sixth, and Seventh Corps. The battle was preceded by the greatest aërial contest ever fought, in which the attacking British airmen established a superiority

over their opponents. Beginning with the cellars and sewers of the city, the British had developed a great system of subterranean shelters, assembly stations, and galleries under Arras, by which the troops who were to attack on that section of the front could reach the first-line trenches practically without exposure to hostile fire.

The British bombardment began on April 4th and eventually rose to a degree of destructive intensity far surpassing the preparation on the Somme in the previous summer. The cannonading ceased for a day, deceiving the enemy, who expected an immediate assault to follow, and was resumed on the morning of April 9th with even greater fury as the immediate prelude to the attack.

The infantry attacked at 5.30 A. M. and captured the first German position in forty minutes. By nine, the Canadians held nearly all of Vimy Ridge, the Seventeenth Corps was advancing on Thelus, and the Sixth had taken Blangy. Further south the assailants had captured an intricate mass of trenches known as the Harp. A half-hour later the whole of the second German position had been taken, except a short length west of Bailleul, and by night the third position had been breached in several places. The British took about 6,000 prisoners on the first day of the offensive.

The water-soaked condition of the ground impeded the advance of the British guns and retarded the progress of the offensive. On the 10th the Canadians completed the conquest of Vimy Ridge and the British reached the outskirts of Monchy-le-Preux, five miles east of Arras. This village, where every house had been converted into a machine-gun nest, was cleared of the Germans on the next day. But in the evening of the 11th the advance came to a halt. After the British had shattered all the German positions on a front of twelve miles, a period of bad

weather gave the Germans time to recover their equilibrium, reconstitute their front, bring up reserves, and deliver a number of severe counter-attacks, in which, however, they were not successful in recovering the lost ground.

On the 23d the attack was resumed on both banks of the Scarpe, on an eight-mile front, and after desperate fighting the British had advanced from one to two miles by the evening of the 25th. They had now covered half the distance from Arras to Douai and only the Drocourt-Quéant line lay before the latter. The original pivotal sector at the northern extremity of the "Hindenburg" line had thus been destroyed.

The fighting in the Arras sector consisted henceforth of local efforts chiefly for the purpose of broadening the conquered zone. On May 3d the Australians captured Bullecourt with the junction of the Drocourt-Quéant and main "Hindenburg" lines. The new German organization of the "Sturm-" or "Stosstruppen," made its first appearance in this battle. Theretofore whole divisions or army corps had been selected for special preparation in view of an important offensive operation, as for the great attack on Verdun. A new and permanent special class of assaulting troops was now established on the basis of a searching process of selection. Individuals preëminent in the required qualities of moral and physical vigor were henceforth picked from different units, assembled in new groups, and trained in all the newest methods of attack. A battalion of these élite "Stosstruppen," or shock troops, was attached to each army corps and consisted of four companies of assault, each with 100 men, a machine-gun company with six machine-guns, a company of bombers, a company of flame-throwers, and a battery of assault. The inactivity on the eastern front had enabled Germany

to strengthen her forces on the western front, where she had 170 divisions at the end of April, seventy against the British and the same number against the French, with thirty as a strategic reserve.

General Nivelle, whose plans at Verdun in the early winter had been realized with such unflinching exactitude, proposed to accomplish the main task of the campaign of 1917 by a single impetuous movement, smashing the German positions between Soissons and Reims, capturing Laon, turning the "Hindenburg" line from the south, and thus, in conjunction with the British, disrupting the entire German front in northern France. The Germans still held the heights north of the Aisne, to which they had retreated after the Battle of the Marne, and von Kluck's attack in January, 1915, had given them a footing on the south bank from Missy-sur-Aisne to a point east of Chavonne. There had been no important operations in this region for more than two years and the Germans had developed their defensive organization in every way, making the most of the favorable natural features, such as the caverns in the limestone rocks, which afforded excellent shelter.

The Northern French army group was now under the command of Franchet d'Esperey, the Central under that of Petain, and the Eastern under that of de Castelnau. A fourth group was formed under General Micheler, who had commanded the Tenth French Army in the Battle of the Somme. Nivelle planned to use the center and the right wing of Micheler's group from the river Ailette to Reims, consisting of the Sixth Army under Mangin, and the Fifth under Mazel, with the Tenth Army in reserve. The army group of the German Crown Prince covered the front from the Oise to Verdun, with the Seventh Army under von Boehn, extending from La Fère to

Craonne, and the First, under Fritz von Below, from Craonne to Champagne, guarding the proposed objectives of the French. About 350,000 infantry held this portion of the German front.

The French artillery preparation began on April 6th and increased in fury until the 15th, when every gun thundered along a front of about fifty miles. The infantry attacked at six on the morning of the 16th. Two army corps advanced along the crest of the plateau and another captured Hurtebise Farm, where the Heights of the Aisne contract to a neck scarcely a hundred yards broad between the valleys of the Aisne and the Ailette.

The village of Craonne stands at the eastern extremity of the heights and of the famous Chemin-des-Dames, which runs along their crest, and commands the low ground to the east, where the valley of the Miette forms a natural highway from the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac north-westward towards Laon. Craonne and two isolated hills, the Bois des Buttes and the Bois des Baches, which bristled with machine-gun positions, guarded this opening from the valley of the Aisne into the plain of Laon. The French reached the outskirts of Craonne on the first day of the attack. They stormed the Bois des Buttes, but did not advance much beyond it. Some progress was made further to the right between the Aisne and Reims. The results of the first day, although considerable, fell far short of expectations.

On the next day, besides resuming the battle along the same sectors, the French extended the offensive to the sector east of Reims. After an artillery preparation, which had been in progress for two weeks, two French corps attacked the German positions in the Moronvilliers hills, which were very strongly fortified and held mainly by the Fourteenth Corps of the First German Army. The first

position of the Germans had already been practically obliterated by the bombardment. The center of the attacking forces pushed well into the hills, but the wings were held at the enemy's second position.

On the 18th the Germans lost most of their salient in the western portion of the Heights of the Aisne. The French stormed the Bois des Baches and repulsed fierce counter-attacks. On the next day the salient held by the Germans since January, 1915, was completely swept away. There was desperate fighting in the Moronvilliers sector, where the Germans repeatedly counter-attacked in vain.

At this point the battle subsided. The French had taken 20,780 prisoners. The Germans had been entirely driven from the banks of the Aisne between Soissons and Berry-au-Bac and from all the spurs of the heights, and the French held the center of the table-land. But the Germans still commanded the gateway to Laon from their position at Craonne. None of the major objectives had been attained.

There was general disappointment, an impression that the losses of the French troops were out of all proportion to the results obtained, and a revulsion of feeling against Nivelle's drastic generalship. These convictions resulted in important changes in the chief command. It was announced on April 30th that the post of Chief of the General Staff at the Ministry of War had been revived and conferred on General Petain. But on May 15th Petain succeeded Nivelle as Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the North and Northeast. Fayolle succeeded to Petain's group command of the Center and Foch succeeded Petain as Chief of the General Staff.

Nevertheless, the offensive had been resumed. On May 4th the French captured Craonne and gained a footing on the eastern section of the Chemin-des-Dames. In spite of

fierce counter-attacks, the Germans were gradually driven from the ridge. But the impetus of the French offensive waned and the battle-lines in the region north of the Aisne remained practically stationary all the summer.

The German losses during the Allied offensive down to May 5th were estimated at about 213,000, about 53,000 having been taken prisoners and 160,000 put out of action, while the aggregate losses of the British were given as about 80,000 and those of the French 93,000.

In June the British initiated their offensive operations in Flanders with one of the most spectacular and thrilling performances of the whole war. An elevation known as the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, included within a salient of the hostile front south of Ypres, had served the Germans as an important observation center since the autumn of 1914 and formed one of the bulwarks of their front in Flanders. The Germans had left nothing undone to make this position impregnable and it was defended by an elaborate trench system about a mile deep.

But for nearly two years Anzac and British sappers had burrowed under this range of hills without betraying the secret of their presence there, and had laid nineteen great mines with 600 tons of ammonite, a very powerful explosive. Finally, after the ridge had been subjected to bombardment for about two weeks, the preparation culminated on June 7th at 3.10 A. M. in the explosion of this tremendous magazine. The crest of the ridge was rent as by a stupendous volcanic upheaval. An eye-witness describes it as "the most terrible, beautiful, thing; the most diabolical splendor" he had ever seen. "Out of the dark ridges of Messines and Wytschaete and that ill-famed Hill 60, for which many of Britain's best have died, there gushed up enormous volumes of scarlet flame from exploding mines and of earth and smoke, all lighted by flame spilling over

into fountains of fierce color, so that the countryside was illuminated by the red light." The report was heard by Mr. Lloyd George in his country home near London, 140 miles away.

At once the British artillery poured a veritable torrent of shell upon the torn and lacerated heights. The infantry of Sir C. O. Plumer's Second British Army carried the vestiges of the first German position on a front of ten miles in a few minutes and captured the entire ridge within three hours. Fierce resistance was encountered when they attacked the rear defenses late in the day, but by nightfall these also had been taken.

In July the Germans scored a local success at the northern extremity of the Allied front in Flanders, where the trenches of the first-line, held by the British, ran on the right bank of the Yser for a distance of about three miles, beginning at the coast. This position involved danger to the communications at the exposed crossing points along the river. The Germans concentrated a strong force of artillery on the sector opposite and began a bombardment of great intensity on July 11th, destroying the parapets and at the same time isolating the British front. The German infantry attacked, killing or capturing nearly all their opponents northeast of the river, about 3,000 in number. This success added to the security of the German hold on the Flemish coast.

The middle of summer passed before the Allies undertook the main operation in Flanders for intercepting the German lines of communication and thereby rendering the submarine bases on the Belgian coast untenable. The series of engagements in which the British and their Allies strove to carry out this purpose are known as the Third Battle of Ypres. During the last ten days of July the German front in Flanders was subjected to a terrible



Sand shoes. *Equipment used by the British troops in Palestine to make easy marching across the desert sand.*



Apparatus used by the French for taking photographs from *aéroplanes*.



Alaskan dogs used by the French army in the Vosges Mountains.



bombardment, which rose to a pitch of intensity that was said to have exceeded anything previously witnessed. This was followed on the 31st by a gigantic attack of the British, with a French contingent on their left, along a front of nearly twenty miles, from Dixmude southward to Warnton, on the Franco-Belgian border. The French captured Bixchoote and Steenstraate and drove back the Germans to a depth of about two miles. The British quickly cleared the first and second German positions and penetrated the third in places, taking Langemarck and St. Julien, besides other villages. But they were soon driven from the places mentioned by the furious counter-attacks of the Germans, who fought with desperate determination to preserve their opportunity for employing effectively an engine of destruction on which their ultimate hopes now rested. The battle was waged with much fury on August 1st, but the offensive was impeded by a very heavy rain which lasted fifty hours continuously.

The British captured Westhoek, east of Ypres, in a sharp attack on August 10th. Five days later the French and British attacked northeast and east of Ypres, the latter taking Langemarck. The Allies attacked at intervals and in great force in Flanders during the autumn, but their superiority in artillery and numbers was largely neutralized by the technical resourcefulness of their opponents, and particularly by the enemy's defensive organization in great depth. The Germans held their front lines, which were liable to complete destruction by the tremendous bombardments, with comparatively inconsiderable forces, while their stronger rear lines absorbed the shock of the attacking infantry before the assaulting waves overwhelmed the defensive system. Thus the offensive operations launched with such vast preparations and high hopes in Flanders remained inconclusive.

Gradually, as we have seen, a closer coördination was being realized between the efforts of the Italians and those of their Allies, and the plans for 1917 called for a combination of offensives by all the Allies in the West. The spring offensive was launched considerably later by the Italians than by the French or the British, probably for premeditated reasons.

Herculean tasks still lay before the Italian armies along the Isonzo before they could expect to advance to their chief goal, Trieste. With the exception of the single Italian bridgehead at Plava, the Austro-Hungarian forces still held the eastern bank of the Isonzo from Monte Santo above Gorizia north to Tolmino. Here the steep wooded cliffs form the western face of the lofty Bainsizza plateau. This, together with the heights east of Gorizia, and the Carso east of the Vallone, had still to be won before the Italians could march upon their ultimate objectives.

The first important effort of the Italians, after the offensive which gave them Gorizia, as described in Chapter XI, had been an attack on the stony ridge of the Carso by the Third Army under the command of the Duke of Aosta. A great bombardment from Vippaco to the sea opened on the morning of September 14, 1916, and the infantry advanced to the assault at four in the afternoon of the same day. The battle lasted four days. The Austro-Hungarians resisted with great tenacity and the Italians made only slight gains. Some further gains in the same region were made during the four days, October 10th-14th, but the Italians were hampered by bad weather. Finally, after a terrific bombardment on October 31st, the Italians shattered the enemy front for a distance of more than two miles, and on the following days secured a considerable salient near Castagnevizza.

Both sides prepared with feverish energy for the campaign of 1917. There were about thirty-six Austro-Hungarian divisions on the Italian front and the Italians expected a furious combined offensive by German and Austro-Hungarian forces.

General Cadorna proposed to forestall the enemy's attack. His plan was to hide the direction of his principal effort by a vigorous preliminary bombardment along the entire Isonzo front. He proposed to strike first with his left and then, when the Austro-Hungarian reserves had been drawn to the points thus threatened, to deliver the principal attack against the southern part of the Carso, where the elevation of Hermada, projecting towards the sea, commanded the coast road to Trieste.

The Italian bombardment began on May 12th and was supported by British artillery. The Second Italian Army delivered the first attack north of Gorizia on a front of about twenty miles. Slowly the assailants struggled up the steep slopes east of the river about 2,000 feet high. By the 15th they had gained the western margin of the plateau and advanced gradually until the 22d, when they had taken 7,113 prisoners and considerable equipment.

The main blow was delivered by the center and the right wing of the Third Army between the Carso and the sea. That the enemy should have no warning, the bombardment was furious but short. It opened at 6 A. M. on May 23d and at 4 P. M. the infantry attacked. Before nightfall they had carried the Austro-Hungarian first and second positions from Castagnevizza to the sea and taken 9,000 prisoners. The battle continued on the following days with the left wing of the Third Italian Army pressing southward from the salient which the Italians had won early in the previous November. By the 25th the Italians had reached the outskirts of Hermada. There was a lull

in the conflict on the 30th. The Italians had taken 16,568 prisoners and had gained a footing on the slopes of Hermada, but the main position of the enemy still held.

Early in June the Austro-Hungarians launched a series of counter-blows. For several days fierce local conflicts raged at different points along the front. But the only permanent gain made by the counter-assailants was in the southern section, where they expelled the Italians from their advanced positions on the slopes of Hermada along a front of about three miles. These efforts ceased and the battle died away after June 5th.

Measured in square miles of conquered terrain, the results of this Italian offensive were slight. But only one who is thoroughly familiar with the rugged nature of the Austro-Italian front, the most arduous of all the theaters of hostilities, can rightly appraise the toil and the intrepid exploits of the operations in those regions. The Italians had stormed elaborately fortified positions of great natural strength in the face of determined resistance and had effected an appreciable advance in the direction of their goal. The enemy, reinforced by divisions from their stagnant eastern front, receded, but still presented a coherent defensive organization. The Italians had still to feed their courage on the engrossing but impalpable possibilities of subsequent offensive operations. Repeated efforts, sustained by the same means and by unflinching resolution, must eventually surmount every obstacle and exhaust all the resources of resistance.

## CHAPTER XVI

### THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND MILITARY COLLAPSE

Ministerial changes in Russia. Remarkable career and assassination of the miracle-worker, Rasputin. Allied conference in Petrograd, February 1, 1917. Critical food situation. Popular demonstrations in Petrograd, resulting in bloodshed on March 11th. Rodzianko's telegram to the Tsar. The Duma refuses to disperse and is declared the sole constitutional authority. The troops join the revolution. An Executive Committee of the Duma as Provisional Government. Fall of the Admiralty, March 13th. Abdication of the Tsar on the 15th. The new ministry. Attitude of the Socialists: Social Revolutionary and Social Democratic Parties; Maximalists and Minimalists, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The Soviet or Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. Neither Duma nor Soviet truly representative of the Russian people. Kerensky. Disintegrating forces. Arrival of Lenin. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The increasing power of the Socialists and the reorganization of the cabinet. The renewal of the Russian offensive in Galicia, July 1, 1917. Capture of Halicz, July 10th. The sudden panic seizing the Russians on the 19th and the collapse.

The only tangible effect of the outcry against the Russian administration in November, 1916, was the substitution of Trepoff as prime minister in place of Stürmer, who had been suspected of a treasonable understanding with the Germans. To preclude further embarrassing discussions, the Tsar suspended the session of the Duma on December 29th. A few days later, on January 9, 1917, Trepoff resigned and was succeeded by Prince Golitzin, who was charged with improving the food conditions. Protopopoff remained throughout these changes as the principal representative and agent of the reactionary elements. Russia was apparently calm, but beneath the surface the disruptive forces were daily gaining strength. The course of political events in the autumn of 1916 had drawn together the moderate, reasonable elements in the Duma, and with this combination

the military chiefs were fortunately in sympathy, while certain sinister elements at court and in the higher bureaucracy, dominated by anxiety for the security of their own influence and privileges, indifferent to every consideration of patriotism, looked forward with hope to a popular uprising which might be easily crushed and would serve as a pretense for repressive measures strengthening their own tenure of power.

An event of extraordinary dramatic interest was a sort of forerunner of the Russian revolution, the assassination of the charlatan Rasputin, who had exercised a potent mysterious influence over the imperial pair. Gregory Novik, born of a peasant family fifty years before in the Siberian district of Tobolsk, received the uncomplimentary epithet Rasputin from his neighbors. Like many holier leaders, he suddenly renounced a life of irregular habits, made profession of intense religious zeal, and, in spite of frequent lapses into drunkenness and immorality, impressed society by his extreme asceticism and devotion. He gained a reputation as a miracle-worker, found a way into the leading social circles, and became a favorite of devout women of high rank, over whom he exercised a hypnotic influence.

Admitted to the intimacy of the court through the medium of a lady-in-waiting, he gained an enormous influence over the Tsarina, particularly, by his supposed miraculous power of healing, as it was believed that the preservation of the life of the Tsarevitch, who was always delicate in health, depended upon his intervention. Rasputin, while tall and well-proportioned, ostentatiously affected a slovenly, unkempt appearance, wearing only peasants' clothes.

The ruling passions of the man were avarice and love of power. His personal influence at court was exploited with great profit to himself. At the same time, he was the confederate of the extreme reactionaries, who desired immediate peace because they foresaw that the continuation of

the war would result in the destruction of the existing order and who regarded the influence of Germany as less dangerous for the Russian autocracy than that of France and Great Britain. Rasputin became the center of a court camarilla made up of the bureaucratic clique. By his corrupting influence and licentious habits he made himself obnoxious to the enlightened and liberal elements. His intrigues and arrogance aroused the jealousy and disgust of many leading members of the aristocracy.

On the night of December 29, 1916, Rasputin was invited to a supper-party at the house of Prince Yusupoff, where the other guests were the Grand-duke Dmitri Pavlovitch and Purishkevitch, a conservative member of the Duma from Bessarabia. The party locked themselves in a salon and gave the miracle-worker the choice between suicide and execution. With the revolver handed him he fired at the grand-duke and missed, whereupon the others shot him dead. His body was thrust through an ice-hole in the Neva, but was subsequently recovered and interred in a silver coffin in the presence of the Tsar and Tsarina at Tsarskoye-Selo. The news of the assassination of Rasputin was received with enthusiasm throughout the country. The conspirators were put under domiciliary arrest and subsequently relegated to remote districts in the country or to the front, but were never placed on trial.

Protopopoff, who was the leading agent in the reactionary plots, had originally been a liberal, but after his visit to Western Europe in the summer of 1916, he had identified himself with the extreme bureaucratic clique. Since he was a man of extravagantly romantic temperament, the change may have been partly due to the glamor of the court.

There was a meeting of representatives of the Allied powers in Petrograd on February 1st, Foreign Minister Doumergue coming from France and Lord Milner from

England. The Allies urged the Tsar to conciliate the Duma by summoning a liberal ministry. At this time the Paris *Temps* declared that the domestic policy of Russia was controlled by the extreme Right, who were opposed to further coöperation with the Western Powers, because they feared that this would lead to liberal reforms. But the Tsar refused to be persuaded and prolonged the prorogation of the Duma. His obstinacy was fatal.

The food situation was rapidly approaching a crisis. In consequence of the inadequacy of the transportation system, as well as the inefficiency of the administration, food conditions displayed the sharpest contrasts, with abundance in some localities and famine in others. In Odessa, for instance, the people were without bread two days a week and without meat three. By March 1st there was no bread to be had in Petrograd.

The sessions of the Duma were finally resumed on February 27th. The disturbances which grew into the revolution in Petrograd are directly traceable to the shortage of food. They began as rather aimless demonstrations, but the reactionaries were apparently determined to exasperate the people for furthering their own nefarious designs. The Nevsky Prospect, the leading artery of Petrograd, was the scene of popular demonstrations on March 9th and 10th, the soldiers showing an inclination to fraternize with the populace. With the fine weather on the afternoon of March 11th the thoroughfare was crowded from end to end. The government had summoned reinforcements for the Petrograd garrison and the police mounted machine-guns on the roofs of buildings at important points. Shortly after 3 P. M. the military were ordered to clear the Nevsky Prospect. A company of the Pavlovsky Guards Regiment took its stand at a central point on this broad avenue near the Sadovaya and fired several volleys in the direction of the





Alexander Kerensky, Minister of Justice and later Minister of War under the first Russian Provisional Government and vice-president of the Soviet.



Prince George Lvoff, Prime Minister under the first Russian Provisional Government.

Anitchkoff Palace, the residence of the dowager empress. Altogether about 200 persons were killed.

On the same afternoon Rodzianko, President of the Duma, telegraphed the Tsar as follows:

“Situation serious. Anarchy reigns in the capital. Government is paralyzed. Transport, food, and fuel supplies are utterly disorganized. General discontent is growing. Disorderly firing is going on in the streets. Various companies of soldiers are shooting at each other. It is absolutely necessary to invest someone who enjoys the confidence of the people with powers to form a new government. No time must be lost. Any delay may be fatal. I pray God that at this hour responsibility may not fall on the wearer of the Crown.”

The text of this message describes exactly the situation. Copies of it were sent to the different commanders-in-chief, whose support was invited and received. Prince Golitzin prorogued the Duma, but this body refused to disperse, and Rodzianko announced that it was now the sole constitutional authority.

On the morning of March 12th the Preobrayensky Guards Regiment, when ordered to fire on the people, mutinied, and their example was followed by the Volynsky and other regiments. The revolting troops captured the Arsenal and supplied the populace with weapons. One by one the strong points of the city fell. About noon the Tsar telegraphed that he was coming and was bringing troops from the northern front to quell the insurrection. In the afternoon the Duma chose an executive committee of twelve men to act as a provisional government, among them being Rodzianko, Prince Lvoff, Miliukoff, and Kerensky.

The police were everywhere hunted down and made the victims of popular fury. About midnight Protopopoff surrendered voluntarily to the Duma guards. The regiments sent to check the movement in Petrograd joined the

revolution as soon as they reached the capital. The Admiralty, the last stronghold of the government, surrendered to the revolutionaries on the morning of March 13th after a siege of thirty-six hours and Stürmer and Sukhomlinoff were arrested.

On the 14th the Tsar attempted to reach Petrograd by rail, but the railway had been cut at Bologoi and he turned back to Pskoff. At 2 A. M. on the 15th he informed General Russky that he had decided to grant a responsible ministry, but the latter, after communicating with the Duma and other generals, advised abdication as the only possible course. This view was sustained by Alexeieff, Brussiloff, Ewarts, and the Grand-duke Nicholas. On the following evening, in the presence of delegates of the Duma in his special train, Tsar Nicholas II drew up and signed the historic document declaring that, for the good of the country, he abdicated the throne in favor of his brother, the Grand-duke Michael Alexandrovitch, not wishing to be separated from his son.

On the afternoon of the same day Miliukoff had made a speech in the Duma announcing the composition of the new ministry, with Prince George Lvoff as Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, Miliukoff for Foreign Affairs, Guchkoff for War and Marine, Kerensky for Justice, Terestchenko for Finance, and Shingareff for Agriculture. The ministry contained Cadets, a Liberal Nationalist, Octobrists, Liberals, and a Social Revolutionary.

But it was soon evident that the authority of the Duma, chosen as it had been by an indirect and complicated system of elections, did not rest upon a broadly representative basis and that the aspirations of the lower classes would inevitably seek expression through other channels.

Although the sternly dogmatic doctrines of Karl Marx were not entirely suited to the temper of Russian Socialism with its individualistic tendencies, a large part of the

industrial workers of Russia belonged to the Social Democratic party, which had been formed in 1884 and professed the arbitrary German tenets. On the other hand, the Socialist Revolutionary party, which came into prominence about 1900, was a distinctively Russian development, perpetuating the spirit of the former Nihilists and numbering among its adherents many intellectuals and idealists of the middle and upper classes. The distinction between the Social Democrats and the Socialist Revolutionaries corresponded roughly to the distinction between the aspirations of the industrial proletariat and those of the peasants. The former aimed to transfer the control of industry and distribution from capital to labor, the latter to place the peasants in full possession of the land. The notion of a strongly centralized state was generally distasteful to the Social Revolutionaries, whose ideal was the full development of the individual, and whose scheme of society was based on the local autonomy of the small community.

Disagreement at a convention in 1903 divided the Social Democratic party into the Bolsheviki and Mensheviki, so-called because they represented at that time, respectively, the majority and minority divisions of the party. Similarly the Socialist Revolutionaries were split into factions known as Maximalists and Minimalists. The Bolsheviki and Maximalists, being the extremist wings of the two parties, made common cause in the early stages of the revolution, so that the original distinction between them was naturally quite often overlooked.

The Bolsheviki were inflexibly opposed to any form of coöperation with the bourgeoisie and demanded a government exclusively of workmen and peasants. Trotsky transferred his allegiance from the Mensheviki to the Bolsheviki at the time of the revolution.

The Mensheviki regarded a workmen's government as a practical impossibility and advocated coöperation with

the bourgeoisie for the establishment of a republic. The Bolsheviks, who were uncompromising internationalists, demanded the immediate termination of the war, so as to clear the field for the fundamental struggle between the classes, to be waged throughout the world. The Mensheviks, less fanatically addicted to abstract doctrine, aiming at definite, practical reforms, were willing to work within the existing organization of society, and were not adverse to continuing the war until an honorable peace had been attained.

Coincidentally with the assumption of sovereign power by the Duma, the Socialists formed a rival organization, based on the model invented at the time of the revolution of 1905 and then known as the Council of Labor Delegates. The new council, or Soviet, consisting of delegates supposedly elected by the workmen of the Petrograd factories, summoned representatives of the garrison to join it, and thus became the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates.

In the face of a moderate, hesitating Duma, fearful above all things lest the nation lapse into a state of chaos in the midst of a great war, the Soviet was far more positive and determined in its attitude. The new régime not only started with a divided sovereignty, but the Soviet, the organ of the workmen, was no more representative than the Duma of the Russian people, three-fourths of whom are peasants.

The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates consisted mainly of Social Democrats with only a few Social Revolutionaries. Lenin was now the leader of the Bolsheviks. Hopes for a successful prosecution of the war by Russia, based upon a supposed analogy with revolutionary France, were bound to be misleading; for while the extremists in Russia were antinational, the extremists in revolutionary France had never ceased to be national in spirit.

Kerensky was one of the vice-presidents of the Soviet; but his manifest patriotic zeal won for him the confidence

of the conservative factions in the Duma. It was largely his task to bridge the chasm between the Soviet and the Provisional Government. Disagreement in regard to the form of government occurred at once, as the Soviet demanded the immediate establishment of a republic. But Kerensky in an address of impassioned eloquence persuaded them that for the present unity was the one supreme necessity, and that they would obtain the republic after the crisis had been passed and victory was achieved. The Soviet adopted a resolution supporting the Provisional Government. On March 16th the Grand-duke Michael resigned all power into the hands of the Provisional Government until a Constituent Assembly should decide on the future form of government.

Russia was especially susceptible to disintegrating tendencies. The autocracy had collapsed from inherent decay rather than from any premeditated assaults by its opponents. The revolution had come as a surprise to the country at large, which was bewildered and without positive aims. The middle class was relatively small and the consciousness of nationality among the masses weak. The new government did not respond to the passionate sentiment of any large body of the people. Local Soviets, with particularistic tendencies, patterned after the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates at Petrograd, sprang up in all the towns and larger villages. Mismanagement and corruption had undermined the economic structure of the nation, and aversion for the war was the one feeling common to the masses.

The Provisional Government abolished the death penalty on March 22d. Military discipline was soon relaxed, the Soviets insisting that all matters relating to discipline must be left to company or regimental committees chosen by the soldiers. The armies were invaded by a swarm of itinerant demagogues preaching the doctrines of pacifism and the social revolution. A systematic agitation intended to demoralize

the nation's fighting power was organized by German emissaries and maintained by German money. The peasants deserted the armies in great numbers, wishing to share in the distribution of land which was believed to be at hand.

Vladimir Ilietch Ulyanoff, commonly known as Lenin, the leader of the Bolsheviki, a fanatic, determined to destroy the existing order, was conveyed by Germany with thirty of his followers, from his place of exile in Switzerland to Sweden, whence he made his way to Petrograd.

The All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which convened in Petrograd on April 13th, voted for the continuation of the war until an honorable peace could be obtained, "without annexations or indemnities," and demanded that the Allies should accept this policy. But the minority, led by Lenin, demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities.

The Soviet was greatly incensed because a Russian note to the Allies dated on May 2d reaffirmed the determination to carry on the war to a "decisive victory" without mentioning the formula of "no annexations or indemnities." Upon the promise that the note would be explained in a sense satisfactory to the delegates, the Soviet by only a narrow majority passed a vote of confidence in the Lvoff ministry. But it was henceforth evident that the Provisional Government, deriving its authority from the Duma, was no longer the dominating power. After a few days Miliukoff resigned, Gutchkoff refused to be responsible any longer for the army and navy, where his authority was disputed, and General Korniloff, who had striven to maintain order in the capital, relinquished his post as commander-in-chief of the Petrograd military district and received the command of the Eighth Army. The trend of events led to the reorganization of the cabinet with a strong representation of Socialists on May 16th. Noteworthy changes were the substitution of Terestchenko as Foreign Minister and of Kerensky as Minister of War.

This coalition cabinet issued a new announcement of policy on the 19th, declaring for a peace in common with the Allies, "without annexations or indemnities," and based on the rights of nations to decide their own affairs; governmental control of the production, transportation, exchange, and distribution of the necessary commodities; and the calling together of a Constituent Assembly. The Allies sent special missions to Russia, M. Albert Thomas representing France; M. Vandervelde, Belgium; Mr. Arthur Henderson, Great Britain; and Senator Root, the United States, which had now joined in the war against Germany. But the representatives of the orderly socialistic movement in the Western European countries found little sympathy among the majority of the Russian Soviets, who classed them as "imperialists," and were being enticed by German machinations to support the idea of a Stockholm Conference of International Socialism, which would "permit the working classes of the whole world to struggle in concert for the general peace," without regard to the nationalistic aims and policies which had occasioned and still prolonged the war. Nevertheless, the Coalition Government obtained the precarious endorsement of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which opened in Petrograd on June 16th, for its policy of continuing the war until Russia could obtain peace concurrently with the Allies.

The saner elements in Russia believed that the only effective means for restoring discipline in the armies and insuring an orderly régime under the revolutionary government was to fuse the discordant sentiments in the fervor of a renewed attack against the foreign enemy. Kerensky visited the different armies, haranguing the troops with feverish eloquence. His exhortations, combined with the firmness of Brussiloff's staff and the influence of the officers of the Allied powers, who were present with the Russian forces

in considerable numbers, prevailed upon the committees in the armies of Galicia to accept the idea of a new offensive.

Germany and Austria-Hungary had transferred many of their most effective fighting elements from their eastern front to the critical battle-zones in France and Italy, intending to bide their time in Russia, aiding the internal disruptive forces of that country by an elaborate system of intrigue. The easy-going methods of the Russians favored the clandestine operations of the German agents. The prisoners of war at Kieff, for instance, were subject to practically no control and circulated freely day or night, engaging in various occupations, as coachmen, gardeners, valets, tramway conductors, and even employees of banks. Thus the hosts of Austro-Hungarian prisoners in Russia could conveniently supply an army of secret Teutonic agents.

For several months there had been no important engagements along the Russian front. The disposition of the Austro-Hungarian-German forces was practically the same as at the close of 1916, with the German army group under Prince Leopold extending from the Baltic to a little south of Brzezany and the Austro-Hungarian, under the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, from there to von Mackensen's Roumanian command. The Russian lines in Galicia covered Brody, fell short of Brzezany and Halicz, and just included Stanislaw. Alexeieff had retired from the High Command early in June and had been succeeded by Brusiloff, whose command of the southern army group had been conferred on General Gutor. The Eleventh Russian Army, now under General Erdelli, extended from Brody to the vicinity of Zborow. South of it, as far as the Dniester, lay the Seventh Army under Tcheremisoff. The Eighth under General Korniloff continued the front southward to the mountains. The plan of the coming attack was mainly the work of Brusiloff. He proposed to deliver the first



An assembly of over three thousand members. *Delegates of the soldiers to the Workmen's and Soldiers' Soviet sitting in Tauride Palace, Petrograd.*



Gregory Novik, called Rasputin. *The peasant Rasputin was introduced to the Russian court by a lady-in-waiting and he soon gained great influence over the Tsarina. His corrupting influence and licentious habits were obnoxious to the enlightened and liberal elements.*



blow north of the Dniester and subsequently to make the crucial attack against Stryj with a view to outflanking Lemberg and eventually forcing its evacuation.

The first attack was made by the Seventh Army on a front of eighteen miles in the sector opposite Brzezany. The artillery preparation began on the morning of June 29th and just after midday on July 1st the infantry attacked. Three Austro-Hungarian positions were carried before nightfall and on the next day the passage of the Zlota Lipa was forced below Brzezany. More than 18,000 prisoners were taken during the first two days of the offensive on this sector.

The Eleventh Russian Army went into action on July 3d north of the Tarnopol-Lemberg railway, drawing to this portion of its opponents' front reserves which might otherwise have been useful in reinforcing the Austro-Hungarian lines south of the Dniester.

Finally, while the battle raged on the portion of the front already mentioned, General Korniloff's Eighth Army opened its bombardment along the Bistritza on the 7th against the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army under von Tersztyansky. The Russian infantry attacked the next day, breached the enemy's line, pursued their opponents eight miles, and took about 7,000 prisoners. Halicz fell on July 10th before the converging attack of the Seventh and Eighth Russian Armies and on the 11th Korniloff entered Kalusch, west of the Lomnica.

But just as the Russians were on the eve of great achievements, their effort, dependent as it was on the fitful revolutionary spirit, suddenly waned. The advance of the Russian armies was impeded by floods, while at the same time the Teutonic armies consolidated their resistance. On July 16th Korniloff found it necessary to relinquish Kalusch and retire to the right bank of the Lomnica. The Austro-Germans directed a main counter-attack against the Eleventh Russian

Army on the high ground between the headwaters of the Sereth and the Zlota Lipa, intending to create a diversion for relieving the pressure on their own lines further south.

Suddenly, on the 19th, the 607th Russian regiment abandoned its position in the battle-line. A panic ensued, the disruptive effect spread quickly, and immediately the infirmities which had been undermining the military establishment of Russia made their baneful presence felt. The system of communications had long been in a state of deterioration, confusion prevailed along the lines of supply, and it was impossible to replenish the armies or transfer reinforcements promptly. Disorganization had destroyed the flexibility of the Russian armies. Indifference, lassitude, visionary expectations, treachery, failure of confidence and discipline, all contributed to the sudden development of the fatal crisis. The Austro-German forces were soon pouring through a gap twenty-five miles in width and the Russian command was powerless to bring together reinforcements in sufficient strength for stemming the headlong current. Characteristic of the general enervation of the Russian armies was the supineness shown generally by the officers in the face of the advancing disaster. The professional officer corps, depleted by three years of fighting and replenished by heterogeneous elements, frequently deficient in education and morale, in some cases chosen by the soldiers' committees, had lost its solidarity, prestige, and authority.

The flight of the Eleventh Russian Army involved the retirement of the Seventh and Eighth. On July 20th the Germans were in Tarnopol. In two or three days practically all the gains of 1916 were swept away. The hopes, which, almost in defiance of reason, had sprung from the shattered prospects of 1915 and had brightened and expanded, were suddenly extinguished. The Russian Empire ceased to be an active combatant.

## CHAPTER XVII

### THE BRITISH BLOCKADE AND THE GERMAN SUBMARINE OFFENSIVE

The struggle for command of the sea. The naval strategy of Great Britain and Germany. The British blockade. Its standing in international law. Its effect on the United States and other neutral powers. The German submarine campaign. Its legality. The submarine as an instrument of warfare. Frightfulness on the sea. Methods of defense against submarines. Armed merchantmen.

From the beginning of hostilities the Great War, in its last analysis, has been a struggle between the land power of Germany and the sea power of Great Britain. That such would be the effect was long foreseen by German statesmen and military leaders. Even such advocates of the "Mailed Fist" policy as Prince von Bülow and Count von Reventlow warned their people of the results to be anticipated from the British navy. Whether disingenuous or not, this is expressed in an article by von Reventlow, published in *The Navy League Annual*, 1909-1910: "Should war break out sooner or later between England and Germany we should be unable, even assuming conditions most favorable to us, directly to protect German commerce so long as the war lasted. Our trading vessels on the ocean would be a prey to the British cruisers, and we should have no means of doing anything for their protection. The few German foreign cruisers would not exist for long, and besides, they would have no stations at which they could coal and execute repairs."

It is probable, however, that in case of Great Britain's early entry into active hostilities, the German Admiralty had counted on taking advantage of the wide distribution of various units of the British fleet in foreign waters to make a sudden stroke against the home fleet, crippling it as far as possible at the outset. But the British Admiralty had foreseen this contingency, and by the mobilization of the fleet at Spithead had parried the blow. The effect of this maneuver was to place the German battle fleet upon the defensive,—a situation that the most strenuous endeavors have been unable to modify. Simultaneously with the declaration of war came the announcement that Great Britain would observe the rules of the Declaration of London in maritime war, and the British navy instituted its blockade of the German Empire.

The great force of British sea power immediately became operant, and Germany found herself a besieged fortress. Great Britain, by her control of the English Channel and the passage between Scotland and Norway, converted the North Sea into a British lake. With the German fleet safely locked up in its bases at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven, the attention of the British navy could be concentrated on ridding the oceans of portions of the German fleet in foreign seas and in suppressing German commerce destroyers. The return of the *Möwe* to Wilhelmshaven on March 5, 1916, marked the last of the German raiders, all the others having been destroyed or interned in neutral ports.

There could be no stronger demonstration of the potency of sea power than that evidenced by the situation at the close of 1916. The British navy had shut up in its home bases a fleet second only to itself, had destroyed or driven to cover all its detached units, and had swept out of existence the commerce of four nations which aggregated, in 1913, three and one-half billions of imports and over three

billions of exports. Virtually the only supplies that entered the Central Powers went through the ports of neutral nations and a continuously increasing pressure was exerted by Great Britain and her allies to bring this trade to an end.

It was an American, Admiral Mahan, who first pointed out the tremendous rôle played by sea power in the development of the British Empire. From the facts of history he drew certain conclusions that, in the main, have been justified by the events of the Great War. Of these, the fundamental one is that the nation in possession of control of the sea cannot be defeated.

The consciousness of this fact was undoubtedly responsible for the rapid and almost hysterical expansion of the German navy—an expansion that, according to the statements of German naval leaders, was far from complete at the outbreak of the war. This fact also, as can be perceived by the most casual study of events, has had a most profound influence upon the military situation of both the Allies and the Central Powers.

Writers on naval strategy recognize three types or gradations of command of the sea: absolute, virtual or relative, and disputed. During the first months of the war the Allied sea power was disputed by the German cruiser warfare, early submarine activities, and by the threat of the high seas fleet. The situation was steadily improved by the Allied fleets until the British obtained virtual command of the sea, which could not become absolute until the German main fleet had been defeated and the submarine activities brought to a standstill.

The effect of British command of the sea upon the strategy of Great Britain and Germany has been most admirably defined by a contributor to *The New York Times* (January 3, 1915) writing under the pseudonym of "Naval Officer." This may be summarized as follows:

The British navy has kept control of the sea and so far has prevented the defeat of the Allies and will eventually force Germany to terms. England's strategy has been of a high order. She has blockaded the North Sea; prevented surprise attacks; convoyed British troops and supplies to France; watched neutral ports; prevented the invasion of England; guarded the Belgian coast; and kept trawlers engaged in dragging for mines and in laying them off the German coast.

The German naval strategy was simpler. The Germans realized that eventually their main fleet would have to fight. Hence, in the earlier stages of the war it would remain under cover of its coast fortifications and strive to do as much damage as possible to British units by sudden raids, mines, submarines, Zeppelins, etc. At the same time, fast cruisers would endeavor to paralyze shipping and cut communications.

During the year 1915 there were only two naval actions of importance in European waters: the Dogger Bank affair (January 24, 1915) and the attack on the Dardanelles fortifications. Otherwise, the British and Allied naval forces were concerned with strengthening the blockade and with suppressing the enemy commerce-destroyers. The destruction of the German Pacific fleet under von Spee at Falkland Islands gave a fatal stroke to German plans on the high seas: hence, by the end of 1915, barring a few exceptions, German cruisers, even the most daring and successful, in the end were sunk or driven into neutral ports. A few, like the *Emden*, by means of disguises were able to run a longer and more romantic course of destruction of commerce, but the infinite eyes and ears of Great Britain made their ultimate fate certain.

The entry of Italy into the war (May 23, 1915) had a far-reaching effect upon the naval situation, for it devolved upon her to assume control of the Adriatic Sea and to shut

up or destroy the Austro-Hungarian fleet. This permitted rearrangement of the Allied forces, the French fleet assuming still more responsibility in other portions of the Mediterranean, with an according strengthening of the British blockade of the North Sea. The Russian fleet with the aid of a few British submarines maintained control of the Baltic, in spite of a somewhat ambitious attack by the Germans against the Riga fortifications (August 16, 1915). In the Black Sea, the situation was quite similar, the Russian Black Sea fleet dominating its waters, yet powerless to accomplish anything against the Turkish defenses at the Bosphorus. The losses to the Allied fleets had been serious and were mainly due to torpedoes and mines, although the Italian battleship *Benedetto Brin* (September 28, 1915) was probably blown up through treachery.

As has been noted, on the same day that Great Britain declared war against Germany (August 4, 1914) a King's Proclamation announced that the rules of the Declaration of London would be observed in the blockade, save that aëroplanes and aëronautic equipment would be transferred from the list of conditional contraband to that of absolute contraband. Similar rules were adopted by Germany, France, and Russia. The adherence to the provisions of the Declaration of London by Great Britain came as somewhat of a surprise, for it had failed to be ratified by the House of Lords on the ground that it constituted a virtual abandonment of everything that would tend to render sea power efficient through commercial blockade.

The Declaration of London was the first well-defined endeavor to draw up a code for maritime war satisfactory to a nation either in the status of a belligerent or that of a neutral. It is easy to see that such an arrangement could be only a compromise at the best, for the same nation that in time of peace would be inclined to favor liberal extensions in the

rights of neutrals, would, during the course of a war, if itself involved, be equally determined to restrict those very rights if they tended to interfere with the chance for victory.

The truth of this has been abundantly verified by the events of the Great War. The first few months of hostilities were marked by successive British Orders in Council modifying the provisions of the Declaration, until finally, on March 15, 1915, it was modified fairly out of existence, and the British blockade of the North Sea was conducted under the earlier rules of international law as defined by the Rule of 1756 and the Declaration of Paris (1856). The former denied to neutrals the right to enjoy trade with belligerents that in time of peace, owing to tariff and other restrictions, did not appertain to them. The latter, which in fact was the only statement of rules for the conduct of maritime war prior to the Declaration of London, was very vague, contenting itself with the following general pronouncements: (1) Privateering is and remains abolished; (2) The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war; (3) Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband, are not liable to capture; (4) Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective.

The modifications in the Declaration of London consisted mainly in the transfer of commodities defined in it as conditional or non-contraband to the list of absolute contraband. Thus, for instance, under the provisions of the Declaration, raw material, such as cotton, wool, rubber, etc., were non-contraband, while food, fuel, money, clothing, flying machines, etc., were classed as conditional contraband. It was, therefore, on the definition of contraband that the issues of the British blockade turned.

Prior to February, 1915, foodstuffs had been permitted to enter Germany through the blockade, but on January 26, 1915, the *Bundesrath*, or Federal Council, announced





Sinking of a torpedoed steamer. Some of the crew are in a lifeboat, one man is seen sliding down a line from the vessel's taffrail, while the splash on the left is where another has dropped into the water.



Passengers and crew of the torpedoed French steamer *Sontay* taking to the lifeboats. Out of a total of 425, 49 persons were lost.

that the German government would assume control of all stocks of flour and grain in the country. Arguing, therefore, that these commodities when imported into Germany would be commandeered and pass directly into the hands of the government and hence to the military authorities, the British government placed them on the list of absolute contraband.

It was soon apparent that the blockade would be a farce if the restrictions placed by the Declaration of London upon the activities of the British fleet were observed, particularly with respect to the neutral powers, such as Holland and the Scandinavian states, which were still in a position to trade directly with Germany. Each of these had a considerable merchant marine, and the result was that their ports were made bases and clearing houses for the provisioning of Britain's enemy. Nor, indeed, could any exception be taken to this trade so long as food was conditional contraband and only subject to seizure when destined directly for the enemy forces, and raw materials were not contraband at all.

The blockade originated in the idea of the siege, the first commercial blockade being the closing of the ports of Flanders by the Dutch in 1584. The Declaration of Paris (1856) was the first compilation of rules for maritime warfare. This is still the basis of the so-called law of blockade, modified, however, by new conditions. One of these modifications is the doctrine of continuous voyage, under which the principle is held that neutral rights cannot be used as a cloak for covering unneutral transportation of munitions and supplies through non-belligerent states adjoining countries at war.

The doctrine of continuous voyage therefore carries the pressure of the blockade into neutral ports, and there can be no question that Great Britain has applied this principle

of international law with steadily increasing thoroughness, in spite of the most strenuous resistance of neutrals. Furthermore, she has made considerable extensions of the principle. Thus, the Order in Council, August 20, 1914, renders a neutral ship "liable to capture for whatever port the ship is bound, and at whatever port the cargo is to be discharged, if it is shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a Government department of the Enemy State, or to or from an agent of the Enemy State or to a merchant or other person under the control of the authorities of the Enemy State."

Great Britain's justification of this supervision of neutral shipping was that it was known that Germany had planned to make a vast use of Dutch, Scandinavian, and other neutral ports for evading the blockade. These measures called forth vigorous protests from neutral exporting powers, and in addition it subjected the neighboring neutrals to the accusation by Germany of aiding the enemy, accompanied by threats of retaliatory action. In reply to the note of Secretary Bryan, December 26, 1914, in justification of the British policy, Sir Edward Grey said:

"The British claim to stop supplies entering Germany through neutral countries was not challenged." (Notes of January 7 and February 10, 1915.)

Again, in his note of July 23, 1915:

"We are taking the utmost care not to interfere with commerce genuinely destined for or proceeding from neutral countries. If we are successful in the efforts we are making to distinguish between the commerce of neutral and enemy countries, there will be no substantial interference with the trade of neutral ports, except in so far as they constitute ports of access to and exit from enemy territory."

The German government, of course, bitterly protested against the increases in the list of absolute contraband. It was joined in this protest by the neutrals, especially the United States, for they, too, were beginning to feel the

economic pressure of the British sea power. Rubber, copper, chemicals, and, finally, cotton and wool were declared to be contraband, and each Order in Council brought on a storm of disapproval which was followed by further difficulties arising from efforts to smuggle these commodities to the Germans. The inclusion of mineral oils and copper in the contraband list (October 31, 1914) aroused also the powerful industrial interests of America and the pressure they brought to bear upon Congress resulted in a considerable exchange of notes between the Department of State and the British government. There was no yielding in principle, however, on the part of Great Britain, but she consented to modify certain details in her methods of applying the blockade to which exception had been taken.

It is probable that sympathizers with the German cause played a very considerable part in the agitation in America regarding the British blockade. At any rate, it appeared as if relations between the United States and Great Britain might become strained on the question of neutral trade and the examination of the mails. The feeling in neutral countries, however, was mild in comparison with that in Germany. The force of sea power thus continually and inexorably exerted was beginning to make itself felt in no uncertain way, and the German leaders were seeking some means of relieving the tension. The cry of "starvation war" was raised in Germany and was echoed by her sympathizers in neutral countries. Seeking for a means of reply to British sea power, as exerted through the blockade, Germany found it in the submarine, the potency of which had already been revealed in a most startling manner by the sinking of British and French battleships and merchant vessels.

The first expression of a policy of ruthless submarine warfare came from High-admiral von Tirpitz, who, in an interview with Karl von Wiegand, a newspaper correspondent,

December 2, 1914, expressed himself as follows: "America has not raised her voice in protest and has taken little or no action against England's closing the North Sea to neutral shipping. What will America say if Germany declares submarine war on all enemy merchant ships? Why not? England wants to starve us. We can play the same game. We can bottle her up and torpedo every English or Allies' ship which nears any harbor in Great Britain, thereby cutting off large food supplies."

This threat on the part of the famous naval leader was destined soon to be realized, for on February 4, 1915, Admiral von Pohl, Chief of the Admiralty Staff of the German Navy, issued a statement involving a new form of naval warfare, declaring as follows:

"1. The waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel, are hereby declared to be war zone. On and after the 18th of February, 1915, every enemy merchant ship found in the said zone will be destroyed without its being always possible to avert the dangers threatening the crews and passengers on that account.

"2. Even neutral ships are exposed to danger in the war zone as in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered on January 31st by the British Government and of the accidents of naval war, it cannot always be avoided to strike even neutral ships in attacks that are directed at enemy ships.

"3. Northward navigation around the Shetland Islands, in the eastern waters of the North Sea and in a strip of not less than 30 miles width along the Netherlands coast, is in no danger."

That the policy outlined in this proclamation had no foundation in international law is tacitly acknowledged in the accompanying memorandum, for it states that the action is taken in retaliation for the British blockade. It was, in essence, a notification to the world that German submarines would sink enemy and neutral vessels under conditions that rendered it impossible to provide for the safety of passengers and crews. This announcement brought forth the solemn warning from the American government (February

10, 1915) which called attention to the possibility of the destruction of American ships and the endangering of lives of citizens of the United States.

The doctrine of reprisals, however, is one that can be adopted by both sides in a controversy, and the British government soon indicated that it was thoroughly awake to its opportunities. Hence, on March 1, 1915, the British Premier made a statement in the House of Commons foreshadowing a still more rigid application of the blockade.

Mr. Asquith said in substance:

Germany declares that enemy ships will be destroyed and neutral ships exposed to danger—in effect a claim to torpedo at sight, without regard for safety of crew and passengers. It is not within the power of the German Admiralty to maintain any surface craft within these waters, but it can attack only by means of submarines—a method of warfare entirely without the scope of any of the international instruments regulating operations against commerce in time of war. The German declaration substitutes indiscriminate destruction for regulated capture. Her opponents are, therefore, driven to frame retaliatory measures in order, in their turn, to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving the German Empire. These measures will, however, be enforced by the British and the French governments without risk to neutral ships or to neutral or non-combatant lives, and with strict observance of the dictates of humanity. The British and the French governments will, therefore, hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumably enemy destination, ownership, or origin. It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless they be otherwise liable to confiscation.

The proclamation of a new blockade policy was given effect by the Order in Council, March 11, 1915, and published in the *Gazette*, March 15, 1915.

Thus was the Declaration of London revoked, conditional contraband passed out of existence, and economic war between the Allies and the Central Powers was based quite frankly upon the doctrine of retaliation or reprisals. This is defined in international law as one of the modes by which belligerents obtain redress for violations of the laws of warfare.

It must be granted that the purpose of Great Britain was to starve Germany into submission. Any endeavor to evade this is a childish shutting of the eyes to a very palpable fact. Yet the blockade, as a means of overcoming the enemy, is universally acknowledged in international law as a belligerent right, and it must also be granted that Great Britain, even in her abrogation of the Declaration of London, has never departed from the principle of the blockade; the abuses complained of against her were against property and things, not against human lives, especially the lives of neutral non-combatants. The pressure brought to bear upon the German civil population was indeed distressing from the higher and absolutely humanitarian point of view, but according to the doctrine of war as taught by German military thinkers it was but an unfortunate result of belligerency, and one that Germany would undoubtedly have inflicted upon Great Britain had it been in her power.

Nor could the United States government offer a protest grounded in international law, for one of the precedents offered by Great Britain in justification of the blockade was the action of the Federal government against the Southern Confederacy and the capture and confiscation of blockade-runners. The legality of these seizures was adjudicated by the Supreme Court (Cases of *The Circassian* and *The Admiral*).

From the viewpoint of naval strategy, the British blockade of Germany differs in scope and character from previous operations of the kind. Writers on naval science distinguish two classes of blockade, the military and the commercial, the former consisting of shutting up the enemy battle fleet in its harbor, as in the case of the Spanish fleet at Santiago; the latter, the suppression of the maritime commerce of a port or of an enemy as a whole, as was exemplified by the blockade of the Southern States. In reality, however, such distinction is difficult to make, for

in general a blockade, if effective, accomplishes both objects at the same time. It, therefore, becomes a question of which phase is relatively more important, the military or the commercial. In the case of the British blockade, judging from the situation, it would appear that the commercial phase is the primary and the enemy fleet the secondary consideration. The latter, so long as it maintains its position in its bases, is as effectually negated as it would be if destroyed. It is true, that as a "fleet in being" it constitutes a menace; the British command of the sea is only relative until it is destroyed, yet until it on its part defeats the British naval forces it is powerless to unclasp the strangle-hold of British sea power.

That the protection of British commerce, and, inversely, the suppression of that of the enemy is the main objective of the British fleet is indicated in a memorandum drawn up by Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, First Sea Lord in 1910, in which he stated that the real danger for Great Britain to guard against was not invasion but the destruction of her merchant shipping, hence, the main object of the British fleet was to prevent any ship of the enemy from getting to sea far enough to do any mischief.

A blockade is necessarily determined by geographic conditions,—a coast is assumed with ports used by the vessels of the enemy. But national maritime frontiers differ, hence, the nature of each blockade will differ according to the geographic problems presented. It would be easier to blockade a harbor with a small entrance than one with a very wide one; easier to shut out the commerce of a country, like Germany, whose shores lie upon enclosed seas, such as the Baltic and the North Sea, than that of the United States with great coast-lines on two oceans.

Geographic conditions, therefore, were ideal for the establishment of a blockade such as that of Great Britain

against the German Empire. The position of the British Islands has also been of tremendous advantage. Great Britain's excellent eastern ports have permitted her to establish bases at strategic points, and by closing the English Channel at the south and the passage at the north, between Scotland and Norway, she has bottled up the German navy as effectually, as far as it might affect Allied communications or come to the aid of the German colonies, as if each German port were surrounded by a cordon of battleships. It is true that the submarines have been able to elude their enemies and do an enormous amount of damage, but they have not been able to impair British naval supremacy to a serious degree. It is also true that the German fleet has a certain freedom of action within the North Sea itself, yet there is a strategic justification for this, as one of the objectives of the British navy is to bring the German fleet to battle and defeat it if possible, a thing presenting almost insuperable difficulties as long as the latter remains within the protection of its coast defenses. The chances would be reversed if the German fleet could be met on the open sea, for in that case the overwhelming superiority of the British fleet might prove decisive.

The maritime strategy of Great Britain has been severely criticised by its own press as being unworthy of the highest traditions of the navy of Hawke, Rodney, and Nelson. Admiral Beresford in the House of Lords made the statement that if the navy had been given a free hand the war would have been over in eighteen months. But it must be admitted that the land and sea operations of the British Empire are interrelated and the blockade has permitted the mobilization of an army without risking the fleet itself. Vastly more rapid and sensational results might be obtained by an attack on the German fleet in its bases, providing it were destroyed, but what if the British fleet suffered an

*Business above everything.*



*The figure of death in the Concord office selling tickets to passengers.*

*No contraband goods.*



*The steamer "Lusitania" sunk by a German diving boat (Tauchboot), May 5, 1915.*

*German medal in commemoration of the sinking of the Lusitania, dated two days before the event took place.*



*Mine-laying German submarine captured by the British. The mines with their anchors are in the grating-covered compartments. Their release is controlled from the conning tower.*



equal fate? The Dardanelles affair supplied some very important information on that subject which was soon to be emphasized by the Battle of Jutland in the open sea. The British navy has "played safe," as it was perfectly justified in doing, and the ultimate result of this policy, if slower, is certainly more sure, for upon it more than any other one influence will depend Germany's defeat on land.

Prince von Bülow in his *Deutsche Politik* states that the British fleet is manacled in the North Sea and cannot reach the submarines; hence, for the first time in a hundred years is the British command of the sea disputed. This assertion is true up to a certain point, for the Germans can organize raids of fast vessels against British ports, can attack individual units of the navy and enemy and neutral merchant fleets, and also, owing to the fact that when the Belgian army retired from Zeebrugge and Ostend these harbors were left intact and the Germans have been able to use them as new and very dangerous submarine bases; yet to say that these operations have broken the Allied sea power is to make a statement that events have apparently not verified.

As has already been suggested, it was the recognition of this very fact that determined Germany to undertake a new onslaught on the laws of so-called civilized warfare, throwing aside all those restrictions upon absolute lawlessness on the part of belligerents that humanitarian instincts have exacted. Germany now proposed to make another experiment of this kind and, therefore, declared war on every nation that was not actively on her side. With the advent of ruthless submarine warfare the principle of neutrality disappeared in a twinkling.

It was the resort of desperation. Its proximate result was the aligning of some fifteen neutral powers, including the United States, on the side of the Allies, and its ultimate result is conceivably not only the defeat of German *Weltpolitik* but

also the establishment of such restrictions upon Germany in the peace arrangements that her rehabilitation among world powers will be deferred for decades, perhaps generations.

What was it that Germany hoped to gain by the adoption of this policy, and what was her justification? The main objective, of course, was the stoppage of men and supplies to the Allied forces and to compel Great Britain to relax the pressure of her blockade. These ends were to be achieved not only through the destruction of ships of the Allies but also by the methods adopted in their destruction. It was clearly Germany's policy to establish such a reign of terror on the sea that the morale of British and neutral seamen would be so broken down that all shipping would disappear from the seas. This plan was not a bad one, and had it not been for a certain streak of obstinacy in the British and their Allies it might have met with better success. The immediate result, therefore, was that the challenge of Germany was accepted, the blockade was still more rigidly applied under the doctrine of reprisals and the Allies' fleets set to work to hunt submarines.

Germany's justification, as stated in Admiral von Pohl's manifesto, was that Great Britain had instituted a "starvation war" by means of her blockade, had armed her merchantmen, and had flown neutral flags over her ships in order to give them immunity from attack. In addition, she had abrogated the Declaration of London and closed the North Sea to neutral trade. "The starvation war is the most serious violation of the rights of nations, which will be indignantly condemned by neutral states."—(*Vienna Fremdenblatt*.) The armed merchantmen, in spite of the fact of their admitted right to defend themselves if they saw fit to run the risk, were called pirates, and threats were made to treat them as such, and, in spite of the German official memorandum of February 11, 1916, to the effect that the crews

of armed merchantmen were to be treated as prisoners of war, a captain of an English merchant vessel, Captain Charles Fryatt, was put to death (July 28, 1916) on these grounds.

The instrument that Germany selected to accomplish her ends was comparatively untried in modern warfare, and prior to the outbreak of the Great War had found little favor in the minds of the naval leaders in Germany. In 1911 Admiral von Tirpitz asserted that submarines were still in the experimental stage of their development and that the German government was not at all convinced that they would form an essential or conspicuous part in future naval programmes. This statement might be considered a form of camouflage destined to mislead other naval powers, did we not know that Germany's submarine flotilla was relatively insignificant at the outbreak of hostilities. The German Admiralty is very reticent regarding naval constructions, but there is every reason for believing that the following statement formulated by the British Admiralty gives with substantial accuracy the submarines available in Germany during 1914: 24 submarines in service, 14 submarines in construction, 8 submarines to be finished in 1914, 6 (Nos. 33-38) commenced in 1913, 5 under construction for Austria, 1 under construction for Norway, or 38 in commission at the beginning of the war.—(Laubeuf, *Submarins et submersibles*.)

The first German submarine, the *U 1* (Untersee-boot 1), was launched August 30, 1905, at the Krupp-Germania shipbuilding plant and was constructed wholly upon French models.

There is a group of men among the naval leaders of the various countries who are of the opinion that the submarine marks the end of the battleship. It was only two months before the outbreak of the war that Admiral Sir Percy Scott, Great Britain's greatest expert in naval gunnery,

announced in *The Times* (June 6, 1914) that the submarine had superseded all other craft save light cruisers and aëroplanes. His argument was as follows:

“The submarine causes to disappear three out of five of the functions, defensive and offensive, of a vessel of war—*i. e.*, port bombardment, blockade, and convoy of a landing party, or the prevention of all three—as no man-of-war will dare to come even within sight of a coast that is adequately protected by submarines. The fourth function of a battleship is to attack an enemy’s fleet, but there will be no fleet to attack, as it will not be safe for a fleet to put to sea. The fifth function is to attack an enemy’s commerce or to prevent attack on our own.

“If by submarines we close egress from the North Sea and Mediterranean, it is difficult to see how our commerce can be much interfered with. Submarines and aëroplanes have entirely revolutionized naval warfare, no fleet can hide itself from the aëroplane eye, and the submarine can deliver a deadly attack even in broad daylight. . . . Naval officers of the future will, therefore, live either above the sea or under it. It will be a navy of youth, for we shall require nothing but boldness and daring. . . .

“What we require is an enormous fleet of submarines, airships, and aëroplanes, and a few fast cruisers, provided we can find a place to keep them in safety during war time.”

Hardly less emphatic is Rear-admiral Degouy, a distinguished officer of the French navy, who says:

“We have allowed ourselves, through false conceptions as much as through timidity, to be led into a reactionary policy regarding our submarine fleet. Let us not, to-day, vaguely dwell upon the responsibilities of others, and let us ignore the past in order to fix our attention upon the future. Let us construct submarines and hurry up about it! Who knows how much service they will render in this war?”—(*La Guerre Navale et l’Offensive*, 1917.)

Yet Admiral Degouy does not admit the supremacy of the submarine in the present conflict, for he says, in his preface:

“For it is not truly possible for us to admit that the submarine blockade will ever, through hunger, force the Allies to throw down their arms.”

The proponents for the battleship are equally assured that the dreadnought is destined for no such ignoble fate. To them, “The cornerstone of naval power is the gun;





Smoke screen evolutions. *Torpedo boat destroyers practising screening of convoy by means of smoke, which is given off by the oil burners under the boilers.*

and the measure of a nation's sea power is the strength of her battleship fleet."—(Gill, *Naval Power in the War*, 1918.) Such is the position also of Bernotti, one of the best known among Italian writers on naval science, but he is not so assured regarding the future of the battleship, for he says: "Of the two types of armored ships—the battle-cruiser and the dreadnought—it is the former whose future must be considered more secure."—(*Previsioni e Realtà nella Guerra Marittima*.—*Revista Marittima*, Agosta, 1917.)

At any rate the submarine is recognized as a very real menace, and in the hand of the Germans it has given the Allied Powers some moments of lively concern. Because of its limitations, being unable to bring its captures into port, or supply them with prize-crews, or, in case it became necessary to sink them, it could not provide for the safety of passengers and crew, the submarine could not be used under the restrictions prescribed by international law, but Germany insisted upon so using it. The Allied navies were confronted by a condition, not a hypothesis.

Germany's submarine offensive falls into three distinct phases: 1. During the earlier months of the war when, in general, she used it legitimately and in consonance with the laws of war; 2. When she instituted a submarine reign of terror, during which the *Lusitania* and other great passenger vessels were sunk for a psychological effect; 3. When failing to destroy Ally morale, she determinedly went to work to sink everything she could.

It has been said that submarine warfare is one of the improvisations of the war. This would appear to be true, in view of the fact that the earlier operations of the submarines were relatively legitimate, and evidence seems to justify the conclusion that Germany had not planned to use this instrument in the manner later adopted. Its earlier successes in sinking the *Pathfinder* (September 5, 1914) and

the remarkable exploit of Lieutenant-commander Wedigen of the *U 9* in destroying three British cruisers, the *Cressy*, *Hogue*, and *Aboukir*, during one attack (September 22, 1914) perhaps gave a clue to the German Admiralty regarding a mode of combating the British blockade. Admiral von Tirpitz's statement, already referred to, and other premonitory activities indicated that Germany was developing a new form of attack on the rules governing warfare.

The proclamation of Admiral von Pohl (February 4, 1915) was the first official statement of Germany's campaign of lawless submarine operations. The fact that the policy of sinking at sight would not permit any adjudication of the innocence of the vessel and cargo, and would submit passengers and other non-combatants to the ordeal of battle was of minor consequence. Germany was making international law to suit herself.

This was a stroke against the rights of neutrals that the United States, the most important nation not involved in the war, could not afford to ignore. Hence, even while she was endeavoring to persuade Great Britain to modify her blockade methods, she was no less interested in Germany's threat to endanger neutral property and lives. It was to this effect, therefore, that Secretary Bryan issued the warning of February 10, 1915:

"It is, of course, not necessary to remind the German Government that the sole right of a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels on the high seas is limited to visit and search, unless a blockade is proclaimed and effectively maintained, which this Government does not understand to be proposed in this case. To declare or exercise a right to attack and destroy any vessel entering a prescribed area of the high seas without first certainly determining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of its cargo would be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that this Government is reluctant to believe that the Imperial Government of Germany in this case contemplates it as possible. . . .

"If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German Government can readily appreciate that the Government of the United

States would be constrained to hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas."

On February 20, 1915, in an endeavor to establish a *modus vivendi* that would be satisfactory to neutrals as well as belligerents, Secretary Bryan addressed a note to Germany and Great Britain proposing that foodstuffs might be allowed to enter Germany for the sole use of non-combatants, and restrictions were to be laid upon the use of mines, the use of neutral flags to be abandoned, and the rules of international law respecting visit and search to be obeyed by submarine commanders. This was refused by Great Britain on the basis that it would not improve the situation, and by Germany as it did not cause a sufficient relaxation of the blockade nor did it permit the importation of raw materials, of which she was in great need. The American effort to establish a compromise was thus a failure and the issue was squarely met by the issuance of the British Order in Council of March 15, 1915.

The adoption of the policy of ruthless submarine warfare was a victory for the militarist elements in the German Empire, but their triumph was not gained without opposition. There is no doubt that the German Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, and perhaps Emperor William himself, opposed such methods of extremism, and for a while the decision hung trembling in the balance. The issue apparently turned upon the question, would it pay? The German Admiralty stated most emphatically that it would. "Give us three months," they said, "and we will bring England to her knees."

That America would not tamely submit to such a reversion to barbarism was well-known to the German leaders,

but they acted upon the presumption that the many German sympathizers in the United States would tend to encourage a temporizing policy, or, even in case of a belligerent attitude on the part of America, they assumed that she was not sufficiently prepared to be a disturbing factor before the realization of the German aims. Such apparently was the decision made, for the German Minister of Foreign Affairs in a note, February 16, 1915, while admitting that the methods proposed might work to the injury of neutrals, insisted upon carrying them out unless the United States intervened to force Great Britain to relax the blockade. The use of neutral, particularly the United States, flags by British ships was again referred to, and the demand was made that Great Britain be required to conform to the provisions of the Declaration of London. The American government was also asked to prevent its merchant vessels from entering the British seat of maritime war lest they be subjected to injury.

The attitude of President Wilson from the beginning of the war had been one of consistent neutrality. Throughout the controversies with Great Britain and Germany he had insisted upon separating the issues which the German government endeavored in every way to confuse. America had very just complaints against Great Britain, but the United States preferred to settle that matter directly with Great Britain. President Wilson saw clearly that for him to bind the government of the United States to a promise to coerce Great Britain into a change of policy regarding Germany would, in itself, have constituted an unneutral act.

Thus, for the time being, the diplomatic memoranda shuttled back and forth, yet, as the submarine sinkings grew more and more numerous and more inhumane, the controversy with Great Britain became less and less important in comparison with the larger question of whether

Germany could apply her doctrine of frightfulness to neutral nations trading on the high seas. It was an issue that concerned the lives of American citizens who were engaged in exercising the rights of trade granted neutrals from immemorial times. It was Germany's duty as a belligerent to break the British blockade, not that of the United States, even though Great Britain had departed from the rules for maritime war she had adopted on her own initiative. That such attitude on the part of America had the effect of aiding the Allies was one of the chances and decisions of the military situation. There is no reason for assuming that Germany would not have benefited equally from American trade could it have been directed towards her. In fact, there can be no doubt that she did receive a considerable percentage of American commerce through neutral countries and by various indirect means. The benefits adhering to the Allies was a by-product and could not be avoided unless America departed from the attitude of strict neutrality and favored Germany. The further alternative of foregoing her European commerce entirely was unthinkable. It would have constituted a sweeping abandonment of all neutral rights with, doubtless, little advantage to the situation of America.

President Wilson endeavored to solve the submarine problem by diplomacy, and his failure to do so cannot close our eyes to the brilliancy of his effort, for it must be confessed that the situation presented difficulties that only the highest statesmanship could meet. The relations of the United States with Germany constitute a drama, with numberless acts, each with its particular climax or crisis, all tending inexorably towards the final catastrophe of war.

The first of these acts was the destruction of the Elder-Dempster liner *Falaba*, which sailed from Liverpool, Saturday evening, March 27, 1915. On board were 140

passengers and a crew of 100 men. She was halted in St. George's Channel, off the coast of Pembrokeshire, by a German submarine, which fired a torpedo while the lifeboats were being launched. Sixty-three passengers and forty-three of the crew were killed, among the former an American citizen, Leon C. Thrasher, an engineer, who was returning home after a year's absence in British West Africa.

One after another the episodes in this drama of nations followed in rapid succession, each creating diplomatic interchanges that ended nowhere. Thus, on March 10, 1915, the German cruiser *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* berthed in Norfolk harbor and interned herself after a career of depredation on the high seas, during which she had sunk an American vessel, the *Wm. P. Frye* (January 28, 1915). A claim for indemnity was instituted by the Department of State, March 31, 1915, which was denied by von Jagow, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, (April 5, 1915) the controversy dragging along until Secretary Lansing (August 10, 1915) proposed that the question be settled by a court of arbitration, pursuant to Article 38 of The Hague Convention (1907).

The next act was the sinking of an American vessel, the *Cushing*, by an aeroplane (April 28th), followed by the torpedoing of the American tanker *Gulflight* (May 1st), finally culminating in the crowning deed of German *Schrecklichkeit*, the destruction of the *Lusitania* (May 7, 1915).

Those who thought that there was a limit to Germany's plan to terrorize the seas received a rude awakening on May 8th, when the morning papers announced the loss of the great Cunard steamer on the day before. That she was marked for destruction the world had been advised by notices inserted in the daily press on May 1st, signed by the German Ambassador himself, warning American citizens from taking passage. She sailed, however, with 1978 souls

on board, and had arrived off the coast of Ireland, when she was struck by two torpedoes, fired by an unseen submarine. Owing to the list of the great 40,000-ton vessel, the lifeboats on one side could not be launched, hence, many lives were lost, due to the impossibility of accommodating all who had leaped from the sinking vessel.

The sinking of these vessels and the loss of American lives resulted in the note of Secretary Bryan of May 13, 1915, in the course of which he said:

“The Government of the United States, therefore, desires to call the attention of the Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the objection to their present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity which all modern opinion regards as imperative. . . .

“American citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking their ships and in traveling wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the high seas, and exercise those rights in what should be the well-justified confidence that their lives will not be endangered by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged international obligations, and certainly in the confidence that their own Government will sustain them in the exercise of their rights.

“There was recently published in the newspapers of the United States, I regret to inform the Imperial German Government, a formal warning, purporting to come from the Imperial German Embassy at Washington, addressed to the people of the United States, and stating, in effect, that any citizen of the United States who exercised his right of free travel upon the seas would do so at his peril if his journey should take him within the zone of waters within which the Imperial German Navy was using submarines against the commerce of Great Britain and France, notwithstanding the respectful but very earnest protest of his Government, the Government of the United States. I do not refer to this for the purpose of calling the attention of the Imperial German Government at this time to the surprising irregularity of a communication from the Imperial German Embassy at Washington addressed to the people of the United States through the newspapers, but only for the purpose of pointing out that no warning that an unlawful inhuman act will be committed can possibly be accepted as an excuse or palliation for that act or as an abatement of the responsibility for its commission. . . .

“Expressions of regret and offers of reparation in case of the destruction of neutral ships sunk by mistake, while they may satisfy international obligations, if no loss of life results, cannot justify or excuse a practice, the natural and necessary effect of which is to subject neutral nations and neutral persons to new and immeasurable risks.”

The third American note on the *Lusitania* case (July 21, 1915) was in no wise a settlement, yet it was believed that Germany would abstain from similar activities. Germany's reply was the sinking of the *Arabic* on August 19, 1915. The *Arabic* had sailed from Liverpool, on the way to New York, hence could not have been carrying contraband. Thirty lives were lost, including two Americans. The German reply to the American protest was to the effect that the attack was justified as the *Arabic* attempted to ram the submarine which was operating against another vessel, the *Dunsley*. This was denied by survivors of the *Arabic*, and all evidence supported their denial.

The sinking of the *Arabic* brought on another crisis in the relations between the United States and Germany. The President apparently took the attitude that all controversy had been closed with the final *Lusitania* note and nothing further could be attained by diplomacy. If Germany persisted in committing acts defined by him as unfriendly, no other interpretation could be placed upon them save that she was willing to run the risk of war with America rather than yield.

Germany, however, was not willing at this moment. Warned by the hostile spirit of American public opinion, the German Ambassador made the following statement to the Secretary of State, which was, in fact, a direct appeal to the American people:

“So far no official information about the sinking of the *Arabic* is available. The Imperial Government trusts that the Government of the United States will not take a definite stand after only hearing the reports coming from one side, which, according to the opinion of my Government, cannot possibly correspond with the facts, but will give the Imperial

Government a chance to be heard equally. Although my Government does not doubt the good faith of the witnesses whose statements have been published by the newspapers in Europe, my Government thinks that it should be borne in mind that such statements have naturally been made in great excitement which might easily produce a wrong impression. In case Americans should actually have lost their lives this would naturally be contrary to the intention of the German Government, who would deeply regret this fact and has instructed me to extend its sincerest sympathy to the Government of the United States."

This was apparently a concession to those in Germany who still believed that it was desirable to keep at peace with the United States. That von Tirpitz and other extremists did not propose to be guided by it was evident, for they continued their efforts in favor of unrestricted sinking of merchant vessels. The destruction of the *Ancona* in the Mediterranean (November 10, 1915) by an Austrian submarine, which was partly disavowed, and that of the *Persia* by a German U-boat (December 30, 1915) in which an American consular officer, R. M. McNeely, was killed, rendered the situation still more strained, which was brought to a crisis by the sinking of the Channel passenger ship, the *Sussex*, (March 24, 1916) the episode that precluded the entry of the United States into the war.

The naval forces of the Allies, even before the initiation of the first campaign of unlimited submarine warfare, had developed plans of defense against the undersea boats, but these were concerned mainly with the protection of naval units and bases. That the submarine would be used in commerce destruction in the manner announced by the German Admiralty, even if foreseen, had certainly not been provided for. The problem presented increased the labors and responsibilities of the Allied fleets tenfold. The new sea-going submersible, with a radius of action of several thousand miles, could penetrate any port on the coasts of Europe or operate on the lanes of commerce hundreds of miles from port.

The appointment of Admiral Lacaze as the Chief of the Naval Staff in France and the adoption of a definite system of defense by the British Admiralty proved to be a palliative at least, yet the sinkings continued each week with monotonous regularity. The defenses consisted of steel nets, in some cases carrying explosive mines stretched across harbor openings; the improvement of mechanical means of detecting the presence of submarines; the use of small but very fast craft armed with rapid-fire guns; and of depth-bombs, or mines, that explode at a determined depth under the water when dropped in the neighborhood of the submarine. In addition thousands of British fishing boats and similar small craft were called into the service to act as patrols and trawlers for mines.

Efforts were also made to discover and destroy secret bases of supplies, for it had been ascertained that Germany was so using certain islands in the Grecian seas and harbors in Spain. Vessels, disguised as neutrals, acted as mother-ships, supplying the submarines with fuel and provisions, usually during the night.

These activities, however, still failed to protect the merchant vessel, the safety of which was quite as important as that of the warship. One of the methods proposed was that of arming them with quick-firing guns. The plan of arming merchant vessels against attack was not a new one, for in his famous speech in Parliament (March 26, 1913) in the course of which he proposed the inauguration of a naval holiday, or a year's cessation of warship construction, Mr. Winston Churchill suggested also that provision be made for arming merchant vessels.

During the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century the right of defense on the part of a merchant ship was unquestioned. With the suppression of piracy and privateering, however, the custom had fallen into disuse.

It was soon evident that the right to arm merchantmen would have to be reasserted if Germany adhered to her methods of submarine warfare.

A few merchant vessels were armed at the outbreak of the war as was evidenced by the controversy that arose between Great Britain and Holland. Holland decided that armed merchant ships were warships, hence, refused to admit them into her ports save under the conditions prescribed by international law for vessels of that class. This position was not receded from, in spite of the fact that her contention was in opposition to nearly every authority in the law of nations.

That the practice, however, did not become universal until the summer of 1915 is indicated by the many pleas for its adoption that appeared in the English press during the early months of unrestricted submarine warfare.

Rear-admiral Lord Bristol at a meeting of the Institute of Naval Engineers (March 25, 1915) was apparently one of the first to recommend the universal arming of merchant ships, for which he was subjected to criticism by a writer in *The Times* (March 31, 1915) who said that "the idea that trading vessels should be armed with light guns is one that has received general support. There is this, however, to be said about such a proposal, that since the waters in which the submarines operate are limited in area, these guns if placed on board vessels would be locked up and useless. The number required is also against the feasibility of the plan. . . . After all prevention is better than the cure. Why is it that merchant ships will go to sea in the daytime? The distance they have to run in submarine infested waters is not great, and while passing through them, in many cases the dark hours might be chosen."

The fact that the vessels of some lines carried guns even in time of peace is indicated by the Report of the Royal Mail and Steam Packet Company (*The Times*, May 5, 1915)

in which it was stated that the relative immunity from submarine attack enjoyed by its ships had been due to the guns they had carried for years.

Among those who wrote in favor of such a policy was Sir Cyprian Bridge, Admiral Fitzgerald, and Sir George Sherston Baker. The latter said: "There is nothing in the law of nations which forbids them to be armed. . . . In the past, when dealing with enemy vessels who observed ordinary humanity, a ship probably would not be armed unless she desired a capture. Now it is different; it is a matter of life or death. Let all merchant ships be armed."

Another method proposed for the protection of merchant vessels was that of the convoy, which was not adopted during the earlier stages of the submarine offensive on the plea that ships would be less liable to attack if sent out singly, as Germany did not possess sufficient submarines and torpedoes to attack more than a small percentage of the vessels sailing to and from ports of the Allies. Furthermore, in case of successful attack on a convoy, the losses would be more severe. Another reason, and perhaps the decisive one, was the disinclination of Great Britain to weaken her naval forces in the North Sea by assigning her most valuable blockade units, the fast cruisers and destroyers, to the convoying of merchant shipping on the high seas.

There can be little doubt but that the submarine came perilously near attaining its goal. There were moments when it seemed as if the losses of merchant vessels would so decrease Allied tonnage that maritime communications would be seriously disturbed. To such a degree was this true that the British Admiralty threw a veil over the losses, contenting itself with vague reports, which were no adequate reply to the vast claims of Germany.

Early in the campaign, British leaders warned the public that it must face a very serious situation. Thus Admiral

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Jellicoe, in an address at Hull, said: "I am afraid we are in for a bad time for a few months; but I have confidence. I have nothing to do with the business now; but I know what is ready, and what is in preparation, and I have confidence that by the summer—the late summer, for I will not put it too soon—about August, if the nation hold out until then we really shall be able to say that the submarine menace is killed."

In one respect, however, the campaign failed utterly. This was the endeavor to break down the morale of the merchant seaman. Instead of becoming panic-stricken, the sailors of Great Britain only stiffened their resolution and put forth to sea in face of the tragedies that were happening to their comrades day by day. The record of the obscure and nameless heroes of the trawling fleets and of the merchant marine will stand in history with a special crown of glory.

According to the Official Report of the British Admiralty, March 21, 1918, the maritime losses and shipbuilding output were:

LOSS BY ENEMY ACTION AND MARINE RISK.				MERCANTILE SHIPBUILDING OUTPUT.		
(Gross Tonnage.)				(Gross Tonnage.)		
Quarter.	United Kingdom.	Foreign.	Total.	United Kingdom.	Foreign.	Total.
August 1st to end of year . . . . .	468,728	212,635	681,363	675,610	337,310	1,012,920
1915.						
First . . . . .	215,905	104,542	320,447	266,267		
Second . . . . .	223,676	156,743	380,419	146,870		
Third . . . . .	356,659	172,822	529,481	145,070		
Fourth . . . . .	307,139	187,234	494,373	92,712	551,081*	1,202,000†
1916.						
First . . . . .	325,237	108,958	524,195	95,566		
Second . . . . .	279,690	251,599	522,289	107,693		
Third . . . . .	284,358	307,681	592,039	124,961		
Fourth . . . . .	617,563	541,780	1,159,343	213,332	1,146,448*	1,688,000†
1917.						
First . . . . .	911,840	707,533	1,619,373	246,239	282,200	528,439
Second . . . . .	1,361,870	875,064	2,236,934	240,331	377,109	626,440
Third . . . . .	952,938	541,535	1,494,473	248,283	368,170	616,453
Fourth . . . . .	782,889	489,954	1,272,843	419,621	512,402	932,023
Totals . . . . .	7,079,492	4,748,080	11,827,572	3,031,555	3,574,720	6,606,275

\* Foreign total for year.

† Grand total for year.

In spite of the tremendous damage done to their enemy, the submarine campaign did not appear to realize the vast results so fondly anticipated by the Germans. As early as August 4, 1915, the famous naval critic, Captain Persius wrote: "At the commencement of February last, the submarine war gave us vast hopes, yet when we consider that during the week ending August 4th, a thousand ships are entering Britannic ports, and our gains only six merchant vessels and nine fishing boats, this does not satisfy the populace, who had conceived the most extravagant anticipations."

Another writer on naval affairs shows an equal pessimism in an article which appeared in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, August 10, 1915.

"It is to be recalled," he says, "that at the beginning of February, hopes in the submarine warfare rose high, and it was widely believed that just as the British fleet had cut off our imports from overseas, so our submarines would have little difficulty in doing the same to England. A part of our press, unfortunately, is responsible for the exaggerated expectations which the public frequently attached to the submarine warfare on merchant shipping. It was often emphasized here that with an expert estimate of the submarine weapon, and particularly with consideration of the quantity, etc., of our submarine fighting forces, the results and effect of the new method of warfare could be gathered only after a considerable time. Ever and again we counseled patience! . . ."

"At the beginning of the war our submarines laid low a series of warships, and now we hardly ever hear of anything of that sort. So speak at times 'naval heroes of the seashore.' There is no better school than war. Only, it is regrettable that it is not we alone who learn in it."

To the dismay of Germany, England seemed to be "doing business as usual," and voices arose in Germany inquiring about the German fleet. When was the day of battle to have its dawning? This was the question most asked around German dinner tables and by the firesides. It was soon to be answered.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

(May 31-June 1, 1916)

Emperor William II and the expansion of the German navy. The *Deutscher Flotten Verein*. Premonitions of a German naval offensive. The battlefield. Phases of the day battle. The night battle. Losses and results. Lessons of the battle. The loss of the *Hampshire* and the death of Earl Kitchener. The German raiders, the *Möwe* and the *Greif*. The submarine *Deutschland's* voyages to America. The treacherous visit of the *U-53*. Effect of her raids on the spirit of Americans.

The coronation of William II as Emperor of Germany on June 15, 1888, marked the beginning of a new epoch in the naval history of the German Empire. Prior to that event the German people were content with their position as the leading land power in Europe. As yet they had not heard the call that "Germany's destiny lies on the seas." Their fleet was scarcely on a parity with those of second-class naval powers, and the policy of placing army officers at the head of the Admiralty combined with the disinclination of the Reichstag to vote large appropriations for battle-ships conspired to keep it in this position. The accession of the present emperor, however, changed all that. Ever interested in sea-life he immediately set to work to build up a navy, which, if not to be the equal of the British, should at least be sufficiently strong to give British statesmen cause for thought. Yet for a decade he found himself confronted by almost insuperable difficulties, the most important being the lack of interest on the part of the German people.

It was necessary to bring them to his viewpoint and to this end the *Deutscher Flotten Verein*, or Navy League, was

founded in April, 1898. This marked the transformation of German naval policy. Through the propaganda under the leadership of an emperor who had said (June 16, 1896) that "the German Empire has become a world-empire," the new German fleet was born.

The underlying purpose of Germany's naval policy was clear. In spite of vehement assertions that the sole aim of the fleet was the defense of her merchant marine and colonial trade, Great Britain was not blind to the fact that it was a distinct threat against her maritime supremacy.

The entry of the British Empire into the great conflict now brought the day near when the test of that supremacy would be made, and the officers and men on both sides were keen for the decisive hour. The earlier naval engagements—Coronel, Falkland, Dogger Bank—were but incidents and preliminary to the great event. That it did not come earlier than May 31, 1916, was due, it would appear, to the facts of the concentration of the British fleet in the North Sea, the mobilization at Spithead and the blockade.

These operations on the part of Great Britain neutralized, for the time being, the German fleet, and minimized the accomplishment of really important results from cruiser warfare. Without the support of the Battle Fleet, the fate of the German commerce-destroyers was but a question of time, as events have proved. Through the blockade, Great Britain retained the virtual command of the sea, which was little short of absolute as long as the German navy hugged its bases. The German naval leaders knew that some time it must come to an issue with the British, but when the gage would be flung down was a subject upon which there was wide variance of opinion. Their eyes were open to the handicaps which they would have to overcome, and they were well aware of the fatal consequences



Vice-admiral Sir David Beatty, commander of the British cruiser fleet in the Battle of Jutland.



of a decisive defeat. Some, indeed, among them probably High-admiral von Tirpitz, did not favor an early offensive on the part of the Battle Fleet, advocating instead the policy of wearing down the British by torpedo and mine attacks upon separate units. They reasoned that in time the enemy force could be reduced to such an extent that the German fleet would be in a position to meet it on more nearly equal terms.

The military situation, however, was complicated by the political. The failure at Verdun and the consequent stagnation on the western front conspired with the economic pressure of the blockade to direct the attention of the German public to the apparent inactivity of the fleet. The Allies had practically suppressed cruiser operations, of which much had been anticipated, and now the only noteworthy successes of the navy were the submarine operations—the legitimacy of which still lingered as a doubt in some German minds. It became more and more clear to the Admiralty that the people expected the navy to justify itself, and the course of events during the early months of 1916 indicated that it was endeavoring to respond to the popular demand.

Thus on December 31, 1915, the Admiralty announced that the German fleet had advanced into the North Sea in search of the British, but without success. In February, the Archduke Karl, Chief of the Austrian navy, visited Berlin, evidently to consider plans for naval coöperation; furthermore, the German press contained articles regarding "surprises" to be sprung by the German navy, of 17-inch guns, unsinkable ships, still greater Zeppelins, torpedoes, etc. In March the ships which had been stripped of crews and material to equip the forts of the Belgian coast were again made ready for service, and 70,000 naval reservists were called to active duty.

The most impressive indication of a major operation of the fleet, however, was the resignation (March 16, 1916) of High-admiral von Tirpitz, who was apparently a determined opponent of an offensive in force against the British navy at that time. He advocated, rather, as has been indicated, the policy of attrition and commerce-destroying, staking all upon the submarine, an instrument of warfare that, publicly, at any rate, he had dismissed a few years before as impracticable. Von Tirpitz was succeeded by Admiral von Capelle as the Chief of the Admiral Staff, while Admiral Scheer, who had been temporarily in command of the High Seas Fleet since the death of Admiral Hugo von Pohl in February, 1916, was confirmed in that position. These appointments offered another indication of more energetic action on the part of the German navy, for both von Capelle and Scheer were known to be strong advocates of an immediate offensive.

Another symptom of offensive operations by the German fleet was the bombardment of the English coast towns, Lowestoft and Yarmouth, April 25, 1916, at 4.10 to 4.40 A. M., in which four persons were killed, twelve wounded, and considerable damage was done. The attacking squadron, which comprised twenty swift vessels, sank the steamer *King Stephen* during the raid, escaping to its bases unchallenged by British warships.

The officers on both sides, therefore, anticipated a pitched battle in the near future, yet just when it would occur no one could say. In it the Germans must assume the initiative, for the British fleet would not undertake an enterprise so hopeless as to attack the Germans behind their powerful coast defenses. It was equally evident that the German admiral would not essay battle unless he had some reasonable assurance of meeting the enemy on equal terms. This he could do only by engaging units

of the British fleet, destroying them separately by swift, hard blows.

Whether or not this was the mission of Rear-admiral Scheer when he left his bases at daybreak, May 31st, is not yet determined. The German accounts are silent on the objective of the fleet. They content themselves with stating that the German fleet set out upon an enterprise to the north,—according to them, one of many similar operations. There has been much speculation regarding the real aim of the German High Command. Distinguished French authorities, like Admiral Degouy, have advanced the theory that the sortie was directed towards the stoppage of munitions and supplies *en route* to Russia by way of Archangel; others hold that it was to break the blockade and release swift cruisers upon Allied trade routes and lines of communication; while another theory is that Scheer was informed of the position of Beatty's squadron of battle-cruisers and thought the time and conditions favorable to defeat it. If this were done before the Battle Fleet could come to Beatty's support, the German navy would strike a most serious blow against Britain's sea power, and could herald it as a decisive victory. It might well be that all these purposes entered into the movement of the German fleet. At any rate, seemingly for the first time since the outbreak of the war, the German ships sought the British fleet with the obvious intention of bringing it to battle.

The question has also been asked whether Beatty's ships were not placed in their position as a bait to the German fleet (cf. Guihéneuc, "*La Bataille Navale du Jutland*"), but this, too, is a point upon which the reports throw no light. The naval strategy of both sides is so shrouded in mystery that it cannot be discussed with assurance until more data is offered. It is, however, known that the British Battle Fleet did not leave its bases until some time during

the day of May 30th. (Wallace, *Premonition in War. A Story of Jutland. National Review*, June, 1918.) The main body of the British Battle Fleet apparently had its base at this time at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands, north of Scotland, while the battle-cruiser units were stationed at Rosyth on the Firth of Forth. The Fifth Squadron, consisting of ships of the *Queen Elizabeth* type, may have put to sea from Scarborough (*Scottish Herald*, June 2d).

The only official information on these points is the introductory statement of Admiral Jellicoe's report, which reads: "The ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left its bases on the previous day, in accordance with instructions from me." As Admiral Beatty's squadron was capable of steaming twenty-eight knots an hour, he could have covered the 350 miles from Rosyth to a point off the coast of Denmark in twelve hours, hence he was doubtless on the field of battle by nightfall, May 30th. That Scheer was aware of this fact is undoubted, and that he thought Beatty too far from the British Battle Fleet to be reinforced by it is probable. At any rate, after all other objectives of the German fleet are given due weight, it is impossible to believe that the entrapping and destruction of Beatty's group of battle-cruisers, the most splendid warships in the world, was preëminently the aim of Hipper and Scheer.

We can assume, therefore, that both sides knew with more or less exactness the positions of the various units. Whether Admiral Scheer was aware that the British Battle Fleet was within striking distance is open to question. At any rate, it would appear that he hoped to dispose of Beatty's ships before they could be reinforced.

What were the positions just before the battle began? The field of the battle was near Jutland Bank, about one





Grand-admiral Alfred Friedrich von Tirpitz, who resigned March 16, 1916, as secretary for the German navy.



Admiral Eduard von Capelle, successor to von Tirpitz as secretary for the German navy.

hundred miles west of Hanstholm on the northern coast of Denmark. The British Grand Fleet, under command of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, was apparently off the coast of Norway, while the cruiser fleet, under Sir David Beatty, was some fifty miles to the south, protected by a screen of light cruisers and destroyers, from ten to twenty miles in advance. According to Admiral Jellicoe's report, "the First and Second Battle-Cruiser Squadrons, First, Second, and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons, and destroyers from the First, Ninth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Flotillas, supported by the Fifth Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with my directions, scouting to the southward of the Battle Fleet, which was accompanied by the Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron, First and Second Cruiser Squadrons, and Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, Fourth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Flotillas."

The most probable composition of Admiral Hipper's Battle-Cruiser Squadron was:

*Lützow*, eight 12-inch and twelve 6-inch guns, 28,000 tons; *Derfflinger*, eight 12-inch and twelve 6-inch guns, 28,000 tons; *Seydlitz*, ten 11-inch and twelve 6-inch guns, 24,640 tons; *Moltke*, ten 11-inch and twelve 6-inch guns, 22,600 tons; *Von der Tann*, eight 11-inch and ten 6-inch guns, 19,400 tons; *New Salamis*, eight 14-inch and twelve 6-inch guns, 19,200 tons. The highest speed would have been about twenty-five or twenty-six knots as a fleet.

The German Battle Fleet, under Admiral Scheer, appears to have been composed somewhat as follows:

*Grosser Kurfürst*, *Markgraf*, and *König*, each ten 12-inch (or 14-inch) and fourteen 6-inch guns, 25,000 tons, twenty-one knots; *Kaiser Friedrich der Grosse*, *Kaiserin*, *König Albert*, and *Prinz Regent Luitpold*, each ten 12-inch and fourteen 6-inch guns, 24,700 tons, twenty-one knots; *Helgoland*, *Thüringen*, *Ostfriesland*, and *Oldenburg*, each 12-inch and fourteen 6-inch guns, 22,800 tons, twenty-two knots; *Nassau*, *Westfalen*, *Rheinland*, and *Posen*, each twelve 11-inch and twelve 6-inch guns, 18,900 tons, twenty and a half knots; *Deutschland*, *Pommern*, *Hannover*, *Schlesien*, *Schleswig-Holstein*, and *Lothringen*, pre-dreadnoughts, each four 11-inch and fourteen

6.7-inch guns, 13,000 tons, eighteen and a half knots. All the above ships have two funnels, except the six pre-dreadnoughts and the four ships of the *Helgoland* class, which have three.

Vice-admiral Sir D. Beatty's Battle-Cruisers were:

*Lion*, eight 13.5-inch and sixteen 4-inch guns, 26,350 tons; *Princess Royal*, eight 13.5-inch and sixteen 4-inch guns, 26,350 tons; *Queen Mary*, eight 13.5-inch and sixteen 4-inch guns, 27,000 tons; *Tiger*, eight 13.5-inch and twelve 6-inch guns, 28,000 tons; *Indefatigable*, eight 12-inch and sixteen 4-inch guns, 18,750 tons; *New Zealand*, eight 12-inch and sixteen 4-inch guns, 18,800 tons. The highest speed as a fleet would be slightly in excess of twenty-six knots.

Rear-admiral Hood's Third Battle-Cruiser Squadron was made up of:

*Invincible*, *Inflexible*, and *Indomitable*, each eight 12-inch and sixteen 4-inch guns, 17,250 tons, twenty-five knots.

Rear-admiral Evan-Thomas's Fifth Battle-Cruiser Squadron comprised:

*Barham*, *Valiant*, *Warspite*, and *Malaya*, each eight 15-inch and twelve to sixteen 6-inch guns, 27,500 tons, twenty-five knots.

The British Battle Fleet, so far as its units are given, was as follows:

Cruiser Squadrons—First, Rear-admiral Sir R. K. Arbuthnot; and Second, Rear-admiral H. L. Heath. Light Cruiser Squadrons—First, Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair; Second, Commodore W. E. Goodenough; Third, Rear-admiral T. D. W. Napier; and Fourth, Commodore C. E. Le Mesurier.

The battle squadrons mentioned as present with Admiral Sir J. Jellicoe, the Commander-in-Chief, whose flag was hoisted on the *Iron Duke*, placed in the Fourth Squadron, were:

First, Vice-admiral Sir C. Burney; Second, Vice-admiral Sir M. Jerram; and Fourth, Vice-admiral Sir D. Sturdee.

The destroyer flotillas mentioned as present were:

First, Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth.

According to Vice-admiral Beatty's despatch, the Battle-Cruiser Fleet was steering to the northward to join the Battle Fleet. At 2.20 P. M. reports were received from the light cruiser *Galatea* (Commodore Sinclair), which was scouting in advance, announcing that enemy vessels had been sighted. The German light cruisers *Elbing* and *Frankfurt* were the first to sight the British ships. At 2.30, therefore, the course of Beatty's division was altered to the S. S. E., the direction of Horn Reef, in order, as his report states, "to place my force between the enemy and his base." It soon became evident that the Germans were out in considerable force. To gain further information a scouting seaplane was sent up from the aeroplane mother-ship, the *Engadine*, formerly the Cunarder, *Campania*.

At 3.30 P. M. Beatty increased speed and formed for battle in line of bearing, *i. e.*, the ships, instead of being directly astern of each other, were slightly in echelon, thus avoiding the smoke of the preceding vessel and the danger of collision. Ahead of the battle-cruisers, and forming a protective screen, was the First Light Cruiser Squadron, while the Second Light Cruiser Squadron and the destroyers of the Ninth and Thirteenth Flotillas fell in astern of the battle-cruisers. N. N. W., at a distance of 10,000 yards, was the Fifth Battle Squadron, four ships of the magnificent Queen Elizabeth type, under command of Rear-admiral Evan-Thomas, consisting of the *Barham*, *Warspite*, *Malaya*, and *Valiant*, the *Queen Elizabeth* being in dock at Rosyth for repairs. (Copplestone, *The Silent Watchers*.)

The German forces were under command of Rear-admiral Hipper, Beatty's old foe in the cruiser engagements off Helgoland and at Dogger Bank. They consisted

of the entire battle-cruiser fleet of Germany, with the exception of the *Goeben*, nominally sold to Turkey, namely: the *Lützow* (flagship), *Seydlitz*, *Derfflinger*, *Moltke*, and *Von der Tann*. This powerful division also had its supporting force of small cruisers and destroyer flotillas.

The firing began at 3.48, almost simultaneously, at a range of approximately 18,500 yards. The battle continued on a southerly course, the two fleets steaming in parallel lines at a speed of about twenty-five knots, or nearly thirty miles an hour.







Beatty was now approaching the German High Seas Fleet at a speed of twenty-five knots plus the speed of the German fleet, in all forty-five knots, about fifty miles an hour. Similarly, though in less degree, he was leaving the support of the Grand Fleet under Jellicoe. Furthermore, conditions of visibility were against him, for, although the weather was good and the sea calm, his vessels were silhouetted against the western sky, while Hipper's fleet was somewhat obscured by a mist which was forming in the east.

In the meantime, the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron were rushing at the height of their speed to the support of the battle-cruisers. In fifteen minutes they would be in a position to deliver effective fire upon the enemy. Yet during these fifteen minutes a tragic event occurred in the British line. Ten minutes after the action began, the *Indefatigable*, the last ship in Beatty's squadron, blew up with the loss of her entire crew of 900 men, two excepted. This was followed a few minutes later (4.30 P.M.) by the loss of the *Queen Mary*, which exploded and sank so quickly that the ships astern steamed over her. Thus, almost at a single stroke, Beatty's force was reduced by a third, and the British navy lost two of its most splendid units.

The official reports are not clear on the cause of these disasters, but we are led to believe that they were due to

BRITISH FLEETS  
UNDER BEATTY

A - 5TH BATTLE  
TURNED TO  
B - C - BATTLE  
LIGHT CRU  
TO STARBOARD



Six diagrams showing the various phases of the action between the British and German fleets off the Jutland Bank, May 31 and June 1, 1916.

the accurate gunfire of the German ships, which was concentrated upon the vessels that went down. Naval authorities, especially those in France, are inclined to believe that Hipper so maneuvered that he led Beatty into a mine-field or a submarine ambushade. The German reports strenuously deny that any submarines were present, but some of the British are equally insistent that they were, stating, indeed, that one was destroyed during the course of the battle. The question, therefore, is one of relative veracity, but even if decided in favor of the British reports, the cause of the sinkings is not explained, for neither Jellicoe nor Beatty admits that torpedoes were in any way responsible.

The Queen Elizabeths came into action at 4.08 P. M. directing an ineffectual fire against the Germans at a range of 20,000 yards. They formed astern of Beatty's ships and when their great 15-inch guns began to take effect, the German firing, which up to that time had been excellent, began to show signs of deteriorating. At 4.18 the third battle-cruiser in Hipper's line was seen to be on fire. In the meanwhile attacks were made by both sides with destroyers and other light craft—the first daylight operations of the kind in the history of naval warfare. The Germans had long been trained in this maneuver by Admiral von Koester and his disciples, but that the British would attempt it had not been foreseen. Nevertheless, at 4.15 British destroyers advanced to attack the enemy line. These were the *Nestor*, *Nomad*, *Nicator*, *Narborough*, *Pelican*, *Petard*, *Obdurate*, *Nerissa*, *Moorsom*, *Morris*, *Turbulent*, and *Terma-gant*, of the Ninth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Flotillas. These vessels were met by a force of fifteen German destroyers supported by the light cruiser *Regensburg*. A desperate encounter at short range ensued, and the German vessels were driven back to their main body without firing their torpedoes, losing two destroyers. The British, however, pushed

home their attack and fired torpedoes at the German battle-cruisers. The *Nestor* and the *Nomad* were sunk, however, and the *Nicator* regained her flotilla, badly damaged but still afloat. Apparently no hits were made by either side, although Beatty's report states that a torpedo from the *Nerissa* struck a rear ship of the enemy line.

"From 4.15 to 4.43 P. M. the conflict between the opposing battle-cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The Fifth Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy's rear ships, unfortunately at a very long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 P. M. the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the northeastward, and the outline of the ships very indistinct." (Vice-admiral Beatty's despatch.)

At 4.38 P. M. the purpose of Hipper's maneuver became clear, for the report came from the *Southampton* that the German Battle Fleet had been sighted in the S. E. Beatty was threatened by a concentration of the whole German navy. His problem now was to change his course to the north and lure the German fleet to the British Battle Fleet without himself being destroyed. The odds were strongly against him. He had already suffered heavy losses, and to turn his fleet right-about in the face of the fire of battle-ships was courting still further disaster. There were now nineteen capital ships against his eight. There is little doubt that the German leaders, in fancy's eye, saw Beatty annihilated. He had, however, one advantage—a few knots' superiority of speed which permitted him to keep just out of range of the heavier vessels, fighting at the same time a holding action with the German battle-cruisers, thereby keeping in contact with the German fleet until he could form a juncture with his battle fleet, arraying the two combined forces against each other. It was a daring move, for

the laming of a single vessel would have meant its destruction, a fate, indeed, that might befall his whole force. That it succeeded is a tribute to Beatty's skill as a leader.

How was it achieved? As soon as he was assured of the presence of the High Seas Fleet, Beatty turned his squadron, in column, sixteen points to the starboard, or directly on an opposite course. The second phase of the battle was therefore fought on a northerly course over the same waters as the first. The smoke of the previous gunfire was a contributive influence in decreasing the visibility. Beatty's force turned, probably, before it came under the fire of the German Battle Fleet, but the Queen Elizabeths continued on the southerly course, screening the battle-cruisers, and at the same time engaging Hipper's force. Still further in advance, forming a reconnaissance force was the Second Light Cruiser Squadron. This came under fire from the leading German squadron before it put about to the north. The Queen Elizabeths turned north at 4.57 apparently to the port, coming under heavy fire at the "windy corner," or point of turning, but the range was long and the squadron seems not to have experienced any material injuries. During the northward course of the battle the German gunnery, which had been excellent, showed further signs of deterioration, although visibility conditions were unfavorable for the British, their ships being silhouetted against the western sky, while the German fleet was more or less obscured by the smoke and haze on the eastern horizon.

At 5 P. M. Admiral Scheer took over the command of the entire German fleet and from that hour until 6 P. M. the action continued on the northerly course. At 5.35 P. M., Beatty, aware, doubtless, of the proximity of Jellicoe's force and trusting to his superior speed, essayed the tactical maneuver known as "Crossing the T." That is, he attempted to throw his fleet directly across the van of the German

line. This operation was only in part successful, for Hipper also sheered off to the northeast and then to the east, keeping his vessels relatively in the same position with respect to the British. Nevertheless, the German van was considerably disorganized, and Hipper was forced to maneuver in order to escape torpedo attacks delivered at 5.45 P. M. by British destroyers.

At 5.50 P. M. the leading vessels of the British Battle Fleet were sighted. These were the ships of the Third Battle Squadron, under command of Rear-admiral Hood, consisting of the battle-cruisers *Invincible*, *Indomitable*, and the *Inflexible*, accompanied by the First and Second Cruiser Squadrons. The advent of this powerful reinforcement extricated Beatty from a situation that was threatening to become critical. Rushing at full speed in front of the German fleet and obliged to close in upon the enemy in order to permit the British Battle Fleet room to deploy, thus for a time blanketing the fire of a good portion of the ships of the Battle Fleet, Beatty's force, unsupported as it now was by the Queen Elizabeths, could easily have been totally destroyed were the Germans permitted to concentrate their gunfire against it. The coming of Hood's squadron accordingly saved Beatty, but at a fearful cost, the *Invincible* going down with virtually all on board, including Rear-admiral Hood.

Hood's squadron entered into action at 6.20, but about an hour before he had sent the light cruiser *Chester* (Captain Lawson) ahead to reconnoiter. At 5.45, this vessel became engaged with four or five enemy light cruisers, escaping from the unequal contest with heavy damage. It was during this action that the heroic boy, John Cornwall, though mortally wounded and with all the gun crew dead, served his gun to the moment of his death.

In moving to the support of Beatty, Hood apparently had advanced too far south, hence was forced to retrace





his course to the northwest, taking his place ahead of Beatty at 6.20, bringing his squadron into action, as Beatty reports "in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors." The range was very short, 8,000 yards, and the squadron immediately became the target for a furious fire. The *Invincible* engaged a ship of the *Derfflinger* class, probably the *Lützow*, which was rendered *hors de combat*, the *Invincible* being sunk at the same time. The great ship was broken in two, the stern and bow projecting from the water. Only six survivors were saved from a personnel of more than 700. It was doubtless during these events that Rear Admiral Hipper transferred his flag from the hopelessly damaged *Lützow* to the *Derfflinger*.

It seems to have been Beatty's plan for the Queen Elizabeths to follow him in the dash across the German van, but when the moment came, their commander, Rear-admiral Evan-Thomas, perceived the advancing squadrons on the right flank of the Battle Fleet. He therefore abandoned the effort to pass in front and directed his course to the north, in order to fall in astern of the Battle Fleet. This incident indicates that the concentration of the two British forces produced a tactical problem requiring the utmost naval skill to solve. As has been indicated, the units under command of Vice-admiral Beatty were passing between Jellicoe and the German fleet. It was, therefore, necessary for him to clear the intervening area in order to permit the Grand Fleet to deploy into action. Furthermore, the poor visibility made the greatest caution necessary, lest British ships be mistaken for those of the enemy. It is very probable, indeed, that this error was committed during the course of the battle. At any rate, in order to clear the field for Jellicoe, Beatty increased his speed and closed in upon the enemy to a distance of about 8,000 yards, a very short range for modern guns. It was nearly 6 P. M.,

therefore, when the Grand Fleet entered into action, the leading vessels firing upon the Germans at a distance of six miles. Just what tactics Jellicoe employed in deploying into battle line is purposely withheld in the reports, yet the diagram in Gill's *Naval Power in the War* represents a mode of deployment that may have been used.

While these larger events were taking place occurred the disastrous episode of Rear-admiral Arbuthnot's division, consisting of the armored cruisers *Defence*, *Warrior*, *Black Prince*, and the *Duke of Edinburgh*. The position of this unit and the purpose of its maneuver is another mystery not cleared up by the reports. It would appear that the squadron either did not originally form a part of the Battle Fleet, or that Arbuthnot, in repelling an attack of German light cruisers and destroyers, misled by the smoke and fog, found himself in the vicinity of the enemy capital ships. At any rate, his vessels were cruising in a westerly direction between the battle lines and less than 8,000 yards from the High Seas Fleet—almost suicide for such lightly armed and armored vessels. The *Defence* was sunk with Rear-admiral Arbuthnot on board, the *Black Prince* put out of action and the *Warrior* rendered helpless, the *Duke of Edinburgh* escaping and later joining the Second Cruiser Squadron. Captain Phillpotts, of the *Warspite*, observed the condition of the *Warrior* and went to her assistance, receiving a most withering fire while covering the drifting vessel. The *Warspite*, on her part, received a shot in her steering-gear that rendered her helpless for the time being. The Germans thought that the *Warspite* was sunk and so reported, but her commanding officer steered her out of danger by means of the engines and she eventually reached her base. The *Warrior*, however, was not so fortunate. Fatally wounded, she sank during the night, after having been towed by the *Engadine* and abandoned, the crew being

transferred. The *Black Prince*, likewise, did not sink immediately but struggled on until night when she probably blew up. Search for her the next day was fruitless.

The cruiser action, however, had not been without its disasters to the German fleet. The new light cruiser *Wiesbaden* was crippled and left hopeless between the battle lines. She sank later, one member of the crew being rescued. The Germans during this phase of the battle, lost two more torpedo boats, while the British destroyer *Shark* was sunk, and the destroyer *Defender* injured. The light cruiser *Chester* suffered further damage at this time.

At 6.17 the British Battle Fleet entered into action, the first shots being fired by the First Battle Squadron, under command of Vice-admiral Sir Cecil Burney, on the *Marlborough*. These were directed against the Third German Battle Squadron, consisting of vessels of the *Kaiser* class, one of which, and one also of the *König* class, being so severely handled that they turned out of line. The gunnery of the *Marlborough* was particularly effective, which was all the more remarkable as she was damaged by a torpedo during the action (6.54 P. M.). The range varied from 8,000 to 11,000 yards, but even then the mist and smoke were so thick and the light so poor that the battle targets were but dimly seen. Ships appeared and disappeared so rapidly that range-finding was difficult and it was almost impossible to ascertain the effect of the firing. This, to a certain extent, also explains the discrepancy between the reports issued by the two sides.


The period of heaviest fighting lasted from 6.20 to 6.40 P. M., a brief twenty minutes, during which time only a portion of the two battle fleets were in a position to deliver effective fire. The German fleet, however, was far more concentrated than the British and its salvos, especially those directed against the battle-cruisers, were most

destructive. The British firing, however, improved to such an extent that the German leaders found themselves in a serious predicament. The tactics that they had found so effective of picking out particular units of the British fleet and concentrating upon them could no longer be carried out. In fact, they were compelled to yield the initiative to the British. No more could they batter up individual ships of the enemy with a modicum of damage on their own part. It was now a question of saving the entire German fleet, which was in grave danger of being enveloped and perhaps destroyed by a vastly superior enemy.


That Scheer accomplished the task with great skill cannot be gainsaid. The British leaders attribute his escape to chance, unfavorable weather conditions, and approaching darkness, which may have had great influence, yet it is not impossible that these elements may all have entered into the plan of German strategy. To disengage his forces, Scheer ordered his destroyer flotillas to attack and at the same time to form a smoke-screen to conceal the movements of his main fleet. This maneuver was fairly successful, the smoke-screen perhaps saving the Germans from envelopment, for it formed a barrier through which Jellicoe did not attempt to penetrate, contenting himself with encirclement and long-range action. It would appear that during a great part of the time, the ships were unable to continue firing owing to the smoke and mist. We are informed that the German fleet was wholly invisible from 6.50 to 7.14 P. M., from 7.45 to 8.20 P. M., and from 8.38 thereafter. Thus during three hours of the main action (6 to 9 P. M.) the British gunners had sight of their targets for three-quarters of an hour, all told.

It should also be kept in mind that from 6 to 6.50 P. M., the Battle-Cruiser Fleet was passing across the van of the Germans, hence between them and the Grand Fleet. Beatty





The German battle-cruiser *Seydlitz*.



Shell holes in the side of a British warship after the Battle of Jutland.

thus blanketed the fire of a considerable portion of Jellicoe's ships. It was, therefore, not until approximately 7 P. M. that the intervening space was cleared and Jellicoe was in a position to close in upon the High Seas Fleet. That the British admiral did not do this resolutely has subjected him to criticism, but it would appear that his decision to circle around the German forces, tailing on to Beatty and closing in gradually, was justified by conditions. To have thrown his ships into the pall of smoke and mist might have been suicidal. That by so doing he could have compassed the destruction of the German fleet must be weighed with the consequences of such a move and the penalty that might be exacted. That the enemy had been already dreadfully punished he well knew, but he, on his part, had experienced appalling disasters. These, however, were not yet sufficient to threaten British supremacy on the sea. Should he, therefore, risk this for a somewhat barren victory? In other words, would the result justify the risk? Sir John Jellicoe thought not, and his decision has been confirmed by the British Admiralty.

The British forces, therefore, at 6.50 P. M. were concentrated in one body, an array of ships that stretched in a single line for a distance of perhaps fifty miles. Moving in the direction of the hands of the clock, it formed a vast semicircle, within which cruised the German fleet on a shorter radius. There was only one avenue of escape for the latter,—to the west and still further from its bases. It was the one that was taken and the German ships escaped the net thrown around them to limp back to Cuxhaven and Wilhelmshaven, in scattered sections and perhaps by neutral waters.

The attack of the German destroyers was countered by British vessels of the same type, supported by the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron. These drove the German light

craft back to the battleships, with the loss of a destroyer in the operation. No damage, apparently, was done to the British vessels. Behind its smoke-screen the German fleet accordingly made its way to the westward, and touch between the capital ships was lost after 7.45 P. M. Both Beatty and Jellicoe advanced cruiser forces, consisting of the First, Third, and Fourth Light Cruiser Squadrons, to find the enemy. These encountered German battleships at 8.10 P. M. and fought with them a furious but unequal contest for ten minutes. The British vessels were driven back, and when Beatty rushed the battle-cruisers to their support it was too late. The German fleet had disappeared in the gathering darkness.

It is almost impossible to obtain a clear idea of the events of the night battle. It would seem that the German fleet was thoroughly disorganized, its different units seeking their bases as best they could. The British battleships, likewise, withdrew from active participation, but remained on the field after taking precautions against torpedo attack, trusting, according to the report, that the enemy could be located and brought to battle on the succeeding morning. Therefore, after 9 P. M. the operations were carried on by the flotilla forces. The battlefield at night was a scene of awful splendor. The sea was lit up by flames of burning vessels. Great ships appeared and disappeared in the smoke which lay heavy upon the water, the surface of which, as an English officer expressed it, "was lit up like marble over which the destroyers moved like cockroaches on a floor."

According to Vice-admiral Beatty's despatch, the heaviest fighting was done by the Fourth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Flotillas, led by Commodore Hawkesley and Captains Win-tour and Stirling respectively. Of these, the Fourth suffered the severest losses, among them the flotilla leader, *Tipperary*, a destroyer of the latest and most powerful type.

When it sank it carried down the greater part of the crew, and with them the body of the brave Captain Wintour, who had been killed earlier in the action. Torpedoes from two destroyers of the Fourth Flotilla, the *Spitfire* and the *Ardent*, were observed to take effect on enemy ships.

A large number of torpedoes were fired by the Twelfth Flotilla, a ship of the *Kaiser* class was seen to blow up, and the *Maenad*, in a second attack, obtained a hit on one of the five remaining ships.

Attached to Admiral Beatty's force were the First, Second, and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons, and the First, Ninth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Destroyer Flotillas. The light cruisers were almost continually in touch with the enemy battle-cruisers and at 10.20, the *Southampton* and the *Dublin* were engaged for fifteen minutes in a hot fight with five German cruisers, experiencing heavy injuries.

It would appear that the German fleet suffered its severest losses during the night, some of which have probably not been revealed. We know from the German accounts that the *Elbing* was lost by collision, that the *Pommern*, the *Frauenlob*, and the *Rostock* were torpedoed, and that the hopelessly damaged flagship of Admiral Hipper, the *Lützow*, was blown up by her own crew when it became evident that she was in a sinking condition. It is the opinion of naval authorities that some of the vessels named were *Ersatz*, or new ships given old names. In the case of the *Pommern*, this suspicion appears to be well-grounded, for the original *Pommern* was reported sunk by a British submarine during the month of July, 1915, in the Gulf of Dantzic. The British claim of further losses by the enemy includes two dreadnoughts of the *Kaiser* class, one or two of the *Helgoland* class, and the battle-cruisers, *Seydlitz* and *Von der Tann*. It is probable, however, that these claims are excessive, as the German ships appear to have been

constructed with such skill from the defensive viewpoint that they were able to undergo an extraordinary amount of punishment without sinking. There can be little doubt, however, in view of corroborative evidence, that the Germans have much understated their losses on May 31st. Such a policy is quite in line with the general military and naval policy of the German General Staff, and it is likely that no loss has been admitted that could, conceivably, have been impossible of positive proof. A case in point is that of the *Lützow*, the loss of which was not officially admitted until several days after the event. In further corroboration of these losses, the British Admiralty announced on July 13, 1915, that positive evidence had been obtained to the effect that the *Kaiser* and the *Kronprinz* were sunk by torpedoes.

However severe the German naval losses may have been they were more than offset by those of Great Britain. These were published in the earliest reports of the battle and struck the people with dismay. The announcement was made suddenly without an accompanying statement of the situation. This afforded an opportunity of which the German Naval Staff was quick to take advantage, heralding, as it did, a decided victory over Britain's mighty navy. The delay in the issuance of the official despatches of Jellicoe and Beatty (July 6th) lent color to the German claims; hence when these appeared they did not serve to dispel the idea in neutral states and even among Great Britain's own allies that her fleet had suffered a very serious check. Only time and the manifest inability of Germany to show any advantage from her so-called victory have revealed the true situation. At the best, however, Britain's losses were grievous.

Was the reward worth the cost? This is a question upon which the opinions of the highest authorities differ.

Assuming that the losses were correct as given by each side the British preponderance was undisturbed. In fact, the losses experienced by Germany were relatively more damaging than those of Great Britain. The truth of this statement is evidenced by the fact that the German navy remained at its bases during the whole interval before the suspension of hostilities. Though still a "fleet in being," its offensive power had been neutralized.

Of the strategy of the battle, as has already been indicated, no statement can be made that will not be subject to correction when the complete story is obtained from official sources. Without knowledge of the mission of the German fleet it is impossible to determine how nearly its objective was obtained, and without a clearer statement regarding the reasons for the dispositions we are unable to say whether Beatty was rash in attacking battleships with battle-cruisers or whether Jellicoe was dilatory in deploying into battle line or at fault in not closing in upon the German fleet and attempting to destroy it. It may be that some of these points in doubt can never be solved, for the facts upon which their solution depends may have sunk with the brave leaders who perished.

With regard to the tactics of the battle it would appear that both fleets were maneuvered with great skill. Admiral Hipper's handling of his units in the battle-cruiser action, his maneuvers in uniting with the German Battle Fleet, and the manner in which he parried Beatty's maneuver in "Crossing the T" were exceptional examples of seamanship and naval skill. The same may be said of Beatty who, confronted with problems quite similar but vastly more comprehensive, brought them to a successful conclusion. It was clear to his mind that to bring the entire German fleet into action with the British Battle Fleet would require large risks, perhaps sacrifices, and he

met the situation in the traditional spirit of the British navy. That Admiral Jellicoe and he did not gain the laurel of a decisive victory may have been due to chance or to the nicely-timed strategy of the German leaders, yet whatever the cause, it was not due to lack of daring or initiative on the part of the leaders and men of the British fleet.

This greatest naval battle the world has seen will be studied by naval strategists during the years to come and yet it so far has revealed nothing essentially new in maritime warfare. The dreadnought and the big gun remain in ascendancy despite Sir Percy Scott's prophecy to the contrary. Submarines and mines undoubtedly had a great influence upon the conduct of the battle, but that their influence was not determining is unquestioned. The German legends of strange and terrible modes of warfare were dissipated by the cold fact that every success they achieved was obtained by the ancient method of straight shooting and skilful management of their fleet units. Submarines, Zeppelins, and perhaps mines played their part, but there can be little question that it was a part profoundly disappointing to the German Naval Staff.

One thing that was new was the extraordinary use of destroyers and other light craft, not only as defensive screens to the capital ships, but also as arms of offense against them. Their attacks by day, the first in the history of naval warfare, and by night, are the outstanding facts of this amazing event.

Light was also thrown on another question that has disturbed naval experts for a decade or more. This is the value of the battle-cruiser. It would appear, in spite of the grievous losses experienced in this type of warship, that the battle-cruiser has demonstrated its peculiar fitness as a useful arm of the navy. This fact has been officially recognized by America's foremost naval leaders, Admiral

Sims and Admiral Knight, in their reports to Congress upon this subject.

Summing up, the battle was inconclusive. This is admitted by both sides. The fact remains that a good part of the German fleet escaped to its bases damaged, it would appear, to the last degree, yet still a fleet, and still possessed of a potency that might reveal itself later. If so, it could never be under conditions so favorable as the day of May 31, 1916, for later the British navy and the American navy stood together and awaited with supreme confidence the coming of a second day of battle. The months that followed the Battle of Jutland showed no indication of an intention on the part of the German Battle Fleet to renew the offensive. In the meanwhile, the blockade, the supreme naval operation of the Great War, continued its inexorable clutch upon the German Empire.

BRITISH FLEET—THE GRAND FLEET

Types of Ships

BATTLESHIPS

NAME.	DATE.	TONS.	SPEED.	ARMAMENT.	BELT ARMOR.	SISTER SHIPS.
<i>Royal Sovereign</i>	. 1916 .	25,750 .	21 . .	8 15-in., 16 6-in. . . .	13-in. . .	<i>Revenge</i> , etc.
<i>Queen Elizabeth</i> (Fifth Squadron) .	1915 .	27,500 .	25 . .	8 15-in., 12 to 16 6-in. . .	13-in. . .	<i>Warspite, Valiant, Barham, Malaya.</i>
<i>Iron Duke</i> (First Squadron) .	1914 .	25,000 .	21 . .	10 13.5-in., 12 6-in. . . .	12-in. . .	<i>Marlborough, Emperor of India, Benbow.</i>
<i>Orion</i> (Second Squadron) .	1912 .	23,000 .	21 . .	10 13.5-in., 16 4-in. . . .	12-in. . .	<i>Conqueror, Monarch, Thunderer, King George V, Ajax, Audacious, Centurion.</i>
<i>Dreadnought</i> (Fourth Squadron) .	1906 .	17,900 .	21 . .	10 12-in., 22 4-in. or 12-pr. . .	11-in. . .	<i>Bellerophon, Temeraire, Superb, St. Vincent, Collingwood, Vanguard, Neptune, Colossus, Hercules.</i>

BATTLE-CRUISERS

<i>Lion</i> (First Squadron) .	1912 .	26,350 .	28 . .	8 13.5-in., 16 4-in. . . .	9-in. . .	<i>Princess Royal, Queen Mary, Tiger.</i>
<i>New Zealand</i> (Second Squadron) .	1912 .	18,800 .	25 . .	8 12-in., 16 4-in. . . .	7-in. . .	<i>Indefatigable, Australia.</i>
<i>Indomitable</i> (Third Squadron) .	1908 .	17,250 .	25 . .	8 12-in., 16 4-in. . . .	7-in. . .	<i>Inflexible, Invincible.</i>

## ARMORED CRUISERS

NAME.	DATE.	TONS.	SPEED.	ARMAMENT.	BELT ARMOR.	SISTER SHIPS.
<i>Defence</i>						
(First Squadron) . . .	1909 . . .	14,600 . . .	23 . . .	4 9.2-in., 10 7.5-in. . . .	6-in. . . .	<i>Minotaur, Shannon.</i>
<i>Achilles</i>						
(Second Squadron) . . .	1907 . . .	13,550 . . .	22½ . . .	6 9.2-in., 4 7.5-in. . . .	6-in. . . .	<i>Cochrane, Warrior.</i>
<i>Black Prince</i>						
(First Squadron) . . .	1906 . . .	13,550 . . .	22½ . . .	6 9.2-in., 10 6-in. . . .	6-in. . . .	<i>Duke of Edinburgh.</i>

## LIGHT CRUISERS

<i>Galatea</i>						
(First Squadron) . . .	1915 . . .	3,750 . . .	29 . . .	2 6-in., 8 4-in. . . . .	— . . .	<i>Aurora, Inconstant, Royalist, Penelope, Phaeton, Undaunted.</i>
<i>Southampton</i>						
(Second Squadron) . . .	1913 . . .	5,400 . . .	25½ . . .	8 or 9 6-in. . . . .	— . . .	<i>Chatham, Dublin, Birmingham, Lovestoft, Nottingham.</i>
<i>Falmouth</i>						
(Third Squadron) . . .	1911 . . .	5,250 . . .	25½ . . .	8 6-in. . . . .	— . . .	<i>Dartmouth, Weymouth, Yarmouth.</i>
<i>Calliope</i>						
(Fourth Squadron) . . .	1915 . . .	3,800 . . .	30 . . .	2 6-in., 8 4-in. . . . .	— . . .	<i>Caroline, Carysfort, Champion, Cleopatra, Comus, Conquest, Cordelia.</i>
<i>Fearless</i>						
(First Flotilla) . . .	1913 . . .	3,440 . . .	25½ . . .	10 4-in. . . . .	— . . .	<i>Active, Blanche, Blonde, Bellona, Boadicea.</i>

## DESTROYERS

<i>Tipperary</i> . . . . .	1914 . . .	1,850 . . .	31 . . .	6 4-in. . . . .	— . . .	<i>Botha, Turbulent, Termagant, and others.</i>
<i>Pelican</i> . . . . .	1915 . . .	Particulars unknown . . . . .				<i>Petard, etc.</i>
<i>Onslow</i> . . . . .	1916 . . .	Particulars unknown . . . . .				<i>Onslaught, Obdurate, etc.</i>
<i>Nestor</i> . . . . .	1915 . . .	Particulars unknown . . . . .				<i>Nomad, Nicator, Narborough, Nerissa, etc.</i>
<i>Moresby</i> . . . . .	1914 . . .	Particulars unknown . . . . .				<i>Manly, Mansfield, Mastiff, Matchless, Mentor, Meteor, Milne, Minor, Miranda, Moorson, Morris, Murray, Myngs, etc.</i>
<i>Landrail</i> . . . . .	1913 . . .	965 . . .	29 . . .	3 4-in. . . . .	— . . .	<i>Lydiard, Laforey, Lookout, Legion, etc.</i>
<i>Acasta</i> ("K" type) . . .	1912 . . .	935 . . .	29 . . .	3 4-in. . . . .	— . . .	<i>Ardent, Fortune, Garland, Ambuscade, Shark, Sparrowhawk, Spitfire, etc.</i>
<i>Badger</i> ("I" type) . . .	1911 . . .	780 . . .	29 . . .	2 4-in., 2 12-pdrs. . . . .	— . . .	<i>Defender, Attack, Hornet, Phoenix, etc.</i>

## MISCELLANEOUS

<i>Abdiel</i> . . . . .	Particulars unknown.
<i>Engadine</i> . . . . .	Seaplane carrier.

## GERMAN FLEET—THE HIGH SEAS FLEET

## Types of Ships

## BATTLESHIPS

NAME.	DATE.	TONS.	SPEED.	ARMAMENT.	BELT ARMOR.	SISTER SHIPS.
<i>Wilhelm II</i> (ex- <i>Wörth</i> ) . . . . .	1916 .	29,000 .	21 .	8 15-in., 16 5.9-in. . . .	— .	"T."
"N" (ex- <i>Salamis</i> ) . . . . .	1916 .	19,200 .	23 .	8 14-in., 12 6-in. . . . .	10-in. .	Unknown.
<i>König</i> . . . . .	1914 .	25,387 .	21 .	10 12-in., 14 5.9-in. . . .	14-in. .	<i>Markgraf, Grosser Kurfürst, Kronprinz.</i>
<i>Kaiser</i> . . . . .	1913 .	24,310 .	21 .	10 12-in., 14 5.9-in. . . .	14-in. .	<i>Kaiserin, Friedrich der Grosse, König Albert, Prinz Regent Luitpold.</i>
<i>Helgoland</i> . . . . .	1911 .	22,500 .	20½ .	12 12-in., 14 5.9-in. . . .	12-in. .	<i>Ostfriesland, Thüringen, Oldenburg.</i>
<i>Nassau</i> . . . . .	1909 .	18,600 .	20½ .	12 11-in., 12 5.9-in. . . .	12-in. .	<i>Westfalen, Rheinland Posen.</i>
<i>Deutschland</i> . . . . .	1906 .	13,040 .	18½ .	4 11-in., 14 6.7-in. . . .	9½-in. .	<i>Hannover, Pommern, Schlesien, Schleswig-Holstein.</i>
<i>Braunschweig</i> . . . . .	1904 .	12,907 .	18 .	4 11-in., 14 6.7-in. . . .	9-in. .	<i>Elsass, Preussen, Lothringen, Hessen.</i>

## BATTLE-CRUISERS

<i>Hindenburg</i> . . . . .	1916 .	28,000 .	27 .	8 15-in., 14 5.9-in. . . .	— .	Unknown.
<i>Lützow</i> . . . . .	1915 .	28,000 .	27 .	8 12-in., 12 5.9-in. . . .	11-in. .	<i>Derfflinger.</i>
<i>Seydlitz</i> . . . . .	1913 .	24,640 .	26 .	10 11-in., 12 5.9-in. . . .	11-in. .	<i>Moltke.</i>
<i>Von der Tann</i> . . . . .	1911 .	19,400 .	25 .	8 11-in., 10 5.9-in. . . .	6-in. .	None.

## ARMORED CRUISER

<i>Roon</i> . . . . .	1905 .	9,350 .	21 .	4 8.2-in., 10 5.9-in. . . .	4-in.	
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The British public had hardly reacted from the depression produced by the garbled accounts of the Battle of Jutland before it received another shock, this time of a nature most unforeseen and startling. On June 10, 1916, the British Admiralty announced that the cruiser *Hampshire* was mined on June 5th, just west of the Orkneys, and all on board save twelve perished, including Lord Kitchener and his staff, who were on a voyage to Russia to consult with Tsar Nicholas and the Russian government on military and financial affairs. The death of Great Britain's greatest military leader was a heavy blow and the whole country was plunged into mourning. There were none, even those who had criticised some of his policies during the early stages of the war, who did not acknowledge

the tremendous debt Great Britain owed to Kitchener. This sorrow was hardly lightened by the knowledge that the best of his work for the Allied cause had been done, and that others stood ready to assume the great burdens he had borne. It is one of the ironies of the war that Lloyd George was to have been a member of the delegation to Russia, but was detained by the critical state of affairs in Ireland. This, perhaps, saved for Great Britain the one man capable of successfully carrying out the work begun by Kitchener of Khartoum.

At the Battle of Jutland the British navy lost its supreme opportunity to establish absolute command of the sea. The situation accordingly resumed its previous status and Great Britain turned her attention to strengthening the blockade. The cordon of steel around the North Sea was steadily drawn tighter and tighter; immense mine-fields were laid from the British Isles to Norway; and the Channel was still more strongly defended by all known means, so that it became almost impossible for enemy surface craft to escape to the high seas.

In fact there were only two efforts on the part of the Germans to accomplish this most difficult task, that of the *Möwe* and that of the *Greif*. The former, a converted fruit trader, the *Ponga*, was so ingeniously disguised that she was in appearance still a harmless merchant vessel flying the flag of Sweden. In a moment, however, the sides of the false fore-castle would fall to the deck, revealing a powerful armament of 6-inch guns. The *Möwe*, it seems, slipped through the blockade during a dark night of December, 1915, and reached the Atlantic, where she inaugurated a career of commerce destroying that cost Great Britain twelve merchant ships valued at \$10,000,000, to which should be added three neutral and Allied vessels.

Among the ships captured was the *Appam*, which the commanding officer of the *Möwe* sent, in charge of a prize crew, to port at Norfolk, Virginia, where it was interned. The presence of the *Appam* in the waters of the United States added to the complexity of the already difficult situation under the status of neutrality. Only one vessel attacked by the *Möwe* was armed and able to resist capture. This was the *Clan MacTavish*, whose 3-inch guns, however, were of small avail against the heavier armament of the enemy. Throughout its career, however, the commander of the *Möwe* acted humanly and his exploits were marked for their skill and daring.

Before the *Möwe* had returned to port, another vessel, the *Greif*, essayed, on February 29, 1916, to repeat the exploits of the *Möwe*. Also disguised as a tramp steamer, she carried 7-inch guns and flew the colors of Norway. Her career of depredation on the high seas was soon brought to an end for she was overhauled by the British auxiliary cruiser, the *Alcantara*, formerly a Royal Mail ship. Upon being hailed, the *Greif* dropped her false bulwarks, firing at a range of 1,000 yards. She also discharged two torpedoes, one of which reached its mark rendering the *Alcantara* helpless. The *Andes*, another British auxiliary cruiser, and the light cruiser *Comus*, came to the assistance of the helpless ship and soon destroyed the *Greif* by gunfire, the *Alcantara* sinking in the meanwhile.

This was the last German endeavor to establish a reign of terror on the seas by commerce-raiders. The vigilance of the British fleet, and the fact that the German fleet could not support the cruisers, determined the German Admiralty to resort to the extra-legal mode of unlimited submarine warfare, with results that have already been indicated.

Another phase of this campaign developed during the latter half of 1916. This was an effort to impress public

opinion in America by showing the range and possibilities of the new underwater craft produced by Germany. The first of these psychological enterprises was that of the submarine merchantman, the *Deutschland*, which arrived at Baltimore, July 9, 1916, remaining there and discharging her cargo of dyestuffs in spite of the protests of the Entente Powers. The *Deutschland* was the forerunner, according to German reports, of a fleet of monster cargo-carrying submarines under process of construction, destined to defy the British blockade. The *Deutschland* made only one other voyage to American waters, arriving at New London, Connecticut, November 1, 1916, sailing again November 17, 1916. The great fleet of blockade runners never materialized. The *Bremen*, the sister ship of the *Deutschland*, and probably the only other one built, was either captured by the British or never attempted the voyage.

A still more flagrant attempt to intimidate public opinion in America was the visit of the *U-53*, commanded by Captain Hans Rose, to the waters of Narragansett Bay.

On Saturday afternoon, October 7, 1916, the report spread like wildfire throughout the city of Newport, Rhode Island, that a German submarine of the largest type was in the harbor and anchored almost within a stone's throw of the Torpedo Station, one of the most important munitions factories of the American navy. The German ensign flying over the long, low craft, with its castle-shaped conning-tower, soon assured the crowds gathered at the water-front that the report was only too true. After paying formal visits to Rear-admiral Knight, commanding the Second Naval District, and Rear-admiral Gleaves, in command of the Destroyer Flotilla, Captain Rose departed with his vessel at sunset.

The mission of the *U-53*, however, was but partly fulfilled, for on Monday morning the American public was amazed to read that she had sunk five ships almost within

sight of the coast. These vessels, two of which belonged to neutral powers, Holland and Norway, were encountered on the ocean highway passing Nantucket Light.

On receiving news of these events, Rear-admiral Knight, who was in close touch with Washington, dispatched the whole destroyer flotilla to the scene of operations, thereby saving the lives of 216 victims of Germany's inhumane methods of warfare. A peculiarly flagrant example of this was the sinking of the Red Star liner, *Stephano*. The British asserted that the act of Germany of setting 164 people adrift, forty miles from land, was in direct contravention of her pledge to take precautions for the safety of non-combatants. The following account of the affair is taken from the statement of Captain Clifton Smith of the *Stephano*:

"We were about three miles east of the Nantucket Lightship and about 42 miles from the mainland when I first saw the submarine. This was at 5.55 P. M. I was on the bridge. The weather was somewhat hazy and it was a little dark, but I could make her out plainly. She was about half a mile away, and was lying next a fairly large ship, which was apparently a supply ship.

"She fired a shot across our bows and I slowed down. There were four such shots fired by her altogether, about two minutes apart. None of them hit us. There were two American destroyers near by about this time. I ordered the boats lowered, and prepared to abandon the ship. There were 97 passengers and 67 crew, and we used six out of eight boats. While we were doing this the submarine went under the lee of the *Stephano*. I could not see much of her, but could tell by her lights that she was going along by the side of the ship.

"When we were in the boats it was dark, but we saw the submarine leave the *Stephano* and go off about a mile and a half and sink a freighter. We could not make out what vessel it was or whether her crew left, but we saw her sink.

"Then the submarine returned to the *Stephano*. She fired thirty shots into the hull of the vessel, but they apparently did little harm. They did not even put the dynamo out of commission, and the vessel remained fully lighted. Then the submarine drew off and fired one torpedo. The *Stephano* went down in seven minutes after being hit. We were later picked up by the destroyer."

This was the last effort of Germany to invade American waters, and, in spite of a temporary panic in shipping, the usual sailings were soon resumed. It is characteristic of Germany's nearsighted policy and bad psychological direction that her raid in the neutral waters of the United States instead of producing the desired effect of keeping America out of the war, had precisely the contrary effect and was a contributory influence towards the participation of America therein. There is no question but that Captain Hans Rose's visit to Newport was the immediate cause of transforming a great number of hitherto "neutral" Americans into ardent advocates of the assertion of international rights backed by all the powers of the American Republic. All efforts to modify an intolerable condition by peaceful means had failed and the people of the United States at last realized that but one solution remained—that of military force.

## CHAPTER XIX

### THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN WAR

American national traits and traditional foreign policy. The repercussion of the European war. American beneficence. The conflict of opinions and the predominance of pro-Ally sentiment. The exportation of munitions and Teutonic intrigues and propaganda; the New York *World* revelation, August 15, 1915; the Archibald affair and the recall of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Dr. Dumba. Questions of naval warfare; the underlying principles of international law and the Declaration of London. The conduct of the Allies in regard to neutral commerce; American protests. The governmental control of the distribution and consumption of cereals established in Germany, February 1, 1915. The Allies henceforth treat cereals as contraband. Germany creates a war zone in the waters around the British Isles, February 18th. Retaliatory measures of the Allies for the purpose of establishing a virtual blockade of Germany, March 15th. The United States contests the legality of these measures. Dangerous questions created by the nature of the submarine as a commerce-destroyer. Sinking of the *Lusitania*, May 7, 1915, and the subsequent discussion. Conflicting tendencies in Germany and resignation of von Tirpitz. The Channel steamer *Sussex* torpedoed, March 24, 1916. American note to Germany, April 18th, and Germany's promise to restrict submarine activity, May 4th. Transatlantic voyages of submarines. Ominous indications in Germany. President Wilson's request for statement of war aims of the belligerents, December 18th; his speech in the Senate, January 22, 1917. Germany announces unrestricted submarine warfare, January 31st; severance of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany, February 3d. President Wilson's address to joint session of Congress and declaration of war by the United States on April 2d. American military preparations. The expansion of the regular army. The National Guard taken into the Federal service. The Selective Draft Law. Registration and the Local Draft Boards. The thirty-two cantonments. Officers' training camps. Army Ordnance Department. Military aeronautics. Arrival of General Pershing and staff in France, June 13, 1917.

The emotional storm created by the outbreak of the war in Europe burst in the United States upon a population presenting the sharp contrast between the older native stock and the conglomerate product of more recent immigration. The former element, comparatively homogeneous in sentiment and mental habits, cherishing for the most part middle-class ideals, was still singularly responsive

to its puritanical traditions, and instinctively regarded society from the individualistic and capitalistic point of view, while the newcomers, notwithstanding their great variety of origin and nationality, exhibited to a great extent a similarity of collectivistic tendencies in thought and feeling.

The native temperament and attitude are our first consideration.

The revered founders of the Republic had adopted the principle of non-interference in the affairs of the Old World as the basis of foreign policy and their successors adhered unswervingly to this doctrine, even after the development of the nation's strength and prestige had made the observance of it less imperative. The typical American of the older stock had been accustomed to associate the foreigner and immigrant with the rudest tasks of unskilled labor. The traditional policy of isolation and the feeling of evident superiority to the foreigners usually encountered, together with the sense of assurance inherited from the pioneer period, pride in splendid material achievements, and concern for the survival of the type combined to create a smug, exclusive spirit which regarded the outside world with condescension often mingled with suspicion.

As a result, the United States was the most eccentric of the greater powers. Many practices of life common to the other civilized lands were strange to American society. Until recently the teaching of geography and history in American schools and colleges had been superficial or even misleading and inaccurate and the vast current of American travel in Europe had only partly dispelled the widespread ignorance and indifference in respect to the contemporary life and conditions of the other most important peoples of the globe. It was the natural ideal of patriotism to assimilate and unify the heterogeneous elements of the population. But it was necessary, if the mission of the Great War




Diagram showing area in which the Germans stated, in their note of January 31, 1917, that they would carry on unrestricted submarine operations.



in breaking down barriers and creating an association of all nations was to be accomplished, that the United States as a people should be drawn from their solitary course, should join in humanity's great struggle by the side of other enlightened peoples, and should make their spiritual qualities felt in the great forum of the world.

The American public more and more absorbed by the increasing tension of the last days of July, 1914, was thrown into a spasm of excitement by the tidings that the great catastrophe had taken place. Their bewildered imagination sought relief in the thought of the broad expanse of ocean separating the United States from the vast conflagration. Yet, with the ties of blood, the facilities of communication, and the intimate relations of commerce and civilization, it was idle to dream of immunity from the effects of the great convulsion. Many of the phenomena produced by the repercussion of the European crisis on the United States were only of passing importance and need not detain us. But a striking indication of the solidarity of human interests was the almost unprecedented financial situation resulting from the frenzied unloading by European holders of American securities on the American market, after the European exchanges had been closed, which made it necessary to close the New York Stock Exchange on July 31st for the first time in forty years.

The President officially proclaimed the neutrality of the United States on August 4th, but the armed clash in Europe immediately provoked an acute conflict of sentiment and opinion in a people which had sprung from the life of the older continent and contained within its borders numerous representatives of all the warring nations.

American sympathy was quickly aroused by the pathetic situation of the innocent victims of the conflict and soon found practical expression in the work of relief committees.

The Commission for Relief in Belgium was created by the American and Spanish Ambassadors at London and Ministers at Brussels, the American Ambassador at Berlin, and the American Minister at The Hague, and an American, Mr. Herbert C. Hoover, won a world-wide reputation as its chairman. That this Commission might act as the intermediary for the transmission and distribution of food consigned to the Belgian population, Great Britain agreed to permit the passage of the shipments through the North Sea, and Holland, the exportation of the food commodities to Belgium, while Germany pledged itself not to requisition the supplies. The headquarters of this Commission was in London and its activity extended to all the neutral countries. Its chief function was the organization of transportation, and it acted as the trustee of two funds, one supplied by donors in various countries for the transportation of donated food supplies, the other provided by the Belgians themselves for the purchase of food supplies. The Commission included the Comité National de Secours et d'Alimentation, created by Belgian business men for the distribution of the food supplies throughout their country, and subsequently the Comité d'Alimentation du Nord de la France, organized for the same function in the occupied region of France, as well as the affiliated commissions in Spain, Italy, and the United States. The latter, whose office was at 71 Broadway, New York, organized or associated with itself local relief committees to the number of more than 1,000, and by the close of 1914 it had established a service of thirty-one steamers between American ports and Rotterdam.

The Belgian Relief Fund was inaugurated on September 10, 1914, for collecting cash, as well as food and other supplies, and forwarding them to the needy Belgians. Particular forms of need in Western Europe and the

suffering created by the devastation of Poland, Galicia, Serbia, Armenia, and Syria called into existence a great number of similar organizations.

The devoted efforts of individual Americans, whose initiative and administrative talent have been an indispensable factor in the success of the Commission for the Relief of Belgium, deserve the highest praise. But the erroneous conception, sometimes encouraged by thoughtless utterances of the press or public speakers, that Belgium was mainly fed by the liberality of the United States should receive emphatic contradiction.

The food distributed in Belgium was largely bought and paid for by the Belgians themselves. The total funds entrusted to the Commission down to October 31, 1916, amounted to \$201,782,079. It had imported into Belgium and the occupied districts of France food valued at \$179,658,916. The British and French governments had advanced to the Belgian government \$108,121,358 for relief in Belgium, and French institutions had loaned the communes in northern France \$66,155,501 for the assistance of the destitute. Down to the close of 1916 about 60% of the disbursements of the Commission had been for purchasing supplies in the United States, on which the profit to Americans was estimated at \$30,000,000. The total of American subscriptions in cash, food, and clothing for the relief of Belgium to October 31, 1916, were \$8,747,138 as compared with \$13,689,670 in Great Britain. Tasmania had given \$6.53, the United States, \$.09, per head of their respective populations down to the close of the same year.

During the present critical period in the life of the great American Commonwealth, the nation has been fortunate in the leadership of a chief magistrate whose policy, inspired by lofty ideals and unusual intellectual vision, was sustained with courage and consistency. The reader may

be spared a formal digression on the previous career of a statesman whose name has become a household word to millions everywhere who yearn and pray for the coming of a new age of international peace and justice. It will be sufficient to recall that Woodrow Wilson was born of Scotch-Irish stock at Staunton, Virginia, December 28, 1856, graduated from Princeton University in 1879, and received his doctor's degree at Johns Hopkins University in 1885; that the merits of his thesis on *Congressional Government* earned him an appointment as associate professor of history and political economy at Bryn Mawr College the same year and later one as professor of these branches at the Wesleyan University; that in recognition of his treatise on *The State* he was called in 1890 to the chair of jurisprudence and political economy at Princeton University and was elected president of the same institution in 1902, the year of the publication of his most comprehensive work, the *History of the American People*; that he was elected Governor of New Jersey in 1910 and President of the United States on November 6, 1912; and that his conduct has ever been characterized by independence and determination.

From the first, President Wilson was guided by the conviction that the United States would best serve the interests of humanity by maintaining strict neutrality in the European conflict with an attitude of friendly sympathy for all the belligerents. As official head of one of the powers signatory to The Hague Conference, in accordance with Article III of The Hague Convention, he offered his services as mediator in the cause of European peace by a message cabled to the rulers of Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia on August 5, 1914, but without effect. The American diplomatic representatives undertook the protection of German and Austro-Hungarian

interests in London, Petrograd, and Tokio; British, Japanese, and Serbian interests in Berlin; British, French, and Japanese interests in Vienna; and German, Austro-Hungarian, British, Serbian, and Japanese interests in Brussels.

President Wilson's attitude was clearly expressed in an address on April 20, 1915, in which he declared:

"We are the mediating nation of the world. We are compounded of the nations of the world; we mediate their blood, we mediate their traditions, we mediate their sentiments, their tastes, their passions; we are ourselves compounded of those things. We are therefore able to understand them in the compound, not separately, as partisans, but unitedly as knowing and comprehending and embodying them all. It is in that sense that I mean that America is a mediating nation."

It was a tremendous conversion from this attitude of sympathetic detachment to one of determined intervention in the struggle, a revolution of epochal importance for the whole world.

The cause of each of the warring groups in Europe found passionate support among the millions of European birth living in the United States. German agencies were soon conducting a vigorous and well-organized propaganda for mobilizing German-American sentiment and spreading the Teutonic doctrine of the causes and moral issues of the Great War. Some prominent scientists and men of letters, inspired by German scholarship, thoroughness, and efficiency, or by academic associations, appealed to the American public with great earnestness in favor of the Central Powers. Other authorities, espousing the Allied cause, challenged with equal fervor the arguments of the first group, and the controversial literature, which was widely circulated, together with the diplomatic correspondence as published by the different belligerents, was read

with close attention and contributed largely to the formation of public opinion.

Affinity of blood, traditions, and civilization, and the similarity of democratic ideals predisposed a large part of the American people to favor the Entente. The public was deeply stirred by the ruthless invasion of Belgium in flagrant disregard of every principle of right and justice and by the subsequent reports of the inhuman conduct of the invaders of that unhappy country.

The conviction was gradually formed in the intelligence of the most representative part of the American democracy that autocracy in the Central Empires, its views distorted by extravagant medieval conceits, supported by a privileged military caste and an insatiable class of large capitalists, regarding war as the supreme source of profit and glory, had deliberately prepared for a struggle of aggrandizement; that Austria-Hungary had sent the ultimatum to Serbia with the full knowledge and consent, if not at the suggestion, of the German government; and that the German people had been beguiled into believing that they were victims of an unprovoked attack and that their consequent struggle in self-defense would be short and victorious. The conviction was even more firmly held by a majority of Americans that Germany's alleged grievances against Belgium were unfounded and that the invasion of that country without just cause was one of the greatest crimes in history. But the American public generally was far from assuming that its own peace and prosperity were threatened by German brutality and contempt for all moral obligation, or that the necessity would ever arise for American intervention in a conflict between European Powers.

With the failure in the early stages of the war to convince the American people generally of the righteousness of the Teutonic cause, the German agencies for propaganda

in the United States turned their attention to the exportation of war supplies to the Allies and appealed on this question with some success, on moral and humanitarian grounds, to the pacifistic sentiment throughout the country.

The command of the sea by the Allied navies secured for the nations of the Entente exclusive access to the potentially abundant sources of war material and munitions in the United States. Before the war had been in progress many months the German public was stirred to resentment by the reports of vast quantities of such supplies shipped from American ports to their opponents, and the view was even expressed in Germany that without this traffic the conflict might have been brought to a victorious termination by the Central Empires within a comparatively short time. In reality, the volume of the exportation of war materials from the United States was practically negligible during the first few months of the war, but it reached the value of \$350,000,000 for the entire fiscal year ending June 30, 1915, and subsequently rose vastly higher.

The Central Empires could not consistently demand the abolishment of international traffic in arms and munitions on principle, in view of their own exportation of the same class of articles during the South African, Russo-Japanese, and recent Balkan Wars, but their general attitude in the existing situation was that the United States should adopt what they regarded as a higher conception of neutrality and place both groups of contestants on an equal footing by suppressing a source of advantage from which only one group could benefit. It was argued that the existing policy of the United States was juristically right but morally wrong.

In general, however, the suppression of international traffic in arms and munitions would be contrary to the interests of a non-militaristic country like the United States, since in case of war it would assure a fatal preponderance

to the militarist state which devoted a large part of its energies in time of peace to the organization of its war industries and the accumulation of war supplies.

In his memorial of April 11, 1915, the German Ambassador at Washington, referred to the "enormous new industry of war materials of every kind," which, "in contradiction with the real spirit of neutrality" was being built up in the United States, and added:

"If the American people desire to observe strict neutrality, they will find the means to stop the exclusive exportation of arms to one side."

With the failure of the agitation for securing the passage by Congress of embargo legislation on the trade in arms and munitions, German zealots adopted more drastic measures, forming intrigues and plots on American soil for provoking unrest and disorder, with the official cognizance and encouragement of the German and Austro-Hungarian authorities.

The country was astounded by the revelation made by the New York *World*, August 15, 1915, of the contents of a series of letters contained in a portfolio taken from Dr. Heinrich F. Albert, financial adviser to the German Embassy, in the New York *Elevator*, on July 31st. These letters, which had been addressed to Dr. Albert, furnished the details of an elaborate scheme for influencing the press, financing professional lecturers, publishing books, provoking strikes in munitions factories, and crippling shipping along the Atlantic seaboard by promoting a general strike of the longshoremen.

Even more sensational was the discovery resulting from the detention of Mr. James F. J. Archibald, an American journalist, when the steamship *Rotterdam* coming from New York touched at Falmouth, England, on August 30, 1915. Among his belongings there were documents



GENERAL JOHN JOSEPH PERSHING  
Commander-in-chief of the United States forces in France.

GENERAL JOHN JOSEPH PERSHING  
Commander-in-chief of the United States forces in France.





bearing the signatures of Count Bernstorff, Dr. Konstantin Theodor Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the United States, and Captain von Papen, German Military Attaché in Washington, showing that Mr. Archibald had undertaken to misuse the privilege accorded an American passport by serving as secret courier between the German and Austro-Hungarian Embassies and the Foreign Offices of the Central Powers.

In one of the letters Dr. Dumba warmly recommended a proposal for fomenting strikes in the plants of the Bethlehem Steel Company and others in the Middle West.

"It is my impression," said Dr. Dumba, "that we can disorganize and hold up for months, if not entirely prevent, the manufacture of munitions in Bethlehem and the Middle West, which, in the opinion of the German Military Attaché, is of great importance and amply outweighs the comparatively small expenditure of money involved."

Trustworthy German and Austro-Hungarian workmen were to be sent to Bethlehem to work in the munition plants and operate secretly among their fellow-workmen, spreading agitation and arranging for popular meetings.

The Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Washington was evidently a center for intrigues and the United States demanded that Dr. Dumba should be recalled on the ground that he had been guilty of a breach of diplomatic propriety.

In spite of indignation at the inhuman acts committed by the Central Powers, irritation at the impudence of the German and Austro-Hungarian official agents in America, and widespread sympathy for the Allies, it was evident that the United States would only be drawn into the struggle by the violation of her rights as a neutral on the sea.

As issues of the greatest importance for the whole world depended on the maritime complications in which the interests of the United States became inevitably involved,

it is essential to have a clear grasp of the fundamental principles upon which discussion turned. A brief review of some of the main elements of the international law of war at sea may, therefore, not be out of place, even though it involves an element of repetition.

The international law of war at the beginning of the Great War recognized a fundamental distinction between the rights of private property on land and those at sea. Private property on land, whether of neutral or enemy ownership, was held to be inviolable, except so far as the necessities of the actual military operations required. But privately owned vessels of the enemy were generally subject to capture, or, if it were impossible to retain them as prizes, they could be sunk or otherwise destroyed, although in this case obvious principles of humanity required that the lives of the passengers and crews should be safeguarded.

As peaceful intercourse is the normal relationship of human society, the neutral might reasonably claim the utmost consideration from the belligerents in his pursuits upon the high seas, which belong to the human race in common, and international law had aimed at guaranteeing the general right of non-belligerents to trade with the contestants, insofar as their commercial operations did not afford direct help in war. The Declaration of Paris in 1856 provided that a neutral flag covered enemy goods and that neutral goods were even immune from seizure when conveyed under the enemy flag.

But neutral commerce was not free to contribute directly to the military operations of a belligerent, either by supplying him with munitions or material of war or by neutralizing the effect of a blockade by replenishing the supplies of the blockaded forces.

Articles which were intended primarily for warlike purposes were known as contraband and were liable to capture

on the high seas when destined for enemy territory. In addition to absolute contraband there were many articles which could be equally used for warlike or peaceful purposes and were therefore called conditional contraband. These were liable to capture only when destined for the armed forces of the enemy. The list of articles classed as contraband has varied considerably from time to time. A tentative list of absolute contraband was formulated at The Hague in 1907 and adopted by the International Naval Conference in the Declaration of London, February 26, 1909. The same document contained a list of conditional contraband which included fuel, foodstuffs, and clothing.

At the beginning of the Great War the different belligerents published lists of the articles which they would regard as absolute and conditional contraband respectively, but the subsequent repeated extensions in the range of contraband in consequence of the advance of military science restricted more and more the scope of neutral commerce and created a feeling of bitterness and injustice among the neutral trading nations.

While the law of contraband authorized the seizure of certain articles wherever encountered on the high seas, when destined for the enemy, the right of blockade implied the obstruction of all communication with the enemy coast. The Declaration of Paris prescribed that blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, or in other words, they must be maintained by forces sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy coast. In case an effective blockade existed, the blockading power was authorized to seize any vessel attempting, or, as some held, intending, to run the blockade.

According to the doctrine of "continuous voyage," the transportation of goods from the original port of shipment to the point of delivery in the enemy territory is regarded

as a single journey. This doctrine was advanced by the Federal authorities in the American Civil War to justify the seizure on the high seas of goods which were ultimately intended for enemy territory, even though they were first to be discharged in a neutral port. This doctrine has been variously held to apply only to contraband or to non-contraband as well in an attempt to elude a blockade.

The London Conference agreed that the doctrine of "continuous voyage" should apply to absolute contraband, as stated in article 30 of the Declaration of London, as follows:

"Absolute contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or to the armed forces of the enemy. It is immaterial whether the carriage of the goods is direct or entails either transshipment or transport over land."

The same document exempted conditional contraband from application of the doctrine of the "continuous voyage," but the British proclamation of August 21, 1914, rejected this reservation.

The rights of contraband and blockade implied the practice of visiting and searching merchant vessels on the high seas for the purpose of ascertaining their nationality, whether they carried contraband, whether they intended to commit or had committed a breach of blockade, or whether they were engaged in the service of the enemy.

On August 6, 1914, the United States proposed to the belligerents that the Declaration of London be accepted by all for the duration of the war, but the Allies agreed only "to adopt generally the rules of the declaration subject to certain modifications and additions." The British and French governments rejected the lists of contraband and free goods contained in the Declaration and applied the doctrine of the "continuous voyage" to conditional as well

as absolute contraband, in case the goods were consigned "to order," or if the papers did not show a consignee of the goods, or if they showed a consignee in enemy territory.

The great problem for the Allies in their operations against German trade was to discover and deal with the cargoes shipped to neutral ports in Scandinavia, Holland, and (at first) Italy, but with ultimate destination in Germany.

According to the principles accepted by themselves, as mentioned above, the Allies could seize all articles of absolute contraband, if it could be proved that they were destined for enemy territory, and articles of conditional contraband, if it could be proved that they were destined for the enemy government or armed forces, while articles of conditional contraband, unless proved to be destined for the enemy government or armed forces, non-contraband goods, and German exports (unless carried in enemy ships) were not subject to seizure.

As every means was used to conceal the enemy destination of goods conveyed in neutral ships to neutral ports, the British government established a Contraband Committee, whose duty it was to collect all available evidence for the real destination of sea-borne goods. The former practice of relying solely on the evidence obtained from an inspection of a ship's papers and cargo by boarding officers in their visits to vessels on the high seas was found to be generally unsatisfactory, and instead, nearly every vessel bound from overseas to Scandinavian or Dutch ports was examined on its way in a British port and every item in its cargo was considered in the light of all the information which had been collected.

For greater convenience in exercising supervision over the overseas commerce of neutrals, the British government eventually entered into agreements with representative associations of merchants in some of the neutral countries,

the latter guaranteeing that articles consigned to them would not reach the enemy in any form, while the British government undertook in return not to interfere with shipments to these societies. Such agreements, either general in scope or limited to certain specified articles, were made with bodies of merchants in the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Switzerland.

But the conduct of the Allied naval authorities soon gave rise to bitter complaints on the part of the shipping interests of the United States and other neutral powers. On December 26th the American Secretary of State, Mr. Bryan, sent a strong note of protest through the hands of Ambassador Page to the British Foreign Office, calling attention to the fact that many American vessels destined for neutral ports had been stopped on the high seas, taken to British ports, and sometimes detained for weeks.

Sir Edward Grey replied in a conciliatory tone on January 7, 1915, declaring that Great Britain had not wished to interfere with the *bona fide* trade of the United States with neutral countries, but quoting statistics to show that the phenomenal increase of American exportation in certain lines, as rubber and cotton, to the countries in question, left no doubt as to the ultimate destination of a large part of the commodities imported. He promised that foodstuffs would not be seized without the presumption that they were intended for the enemy forces.

But the establishment of official control in Germany of the distribution and consumption of all cereals on February 1, 1915 (announced January 26th), was the professed motive for Great Britain's declaration of February 2d that all shipments of foodstuffs to Germany would thereafter be subject to seizure as contraband, since it would be impossible to distinguish between the supplies of the civilian population and those of the army.

This was followed by Germany's epochal decree on the 4th, as a retaliatory measure for alleged violations of international law by Great Britain and her allies, establishing a war zone around the British Isles, effective from the 18th, within which Germany would destroy all enemy merchant vessels encountered, inevitably jeopardizing the persons and the cargoes which they carried. Neutral vessels were warned that they exposed themselves to danger by entering the war zone, in consequence, as it was alleged, of the deceptive use of neutral flags by British vessels.

About the middle of March, Great Britain and France put into effect a system of reprisals which amounted practically to a blockade of Germany, although to avoid needless complications this term was intentionally avoided. It was now the purpose of the Allies to intercept all the overseas trade of Germany, although the measures adopted did not enjoin the confiscation of ships or of cargoes, excepting contraband.

In a note to the British government on March 30th, the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Bryan, called attention to the irregular character of the Allied blockade. While the United States might admit that the form of close blockade with its cordon of ships in the immediate offing of the blockaded ports was no longer practicable with the present conditions of naval warfare, the use of mines, submarines, and aircraft, it insisted that the form of effective blockade adopted must accord "with the spirit and principles of the essence of the rules of war." The extension of the blockade to neutral ports by virtue of the theory of "continuous voyage" was particularly objectionable.

Sir Edward Grey replying for Great Britain contended that there was precedent for British conduct in the position taken by the United States in the Civil War, when the Federal government, fearing that the vigilance of its

fleet before the Confederate ports would be rendered ineffective by overseas traffic with the South through neutral ports of access, took immediate steps to suppress such traffic.


In the present situation the United States maintained that of goods shipped to neutral ports only contraband should be liable to seizure. The Declaration of London had not recognized the theory of "continuous voyage" as a legitimate means of enforcing a blockade, and the United States courts in the Civil War seem to have applied the theory of "continuous voyage" to contraband only, and not to blockade. For example, the United States Supreme Court rendered the following decision in the case of the cargo (partly contraband) of the British vessel *Peterhoff* bound for Matamoros, Mexico:

"The trade of neutrals with belligerents in articles not contraband is absolutely free unless interrupted by blockade; the conveyance by neutrals to belligerents of contraband articles is always unlawful and such articles may always be seized during transit by sea. Hence, while articles not contraband might be sent to Matamoros and beyond to the rebel regions, where the communications were not interrupted by blockade, articles of a contraband character, destined in fact to a state in rebellion or for the use of the rebel military forces, were liable to capture though primarily destined for Matamoros."

The discussion was prolonged for many months in an ineffectual correspondence between the two governments, until the American claims were emphatically summed up in a note delivered to the British Foreign Office through the American Embassy in London on November 5, 1915.

This communication pointed out that the delays imposed upon the cargoes of American ships destined for neutral ports had become increasingly vexatious. Instead of acting on the basis of such evidence as could be obtained by





President Wilson delivering his War Message in the Senate Chamber to the joint session of Congress on Monday night, April 2, 1917

examination at sea, the British authorities often detained vessels in port on mere suspicion, awaiting evidence from extraneous sources to justify the institution of prize court proceedings, and thereby causing loss, delay, and expenses to the owners, which were practically destroying much of the export trade of the United States to the neutral countries in Europe. British suspicions created by the comparative values of American exportation to certain neutral countries, then and before the war, were unjustifiable, because the increased prices of the commodities were not taken into consideration and British exports to the same countries had likewise increased. The United States claimed the right to sell goods into the common stock of neutral countries without respect to the ultimate disposition of the goods thus sold. It maintained, moreover, that the blockade was illegal, that it was not applied impartially to ships of all nations, and that its extension to the commerce of neutral ports was unjustifiable. It protested against the application of the doctrine of "continuous voyage" in support of a blockade; and to the British contention that redress for grievances should be sought in the British Prize Courts, it objected that these tribunals were bound in their procedure, not by international law, but by the same municipal regulations which were in dispute. It declared, in short, that the United States could not "submit to the curtailment of its neutral rights by these measures, which are admittedly retaliatory, and therefore illegal in conception and nature, and intended to punish the enemies of Great Britain for alleged illegalities on their part."

The British Foreign Office made no formal reply until April 24, 1916, when it declared that "new devices for despatching goods to the enemy must be met by new methods for applying the fundamental and acknowledged principle of the right to intercept such trade." The

conditions of modern navigation had made it impossible to exercise satisfactorily the right of search on the high seas. The size of modern ships made it much more difficult to discover contraband in the cargoes. The conditions had made the old rules of Prize Court procedure obsolete.

“International law,” according to the British memorandum, “only requires that the practice in the Prize Courts of the belligerent nation should afford a fair hearing to all claims put forward by neutrals, and should enable the courts to arrive at a just conclusion upon the evidence. Subject to that condition, each nation may regulate the practice to be followed in its Prize Courts.” The British note explained that facilities for the rapid transmission of supplementary information as to the final disposition of cargoes by fast mails and cables made it unnecessary for shippers to give final directions in the ship’s papers, so that the latter had ceased to be a safe and satisfactory guide in the matter. As evidence against the claim that the burdens and annoyances of British Prize Court procedure were destroying much of the export trade of the United States to neutral countries, American statistics were cited, showing that the exports of the United States to the Scandinavian countries and Holland had risen from \$97,480,000 in the first seven months of 1913 to \$234,960,000 for the corresponding months of 1915. Some of the ports in these neutral countries were the main avenues by which supplies had reached the enemy from all parts of the world and in the case of goods consigned to these ports the ship’s papers offered no suggestions as to the ultimate destination.

The British Foreign Office denied that the retaliatory character of the British measures made them illegal, since they did not conflict with any general principle of international law, humanity, or civilization. To the complaint

that British Prize Courts were not qualified to grant redress to Americans for the alleged grievances, it replied that these courts were entitled, if satisfied that an order or instruction issued by the British government to its naval forces was inconsistent with international law, to decline to enforce it. The Allied governments would gladly consider any suggestions that would alleviate the situation of neutrals without impairing the substantial effectiveness of the measures in force.

The questions at issue with Great Britain involved only rights of property, which could eventually be adjusted by arbitration, in accordance with the arbitration treaty recently signed. But the questions at issue with Germany involved the lives of innocent men, women, and children, which could not be compensated for like material losses. Besides, there was no treaty of arbitration between the United States and Germany.

The German threat in the announcement of February 4, 1915, depended for its execution on the submarine, which by its very nature was unsuited to act as a commerce-destroyer, if bound by the requirements of international law and of humanity. While equipped with a terribly effective weapon for offense in the torpedo, the submarine was so frail and so weak defensively, that a merchant vessel might destroy it by the fire of a light gun or by ramming. These conditions impelled the submarine commander to attack suddenly and unexpectedly, without waiting to verify the character and destination of a suspected vessel or to warn the passengers or crew. The capacity of a submarine, moreover, was so limited that it could neither detach a prize crew to man a captured vessel nor take the passengers and crew on board itself. It had to destroy its victim, leaving the persons on board to seek safety as best they could in small boats.

The United States government, alive at once to the imminence of complications, notified Germany on February 10th that it would regard the destruction of an American vessel on the "high seas as an indefensible violation of neutral rights, which it would be very hard to reconcile with the friendly relations" then existing between the two governments. The supposition that ships of a belligerent power were using neutral flags was held by the American government to create no just presumption that all ships traversing the proscribed area were subject to the same suspicion. In the case of the destruction of an American vessel, the note declared that the Imperial German government could "readily appreciate that the government of the United States would be constrained to hold the Imperial German government to a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities, and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard American lives and property, and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their acknowledged rights on the high seas."

The whole submarine controversy grew out of a fundamental conflict of ideas, the German assumption that the inherent disabilities of the submarine should turn to the disadvantage of non-combatants as opposed to the American contention that these disabilities should react to the disadvantage of the craft itself.

In a note of February 16th the German government repudiated all responsibility for the safety of neutral ships entering the war zone around the British Isles, announced that mines would be laid in these waters, and suggested that if the United States would persuade Great Britain to withdraw her decree regarding foodstuffs and abide by the Declaration of London, Germany would spare British shipping. Mr. Bryan, whose supreme concern throughout was to safeguard the neutrality of the United States, proposed

in effect to the British and German governments on the 20th that foodstuffs for the sole use of non-combatants be allowed to enter Germany, while German submarine commanders should in turn observe the customary rules of visit and search. But the proposed compromise led to no practical results.

The American government's apprehensions at Germany's lawless policy were soon realized. A series of offenses, involving American lives and property, the torpedoing by a German submarine of the British steamer *Falaba*, March 28th, with the loss of one American life, the attack on the American vessel *Cushing* by a German aëroplane, April 28th, and the attack on the American steamer *Gulflight* by a German submarine, May 1st, when two American members of the crew were drowned, foreshadowed the great climax of ruthlessness, the tragedy at which the imagination of mankind will be stirred as long as the memory of the Great War endures. The American nation was staggered at the report that the *Lusitania* had been sunk by a German submarine off the Old Head of Kinsale, the southeastern point of Ireland, on May 7th, with the loss of 1,152 lives, including 114 Americans. Bewilderment was followed by a sharp reaction of feeling, though public opinion was variously affected. The prevailing impression was one of intense indignation and the government was showered with demands for prompt and vigorous action. A notice from the German Embassy in Washington appearing in the press on the morning of the departure of the *Lusitania* from New York, May 1st, warning Americans of the danger of travelling on British vessels through the war zone, was naturally regarded as an indication that the outrage had been expressly planned and anticipated.

The *New York Times* declared: "From our Department of State there must go to the Imperial German government at Berlin a demand that the Germans shall no

longer make war like savages drunk with blood, that they shall cease to seek the attainment of their ends by the assassination of non-combatants and neutrals. In the history of wars there is no single deed comparable in its inhumanity and its horror to the destruction without warning by German torpedoes of the great steamship *Lusitania* with more than 1,800 souls on board, and among them more than one hundred Americans. Our demand must be made and it will be heeded unless Germany in her madness would have it understood that she is at war with the whole civilized world."

But there was an important element among the American people in whom anxiety for the danger to American neutrality outweighed indignation at Germany's ruthless conduct, while still others condoned the destruction of the *Lusitania* or openly upheld the German point of view.

While sorrow was expressed in Germany at the death of so many non-combatants, the public applauded the sinking of the *Lusitania* by the sole means available, on the ground that the vessel carried a large cargo of munitions and other material of war and that she was armed with guns. The sinking of the *Lusitania* was regarded as legitimate warfare and the attendant destruction of non-combatants, while unfortunate, was held to be no more inhuman than the losses unintentionally inflicted on the civilian population of fortified towns under bombardment. The Germans argued that to admit special immunity for enemy vessels carrying passengers would sanction the practice, already imputed to the British, of deliberately using passengers as a protection for shipments of war material.

In a communication of May 10th the German government expressed its sympathy for the loss of American lives on board the *Lusitania*, but at the same time asserted that the responsibility rested upon the British government.

With the grave situation and his own immense responsibility before him, the President of the United States studied in private the problem confronting the government. Earnestness and self-possession characterized his attitude and the conduct of the administration under his direction. He wished to deal moderately but firmly with Germany, appeasing popular resentment at home and forestalling any passionate outburst that might impel the government to inconsiderate action.

As a whole the country was adverse to a hostile policy, but the president's warning of holding Germany to a "strict accountability" seemed to leave no alternative to drastic action, in case Germany were recalcitrant. Feeling was very tense when the cabinet met to consider the situation.

After a protracted deliberation the American note of protest, to which reference has already been made in a previous chapter, received its definite form and was dispatched to Ambassador Gerard in Berlin for transmission to the German government on May 13th. It pointed out that a grave situation had been created, calling for a clear understanding. The American government had followed the acts of German naval warfare "with growing concern, distrust, and amazement."

The attitude of the United States government was expressed with studied precision:

"It assumes . . . that the Imperial (German) government accept, as of course, the rule that the lives of non-combatants, whether they be of neutral citizenship or citizens of one of the nations at war, cannot lawfully or rightfully be put in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unarmed merchantman, and recognize also, as all other nations do, the obligation to take the usual precaution of visit and search. . . ."

An opportunity was suggested for the German government to disavow the destruction of the *Lusitania* by the assumption of the American government expressed in the note that the German naval commanders in committing these acts of lawlessness did so under a misapprehension of their orders.

The note closed with the statement:

“The Imperial German government will not expect the government of the United States to omit any word or act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment.”

The reply of the German government on May 28th was merely an effort at evasion. Avoiding the cardinal points at issue the German government sought to establish its own conception of an adequate basis for discussion. It claimed that the American government was not properly informed as to the real character of the *Lusitania* and proceeded to enlighten it by declaring that the ill-fated steamship was in reality an auxiliary cruiser of the British navy, armed and manned by gunners, and that the British government had advised British merchantmen to destroy hostile submarines by ramming them. It was impossible, therefore, for German war craft to regard British merchantmen as undefended or to observe the customary prize regulations. It was claimed, furthermore, that the rapid sinking of the *Lusitania* was due to the explosion of the ammunition on board. The German government withheld its final decision awaiting the views of the United States government on the aspects of the case as thus presented. The note contained no reference to reparation or guarantees for the future.

The British ambassador at Washington as well as the port officials at New York denied that the *Lusitania* was armed.

A second American note, June 9th, reiterated the principles expressed in the first, demanding a disavowal by the German government of the destruction of the *Lusitania* together with the undertaking that attacks on unresisting non-combatants should cease.

The note intimated that the German government's statements about the *Lusitania* were an implication of remissness on the part of the American government, since, if they had been true, it would have been the duty of the American authorities to deny the vessel clearance papers at New York.

"But the sinking of passenger ships," the note asserted, "involves principles of humanity which throw into the background any special circumstances of detail that may be thought to affect the cases; principles which lift it, as the Imperial German government will no doubt be quick to recognize and acknowledge, out of the class of ordinary subjects of diplomatic discussion or of international controversy. Whatever be the other facts regarding the *Lusitania*, the principal fact is that a great steamer, primarily and chiefly used for the conveyance of passengers, and carrying more than a thousand souls who had no part or lot in the conduct of the war, was torpedoed and sunk without as much as a challenge or a warning, and that men, women, and children were sent to their death in circumstances unparalleled in modern warfare. The fact that more than a hundred American citizens were among those who perished made it the duty of the government of the United States to speak of these things and once more, with solemn emphasis, to call the attention of the Imperial German government to the grave responsibility which the government of the United States conceives that it has incurred in this tragic occurrence, and to the indisputable principle upon which that responsibility rests."

“The government of the United States is contending for something much greater than the mere rights of property or privileges of commerce. It is contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity, which every government honors itself in respecting and which no government is justified in resigning on behalf of those under its care and authority. Only her actual resistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so for the purpose of visit could have afforded the commander of the submarine any justification for so much as putting the lives of those on board the ship in jeopardy.”

Rather than sign this note, which had been drawn up by the president, Mr. Bryan resigned as Secretary of State the day before it was sent. He disagreed with the president as to the tone to be adopted towards Germany, maintaining in particular that the pending question should be settled by an international commission and that Americans should be warned against travelling on the ships of belligerents or on those carrying munitions.

Again on July 8th the German government sent an evasive reply, containing chiefly an indictment of Great Britain for obliterating all distinction between merchantmen and war vessels.

In spite of the clearness of the American demands, the negotiations thus far had reached no tangible results. A feeling of uneasiness and dissatisfaction pervaded the country. The dilatory methods of the German government, its attempts to confuse the real issue, called for a more peremptory tone. Berlin was informed on July 21st that its reply had been unsatisfactory. In particular the United States deprecated the deflection of the discussion to the conduct of third parties:

“The Imperial German government will readily understand that the government of the United States cannot

discuss the policy of the government of Great Britain with regard to neutral trade except with that government itself, and that it must regard the conduct of other belligerent governments as irrelevant to any discussion with the Imperial German government of what this government regards as a grave and unjustifiable violation of the rights of American citizens by German naval commanders."

In restating its demands the American government declared that friendship itself prompted "it to say to the Imperial government that a repetition by the commanders of the German naval vessels of acts in contravention of these rights must be regarded by the government of the United States, when they affect American citizens, as being deliberately unfriendly."

But before Germany had replied, an event occurred which seemed to be a wilful defiance of the United States. The White Star steamship *Arabic*, leaving Liverpool on August 18th, was torpedoed the next morning close to the scene of the *Lusitania* disaster and sank in eleven minutes with two Americans among the victims.

In reality, this sudden aggravation brought the German government face to face with the danger of a break and the necessity of some conciliatory steps and was followed by a gradual alleviation of the situation. Ambassador von Bernstorff asked for a suspension of judgment until exact information could be obtained and on September 1st handed Mr. Lansing, who had succeeded Mr. Bryan as American Secretary of State, a memorandum to the effect that German submarines would in future not sink liners without warning or without ensuring the safety of non-combatants, unless the liners tried to escape or offered resistance.

On the 7th the German Foreign Office submitted a memorandum to Ambassador Gerard stating that the submarine commander who torpedoed the *Arabic* acted under

a conviction, based on the course of the steamship, that the latter intended to ram him, but declining to acknowledge any obligation to grant indemnity, even in case the commander of the submarine were mistaken.

The German government took a final step on October 5th when Count von Bernstorff delivered a note with the statement that the orders issued to the commanders of German submarines had been made so stringent that the recurrence of incidents similar to the *Arabic* case was considered out of the question and that the Imperial government regretted and disavowed the attack on the *Arabic* and was prepared to pay indemnity for the American lives lost.

It was announced on January 10, 1916, that Count von Bernstorff was sending to the German Foreign Office for its approval a tentative agreement on the *Lusitania* case, by which Germany offered indemnity but neither disavowed the sinking nor admitted its illegality. This was naturally unsatisfactory to the United States.

The resignation, at the beginning of March, of Grand-admiral von Tirpitz, who was so closely identified with the submarine campaign, although welcomed as a victory for the moderate element in the German government, was followed on March 24th by the submarine attack on the unarmed French channel steamer *Sussex*, plying between Folkestone and Dieppe, in flagrant violation of the promises made to the United States. Three Americans were injured and the whole submarine question was brought back to an acute stage.

The German government tried to gain time by casting doubt on the cause of the disaster. But after trustworthy investigation had removed all doubt as to the main facts and the culpability of a German submarine, Secretary Lansing directed a note to Germany on April 18, 1916, with the following statement:

“If the Imperial (German) government should not now, without delay, proclaim and make effective renunciation of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and cargo ships, the United States government can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German government altogether.”

In an address to Congress the next day President Wilson renewed his denunciation of submarine warfare, declaring that it could not “be carried on without the most palpable violation of the dictates alike of right and humanity,” and that the “use of the submarine for the destruction of the enemy’s commerce is incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals and the sacred immunities of non-combatants.” He regarded it as his duty to inform Germany that unless the Imperial German government should immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of warfare against passenger and freight vessels, the government could have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the government of the German Empire altogether.”

The German reply to Secretary Lansing’s note, on May 4th, marks a distinct though transient stage in the course of the submarine controversy. The German government affirmed that submarine operations involving neutral vessels had been regularly conducted in accordance with the rules of international law, in spite of accidental exceptions, and protested its willingness to return entirely to the principles recognized before the war, provided their opponents would do the same. Although the German people were under the impression that the government of the United States, while demanding that Germany, who was struggling for existence, should restrain the use of her effective weapon, confined itself to protests against the illegal methods employed by Germany’s enemies, the German government,

wishing to prevent the submarine question from threatening peaceful relations between the two countries, made the further concession in the following terms:

“The German government, guided by this idea, notifies the government of the United States that the German naval forces receive the following orders for submarine warfare in accordance with the general principles of visit, search, and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by International Law. Such vessels, both within and without the area declared as a naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless the ship attempts to escape or offer resistance.” The note expressed the hope that the two governments might now cooperate in efforts to restore the freedom of the seas during the war as suggested in the American note presented on July 23, 1915, and the confident expectation of the German government that the United States would now demand that the British government forthwith observe the rules of International Law universally recognized before the war. It added, however, that in case the steps taken by the government of the United States did not attain the desired object, the German government would be “facing a new situation in which it must reserve for itself complete liberty of decision.”

In its reply on the 28th, the United States government expressed its satisfaction at Germany's abandonment of the submarine policy which had menaced the good relations of the two countries; and to preclude any inference that the United States might admit a limiting condition in Germany's adhesion, the following was added:

“The government of the United States feels it necessary to state that it takes it for granted that Germany does not intend to imply that the maintenance of the newly-announced policy is in any way contingent upon the course

or result of diplomatic negotiations between the government of the United States and any other belligerent government, notwithstanding the fact that certain passages in the Imperial government's note of the 4th inst. might appear to be susceptible of that construction.

"In order, however, to avoid any misunderstanding, the government of the United States notifies the Imperial government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, the suggestion that respect by the German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way, or in the slightest degree, be made contingent upon the conduct of any other government as affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. The responsibility in such cases is single, not joint; absolute, not relative."

Great interest was aroused in the summer of 1916 by the first crossing of the Atlantic by a submarine, effected by the German cargo-carrier submarine *Deutschland*. The accomplishment of the return voyage by the arrival of this vessel at Bremen with a cargo of rubber and metal on August 23d was celebrated throughout Germany as the defeat of the British blockade. The same craft made a second voyage in the autumn. Still more sensational was the appearance of the German naval submarine *U-53* at Newport, Rhode Island, October 7, 1916. Departing after a few hours, she sank one Dutch, one Norwegian, and three British vessels the next day off Nantucket, terrorizing shipping along the Atlantic seaboard of the United States.

This performance was doubtless intended as a demonstration for the benefit of the American government and soon there were indications of an increasing agitation in Germany for unrestricted submarine operations, in spite of the attitude which the United States had taken. Even von

Bethmann-Hollweg declared before the Reichstag on September 28, 1916:

“A German statesman who would hesitate to use against Britain every available instrument of battle that would really shorten the war should be hanged.”

From the general course of events and information received through various channels it became evident to President Wilson and his advisers towards the end of the year that unless the Central Powers could obtain immediate peace by negotiation, they would adopt the most desperate means for wresting the victory and resume unrestricted submarine warfare, and that a crisis impended which might influence decisively the policy of the United States. Wishing, therefore, to obtain a definite basis for eventual decisions of the greatest importance, the president despatched on December 18th an identic note to the governments of the different warring nations, requesting them to state more definitely than had yet been stated the terms upon which they would consent to make peace.

The Central Powers returned an evasive answer, merely offering, with an assumed air of magnanimity and forbearance, to meet their antagonists in conference for discussing the basis of peace. The powers of the Entente expressed themselves in general terms, yet much more definitely, describing the nature of the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation, which they regarded as indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement.

On January 22, 1917, President Wilson delivered before the Senate an address which may well become a historical document of transcendent importance, in which he revealed his lofty aspirations for a concert of the powers to guarantee justice and peace throughout the world. This he regarded as an enterprise in which it would be the duty of the United States to take part, and therefore he felt that the government

believe that any person about to violate, any regulation or law promulgated by the President, or any criminal law of the United States, or of the States, or any ordinance thereof, will be subject to summary arrest by the United States Marshal, or his deputy, or such other officer as the President may designate, and to confinement in such public or military prison, jail, military camp, or other place of detention as may be directed by the President.

This proclamation and the regulations herein contained shall extend and apply to all land and water, continental or insular, in any way within the jurisdiction of the United States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington,  
this *Sixth* day of April,  
in the year of our Lord one  
thousand nine hundred and  
seventeen, and of the inde-  
pendence of the United States  
the one hundred and forty-  
first.

*Woodrow Wilson*

By the President

*Thomas L. Lansing*  
Secretary of State.

War Proclamation of the United States. The formal declaration of war with Germany, bearing the seal of the United States and signed by President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing.



ought "to formulate the conditions upon which it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a League for Peace." The conditions were substantially as follows:

The terms upon which the world war would be concluded must be such as to create a peace worth guaranteeing and preserving by means of the proposed universal league and covenant.

Such a peace must be "a peace without victory," not "a peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished," which "would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which the terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand."

The peace must rest on a basis of equality and a common participation in a common benefit. It must rest on an equality between all nations, large and small, powerful and weak. It must recognize "the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property." The necessity for establishing a united, independent, and autonomous Poland was cited as a self-evident illustration of this principle.

As far as practical, every great people should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea, and where this cannot be obtained by cession of territory, it should be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way.

"The freedom of the seas," he declared, "is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, and coöperation."

There should be a systematic limitation of naval and military armaments and of all programmes of military preparation.

He believed that in voicing these aspirations he was speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and that the participation of the United States in a league of nations guaranteeing peace upon such terms would be a natural consummation of this country's policies, the fulfilment of all that the American people had professed or striven for.

"These," he said, "are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail."

On January 31st Count Bernstorff presented a note of the German government to the Secretary of State withdrawing the German pledge of May 4, 1916, and announcing Germany's purpose of intensifying and rendering more ruthless the operations of its submarines at sea in the manner against which the government of the United States had protested from the first. The indignation created by this virtual challenge was aggravated by the shamelessly perfidious attitude revealed in the German Chancellor's statement before the Reichstag that only lack of sufficient submarines had prevented the earlier adoption of this ruthless policy. Germany had apparently maneuvered to hold the United States aloof by delusive promises until she was confident that the extent of her equipment in these stealthy engines of destruction would enable her to sweep the seas and defy still another great power with impunity.

The relations between the two governments had now reached an abrupt and unavoidable conflict in which further diplomatic communication was useless. Accordingly, the German Ambassador in Washington received his passports on February 3d and on the same day the

president, addressing a joint session of the two Houses of Congress, announced the complete severance of relations with Germany, saying that, in view of the new situation, he had felt it necessary to take the steps which he had threatened in such circumstances, although the act was not equivalent to war.

“We are sincere friends of the German people,” he declared, “and earnestly desire to remain at peace with the government which speaks for them. . . .

“But if American ships and American lives should in fact be sacrificed by their naval commanders, in heedless contravention of the just and reasonable understandings of international law and the obvious dictates of humanity, I shall take the liberty of coming again before Congress to ask that authority be given to me to use any means that may be necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful, legitimate errands on the high seas.”

In spite of the president's solemn warning and its endorsement by the Senate, the German government conducted the negotiations opened through the Swiss Legation in Washington in a characteristically temporizing spirit, persistently avoiding the main issue. On February 26th the president again addressed Congress, pointing out that Germany had practically placed an embargo on American shipping and asking authority to arm American merchant vessels for defense. This proposal was accepted by a vote of 403 to 13 in the House of Representatives, but its passage was obstructed by a group of pacifists in the Senate, until the session of Congress ended automatically on March 4th. However, an executive order for placing armed guards on American merchant ships was issued on March 12th.

In the meantime, the *Laconia* had been sunk with the loss of eight Americans on February 26th. A sensation

was created by the publication on March 1st of an intercepted despatch of January 19th from Herr Zimmermann, the German Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to the German Minister in Mexico, instructing the latter, in view of the intended repudiation of the *Sussex* pledge, to propose an alliance to the Mexican government, in the event of war between Germany and the United States, offering the restitution of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona to Mexico as a reward for the latter's coöperation, and at the same time suggesting that efforts might be made to bring Japan into partnership with Mexico and Germany against the United States.

President Wilson had declared that only actual overt acts would convince him of Germany's hostile purpose. These now came in quick succession. The *Vigilancia* was sunk with the loss of five Americans on March 16th; the destruction of the *City of Memphis* and of the *Illinois* followed the next day; the loss of the *Healdton* on the 21st involved seven American lives; and that of the *Aztec* on April 1st, twenty-eight.

The American people realized at last the inevitable necessity for war. They awoke from the cherished dream of isolation in a world where human ingenuity had conquered space. The self-imposed reserve of neutrality was swept aside and national feeling revelled in the new-born consciousness of identity of interest and purpose with the free peoples of Western Europe.

In the words of the official statement: "Judging the German government now in the light of our own experience through the long and patient years of our honest attempt to keep the peace, we could see the Great Autocracy and read her record throughout the war. And we found that record damnable. Beginning long before the war in Prussian opposition to every effort that was made by other nations and



General Pershing and Marshal Joffre, in Paris.



A 14-inch shell weighing 1,070 pounds and the propelling charge of 325 pounds of smokeless powder in bags.



our own to do away with warfare, the story of the Autocracy has been one of vast preparations for war combined with an attitude of arrogant intolerance toward all other points of view, all other systems of government, all other hopes and dreams of men. With a fanatical faith in the destiny of German kultur as the system that must rule the world, the Imperial government's actions have through years of boasting, double dealing, and deceit tended toward aggression upon the rights of others. And if there still be any doubt as to which nation began this war, there can be no uncertainty as to which one was most prepared, most exultant at the chance, and ready instantly to march upon other nations—even those who had given no offense. The wholesale depredations and hideous atrocities in Belgium and in Serbia were doubtless part and parcel with the Imperial government's purpose to terrorize small nations into abject submission for generations to come. But in this the Autocracy has been blind. For its record in those countries, and in Poland and in northern France, has given not only to the Allies but to liberal peoples throughout the world the conviction that this menace to human liberties everywhere must be utterly shorn of its power to harm."

The president addressed the memorable joint session of Congress on April 2d. He declared that he had been disappointed in his hope that a state of armed neutrality would suffice for the defense of American rights against lawless violence at sea. Germany denied the right of neutrals to use arms in their own defense within the proscribed areas of the sea and might very likely treat armed guards on American merchant ships as pirates. Thus the United States had to choose between war and submission. With full appreciation of the gravity of the step he advised that Congress declare "the recent course of the Imperial German

government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense, but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the government of the German Empire to terms and end the war."

This, he explained, would involve the utmost coöperation with the governments then at war with Germany, the extension to them of the most liberal financial credits, the organization and mobilization of all the material resources of the country, the immediate full equipment of the navy, the immediate addition to the armed forces of the United States of at least 500,000 men with additional increments of equal force as soon as needed and as they could be handled in training.

The president declared that he still had the same things in mind as when he addressed the Senate on January 22d, "to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power, and to set up among the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth insure the observance of those principles." The world had reached "the beginning of an age in which it will be insisted that the same standards of conduct and of responsibility for wrong done shall be observed among nations and their governments that are observed among the individual citizens of civilized states."

The United States had no quarrel with the German people, as the war had not been launched with their approval, but "was determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked

and waged in the interests of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow-men as pawns and tools."

"A steadfast concert for peace," he declared, "can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would, and render account to no one, would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own."

"One of the things," he continued, "that have served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not and could never be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce."

The United States was now about to accept gage of battle with the natural foe to liberty and was ready, if necessary, to spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and power.

"We are glad," said the president, "now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretence about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privileges of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political

liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them."

The president explained that the Austro-Hungarian government had avowed its unqualified acceptance of the lawless submarine warfare of the German government, so that it was impossible for the American government to receive Count Tarnowsky, the ambassador recently accredited by Austria-Hungary to the United States. But as Austria-Hungary had not actually engaged in warfare on the seas against citizens of the United States, the question of American relations with it was for the time postponed.

The address closed with the following words:

"It is a fearful thing to lead this great, peaceful people into war, into the most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance. But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts,—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other."

In vain Senator Stone, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and a small group of German sympathizers or convinced pacifists opposed the presidential policy. A resolution declaring that a state of war existed with Germany passed the Senate on April 4th by a vote of 82 to 6. Discussion in the House of Representatives brought out the instinctive repugnance of a comparatively small minority to a course that violated their deep-seated prepossessions. But obsolete and superficial arguments were of no avail against the overwhelming tide of Destiny.

In the early hours of April 6th the House of Representatives by a vote of 373 to 50 passed the joint resolution already adopted by the Senate:

“Whereas the Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and people of the United States of America: Therefore be it

“Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.” On the afternoon of the same day the president signed the resolution and issued a proclamation that a state of war existed between the United States and Germany. Austria-Hungary and Turkey severed diplomatic relations with the United States on April 9th and 21st respectively.

Practically nothing had been done since the severance of relations with Germany to put the resources of the country on a warlike basis. But the immediate inauguration of mammoth warlike preparations after the declaration of hostilities quickly dispelled the notion that the United States might confine itself to a limited liability participation in the struggle. Congress was confronted by an enormous task of special legislation. The most important measure was the bill "to increase temporarily the military establishment of the United States" by compulsory service, commonly called the Selective Draft Bill.

At the beginning of April, 1917, the Regular Army of the United States contained 5,960 officers and 127,151 enlisted men, and the strength of the National Guard, or militia, was 174,008. The purpose of the Selective Draft Bill was to authorize the president to increase the Regular Army and the National Guard to their maximum war strength of 293,000 and 400,000 respectively, by voluntary enlistment, if possible, and to create in succession by selective draft two forces, each of 500,000 men, later called the National Army. All male citizens and intended citizens between the ages of twenty-one and thirty inclusive were to be made subject to draft and to be required to register for eventual enlistment. This drastic measure was adopted by both Houses of Congress on April 28th and the president officially proclaimed the registration on May 18th.

The registration, which took place on June 5th, resulted in a total enrollment of 9,586,508 names. For enlistment purposes the country was divided into 4,557 districts and in each an exemption board was created for the examination and exemption, discharge, or acceptance for military service of the persons summoned. It was found necessary to add 187,000 to the quota of the first levy under the selective draft to supplement the voluntary enlistments

in the National Guard, making the total number called 687,000. The quota to be levied from each state and territory and from the District of Columbia was determined in proportion to the population. Numbers were drawn at Washington on July 20th to establish the order in which individuals would be summoned before the local boards by their serial numbers in the different districts.

It was decided to call for examination, in the order of the numbers thus established, twice the actual number of men at that time required for service, in other words, a total of 1,374,000, so as to make sure of obtaining the necessary number of available recruits.

According to the general plan of organization, the Regulars, with the National Guard, formed sixteen divisions, while the National Army made up another series of sixteen divisions. The construction of sixteen huge cantonments or concentration camps for the eventual training of the divisions of the National Army was undertaken with the utmost expedition. Each cantonment was a complete town with streets, waterworks, sewerage system, and lighting plant. The National Guard, taken into the federal service on August 5th, was concentrated in sixteen training camps, which were subsequently transformed into regulation cantonments by the erection of wooden barracks.

A training course for providing officers of the National Army started May 15th in sixteen camps corresponding with the sixteen territorial divisions of the new force and closed August 15th, when 27,341 candidates received commissions.

For the present we can only foreshadow the remarkable development in the organization of the technical staff of the army by observing that during the first year of the war the Army Ordnance Department grew from ninety-seven to about 5,000 officers.

Complete aviation training was instituted at once in the United States. It was believed that, while this country should make an enormous effort in this arm, the most effective service could be rendered by turning out as soon as possible a vast number of machines of a standard type.

Meanwhile, at the request of the Allies, the government decided to send a preliminary expeditionary force abroad as soon as possible, and Major-general John J. Pershing was selected as its leader. The first commander to lead American troops on European battlefields had graduated from West Point and entered the Regular Army as second lieutenant of cavalry in 1886. His first experience in the field was gained in Indian warfare. After service during the Spanish War in Cuba he was sent to the Philippines, becoming captain in the Regular Army in 1901. As a reward for unusual valor in warfare against the Moros, President Roosevelt promoted him over 862 senior officers to the rank of brigadier-general in 1906. After the final subjection of the Moros, General Pershing returned to the United States in 1913 and received the command of the 8th brigade of the Regular Army with headquarters at El Paso, Texas. He was entrusted with command of the punitive expedition into Mexico following the raiding of Columbus, New Mexico, by Villa, and, after performing this task to the entire satisfaction of the president, he succeeded Major-general Funston, upon the latter's death, as commander of all the forces on the Mexican border. From this post he was called to take charge of the American Expeditionary Force soon to embark for France.

Accompanied by his staff of fifty-three officers and 146 enlisted men, General Pershing landed in Liverpool from the White Star steamship *Baltic* on June 8th and was received in England with every mark of honor. After a few days spent in conference with the military and civilian





American troops in London passing in review before King George. *With the king are Queen Mary and Field-marshal Lord French.*



American troops after landing in France.

chiefs in London, he proceeded to France on the 13th, where a stirring reception awaited him in Paris. A group of distinguished statesmen and officers, including Marshal Joffre, M. Viviani, M. Painlevé, Minister of War, and Generals Foch and Dubail, escorted him from the Gare du Nord to his temporary headquarters at the Hôtel de Crillon, fronting the Place de la Concorde. Next morning General Pershing paid a solemn visit to the tomb of the Great Napoleon at the Invalides and was escorted later with military honors to the Elysée Palace, where the President and Madame Poincaré gave a state luncheon in his honor.

General Pershing's program of official courtesies ended on the afternoon of the 15th with a visit to the last resting place of the Marquis de Lafayette. Accompanied by a group of staff officers he was received at the Picpus Cemetery by the Marquis and the Count de Chambrun, descendants of Lafayette, who led him to the tomb. Replying briefly to the greeting of the Marquis, General Pershing expressed the great pleasure of every American in visiting the tomb of one who had done so much for the United States to pay a tribute of devotion sealing the friendship of the two countries. The officers stood at salute while the wreath brought by General Pershing was laid upon the tomb. The words, "Lafayette, we are here!" express the fervent satisfaction of a grateful people.

The first contingent of the American Expeditionary Forces transported overseas consisted of an army division, nine engineer regiments, and a force of the marine corps. Their departure was veiled in secrecy and the first public intimation of their movement was news that the transports had been reported at a French port, June 26, 1917. After debarkation the troops were immediately conveyed to the base camps which had been selected for their intensive training in the latest methods of warfare.

The United States was now committed by fact as well as formal resolution to its first great military enterprise abroad. Americans felt that the Russian revolution and the overthrow of the Tsar's government with its proverbial tyranny and abuses had happened providentially to clear the higher issues of the war and remove the final barrier to a full and hearty comradeship in aim and sentiment with the Allies. Now, with the passing of American uncertainty, constraint, and perplexity, the soul of the nation responded to the joyous conviction that the United States had taken its stand in the great conflict for the defense of liberty and righteousness and all the noblest ideals, beside the nations who had been the torchbearers of civilization throughout the centuries, whose venerable past had become the common treasure of humanity.

With the effective intervention of the Great Republic of the West, the struggle entered its supreme stage. To the Allies, who, through the months of gloom, had clung with heroic fortitude to their faith in ultimate victory, this was like the first radiance of dawn, piercing the night and heralding the glorious break of day. By slow and toilsome effort they had prepared and strengthened their resources. Perilous situations, terrible trials still lay before them. But all the eventual elements of success were now at hand, thanks partly to the madness of the enemy. By intricate and mysterious processes, Destiny had elaborated the combination which would finally produce the victory of right and the Triumph of Democracy.

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